We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).” — Sam26
Perhaps this is how one should think about these objects. The analysis of language demands that there are elementary propositions. These elementary propositions are about possible atomic facts, consisting in combinations of names. These names name elementary objects
Of course this is muddled, hence the PI. — Banno
so a step back. — Sam26
... arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). — Sam26
Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ... — Sam26
Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ...
— Sam26
What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them? — Fooloso4
Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact? — Fooloso4
when Wittgenstein states that "the variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object (T. 4.1272)." - he is simply saying something about the essence of symbolic representation in formal logic. — Sam26
The concept of an object, as Wittgenstein envisions it, is not real in the sense that it lacks empirical content or logical significance within his analysis. — Sam26
Strangely, he refers to objects as pseudo-concepts, and at the same time, they form the building blocks of atomic facts. Maybe it's a pseudo-concept because no concept can capture their essence. I'm not sure. — Sam26
I must point out that you don't have to understand all of this to understand Wittgenstein's basic ideas in the Tractatus. — Sam26
Wittgenstein wants us to be silent about the propositions of metaphysics. — Sam26
These propositions include, but are not limited to, religion (praying for e.g.), poetry, music, and art, so there are many ways to express the inexpressible. — Sam26
After all, he says in the Preface that the truth of the propositions outlined in the Tractatus is unassailable and definitive — Sam26
I would say that, perhaps, he wants us to be silent about certain kinds of metaphysics. Like Hume before him which said to "cast into the fire" all metaphysics devoid of quantification or qualification, this reduces the sphere substantially. — 013zen
It seems clear to me that metaphysics is beyond the world of facts, and that metaphysics for Wittgenstein is beyond what can be said. This is the distinction between saying and showing. — Sam26
This doesn't make sense though. First off, this statement itself is a metaphysical statement of the world.. one regarding metaphysics relationship with facts — schopenhauer1
Given Wittgenstein's logic about what can be said within the limits of the world of facts, anything that goes beyond the world of facts (beyond the propositions of natural science) is metaphysical and outside the limit of what can be said. — Sam26
His statement doesn't violate his logic, i.e., it's not a metaphysical statement. — Sam26
Wittgenstein does make metaphysical statements in the Tractatus, but they're meant to show us the way, i.e., they're not meant to be factual in Wittgenstein's sense. They show the way up the ladder, and once the ladder is traversed it can be discarded. What we're left with after the ladder is discarded is all the propositions that connect with the world of facts. — Sam26
Is the world of facts only propositions of natural science? Why would it be so? — schopenhauer1
If you have a better understanding of Wittgenstein's Tractatus explain it in a thread. I'm just giving my interpretation of what he said. — Sam26
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