Implicit in this argument is the additonal argument that if a news outlet doesn't adequately promote the correct ethical side, financial pressure should be placed upon that outlet to get it to change its course.

I'd argue that it is this type of reasoning that has led to the politicalization and delegitimization of much of media where you go only to your own personal trusted news source for any information. — Hanover

I do not think it is a question of whether financial pressure should be placed on the outlet. It is, rather, that readers, listeners, and viewers turn to those outlets that align with their own opinions. The dollars follow.

The article makes clear that NYT readers believe the NYT has an ethical duty to promote Biden and never to provide fodder to the right. — Hanover

Does it? What did I miss?

As a NYT reader who often reads the comment section attached to articles I do not think this claim is true.

My question is whether anyone disagrees with what I've said and believes that the press has a duty to stake out a preferred social objective and then to use its power to promote that objective? — Hanover

The press has a duty to the truth. To put it in terms of "a preferred social objective" is to reduce questions of truth to a matter of preference. The idea of neutrality is a myth with its own preferred social objective.

Do you see the press as a legitimate political force ... — Hanover

Yes. But only if it is free.

... leaving to the reader the conclusions he wishes to draw? — Hanover

The editorial and opinion sections are the place for making persuasive arguments from which the reader can draw his own conclusions.

As usual, in your compulsive attempt to defend Trump you have lost track of the argument. Go back to the beginning.

Thankfully the justices can all read the plain language of the Constitution. — NOS4A2

The objection in the concurrence is that the decision went beyond the plain language of the Constitution regarding the question of whether the state of Colorado has the authority to disqualify Trump.

I think I might like pineapple. I usually make 2 or 3 pizzas, so maybe I will!

I don't think I would like a pizza with the sweet red stuff called BBQ sauce. That is why I have not tried it, or if I did I did not find it memorable.

I would try pineapple but my wife says no.

I do a few variations on white. With ricotta or without.

I do not recall doing barbecue. The tikka masala started as a joke. We were talking about what to make next and my son said tikka masala. If he had said barbecue I would have tried it, We like the tikka masala on occasion but the barbecue might have been one and done.

You're quoting the concurring opinion. — NOS4A2

Yes, I am. I said this several times. They were there and heard and participated in all the arguments. You were't and you didn't. But with your fine legal mind, perhaps you can explain to them why they are wrong.

With regard to the irrelevant issue of insurrection. The fact is, the majority of the senate voted to convict Trump. The fact that he was not convicted has much more to do with politics than with his responsibility for what happened. It is, however, a moot point. For two reasons. First, the court did not address the issue. Their decision has nothing to do with it. Second, even if Congress was in agreement that he is an insurrectionist, procedures are not in place to do anything about it.

The majority mentioned the laws already in place to jail and disqualify insurrectionists from office. — NOS4A2

The majority said:

Congress must “prescribe” specific procedures to “ascertain” when an individual is disqualified under the 14th Amendment.

Those specific procedures do not exist. Without such procedures Congress could be in 100% agreement that a candidate is guilty of insurrection and still not be able to declare him ineligible.

They probably should have mentioned that Trump was already acquitted of insurrection, as well. — NOS4A2

First, what they said is not limited to Trump. It effects all future candidates. Second, the majority of senators voted to convict Trump — 57 to 43, including seven Republicans. But this fell short of the 2-thirds majority required.

... on the basis of some hare-brained theory, — NOS4A2

The court did not determine that it is a hare -brained theory. The issue was whether the states rather than the federal government has the authority to disqualify insurrectionist candidates, not that a candidate guilty of insurrection should be disqualified.

There is one issue brought before the court and decided by the court. Per Curium. 9-0. And that was whether those who tried to remove Trump from the ballot were wrong in doing so. They were. You ignore it. — NOS4A2

Right. There was one issue. It was decided unanimously that eligibility is a federal rather than state matter. The court should have stopped there. It didn't.

Let me repeat that since you fail to understand it:

The court should have stopped there. It didn't.

The majority says that Congress must “prescribe” specific procedures to “ascertain” when an individual is disqualified under the 14th Amendment. Such procedures, of course, do not exist today. And without them, the majority insists—in just a few paragraphs of sparse reasoning—the insurrection clause cannot be enforced against office seekers.

(https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2024/03/supreme-court-trump-colorado-ballot-disaster.html)

There are two issues. You ignore the second. Although the petition raised a single
question, that is, the first issue, the court's main opinion did not stop there as it should have and reached a second opinion.

Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote in their joint concurrence, that the court's main opinion:

... reaches out to decide Section 3 questions not before us, and to foreclose future efforts to disqualify a Presidential candidate under that provision. In a sensitive case crying out for judicial restraint, it abandons that course.

This is not my spin. It is a direct quote from them. It is judicial overreach. It has direct bearing not only on Trump but future insurrectionist attempts.

Solipsism and Skepticism

Solipsism: The I alone. Solus - alone Ipse - self.

The Tractatus begins:

The world is all that is the case.

(1)

In order to determine if the world is limited we would have to know all the elementary objects and all their possible combinations. This is not the limit Wittgenstein draws. The limits he draws are to my language and my world (5.6) and to logic and the world (5.61). The limits of my world are the limits of my language and not the limits of logic and the world. We cannot say a priori all that is the case.

Whatever we see could be other than it is.
Whatever we can describe at all could be
other than it is.
There is no a priori order of things.

(5.634)

The limits of my world are not the limits of the world, the limits, if there is such, of all that is the case and all that will be the case. This distinction is important for understanding what Wittgenstein will say about solipsism.

The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

(5.632)

The subject is the "philosophical self", the "metaphysical subject" (5.641). It is not a part of the world. It is not a fact. That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented.

Just as the limits of my world is not coextensive with the world, the limits of my language is not coextensive with language.

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.

(5.62)

I alone, solus ipse, am a limit of the world, of my world, the limit of what I can say and think, and see and experience. This is not a fixed limit, since it is always possible to learn something new, but a limit nonetheless. We cannot step out beyond ourselves and our understanding.

Tractarian solipsism does not lead to skepticism in the modern sense of doubt about the existence of the world or the possibility of language. There is only one statement about skepticism:

Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where
no questions can be asked.
For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said.

(6.51)

This should be understood in light of what follows:

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.

(6.53)

Since what can be said, propositions limited to natural science, have nothing to do with philosophy, the whole of philosophy is nonsense. Philosophical statements say nothing about what is the case. But the failure of philosophy to say, to give meaning, to picture the facts of the world, leaves open and untouched the metaphysical subject. Although propositions about the metaphysical subject are nonsense, this does not mean there is no metaphysical subject, only that the metaphysical subject is not to be found within the world.

Wittgenstein’s own skepticism has much in common with Ancient and Pyrrhonian skepticism. His philosophy was and remained a practice of inquiry, of investigation. And, along with Pyrrhonism, sought a state of tranquility free from troubling questioning. It is in this sense therapeutic.

It leaves open the question of what can be known and in that way differs from dogmatic skepticism. It also leaves open matters of belief that are not matters that can be decided by natural science, matters of ethics and aesthetics.

As expected, your spin veers off from the truth. What they determined is that this is not a matter to be decided at the state level. However:

“Although federal enforcement of Section 3 is in no way at issue, the majority announced novel rules for how that enforcement must operate,” Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote in their joint concurrence, referring to the section of the 14th Amendment that contains the insurrection clause. The court’s main opinion, those three justices wrote, “reaches out to decide Section 3 questions not before us, and to foreclose future efforts to disqualify a Presidential candidate under that provision. In a sensitive case crying out for judicial restraint, it abandons that course.”

(bold added)

In their opinion the court's decision went too far.

The decision hints as how the majority might vote on the question of presidential immunity. The court did not weigh in on the question of insurrection, but the concern of the three justices is that even if Congress were to find Trump or any other presidential candidate guilty of insurrection, the decision, in overstepping the limits of the case, forecloses future efforts by Congress to disqualify an insurrectionist candidate.

What started years ago as a hobby eventually became a requirement.

Bread - french, focaccia, ciabatta, semolina, sourdough, cinnamon, cranberry walnut, naan

Pizza - anything from Margherita, to seafood - clam, scallops, shrimp, to goat cheese sun dried tomatoes and asparagus, to chicken tikka masala, to apple

Liberalism as we now understand it is the idea that no conception of the good life is to be imposed, and everyone is to be allowed to pursue their own notion of the good life. — Leontiskos

As expressed in the Declaration of Independence: the pursuit of happiness. But this does not mean, do whatever you think makes you happy. In his recent book constitutional scholar Jeffery Rosen argues that the term as used by the Founders traces back before the philosophers of Liberalism to the classical philosophers such as Aristotle and Cicero. The pursuit of happiness is deliberative and public minded. It is not self interested but a matter of the 'common good' and 'general welfare'.

My earlier comment about epistemology was in jest, and yet that seems to have been your read on these Daoist "parables." — ENOAH

I am in agreement with Wittgenstein when he says:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight.

[CV, p. 47].

Just as shoes that are too tight make it difficult to walk, the language used by philosophers makes it difficult to think.

To read Zhuagzi in terms of the theories and problems of epistemology can put us in a bind - disputes over in what way he is or is not in line with this or that epistemological claim. An objection would be that he misuses the term 'know'.

I don't agree that Plato ignored Socrates. On my reading he is a Socratic philosopher. He too knows that he does not know and demonstrates to other that they do not know either. At best, as Timaeus puts it, we have "likely stories". If you are interested I have several threads of varying length and detail on some of the dialogues:

Timaeus

Phaedo

metaphysics

Socratic Philosophy

Euthyphro

You cut the story short:

Huizi [his friend] said, “I’m not you, so I certainly don’t know what you know. And since you’re not a fish, you don’t know what fish like. There, perfect!”
Zhuangzi said, “Let’s go back to the beginning. When you asked how I knew what fish like, you had to know I knew already in order to ask. I know it by the Hao River—that’s how.

The word ‘how’ can also be translated ‘where’. In other words, he knows it relative to his own perspective, from a bridge above the water. That is, from where they are standing looking at the fish. But Huizi is also standing on the bridge. When Zhuangzi suggests going back to the beginning it is not just the beginning of their conversation but back to what it means to know something.

Elsewhere Zhuangzi says:

Only as I know things myself do I know them.

Knowing the limits of his perspective is to know things in a way that differs from him not knowing his limits. I discuss this in a thread I started on Zhuangzi

If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are laws of nature.
But of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest.

(6.36)

Why can't this be said? Of course he can say the words, he just did, but:

We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.

(5.1361)

There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The
only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

(6.37)

The law of causality is not a law but the form of a law.

(6.32)

The form is the method used to describe the world not what is described.

All such propositions, including the principle of sufficient reason, the laws of continuity in nature and of least effort in nature, etc. etc.— all these are a priori insights about the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast.

(6.34)

But they seem to be as inscrutable, and hence as propositionally useless, as Kant's 'things in themselves' — Janus

I agree that they are inscrutable and propositionally useless, but Wittgenstein's argument is about the possibility of propositions.

Just as elementary facts consist of objects, elementary proposition consists of names. (4.22)

We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possible forms of elementary
propositions.

Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with different meanings, we are
also unable to give the composition of elementary propositions.

(5.55)

Simple names function as the names of simple objects, but this does not mean they name things in the way tables and chairs do. They are not the names of 'this' or 'that'. They are about the form not the content of propositions.

Do you read it as suggesting that we can know any "internal properties" of objects, or is all we can know of objects "external properties"? — Janus

Well, to begin we would have to identify the objects.Wittgenstein does not do this. We do not even know what these objects are let alone knowing internal or external properties except that internal to them they must have the ability to combine with other objects.

Cheers. — Banno

l'chaim.

But where is this used by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus? — Banno

Where is what used?

objects by themselves don't do much of anything — Sam26

Objects contain within them all of the possible ways in which they can combine.

If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) (2.0123)

As you point out, we have no examples of objects. This raises the question of in what way we can know these objects.

If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all
its internal properties. (2.01231)

If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given. (20124)

It would seem that we know these objects in so far as they are the source of the possibilities of the world. From themselves they generate the world through the ways in which they combine.

There is a bottom up order to the universe.

From what I've read and heard things in this statement are not objects. — Sam26

2.01:

A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

A combination of elementary objects would be a state of affairs. A table is a combination of elementary objects. A fact of the world.

We're not at the object stage yet. — Sam26

I think that this is where he is at. This is what he begins with. Elementary configurations of elementary objects. But what he says would also be the case with compound objects or things. The world is not a collection of separate things.

Facts for Wittgenstein are states of affairs which are not things (not a list of things like table, chairs, mountains, etc), but the arrangement of things and their relationship to each other. — Sam26

By 'things' he means simple or elementary objects not configurations of things such as tables and chairs.

Objects are simple.

(2.02)

Objects make up the substance of the world.
That is why they cannot be composite.

(2.021)

Tables and chairs are composite. This is not nit picking. It is essential for understanding both the ontology of the Tractatus and the logical structure of language.


.

In a now famous letter to von Ficker Wittgenstein says:

The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing. I have managed in my book to put everything firmly in place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book.

Ethical claims are meaningless but ethics is not. Ethics lies outside the limits of logical constructs and analysis. It is experiential , existential. From within the world, logic. From without, ethics and aesthetics. The two transcendentals of the Tractatus.

Best drop this. It is a side line and rather pointless. — Banno

Sure, we can drop it. But what it means for the limit of my language to be the limit of my world is not a side line and is not pointless.

We cannot a priori construct all true propositions and cannot do so a posteriori either unless we knew of all the facts of the world.

As to the claim:

if you have all the true propositions, then you have completely described the world. — Banno

it is a tautology. If you could say everything true about the world, then you could say everything true about the world.

Nowhere does Wittgenstein say that we cannot know all the facts. Nowhere is that relevant to his argument. — Banno

Immediately before saying the limits of my language means the limits of my world. (5.6)

He says:

If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are, then the attempt to do so must lead to obvious nonsense.

(5.571)

The idea of having all true propositions is nonsense.

The application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are.
What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate.
It is clear that logic must not clash with its application.
But logic has to be in contact with its application.
Therefore logic and its application must not overlap.

(5.557)

Logic tells is there must be elementary propositions, but cannot determine what they are. This requires a move from logic to its application, from form to content. The claim that the world is the totality of facts is a priori,. From this we know nothing about any of the facts of the world, what they are, how many there are, or what the totality of them is.

Of course if we did have all the true propositions we would have a complete description of the world! But positing this hypothetical condition does not explain Wittgenstein's claim that the limits of my language means the limits of my world. The limits of my language does not include the totality of true propositions.

My language is limited by my life:

So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.(6.432)
The world and life are one. (5.621)
I am my world. (5.63)

One need not put aside the question of truth, but the question of whether what he says is true should not come before the question of what it is he is saying. What he is saying is what is at issue.

I don't know what this is supposed to mean. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle didn't think rational inquiry was useful? Is Plato sceptical of the dialectical having any utility? This would seem strange. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Both terms 'zetetic' and 'skeptic' originally meant inquiry. It is not skepticism in the modern dogmatic sense, which denies the possibility of knowledge, but rather an acknowledgement that one does not possess knowledge. Hence, to proceed by inquiry, which in large part is dialectical, that is, via argument.

... he also seems to allow that they can point to, aid in the remembrance of, knowledge (e.g. the Meno teaching scene) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Recollection (anamnesis) is a myth. As a reasoned argument it suffers from the problem infinite regress. There must have been some previous life in which one learned what in later lives is recollected. In that case knowledge would not be recollection.

Recollection also plays a part in our life here and now. In the Phaedo Socrates gives the following example:

Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.

(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something. In the example given recollection is independent of stories of death. Simmias must be reminded of the argument that learning is recollection. If he is to learn that learning is recollection he learns it by being reminded of the story, not by recollecting something from a previous life. As he says:

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded".

It should not escape notice that he says "undergo". Accepting the story is more like an indoctrination than simply hearing the story.

A person must be ruled over by the rational part of the soul to leave the cave — Count Timothy von Icarus

Reason functions in the same way in the cave:

And suppose they received certain honours and praises from one another, and there were privileges for whoever discerns the passing shadows most keenly, and is best at remembering which of them usually comes first or last, which are simultaneous, and on that basis is best able to predict what is going to happen next.

(Republic 516c-d)

Reason can rule even for us ignorant cave dwellers who are not ruled by the myth of transcendence.

Would it be more accurate to call this fallibalism rather than relativism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Relativism is the term used in the OP as the opposite of an absolute position.

The problem with the term 'fallibilism' is that it is usually defined in terms of epistemology. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were zetetic skeptics. An examination of opinion.

In order to give a complete description of the world one would have to know all the facts of the world. Is there anyone who knows all the facts of the world?

I think he is claiming that facts are not descriptions. That we cannot give a complete description of the world. That we cannot derive the content of the world from its form.

Just to be sure, do you think he is denying one or more of these things? If so, which ones and on what textual basis?

just to be sure, is this what you think Wittgenstein is claiming in the tractatus? — Banno

Is what what I think Wittgenstein is claiming? That facts are not descriptions? That we cannot give a complete description of the world? That we cannot derive the content of the world from its form?

Of course the propositions do not give a compete description of the world, but surely the facts do. — Banno

Facts are not descriptions.

If we knew the totality of facts we would be able to give a complete description of the world, but we do not have the totality of facts. And so we do not have all true propositions. Without having all true propositions we do not have a complete description of the world.

But if you say something about the world, it would be odd if what you say about the world were not true... — Banno

What would be odd is if everything you say about the world is true.

Everything that can be said about the world would not give us a complete picture of the world
— Fooloso4

Then I do not see how you can make sense of Tract 1.1 — Banno

Everything that can be said about the world includes saying things that are not true. A complete picture of the world would not include an equal number of true and false statements. What is false is not a fact. From this description of the world that says everything that can be said you would not know what the facts are.

Right, but you never will have all true propositions. All that we say does not limit what there is.
— Fooloso4

That's not the point. — Sam26

It is pointless to say that what can never be said can be said.

Quit trying to put words in my mouth. — Sam26

Your words:

If as Wittgenstein believed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between what can be said about the world, and the facts of the world, then everything that can be said about the world, would give us a complete picture of the world. We would have completely described the world, given we have everything that can be said. — Sam26

Everything that can be said about the world would not give us a complete picture of the world but rather a complete picture of the possibilities of the world, both true and false. From this picture we would not know what is the case.

We cannot determine which propositions are true by looking at language . Within the limits of language we do not arrive at a true picture of the world.

I'm using depict in reference to what the picture displays, i.e., the content of the picture. Wittgenstein is saying that a picture doesn't represent its form, it shows or displays it. — Sam26

The form is not the content.

As I read him, Plato is a relativist. Only not the kind of relativist that Schindler attacks. The argument is simple. Knowledge of ignorance means that moral absolutes are beyond our grasp. In their absence Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle must settle for what on the basis of argument seems true and best to them. In the absence of knowledge we cannot say that absolutes do not exist, but we can recognize that we are not in possession of the them. We remain in the realm of opinion.

The problem of misologic is raised at the center or heart of Plato's Phaedo. Simply put, Socrates wants to provide his friends with arguments to support belief in the immortality of the soul. The arguments fail to accomplish this. Those whose trust in reasoned argument is excessive and unreasonable are shattered. They may become haters of argument because it has failed them.

The cure involves, as the action of the dialogue shows, a shift from logos to mythos. Socrates turns from the problem of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments. Socrates human wisdom, his knowledge of his ignorance, is more than just knowing that he is ignorant. It is knowing how to think and live in ignorance.

If you have all the true propositions, then you have completely described the world. — Sam26

Right, but you never will have all true propositions. All that we say does not limit what there is.

If a proposition is true, then the picture, which depicts a particular form, correctly matches reality. — Sam26

The picture does not depict a particular form.

A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it.

(2.172)

You are conflating form and content.

The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the
possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

(2.15)

Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as
the elements of the picture.

(2.151)

What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.

(2.18)

A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.

(2.2)

What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of
its pictorial form.

(2.22)

If as Wittgenstein believed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between what can be said about the world, and the facts of the world, then everything that can be said about the world, would give us a complete picture of the world. We would have completely described the world, given we have everything that can be said. So, if this is true, then the limits of our language, i.e., everything that can be stated about the world, would completely describe the limits of our (or my) world. — Sam26

This is misleading. We would not have completely described the world. The reason is twofold:

First, given all the simple objects we know all their possible configurations but do not know their actual configurations. Simple objects make up the substance of the world (2.021) They determine a form and not any material properties. It is the configuration of objects produce the material properties. (2.0231) The substance, the simple objects, subsist independently of what is the case, independently of the facts. (2.024)

Second:

There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

(6.37)

Sam starts out looking in the right direction with the limits of what can be said, but continues in the wrong direction. The limits of my language does not mean that we have completely described the world, but rather, that what can be said about the world is limited by what it makes sense to say, by propositions that have meaning. Propositions picture the world. An illogical picture would represent an illogical world. The world is logical and so what is pictured in language must be logical.

Wittgenstein's claim that logic is transcendental differs fundamentally from Kant's transcendental idealism. Logic is the condition for both the world as the totality of facts and our representation of those facts in language. A fact is a state of affairs, a combination of objects or things. Things exist in logical space. This is not a claim about how things are for us, but how they are, necessarily, in themselves.

His claim that ethics/aesthetics is transcendental, on the other hand, is about how things are for us. Not as a matter of fact, but of value. Not as something that can be said, but as how we see or perceive things, how we experience the world.

Logic is the transcendental condition for the world. Ethics/aesthetics the transcendental condition for my world.

A form of life includes something that is missing from both Tractarian logic and ethics/aesthetics - what we do, how we live, and how the world is shaped by us. Rather than drawing limits Wittgenstein is now more interested in possibilities:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

(PI 90)

He does this not by marking limits to what is possible but by clearing away misunderstandings.

The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

(PI 126)

He has reversed the direction of his investigation. From the conditions for to conditions against, to what stands in the way and prevents us from seeing new possibilities. Related to this is the phenomena of seeing aspects:

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something a because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

(129)

Here the shift is from the condition for the possibility of experience to the experiences themselves.

The problem with this perspective is that illogical thought is actually quite common, and even illogical speaking cannot be ruled out. — Metaphysician Undercover

A common response to this is: "think" or "think about it" or "think it through". We might also ask for an explanation.

The lack of an underlying logical structure is the position Wittgenstein moved on toward in the Philosophical Investigations ... — Metaphysician Undercover

You are late to the party. This has been part of the discussion since the OP.