... the Aristotelian concept of essence (which Thomas inherits) ... — Relativist

The term essence (essentia) was a Latin invention used to translate Aristotle's Greek ousia. Cicero is credited with inventing the term, from the Latin esse, to be. It means "what it is to be". To complicate matters, ousia is often translated as 'substance', a term whose meaning is not co-extensive with ousia. Ousia refers to some particular being, Socrates or Plato.

The guiding question of Aristotle's Metaphysics is the question of 'being qua being", that is, what it is for something to be the thing that it is. What is it, for example, that distinguishes man from other beings. And, what it is distinguishes Socrates from other men. The puzzle is laid out in Plato's Phaedo. Each attempted solution proves to be problematic.

Those who desire answers and assurances will take part to be the whole. In the Phaedo in the double sense of the soul not as a part but as the whole and the stories and not the arguments as the whole. In re Aristotle's Metaphysics, the problem of prime movers is taken to be not the problem but the answer.

The Tractatus mentions three kinds of concepts: formal concept, concept proper and pseudo-concept. — RussellA

Formal concepts are pseudo-concepts.

Objects are pseudo concepts because they exist in the world and make up the substance of the world. — RussellA

'Object' is a pseudo-concept because it says nothing about what is the case, not because it makes up the substance of the world.

The number 3 is a sign that signifies a number. Numbers are formal concepts. Therefore, the number 3 is a sign that signifies a formal concept — RussellA

'3' signifies the value of the concept number. A particular number falls under the concept number in a way analogous to 'table' falling under the concept 'object'. That does not mean that 'table' is a pseudo-concept.

Mathematical equations are pseudo-proposiitons , but this does not mean the equation is a concept, either proper or formal. 1+1=2 is not concept, it is a calculation.

Mathematics is a logical method.
The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions.

(6.2)

What falls under a formal concept is not another formal concept.

When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign for this object. (A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for a number that it signifies a number, etc.)

(4.126)

The sign '3' signifies a number, not the concept 'number'. '3' falls under the formal concept number. If '3' was a formal concept then every number would be a formal concept. In that case we would have the formal concept 'number' and the formal concepts '1', '2', '3' .... and so on.

Every variable is the sign for a formal concept.
For every variable represents a constant form that all its values possess, and this can be regarded as a formal property of those values.

(4.1271)

'Number' is the constant form. 1, 100, and 1,000 are variables that have as a formal property this formal concept.

Why do you think that particular numbers, such as the number 1, are not formal concepts? — RussellA

See the statement I put in bold:

A formal concept is given immediately any object falling under it is given. It is not possible, therefore, to introduce as primitive ideas objects belonging to a formal concept and the formal concept itself. So it is impossible, for example, to introduce as primitive ideas both the concept of a function and specific functions, as Russell does; or the concept of a number and particular numbers.

(4.12721)

If I say: "There are a number of horses" that is expressed by the variable x. This does not tell us how many horses. If, however, I say: "There are three horses" then the number of horses is not expressed as the variable 'x', which could mean any number of horses, but as '3'.The logical structure of the proposition is the same, but in this case I am not talking about the formal concept 'number'.

See 4.12721. The concept of a number is a formal concept. Particular numbers are not. They fall under the concept of a number.

You're close, but this isn't quite right, I don't believe.

In the function: "T(x)", both "T()" and "x" show that to each corresponds a different formal concept. — 013zen

If, as Russell stipulates, x is a book, then there are no formal concepts in "T(x)". I don't know what () on the table means.

Wittgenstein is doing propositional analysis not coding.

This is to say, that there is a formal concept associated with it, but "x" is not itself a formal concept, nor does it name a formal concept — 013zen

The first part is correct. The second part needs clarification. Formal concepts are represented in conceptual notion by variables. (4.1272)

For example, if an apple was a logical object in logical space, it would have the necessary properties such as weight, colour and taste. — RussellA

.

The properties of objects in logical space are formal, internal, necessary properties. Weight, color and
taste are not necessary properties. 'Fact' is a formal concept. The facts in logical space are about the formal, logical structure of of the world. Facts in physical space are accidental, contingent. They are made possible by the necessary, logical structure of the world.

There are proper concepts such as "grass" and formal concepts such as the variable "x". — RussellA

'x' is not a formal concept. It is the name used to refer to the formal concept.

I'm suggesting that in the expression "grass is green" is true iff grass is green, objects such as grass are not referring to actual objects, which are divisible, but must be referring to logical objects, which can be indivisible, and are simples. — RussellA

The name "grass" as it occurs in a proposition refers to an actual complex object. I think what you are getting at is along the lines of what I said above:

As part of a propositional analysis apples and tables can function as simples. Whether they do does not depend on their being possible, but on whether further analysis is needed in order for the proposition to make sense, that is, to know what is the case if it is true. — Fooloso4

Book is not a formal concept.
— Fooloso4

I agree. The variable x is the formal concept, not the book. — RussellA

It is because a book is not a formal concept that Wittgenstein does not refer to it by a variable name. The variable is a name not a concept.

I agree that the expression "logical objects" may be read in two ways. It can be referring to either 1) objects that are logical or 2) logic can be an object. — RussellA

An unhappy apple is an illogical proposition not an illogical object. An apple on the table or inside the sun is not a combination of objects it is a relation of the objects apple and table (on) or apple and sun (in).

As concepts can be simples, the concept "grass" could be a simple, and as words such as "grass" logically picture an object such as grass existing in a logical space, this suggests that objects such as grass are also simples. — RussellA

I don't know if you are attempting to interpret the Tractatus or argue against it. He makes a distinction between proper concepts such as grass and formal concepts such as 'simple object'.

At 4.126 Wittgenstein introduces the term "formal concepts".
— Fooloso4

In the function T (x), where T is on a table, the function T (x) is true if the variable x satisfies the function T (x). For example, T (x) is true if the variable x is a book.

As I understand it, the variable x is what Wittgenstein is defining as a formal concept. — RussellA

Book is not a formal concept. In a proposition it does not have both the name 'book' and the variable name for a formal concept 'x'.

The answer to the title question is - yes ... and no.

If we wish to understand the thought processes of the Islamic State or the Taliban, we need only read the Old Testament. — alan1000

If we wish to understand how the Hebrew Bible ("Old Testament" is itself of a misconception) answers the question, we should look at the duel aspects of the tree of knowledge (good and bad) and God's blessings which are also curses (child birth, for example).

Here is an informative article from The New Statesman that overturns some common notions about Christianity. As to whether its influence has been good: on plus side the article sites the origin of the idea of equal dignity. On the negative, the destruction of Rome.

At 4.126 Wittgenstein introduces the term "formal concepts". He distinguishes formal concepts from concepts proper.‘Book’ is a proper concept. It makes sense to ask where the book is. The answer “on the table” makes sense. It does not make sense to ask where the object is or to get the answer “the object is on the object”. ‘Object’ and other formal concepts are “pseudo-concepts”.Other examples he gives are: ‘complex’,‘fact’, ‘function’, ‘number’. (4.1272)

Logical objects in logical space puts a limit on what is possible — RussellA

There are no ‘logical objects’ (4.441)

Objects such as apples and tables as logical objects are possible and therefore simples. — RussellA

As part of a propositional analysis apples and tables can function as simples. Whether they do does not depend on their being possible, but on whether further analysis is needed in order for the proposition to make sense, that is, to know what is the case if it is true. If the proposition is about seeds or legs then apples and tables are not simples, but if the proposition is "The apple is on the table" no further analysis might be necessary.

What conclusions were drawn from the evidence in the 2016 election? How much more reliable is the evidence today?

What do the statistics show about the health of someone Biden's age, who is fit and active, versus someone Trump's age who drives his ft ass around in a golf cart and shuns vegetables in favor of Big Macs?

Whether it does combine depends on whether or not the atomic fact obtains. — Sam26

Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact?

"...there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others (T. 2.0121)." — Sam26

I take him to be saying that combining with others is what it is to be an object, and that there is no object that cannot combine with any other object.

Trump’s candidacy is not official until the Nominating Convention in July in Milwaukee. — Wayfarer

The Republican National Committee has been taken over by Trump. Party Chairman Michael Whatley was picked by Trump. Trump's daughter-in-law, Lara Trump, will serve as the co-chair and was elected by unanimous vote.

If there has been nothing so far that has distanced the party from Trump I don't know what would. His trials are being treated as an asset. Us against everyone including the whole judicial system that they are claiming has treated him unfairly.

so a step back. — Sam26

Your step back is a step forward. We are in agreement.

... arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). — Sam26

As you go on to say, objects contain the possibility of arranging into facts, but as stated it might be taken to mean that something arranges them. Objects arrange themselves. Facts are the result of such arrangements.

Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ... — Sam26

What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them?

Unlike you, just because I have a philosopher in my name, doesn't mean I'm a blind adherent. — schopenhauer1

I am not a blind adherent of Wittgenstein's or anyone else. I disagree with much of what he says about philosophy in both his earlier and later works. I don't buy into his concept of objects, but I don't have to accept it as true in order to attempt to understand it. I like the interpretive challenge.

Who definitively knows this? — schopenhauer1

No one.

Why must it be an object and not a unified whole? — schopenhauer1

An object is a unified whole.

What he is saying is that in order for atomic facts be about something ... — schopenhauer1

A fact is what is the case, a state of affairs. "The book is on the shelf" is a fact. It is not about anything other than the book being on the shelf.

Where does he say that an atomic fact is about something?

Whether or not they are right about there being logically simple entities is another question entirely, — 013zen

I was going to say the same thing.

So there are metaphysical claims- objects, substance, states of affairs (arrangements of objects)

There are epistemological claims- facts, atomic facts, true and false propositions. — schopenhauer1

The problem is not that Wittgenstein muddles things, you do.

A state of affairs is a fact.

without the reader doing the heavy-lifting — schopenhauer1

Given that the stated goal of the text is to draw the limits of thought or its expression in language, the need to think in order to understand the text is in service of that goal.

as Banno pointed out, his major point is right at the top:
The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
— 1.1 — schopenhauer1

The facts are contingent. Objects are necessary. Facts are changeable. Objects are unchangeable. Wittgenstein's concern is not with the facts of the world but with what underlies both the possibility of facts and the possibility of propositions. With what underlies and connects them.

That is to say, Wittgenstein is using circular reasoning, and "double-dipping" his idea of logical structure (picture) in covertly hiding his idea of atomic facts in the idea of objects. — schopenhauer1

Logical structure underlies both the facts of the world and propositions. Atomic facts are objects in configuration. And this is what you go on to say.

"Objects being arranged" allows for ----> States of Affairs. — schopenhauer1

Objects are not being arranged. They arrange themselves.

Is it "States of Affairs" of the World, or is it Atomic Facts of the World? — schopenhauer1

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

(2)

One is a "realism" whereby the world exists independently of facts, and the other is an idealism of sorts whereby the world is simply the logical coherence of the world. — schopenhauer1

Both are wrong. No facts no world. Logic deals with possibilities and necessities.

That is to say, objects are given short-shrift. — schopenhauer1

To the contrary:

Objects contain the possibility of all situations.

(2.014)

To me it's just a place holder for "go pound sand and don't look behind the curtain cause I just want to move forward with my argument and not go further into those pesky philosophical metaphysical things". — schopenhauer1

Metaphysics deals with the arche, the source or origin of things and what is first or primary. His view, like all others, is speculative. It takes as its principles the existence of simples as primary. These objects have within themselves the ability to combine to form more complex objects and states of affairs. The order of the universe is thus bottom up.

He doesn't define them other than they exist and facts are about them. — schopenhauer1

He says:

Objects make up the substance of the world.

(2.021)

Objects are just what constitute the unalterable form of the world.

(2.023)

A definition occurs within a proposition. Elementary propositions consist of names. (4.22) A name means an object. (3.203) We cannot use a proposition to define a name because the proposition is a nexus, a concatenation, of names. (4.22) We cannot then define an object beyond defining its role as the substance of facts. As the substance of the world.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein was trying to avoid a pure Coherentism, where one proposition gets its meaning from another proposition etc, by ultimately founding propositions on states of affairs that exist in a world outside these propositions. — RussellA

It is the substance of the world not the facts in the world that prevents this:

If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.

(2.0211)

4.122 is saying that propositions cannot describe properties and relations, but can only show them. This is the difference between what is said and what is shown. — RussellA

Your claim was that about his removal of relations and properties from his ontology. If ontology is about what exists, and properties and relations are shown, then even if they cannot be described they exist.

The Tractatus is not about universal concepts describing a world, but about particular propositions (which are particular thoughts) showing particular states of affairs. — RussellA

The first part is true. The second part is false.

A picture is a model of reality.

(2.12)

He is not interested in the particular state of affairs that are modeled, but the possibility that is can be modeled.

The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

(2.15)

Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as
the elements of the picture.

(2.151)

Facts set out the configuration of objects. — Banno

They do not. You have got it backwards. The objects are self-determining. The facts are the result of their combining as they do.

There is nothing much that can be said about objects per se; — Banno

He says quite a few things about them:

Objects make up the substance of the world. (2.021)
— Fooloso4

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it.

(2.022)

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.

(2.023)

The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

(2.024)

It is form and content.

(2.025)

There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form.

(2.026)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.

(2.027)

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.

(2.0271)

It has also to be understood that the Argument for Substance is rejected in PI. — Banno

You might think it gives you reason to dismiss it without understanding it, that is on you. There is to this day plenty of attention being paid to the Tractatus and the problem of objects.

Objects make up the substance of the world.

Do you agree? If so what do you think this means?

Objects are necessary. Facts are contingent.

Do you agree? If so what do you think this means?

His definition is like one in computer programming it seems — schopenhauer1

It is not. An object is not a logical marker or a name.

As I mentioned in a prior post:

Logic as the term is used in the Tractatus, is not primarily a human activity. Logic is not propositional. Propositions are logical. Logic deals with what is necessary rather than contingent. — Fooloso4

You mine [might?] as well just start with atomic facts.. — schopenhauer1

Facts are contingent. It is not necessary that these elementary facts and not others exist. Objects are the answer to your question "whence facts"

Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world. Logic is transcendental.

(6.13)

Logic is transcendental in the Kantian sense of a condition for the possibility of a world. A world is made possible by the formal properties and relations of its objects and the structural properties and relations of facts. (4.122) Objects have within them the possibility of combining into states of affairs. ( 2.0121) Logic is a mirror image of the world in that their structure is the same, but it is the reverse in that logic determines only what is possible, and the world determines which of those possibilities is actually the case.

The facts in logical space are the world.

(1.13)

Logical space is the space of what is possible and impossible. The facts of the world are a subset of what is possible.

Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.

If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from
the possibility of such combinations.

(2.0121)

The formal or internal property of an object is the possibility of combining with other objects.

In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.

(2.012)

With regard to their possibilities both a ‘thing’ and an ‘object’ have them as part of their logical properties. What this means for things in the world is that what is possible and impossible is fixed and determined. States of affairs are independent of each other (2.061). They do not determine what is necessary or possible. What is possible is determined by things themselves, whether they be simple objects or complex. To say what is possible and impossible, however, cannot be determined unless objects are known, and to know them requires being able to identify them.

However, one feature of the Tractatus is Wittgenstein's removal of relations and properties from his ontology. — RussellA

He doesn't.

In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and states of affairs, or, in the case of facts, about structural properties: and in the same sense about formal relations and structural relations.
(Instead of ‘structural property’ I also say ‘internal property’; instead of ‘structural relation’, ‘internal relation’.
I introduce these expressions in order to indicate the source of the confusion between
internal relations and relations proper (external relations), which is very widespread among philosophers.)
It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects.

For the Tractatus, objects combine as particulars not as universals. — RussellA

Do objects count as particulars? If a particular is something that can only exist in one place at one time then objects are not particulars. Every object in the world is composed of simple objects. These simple objects are in this sense universal. They exist independently of whether or not they are instantiated.

There are, however, problems with classifying them as universals too. I think it best to not try and shoehorn them into on or the other of these problematic categories.

Objects are necessarily linked to atomic facts, as atomic facts are about the objects in the world and their possibilities. — schopenhauer1

Simple or elementary objects, which are what this thread is about, are not objects in the world.

That is to say, if Wittgenstein forfeits defining what objects are beyond vague notions, then the tower of babel is simply axiomatic and self-referential and points to nothing. — schopenhauer1

I included a link to this thread thinking you might read it before posting.

See this discussion.

It is clearly the case that from the outward form of clothing we can infer the form of the body beneath it. — RussellA

If we must infer what the form is then it is hidden by the clothing. Some people wear baggy clothing to hide what is underneath. What they think there might be too much of or too little of.

It is also clearly the case that from the outward form of language we can infer the form of the thought beneath it, otherwise language would be meaningless. — RussellA

And yet, the meaning is often not understood. Your reading of Wittgenstein is a case in point. If we must infer what is meant then it is not evident from the outward form.

What use would language be if when someone said "please pass the sugar", no-one knew the thought behind these words. — RussellA

It does not follow from one example where the meaning is evident that it is in all cases. You have been reading philosophy long enough to know that not all sentences are transparent. But even in this case there is room for misunderstanding (and I don't mean there is a room somewhere where misunderstanding can be found). If in response to the request to pass the sugar someone says "Go long" (a term from American football) they did not get the meaning.

From the outward form of language we clearly do know the form of thought beneath it. — RussellA

The form of thought is not beneath the form of language. Are poetry and prose the same form of language?

Wittgenstein in the Tractatus does away with universals in favour of particulars, — RussellA

Objects are particulars. A universal property of objects is to combine with other objects.

There is another faction, those more aligned with the Claremont Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and Hillsdale College. They certainly are not uneducated. They are the "elites" that they and others love to blame.

They are not the MAGA faithful but, at least for now, back him and the plan to consolidate executive power. Whereas Trump and the Trumpsters are focused on him, they have their sights set on long term goals. Win or lose, when Trump is gone, they remain.

4.002 may be correct that language disguises thought, but is not inconsistent with the idea that language is thought. — RussellA

As he says in the preface, language is the expression of thought. At 4.002 he says:

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.

(Emphasis added.)

From the outward form, how the thought is expressed, we do not see the logical form that underlies it.

As I understand it, for the Tractatus:

The world is a logical space in which can only exist logical objects in logical configurations. — RussellA

See, for example:

Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.

(2.0121)

Perhaps you have in mind:

The facts in logical space are the world.

(1.13)

I will be saying more about logic space and the possibility of objects combining with others.

I am glad you took my remarks in the spirit in which they were intended. Of course, down the road I might see the need to revise my views. It would not be the first time! I think that anyone who thinks he has got it all right has got it wrong

How we are to understand "form" and "content" exactly, however, is still somewhat unclear, but I think you're on the right track by tying it to logic. — 013zen

Substance is logical form. The form of reality. (2.18) Objects are its content. (2.023)

This might make more sense in my next post.

That is a pivotal matter in the question of how much this work presents an epistemology or not. — Paine

Good point. Objects are not treated as things to be known. To the extent there is knowledge of the world it comes from science not logic.

I don't know if anyone has mentioned this, but the idea bears resemblance to the classical conception of substance (ouisia). — Wayfarer

Which classical conception? Certainly not Aristotle,

The term ‘substance’ has a long and varied history. For this reason, none of them will serve as a reliable starting point for determining what Wittgenstein means by the term. — Fooloso4

Objects make up the substance of the world. (2.021)

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it. (2.022)

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form. (2.023)

The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case. (2.024)

It is form and content. (2.025)

There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. (2.026)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same. (2.027)

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable. (2.0271)

This is as close as we get to a sustained discussion of objects. The term ‘substance’ has a long and varied history. For this reason, none of them will serve as a reliable starting point for determining what Wittgenstein means by the term.

Every world, real or imagined, must have a logical form in common. However different and changeable they are, their shared logical form subsists. This form consists of unchangeable objects. Their configuration is what is changeable. That substance is form and content means that it is logical and consists of unchangeable objects.

Added: Before moving forward I would like to clarify a potential source of confusion.Logic as the term is used in the Tractatus, is not primarily a human activity. Logic is not propositional. Propositions are logical. Logic deals with what is necessary rather than contingent.

He complicates this by using the term 'object' in both cases without always making the distinction clear.
— Fooloso4

I don't think that this is necessarily a bug, as much as a feature. Part of the work seems to be dealing with the idea that the meaning of a word or proposition is dependent upon how its being used. — 013zen

The word 'object' refer to the object, but an object is not a word. One of Wittgenstein's main concern was clarity.

Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts ...
Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the clarification of propositions.

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

(4.112)

Perhaps he assumed that the reader who followed his argument would make the distinction.

These are not Wittgenstein's objects, nor are they what correspond to his objects. — 013zen

He complicates this by using the term 'object' in both cases without always making the distinction clear.