Wittgenstein, though, is not treated this way by the majority of his adherents. — AmadeusD

I will leave them to stick together.

By own approach is to assume that when an important philosopher says something that seems wrong to begin with the assumption that the fault is my own. That is not to say they are not wrong. It is a matter of interpretive humility.

Having said that, in the case of the Tractatus, there are things that he himself admits he got wrong. One might then wonder why anyone bothers trying to make sense of it. My response is that even if it is in some ways wrong it is still a powerful demonstration of logical thinking and an interpretive challenge that serves as an fine exercise for our own thinking that keeps scholars working on it to this day.

we know that there must be simple physical entities to which correspond our simple objects, right? — 013zen

I don't think so. As I understand it, or perhaps misunderstand it, there are no simple physical entities or objects. Every physical object is complex. The problem is to explain how a configuration of simple non-physical objects results in a physical object. It may be that this indicates that I have got something wrong, but it may simply be that Wittgenstein would have said that such problems are a matter of science not logic.

He says only:

The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented—only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.

(2.0231)

I will hold off saying more for the moment. This should not be taken to mean that an explanation will be forthcoming. To the extent I can address it it will be in terms of what an object is.

My prior response may have been more than you were looking for. More briefly:

We do not have knowledge of such things as the gods and the arche or origin of the whole of what is. At best we have stories or myths, ton eikota mython. that is, likely accounts. Timaeus proposes it is best to accept likely stories and not search for what is beyond the limits of our understanding.
Now, a philosopher, someone who desires truth and knowledge, but is aware that there are things that are beyond our understanding, will not accept such stories as more than at best what seems likely. But if the philosophers are the city's educators it is best that they tell some version that the people will accept as true and complete.

Forms are a likely story, but however likely it may seem, it is inadequate and problematic. The account is at best only part of an account of the whole. Timaeus' whose account, takes the Forms or intelligibles as part of his story, attempts to do what Socrates' cannot, that is, give an account of motion, of change and chance. But one of the most striking features is just how unlikely it is!

We should not expect more.

Another fine example of you doing nothing with words.

Post hoc ergo propter hoc

There is a difference between what an object is, which Wittgenstein does address, and the identification of an object. This is about the former. As will become evident, the latter is not something to be found in the world, and thus not something to be discovered by propositional analysis.

Simple objects are not like the objects we encounter in the world. Objects in the world are a configuration of simple objects. These complex objects are facts. A state of affairs. Simple objects are not the objects of empirical science. They are not physical entities. They are not what we would find if we divided physical objects to the point where further division is no longer possible. They are not something like subatomic particles.

They exist in logical rather than physical space. Simple objects are merely formal or logical. They are the constituents of the transcendental logical structure of the world.

More to follow.

Isn't it to be assumed that doing good means doing something that will have actual benefit in the world? If that is the case, then what you do in a simulation is not good. It might lead to some degree of self-satisfaction and happiness, but it would not lead to:

... knowledge of the true Good from which all good flows, God — Count Timothy von Icarus

For the source in the simulation is not God, and what is done is not truly good. At best it might lead to a sense or idea of God as the ultimate doer of good.

All this was obvious long ago. — Mikie

True. Long before he became a TV game show host he had a reputation in the NY area as a fraud and swindler. And, in his desperate failed attempt to be one of the "beautiful people" the target of laughter an ridicule. Of course, he then bad mouthed the people he wanted to accept him.

As to the election, I'm not placing any bets.

Now it remains unclear to me what you are claiming, but I don't much care. — Banno

Well then, I will leave it there.

1. Thought

Facts>Atomic Facts> Objects — 013zen

I would not put facts and objects under the heading of Thought. They are independent of thought. I would put them under Reality.

The following statements might lead someone to think that facts are part of thought:

:

“The picture is a fact” (2.141).
“The picture is a model of reality” (2.12). — 013zen

but:

We picture facts to ourselves.

(2.01)

A painting of a tree is a fact. It hangs on the wall, but what is pictured in that picture (painting) is not another picture.

When it is the case, to a fact corresponds an atomic fact and is called a positive fact:

“What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts” (2).

When it is not the case, to a fact corresponds the nonexistence of atomic facts, and is called a negative fact:

“(The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact)” (2.06). — 013zen

I think the Pears/McGuinness translation is clearer here:

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

(2)

(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)

(2.06)

It is not "when it is the case, to a fact corresponds an atomic fact and is called a positive fact". It is that when a state of affairs exists we call it a positive fact, or, in ordinary terms simply 'a fact'. And when the state of affairs does not exist it is a negative fact, or, in ordinary terms 'not a fact'. If the state of affairs exists a proposition stating it a fact is true, and if the state of affairs does not exist then a statement stating it is a fact is false.

I have no objection to you starting it.

So, there is justice in the world after all:

Trump is unable to put his money where is mouth is. He pretends to be famously wealthy , but does not have the money to make bond and says he cannot raise the money:

https://www.axios.com/2024/03/18/trump-new-york-fraud-case-appeal-bond

My apologies. I stand corrected. My attention was drawn elsewhere and I forgot to return to this.

You said:

Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. — Sam26

While it is true that they make up the substance of the world, I think the building block analogy is misleading. You did point out that they are not material, but building blocks and the building are made of the same kind of stuff. The substance of the world and the world, however, are not.

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. — Sam26

This unalterable form is not an arrangement. Objects have within them the possibilities of forming arrangements, but the form of objects is logical form. Unfortunately, he uses the term 'form' in different ways. There is the unalterable form (singular) and the forms (plural) of objects in configuration.

In another post you say:

Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality). — Sam26

They do not form the substance by combining. They are the substance. And I think this is the crux of the matter. What does he mean by substance? As I mentioned above, I will be starting a thread on this, but if you want to discuss it here I'm game.

Let's take a step back:

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4

I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211. — Banno

To which I asked again:

Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name. — Fooloso4

The simple answer is no, she does not. To claim that language demands it is not to identify one.

With me so far?

In your response to this you said:

What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno

What do we find at the top for page 28? Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein:

‘I don’t know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have constituents which correspond to the words of language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out.’

It is the constituents of a thought that he says is irrelevant. That is what is a matter of psychology. The constituents of a thought is not an object. That the constituents of a thought are irrelevant and a matter of psychology does not mean that the question of what an object is is either irrelevant or a matter of psychology.

What an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, is unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented. — Banno

Does she say this? Where?

On the top of page 29 she says:

The objects form the substance of the world.

That objects form the substance of the world is not unimportant. It is fundamental.

But the vital thing here, which permeates all of Wittgenstein's work, is that the world is not made of objects but of facts. — Banno

And the facts are made up of objects. The question of what objects are is deeply problematic. I can understand why you and Sam want to skip over it. As I said above, I will be addressing it in a separate thread.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12008/shaken-to-the-chora/p1

↪Fooloso4 In the post above, (↪Fooloso4 )where you quote my comment about simple objects and then go on to reply to it as if it were about elementary propositions. — Banno

First off, what you referred to was not about simple objects:

He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. — Fooloso4

Second, come on Banno! This is basic stuff. We have been through this before, if not in this thread then in others.

The elementary proposition consists of names. (4.22) A name means an object. (3.203)

I picked that this passage:

If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.

because it is part of her argument that shows, contrary to your claim that what objects are is irrelevant or a matter of psychology, that an account of them is important for understanding the Tractatus. An account of elementary propositions must necessarily include an account of names and the objects the are names of. As she says prior to this on page 28:

And that there should be simple names and simple objects is equally presented as a demand at 3.23

It makes no sense to say that an account of elementary propositions is important but to address what an object is is irrelevant.

Because you seemed to me not to be differentiating between atomic objects and elementary propositions. — Banno

Where do you think I failed to differentiate them?

↪Fooloso4 Ok, but elementary propositions are not atomic objects. — Banno

Did I say or imply otherwise? Why bring this up?

See also the last whole paragraph on p.27. "The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. — Banno

Right, but the epistemological problem and the problem of what elementary objects are are two different issues. Anscombe remarks:

But it is fair to say that at the time when he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning, with which he was concerned.

(28)

Saying he pretended suggests he knew better.

He does say a few important things about what they are:

In order to avoid the impression of interrupting and interfering I decided to delete the rest of my post and start a new topic of Tractarian objects,

That there are such things is implied by the structure of language Wittgenstein develops. What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno

In the passage where Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein he does not say that what objects are is irrelevant or a matter of psychology. He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. This in support of Anscombe's point, contra Popper, that:

...whatever elementary propositions may be, they are not simple observation statements

Whatever they may be is not irrelevant and not an issue for psychology. In fact, she goes on to say:

If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.

One need only take a quick look at other secondary sources to see that scholars still do not have an agreed upon account.

(To quote try highlighting and control C. to copy and control V to paste,)

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4

I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211.

The rejection of this view strikes me as one of the main departures from the Tractatus found in the PI. — Banno

Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name.

Now we can be lost together!
— Fooloso4

This is why we do philosophy, after all. — 013zen

As Wittgenstein said:

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(CV 65)

So, there we see clearly what Wittgenstein has in mind here. — 013zen

Perhaps. I thought we understood this in the same way but your next post indicates that we don't.

"The young man is starting college tomorrow." — 013zen

To simplify this a bit I would analyse this as: a (young man) stands in relation (R) to b (college)

Any young man, any college, any date, etc. — 013zen

Yes, the variables can stand for anything, real or imagined. The logical structure and relation stays the same. His analysis is logical. It says nothing about the content or beings in the world.

The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.

(3.1431)

That is, the sense of a proposition does not require that objects be simple.

Objects make up the substance of the world

(2.021)

What does this mean? As he goes on to say:

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it. (2.022)

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form. (2.023)

There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. (2.026)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same. (2.027)

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable. (2.0271)

What subsists, unalterable objects, are not the changeable spatial objects such as tables and chairs we encounter in the world. They are not objects to be found in the world if we are able to analyse compound object completely. They are what all object in the world have. They are formal properties. Internal relations. The possibility of combining. They are purely logical or formal.

What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. — Sam26

"The Earth has six moons" is a state of affairs. It tells us what is the case, but only if it is true.

The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)

(2.06)

“Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real. — Sam26

If what is real is what is the case then substance is not real:

Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.

(2.024)

The substance of the world is not a state of affairs. The substance of the world is not a fact. Substance is what stands under and makes possible what is real.

The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties.

(2.0231)

This is an a priori claim about the form of the world, its logical structure.

The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. — Sam26

It is because they have the same logical form that the picture makes sense. If the proposition did not have logical form, the form of both a proposition and of reality, it would not make sense. They are not independent of each other.

I don't believe that this is how analysis works for Wittgenstein. Analysis yields atomic propositions, which are objects. "Man is a man" is just another proposition, not an atomic proposition. — 013zen

This begs the question of what stands as a completely analysed proposition. What functions as a name?

The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense.
(18.6.15) — Fooloso4

What determines a simple thing is that which yields definite sense. I think that holding on to the picture of elementary objects as the building block of the world (@Sam26 )misleads us. Wittgenstein's investigation is in "logical space" (1.13) not physical space.

Thanks for the direction! — 013zen

Now we can be lost together!

Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem. — Sam26

The problem arises when we move from the logical form and structure of the world to its content. When we move from a form to content. When we treat Tractarian objects as if they are entities existing in the world.

Besides I'm not sure I see your point. — Sam26

The point is that the analysis of a proposition is to determine its sense. If this means to arrive at the relationship between the names of simple objects then we never complete an analyse of propositions.

Rather, it is the precise material properties that a particular has that are determined by the arrangement of objects. — 013zen

When he says that is that it is only by the configuration of objects that material are produced, he does not distinguish between the production of material properties in general and the precise material properties of particulars. It is only by the configuration of object that material properties are formed. Objects do not have material properties.

Those are objects "in the original sense" — 013zen

Right, and the proposition requires no further division for it to make sense.

Plato is a complex entity which we can define by appealing to many different aspects of his existence. — 013zen

Take the proposition: Plato is a man. In our analysis of this proposition do we arrive at the tautological proposition: this man is a man? Is man a part of the man? Does an analysis go from the more general to the more specific or the more specific to the more general? Which is more simple? Is man a part of Plato or is Plato a part of man?

"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70). — 013zen

That supports what I have been saying. His concern is with propositions and meaning. Whether this thing, Plato, is a simple or complex thing is not his concern. We know who Plato is and further analysis is not necessary.

For him objects are merely formal. Whether or not there are such things in the world was not his concern.

Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality. — Sam26

But the picture might be true or false. This cannot be determined by the proposition. The proposition might be a false picture of reality.

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." — Sam26

How do you interpret the passage I quoted?

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

On the same day he says:

Now, however, it seems to be a legitimate question: Are-e.g.- spatial objects composed of simple parts; in analysing them, does one arrive at parts that cannot be further analysed, or is this not the case?

and:

It does not go against our feeling, that we cannot analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as to mention the elements by name; no, we feel that the WORLD must consist of elements. And it appears as if that were identical with the proposition that the world must be what it is, it must be definite. Or in other words, what vacillates is our determinations, not the world. It looks as if to deny things were as much as to say that the world can, as it were, be indefinite in some such sense as that in which our knowledge is uncertain and indefinite.

and:

All I want is only for my meaning to be completely analysed!

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." — Sam26

I misspoke. I agree that proposition consist of names not objects, but Plato is both the object meant and the name of that object. When we talk about Plato isn't the meaning of who we are talking about clear? What further analysis is necessary? Does the meaning become clearer when we talk about Plato's eyes and hair or some other components of him?

First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language. — Sam26

I have recently come to the opposite conclusion as can be seen in my post above and subsequent exchange with @013zen.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. They are a priori objects of human thought. His concern is with propositions are how they make sense. The analysis of language does not reveal simple names of simple objects. The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'.

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

(Notebooks 17.6.15)

The Socrates of The Clouds has the advantage of being quite funny though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It certainly is! But also quite serious.

Diogenes Laertius says:

he knew nothing except just the fact of his ignorance.

but fails to provide a reference. In the same paragraph he mentions Xenophon's Symposium but I was unable to find it there.

In Plato's Apology he says that he does not know anything noble and good. (Apology 21d)

In Plato's Symposium Socrates says:

I know nothing other than matters of eros ...

(177d)
His knowledge of ignorance is not simply a matter of knowing that he is ignorant but of knowing how to proceed in the face of ignorance. Knowledge of our ignorance is essential to Socratic philosophy. His practice of inquiry stems from his not knowing, from his search for knowledge.

I have not fully studied the historiography of Socrates (anyone here?) — Lionino

I would not say I did a full study, but I did take a course, mostly centered around Guthrie's "Socrates". That was a long time ago. At the time I thought it was a dead end. The reason is that none of the main sources on Socrates - Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato are intended to be historical accounts. Both Plato and Xenophon write in response to Aristophanes portrayal of Socrates as a sophist.

Socrates famously proclaimed that he knew that he knew nothing. — Echogem222

Where does he say this? It is the most famous thing he never proclaimed. If you search the dialogues you will find that what he did say is quite different.

I don't see the issue that you're referring to. — 013zen

What is at issue is the relationship between Wittgenstein's indivisible propositional 'objects' and the objects we find in the world. The question of whether there are indivisible objects that make up the world. In the Notebooks he says:

And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.

(NB 17.6.15)

You said:

In a sense, an object is both logical and physical. — 013zen

But Tractarian objects are not physical:

... only by the configuration of objects that they [physical objects] are produced.

(2.0231)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.

(2.027)

An expression characterizes a form and a content" (3.31). — 013zen

A couple a points on the content of a proposition:

A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.

(3.13)

All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content are false.

(6.111)

We cannot infer the content of the world from the form of a proposition.

Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.

(3.221)

We cannot say what the objects of the world are. From the Notebooks:

Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one.

(21.6.15)

To my understanding, the Tractatus essentially sets up an isomorphism between thought, language, and possible/actual reality. — 013zen

It is isomorphic. That is, language and the world have the same underlying logical form. It is this form that makes it possible to say anything true or false about the world. But this says nothing about the content.

Sorry, you lost me. The passage you quoted:

"Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then there must be objects and atomic facts" (Tract, 4.2211) — 013zen

Might seem to support that there are, independent of us, simple objects that combine to make the physical world. I have sometimes read it that way, but I think that is wrong. One problem is that if such objects are non-material, then how do non-material objects combine to make material objects?

The facts in logical space are the world.

(1.13)

Logical space is the space of what is possible. The facts in logical space are not the facts in physical space. The facts in physical space is a subset of the facts in logical space.

If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.

(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.)

(2.0121)

"The ball" is an arrangement of objects both logically and spatiotemporally. — 013zen

If the ball is an arrangement of objects then it is composite. Objects cannot be composite. (2.021)

Wittgenstein's objects are not physical objects, they are analytical.

In the Notebooks he says:

Let us assume that every spatial object consists of infinitely many points, then it is clear that I cannot mention all these by name when I speak of that object. Here then would be a case in which I cannot arrive at the complete analysis in the old sense at all; and perhaps just this is the usual case.

He asks:

Is it, A PRIORI, clear that in analyzing we must arrive at simple components - is this, e.g., involved in the concept of analysis-, or is analysis ad infinitum possible?-Or is there in the end even a third possibility?

And in response:

And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.

But:

And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing.

(NB 17.6.15)

Whether things in the world are infinitely divisible is left open. His investigation is logical. To the question raised above as to whether we must arrive at simple components or ad infinitum analysis, his answer is a third possibility.

The simple thing for us is: the simplest thing that we are acquainted with.--The simplest thing which our analysis can attain-it need appear only as a protopicture, as a variable in our propositions-that is the simple thing that we mean and look for.

(11.5.15)

Wittgenstein's concern is propositional analysis, not physical analysis.

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

(17.6.15)

We do not have to dissect a frog to make sense of the proposition: "The frog jumps". In this proposition the frog is a simple object. If, however, the proposition was about the nervous system of a frog, the name 'frog' would not serve as a simple name.

The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense.

(18.6.15)

When he says that no further division is possible, this is because we have arrived at the simple propositional names, not at some imagined indivisible entities. Wittgenstein's simples are not Democrates' atoms. Further division is superfluous because it would not make better sense of the proposition.

Thanks for the link. A few points of contention:

I think Wittgenstein's view of solipsism differs significantly from that of Schopenhauer. This difference centers on their different conceptions of representation.

Magee ascribes to Wittgenstein the idea of:

... the worthlessness of the world (6. 41)

Wittgenstein did not say the world is worthless. He says that no value exists in the world. Worthless is a negative value.

and the ethical will, which rewards or punishes itself in its very action (6. 422)

Wittgenstein's claim that the rewards and punishment are in the action itself is not the same as saying that the will rewards or punishes itself.

Magee goes on to credit:

the power of the will to change the world as a whole without changing any facts (6. 43).

Again, it is the exercise of the will, doing good or bad, that changes the world as it is for me. It changes me.

Wittgenstein says in that passage:

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

The most important difference can be found in what Magee says at the start of making the comparison:

[Wittgenstein] could make nothing of the "objectification of the Will"

The objectification of the Will is central and fundamental to Schopenhauer, but not to Wittgenstein.

With regard to both representation and will the differences are far more significant than the commonalities.

Is this noumena? — Manuel

I don't think so. We can know the facts of the world independent of us. He does not make a distinction between phenomena and noumena in the Notebooks or Tractatus.

Or ethics? — Manuel

Ethics and aesthetics are matters of experience. They are outside the bounds of the world and language.

Or sensations? — Manuel

I do not know why he does not say anything about sensations.

For instance, the metaphor of reading his book is like climbing a ladder and then kicking it down was taken directly from Schopenhauer who says the same thing. — Manuel

Although they both used the metaphor of the ladder they are talking about different things.

Not how the world is, but that it is, is what's mystical, reminds me of Schopenhauer's claim about the riddle of the world. — Manuel

Schopenhauer traces the sense of wonder back to Plato and Aristotle. Although Wittgenstein claimed he never read Aristotle, he did read Plato. In the Theaetetus (155c-d ) Socrates says that wonder is the origin of philosophy. It is also here (203a) that we find an analysis of elements and their combinations.

His last part of the Tractatus, the mystical side, certainly echoes Schopenhauer's views about art, wherein we catch glimpses of a pure idea, but such experiences are very poorly explained in propositional form. — Manuel

This too can be found in Plato - the place of thinking (dianoia) on the divided line, exstasis (divine madness), and eros (ladder of love).

As for representation, I don't know exactly how it fits in, nevertheless, Schopenhauer begins his book by saying "The world is my representation.", Wittgenstein says "The world is everything that is the case." There may be something to that. — Manuel

It is here that we can see the difference. What is the case, the facts of the world, are independent of my representation of them.

Added: None of this is meant to imply that Plato is the source of origin of these ideas. Influence is not always direct or linear, and similarities or commonalities are not always the result of influence. The neat and tidy stories found in histories of ideas are often simplistic distortions.

The early Wittgenstein was a Schopenhauerian. — Manuel

What does this mean? It is often repeated, but how close does the Tractatus map to the writings of Schopenhauer? A few major points where they seem to differ:

Wittgenstein's claim that logic is transcendental.
Wittgenstein's "pure realism" vs. phenomenal and noumenal distinction.
The role of representation.
Will vs. independence of facts.

Putting the government in charge of reporting the news is a nod toward allowing propoganda. — Hanover

This would be a problem if the government was in charge, but it's not.

That was a pro-Biden, anti-Israel, anti-Trump conversation. — Hanover

Without a transcript I can only address this in general terms.

Did one of the participants represent the view of NPR?

What does anti-Israel mean?

Is NPR opposed to the state of Israel? One can be opposed to the war without being anti-Israel.

I think the matter is put more forcefully than that:

Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
— ibid. 5.64

That may have a shared purpose with other expressions of doubt. But it is also cojoining what many have struggled to keep apart. — Paine

I decided not to get into the question of what he meant by "pure realism".