However, one feature of the Tractatus is Wittgenstein's removal of relations and properties from his ontology. — RussellA

He doesn't.

In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and states of affairs, or, in the case of facts, about structural properties: and in the same sense about formal relations and structural relations.
(Instead of ‘structural property’ I also say ‘internal property’; instead of ‘structural relation’, ‘internal relation’.
I introduce these expressions in order to indicate the source of the confusion between
internal relations and relations proper (external relations), which is very widespread among philosophers.)
It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects.

For the Tractatus, objects combine as particulars not as universals. — RussellA

Do objects count as particulars? If a particular is something that can only exist in one place at one time then objects are not particulars. Every object in the world is composed of simple objects. These simple objects are in this sense universal. They exist independently of whether or not they are instantiated.

There are, however, problems with classifying them as universals too. I think it best to not try and shoehorn them into on or the other of these problematic categories.

Objects are necessarily linked to atomic facts, as atomic facts are about the objects in the world and their possibilities. — schopenhauer1

Simple or elementary objects, which are what this thread is about, are not objects in the world.

That is to say, if Wittgenstein forfeits defining what objects are beyond vague notions, then the tower of babel is simply axiomatic and self-referential and points to nothing. — schopenhauer1

I included a link to this thread thinking you might read it before posting.

See this discussion.

It is clearly the case that from the outward form of clothing we can infer the form of the body beneath it. — RussellA

If we must infer what the form is then it is hidden by the clothing. Some people wear baggy clothing to hide what is underneath. What they think there might be too much of or too little of.

It is also clearly the case that from the outward form of language we can infer the form of the thought beneath it, otherwise language would be meaningless. — RussellA

And yet, the meaning is often not understood. Your reading of Wittgenstein is a case in point. If we must infer what is meant then it is not evident from the outward form.

What use would language be if when someone said "please pass the sugar", no-one knew the thought behind these words. — RussellA

It does not follow from one example where the meaning is evident that it is in all cases. You have been reading philosophy long enough to know that not all sentences are transparent. But even in this case there is room for misunderstanding (and I don't mean there is a room somewhere where misunderstanding can be found). If in response to the request to pass the sugar someone says "Go long" (a term from American football) they did not get the meaning.

From the outward form of language we clearly do know the form of thought beneath it. — RussellA

The form of thought is not beneath the form of language. Are poetry and prose the same form of language?

Wittgenstein in the Tractatus does away with universals in favour of particulars, — RussellA

Objects are particulars. A universal property of objects is to combine with other objects.

There is another faction, those more aligned with the Claremont Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and Hillsdale College. They certainly are not uneducated. They are the "elites" that they and others love to blame.

They are not the MAGA faithful but, at least for now, back him and the plan to consolidate executive power. Whereas Trump and the Trumpsters are focused on him, they have their sights set on long term goals. Win or lose, when Trump is gone, they remain.

4.002 may be correct that language disguises thought, but is not inconsistent with the idea that language is thought. — RussellA

As he says in the preface, language is the expression of thought. At 4.002 he says:

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.

(Emphasis added.)

From the outward form, how the thought is expressed, we do not see the logical form that underlies it.

As I understand it, for the Tractatus:

The world is a logical space in which can only exist logical objects in logical configurations. — RussellA

See, for example:

Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.

(2.0121)

Perhaps you have in mind:

The facts in logical space are the world.

(1.13)

I will be saying more about logic space and the possibility of objects combining with others.

I am glad you took my remarks in the spirit in which they were intended. Of course, down the road I might see the need to revise my views. It would not be the first time! I think that anyone who thinks he has got it all right has got it wrong

How we are to understand "form" and "content" exactly, however, is still somewhat unclear, but I think you're on the right track by tying it to logic. — 013zen

Substance is logical form. The form of reality. (2.18) Objects are its content. (2.023)

This might make more sense in my next post.

That is a pivotal matter in the question of how much this work presents an epistemology or not. — Paine

Good point. Objects are not treated as things to be known. To the extent there is knowledge of the world it comes from science not logic.

I don't know if anyone has mentioned this, but the idea bears resemblance to the classical conception of substance (ouisia). — Wayfarer

Which classical conception? Certainly not Aristotle,

The term ‘substance’ has a long and varied history. For this reason, none of them will serve as a reliable starting point for determining what Wittgenstein means by the term. — Fooloso4

Objects make up the substance of the world. (2.021)

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it. (2.022)

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form. (2.023)

The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case. (2.024)

It is form and content. (2.025)

There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. (2.026)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same. (2.027)

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable. (2.0271)

This is as close as we get to a sustained discussion of objects. The term ‘substance’ has a long and varied history. For this reason, none of them will serve as a reliable starting point for determining what Wittgenstein means by the term.

Every world, real or imagined, must have a logical form in common. However different and changeable they are, their shared logical form subsists. This form consists of unchangeable objects. Their configuration is what is changeable. That substance is form and content means that it is logical and consists of unchangeable objects.

Added: Before moving forward I would like to clarify a potential source of confusion.Logic as the term is used in the Tractatus, is not primarily a human activity. Logic is not propositional. Propositions are logical. Logic deals with what is necessary rather than contingent.

He complicates this by using the term 'object' in both cases without always making the distinction clear.
— Fooloso4

I don't think that this is necessarily a bug, as much as a feature. Part of the work seems to be dealing with the idea that the meaning of a word or proposition is dependent upon how its being used. — 013zen

The word 'object' refer to the object, but an object is not a word. One of Wittgenstein's main concern was clarity.

Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts ...
Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the clarification of propositions.

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

(4.112)

Perhaps he assumed that the reader who followed his argument would make the distinction.

These are not Wittgenstein's objects, nor are they what correspond to his objects. — 013zen

He complicates this by using the term 'object' in both cases without always making the distinction clear.

Wittgenstein, though, is not treated this way by the majority of his adherents. — AmadeusD

I will leave them to stick together.

By own approach is to assume that when an important philosopher says something that seems wrong to begin with the assumption that the fault is my own. That is not to say they are not wrong. It is a matter of interpretive humility.

Having said that, in the case of the Tractatus, there are things that he himself admits he got wrong. One might then wonder why anyone bothers trying to make sense of it. My response is that even if it is in some ways wrong it is still a powerful demonstration of logical thinking and an interpretive challenge that serves as an fine exercise for our own thinking that keeps scholars working on it to this day.

we know that there must be simple physical entities to which correspond our simple objects, right? — 013zen

I don't think so. As I understand it, or perhaps misunderstand it, there are no simple physical entities or objects. Every physical object is complex. The problem is to explain how a configuration of simple non-physical objects results in a physical object. It may be that this indicates that I have got something wrong, but it may simply be that Wittgenstein would have said that such problems are a matter of science not logic.

He says only:

The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented—only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.

(2.0231)

I will hold off saying more for the moment. This should not be taken to mean that an explanation will be forthcoming. To the extent I can address it it will be in terms of what an object is.

My prior response may have been more than you were looking for. More briefly:

We do not have knowledge of such things as the gods and the arche or origin of the whole of what is. At best we have stories or myths, ton eikota mython. that is, likely accounts. Timaeus proposes it is best to accept likely stories and not search for what is beyond the limits of our understanding.
Now, a philosopher, someone who desires truth and knowledge, but is aware that there are things that are beyond our understanding, will not accept such stories as more than at best what seems likely. But if the philosophers are the city's educators it is best that they tell some version that the people will accept as true and complete.

Forms are a likely story, but however likely it may seem, it is inadequate and problematic. The account is at best only part of an account of the whole. Timaeus' whose account, takes the Forms or intelligibles as part of his story, attempts to do what Socrates' cannot, that is, give an account of motion, of change and chance. But one of the most striking features is just how unlikely it is!

We should not expect more.

Another fine example of you doing nothing with words.

Post hoc ergo propter hoc

There is a difference between what an object is, which Wittgenstein does address, and the identification of an object. This is about the former. As will become evident, the latter is not something to be found in the world, and thus not something to be discovered by propositional analysis.

Simple objects are not like the objects we encounter in the world. Objects in the world are a configuration of simple objects. These complex objects are facts. A state of affairs. Simple objects are not the objects of empirical science. They are not physical entities. They are not what we would find if we divided physical objects to the point where further division is no longer possible. They are not something like subatomic particles.

They exist in logical rather than physical space. Simple objects are merely formal or logical. They are the constituents of the transcendental logical structure of the world.

More to follow.

Isn't it to be assumed that doing good means doing something that will have actual benefit in the world? If that is the case, then what you do in a simulation is not good. It might lead to some degree of self-satisfaction and happiness, but it would not lead to:

... knowledge of the true Good from which all good flows, God — Count Timothy von Icarus

For the source in the simulation is not God, and what is done is not truly good. At best it might lead to a sense or idea of God as the ultimate doer of good.

All this was obvious long ago. — Mikie

True. Long before he became a TV game show host he had a reputation in the NY area as a fraud and swindler. And, in his desperate failed attempt to be one of the "beautiful people" the target of laughter an ridicule. Of course, he then bad mouthed the people he wanted to accept him.

As to the election, I'm not placing any bets.

Now it remains unclear to me what you are claiming, but I don't much care. — Banno

Well then, I will leave it there.

1. Thought

Facts>Atomic Facts> Objects — 013zen

I would not put facts and objects under the heading of Thought. They are independent of thought. I would put them under Reality.

The following statements might lead someone to think that facts are part of thought:

:

“The picture is a fact” (2.141).
“The picture is a model of reality” (2.12). — 013zen

but:

We picture facts to ourselves.

(2.01)

A painting of a tree is a fact. It hangs on the wall, but what is pictured in that picture (painting) is not another picture.

When it is the case, to a fact corresponds an atomic fact and is called a positive fact:

“What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts” (2).

When it is not the case, to a fact corresponds the nonexistence of atomic facts, and is called a negative fact:

“(The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact)” (2.06). — 013zen

I think the Pears/McGuinness translation is clearer here:

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

(2)

(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)

(2.06)

It is not "when it is the case, to a fact corresponds an atomic fact and is called a positive fact". It is that when a state of affairs exists we call it a positive fact, or, in ordinary terms simply 'a fact'. And when the state of affairs does not exist it is a negative fact, or, in ordinary terms 'not a fact'. If the state of affairs exists a proposition stating it a fact is true, and if the state of affairs does not exist then a statement stating it is a fact is false.

I have no objection to you starting it.

So, there is justice in the world after all:

Trump is unable to put his money where is mouth is. He pretends to be famously wealthy , but does not have the money to make bond and says he cannot raise the money:

https://www.axios.com/2024/03/18/trump-new-york-fraud-case-appeal-bond

My apologies. I stand corrected. My attention was drawn elsewhere and I forgot to return to this.

You said:

Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. — Sam26

While it is true that they make up the substance of the world, I think the building block analogy is misleading. You did point out that they are not material, but building blocks and the building are made of the same kind of stuff. The substance of the world and the world, however, are not.

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. — Sam26

This unalterable form is not an arrangement. Objects have within them the possibilities of forming arrangements, but the form of objects is logical form. Unfortunately, he uses the term 'form' in different ways. There is the unalterable form (singular) and the forms (plural) of objects in configuration.

In another post you say:

Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality). — Sam26

They do not form the substance by combining. They are the substance. And I think this is the crux of the matter. What does he mean by substance? As I mentioned above, I will be starting a thread on this, but if you want to discuss it here I'm game.

Let's take a step back:

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4

I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211. — Banno

To which I asked again:

Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name. — Fooloso4

The simple answer is no, she does not. To claim that language demands it is not to identify one.

With me so far?

In your response to this you said:

What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno

What do we find at the top for page 28? Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein:

‘I don’t know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have constituents which correspond to the words of language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out.’

It is the constituents of a thought that he says is irrelevant. That is what is a matter of psychology. The constituents of a thought is not an object. That the constituents of a thought are irrelevant and a matter of psychology does not mean that the question of what an object is is either irrelevant or a matter of psychology.

What an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, is unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented. — Banno

Does she say this? Where?

On the top of page 29 she says:

The objects form the substance of the world.

That objects form the substance of the world is not unimportant. It is fundamental.

But the vital thing here, which permeates all of Wittgenstein's work, is that the world is not made of objects but of facts. — Banno

And the facts are made up of objects. The question of what objects are is deeply problematic. I can understand why you and Sam want to skip over it. As I said above, I will be addressing it in a separate thread.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12008/shaken-to-the-chora/p1

↪Fooloso4 In the post above, (↪Fooloso4 )where you quote my comment about simple objects and then go on to reply to it as if it were about elementary propositions. — Banno

First off, what you referred to was not about simple objects:

He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. — Fooloso4

Second, come on Banno! This is basic stuff. We have been through this before, if not in this thread then in others.

The elementary proposition consists of names. (4.22) A name means an object. (3.203)

I picked that this passage:

If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.

because it is part of her argument that shows, contrary to your claim that what objects are is irrelevant or a matter of psychology, that an account of them is important for understanding the Tractatus. An account of elementary propositions must necessarily include an account of names and the objects the are names of. As she says prior to this on page 28:

And that there should be simple names and simple objects is equally presented as a demand at 3.23

It makes no sense to say that an account of elementary propositions is important but to address what an object is is irrelevant.

Because you seemed to me not to be differentiating between atomic objects and elementary propositions. — Banno

Where do you think I failed to differentiate them?

↪Fooloso4 Ok, but elementary propositions are not atomic objects. — Banno

Did I say or imply otherwise? Why bring this up?

See also the last whole paragraph on p.27. "The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. — Banno

Right, but the epistemological problem and the problem of what elementary objects are are two different issues. Anscombe remarks:

But it is fair to say that at the time when he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning, with which he was concerned.

(28)

Saying he pretended suggests he knew better.

He does say a few important things about what they are:

In order to avoid the impression of interrupting and interfering I decided to delete the rest of my post and start a new topic of Tractarian objects,

That there are such things is implied by the structure of language Wittgenstein develops. What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno

In the passage where Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein he does not say that what objects are is irrelevant or a matter of psychology. He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. This in support of Anscombe's point, contra Popper, that:

...whatever elementary propositions may be, they are not simple observation statements

Whatever they may be is not irrelevant and not an issue for psychology. In fact, she goes on to say:

If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.

One need only take a quick look at other secondary sources to see that scholars still do not have an agreed upon account.

(To quote try highlighting and control C. to copy and control V to paste,)

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4

I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211.

The rejection of this view strikes me as one of the main departures from the Tractatus found in the PI. — Banno

Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name.

Now we can be lost together!
— Fooloso4

This is why we do philosophy, after all. — 013zen

As Wittgenstein said:

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(CV 65)

So, there we see clearly what Wittgenstein has in mind here. — 013zen

Perhaps. I thought we understood this in the same way but your next post indicates that we don't.

"The young man is starting college tomorrow." — 013zen

To simplify this a bit I would analyse this as: a (young man) stands in relation (R) to b (college)

Any young man, any college, any date, etc. — 013zen

Yes, the variables can stand for anything, real or imagined. The logical structure and relation stays the same. His analysis is logical. It says nothing about the content or beings in the world.

The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.

(3.1431)

That is, the sense of a proposition does not require that objects be simple.

Objects make up the substance of the world

(2.021)

What does this mean? As he goes on to say:

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it. (2.022)

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form. (2.023)

There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. (2.026)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same. (2.027)

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable. (2.0271)

What subsists, unalterable objects, are not the changeable spatial objects such as tables and chairs we encounter in the world. They are not objects to be found in the world if we are able to analyse compound object completely. They are what all object in the world have. They are formal properties. Internal relations. The possibility of combining. They are purely logical or formal.

What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. — Sam26

"The Earth has six moons" is a state of affairs. It tells us what is the case, but only if it is true.

The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)

(2.06)

“Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real. — Sam26

If what is real is what is the case then substance is not real:

Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.

(2.024)

The substance of the world is not a state of affairs. The substance of the world is not a fact. Substance is what stands under and makes possible what is real.

The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties.

(2.0231)

This is an a priori claim about the form of the world, its logical structure.

The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. — Sam26

It is because they have the same logical form that the picture makes sense. If the proposition did not have logical form, the form of both a proposition and of reality, it would not make sense. They are not independent of each other.

I don't believe that this is how analysis works for Wittgenstein. Analysis yields atomic propositions, which are objects. "Man is a man" is just another proposition, not an atomic proposition. — 013zen

This begs the question of what stands as a completely analysed proposition. What functions as a name?

The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense.
(18.6.15) — Fooloso4

What determines a simple thing is that which yields definite sense. I think that holding on to the picture of elementary objects as the building block of the world (@Sam26 )misleads us. Wittgenstein's investigation is in "logical space" (1.13) not physical space.

Thanks for the direction! — 013zen

Now we can be lost together!

Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem. — Sam26

The problem arises when we move from the logical form and structure of the world to its content. When we move from a form to content. When we treat Tractarian objects as if they are entities existing in the world.

Besides I'm not sure I see your point. — Sam26

The point is that the analysis of a proposition is to determine its sense. If this means to arrive at the relationship between the names of simple objects then we never complete an analyse of propositions.

Rather, it is the precise material properties that a particular has that are determined by the arrangement of objects. — 013zen

When he says that is that it is only by the configuration of objects that material are produced, he does not distinguish between the production of material properties in general and the precise material properties of particulars. It is only by the configuration of object that material properties are formed. Objects do not have material properties.

Those are objects "in the original sense" — 013zen

Right, and the proposition requires no further division for it to make sense.

Plato is a complex entity which we can define by appealing to many different aspects of his existence. — 013zen

Take the proposition: Plato is a man. In our analysis of this proposition do we arrive at the tautological proposition: this man is a man? Is man a part of the man? Does an analysis go from the more general to the more specific or the more specific to the more general? Which is more simple? Is man a part of Plato or is Plato a part of man?

"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70). — 013zen

That supports what I have been saying. His concern is with propositions and meaning. Whether this thing, Plato, is a simple or complex thing is not his concern. We know who Plato is and further analysis is not necessary.

For him objects are merely formal. Whether or not there are such things in the world was not his concern.

Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality. — Sam26

But the picture might be true or false. This cannot be determined by the proposition. The proposition might be a false picture of reality.

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." — Sam26

How do you interpret the passage I quoted?

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

On the same day he says:

Now, however, it seems to be a legitimate question: Are-e.g.- spatial objects composed of simple parts; in analysing them, does one arrive at parts that cannot be further analysed, or is this not the case?

and:

It does not go against our feeling, that we cannot analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as to mention the elements by name; no, we feel that the WORLD must consist of elements. And it appears as if that were identical with the proposition that the world must be what it is, it must be definite. Or in other words, what vacillates is our determinations, not the world. It looks as if to deny things were as much as to say that the world can, as it were, be indefinite in some such sense as that in which our knowledge is uncertain and indefinite.

and:

All I want is only for my meaning to be completely analysed!

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." — Sam26

I misspoke. I agree that proposition consist of names not objects, but Plato is both the object meant and the name of that object. When we talk about Plato isn't the meaning of who we are talking about clear? What further analysis is necessary? Does the meaning become clearer when we talk about Plato's eyes and hair or some other components of him?

First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language. — Sam26

I have recently come to the opposite conclusion as can be seen in my post above and subsequent exchange with @013zen.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. They are a priori objects of human thought. His concern is with propositions are how they make sense. The analysis of language does not reveal simple names of simple objects. The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'.

When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.

(Notebooks 17.6.15)

The Socrates of The Clouds has the advantage of being quite funny though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It certainly is! But also quite serious.