The idea of thoughts as 'shadows of our feelings' of Nietzsche is interesting here. I also wonder where dreams fit into this because they may be shadows of thoughts and feelings. — Jack Cummins

In one sense we are inclined to say that if I express my thoughts or feelings, then those are my thoughts or feelings. They're not shadows of my thoughts or feelings. We just don't talk like this, at least generally. Imagine someone saying, "Here is a book that expresses my thoughts, but they're not the real thing. They're only shadows of my thoughts or feelings." So, the wording is a bit strange, to say the least.

On the other hand, if I use a concept to refer to objects in space, that concept is not the actual thing, it's simply used to refer to the thing in space, depending on the context. So, we think of the concept as a kind of reflection of the thing. In this sense, one might say that the concept is a kind of shadow of the thing, it's not the real thing. However, if you're not careful in your wording, you're going to run into problems.

Lastly, to refer to dreams as "shadows of thoughts" also seems a bit strange. Last night I experienced shadows of thoughts. What would that even mean? This seems like even more of a confusion. However, I think we can sympathize with the questioning of what dreams are, many of us do have questions. Again, we have to go back to how we use the concept generally.

The way I think about this, is the following: Thoughts, and for that matter consciousness, and here we're talking about the concepts, are reflected in two ways. First, our bodily actions (digging a ditch, or building a home), and second, linguistic actions (talking and writing). So, consciousness as a concept, is reflected in things we can observe. However, this doesn't deny that there are internal reflective experiences, but as soon as we try to make the meaning of the concept the internal thing, then we run into problems. Pointing to the internal is not the same as pointing to a cup (which we all can observe), obviously, but that is what people do. So, they ask, "What are thoughts?" - and they try to focus on some thing (I'm talking generally, not necessarily referring to the OP) that corresponds to the concept thought, and it is here that they go astray. What can help, is to try to focus on that which gives the concept its footing, viz., how we use it with one another. And, what we see are the expressions (both physical and linguistic), that give substance to these concepts, that is, the social setting.

I'm not saying that the internal experiences are not real, or that there is no connection between what's happening in our minds, and the concepts we use. I'm saying that we lack the objective component to be able talk sensibly, in some cases, about consciousness or the self. In other words, we can't get beyond ourselves, we lack the proper view.

I think each side of the argument tends to go to far in one direction or the other, and they stick with their particular conceptual view. The problem is probably linked with linguistic boundaries, i.e., what can be sensible said about the subject without talking nonsense. So, I see the problem, at least much of the problem, as a conceptual one. We have a tendency to limit our conceptual view based on a theory, and if this theory comes up against another theory, with a different conceptual view, then the clash. It's like chess conflicting with checkers. My piece doesn't move like your piece, etc.

Just some thoughts.

I don't see that any progress can be made, so I don't see the point. More importantly, I don't see that your interpretation has any traction.

What kind of bullshit purpose is "congenital" supposed to serve here? Are you racist? — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you go from having a "congenital logical problem," to racism? All he means is you have a persistent or chronic problem. That's kind of a low blow, don't you think? People just love to throw this word around to make people look bad. The only people who look bad are the people using it without a good reason.

:gasp:

What you describe here is a sort of paradox, which might even be called a contradiction. If a word's "home" is its position within a particular language game, but the same word might be used in different games, then it has distinct homes. So we have the problem of the same word having numerous homes. To resolve this problem we ought not think of these numerous and distinct uses, of what appears to be the same word, as actually being instances of "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover

You should think of a word like a tool, as Wittgenstein said. Each use of a tool can be compared to each use of a word (each use being differentiated by a context or language-game). Now, would you say that because a tool is being used differently in a different context that it's a different tool? Obviously you wouldn't because that would be silly. It's the same tool or word used in a different way, with a different function or sense depending on the language-game. The idea that it's a paradox or possibly a contradiction is just not the case.

I've been writing in other places, including my Facebook page, and I thought that some of what I wrote would be appropriate here.
_____________________
"There are numerous interpretations of precisely what Wittgenstein's Private Language argument is, where it begins and ends in Philosophical Investigations, what its target is, and whether it is successful...so it was nice to discover Stewart Candlish's one sentence summary of it in Edward Craig (ed.) The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:"

' ...a language in principle [is] unintelligible to anyone but its user would necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because no meanings could be established for its signs'

The above was take from the following link:

https://virtualphilosopher.com/2006/10/the_private_lan.html
_____________________

How does Wittgenstein demonstrate that a private language is unintelligible? In order to be clear about what Wittgenstein is doing, you must be clear about what is meant by a private language. It is a language that is only understood by the person inventing it. This means, obviously, that the meanings of the words or signs are also generated by the person creating the language, and herein lies the rub.

Wittgenstein wants us to imagine, in PI 258, trying to give meaning to a sign “S” (Think of a sign as any written designation used to refer to something, be it a sensation, as in this example, or some other object.) by associating “S” with a private sensation, and this we do by keeping a diary. So, every time I have a sensation, I mark it in my diary. The only kind of definition I can give is a kind of ostensive definition, that is, it is a kind of pointing to the sensation, but “[n]ot in the ordinary sense.” What I am doing is focusing my attention on the sensation, “…and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.” Thus, the meaning is supposedly established by my focus on the sensation, where the “impression” is made between the sign and the object of the sign, namely, the sign’s designation. However, Wittgenstein points out that the impression can only serve as a future reminder, namely, that I have made the correct association between the sign and the object. “But in the present case [forget about remembering in the future] I have no criterion of correctness (PI 258).” Therefore, it is not about our memory, as some might interpret this passage, but about how we could establish any correct use of sign “S.” And, if there is no correct use of the sign, then how could any remembrance of its use have anything to do with future uses in terms of meaning?

Ya, I lost it about 10 pages ago. :grin:

Cheers

Yes, exactly.

His point was that you cannot doubt your existence. It's not the kind of thing that can be doubted. I took that to be your point. — jamalrob

Well, my opinion is that his whole approach is incorrect. Of course I'm not a fan of Descartes.

It is my point, but Descartes analysis is not the same as Wittgenstein's analysis in OC, which is what I was trying to represent. :grin:

What? Descartes was confused about the whole notion of doubting.

For those of you who haven't already, study On Certainty (Wittgenstein's final notes), it helps to clear up some of these misunderstandings. Then again, you might read it, and think, what in the world is he talking about? :wink:

"Cogito ergo sum." I think therefore I am. If I did not exist, I could not think, therefore thinking alone proves undoubtedly to myself that I exist. — god must be atheist

The idea that one would need a proof to convince oneself that you exist, is ridiculous, better yet, it's just nonsense. How would a doubt about your own existence arise? And, if you could doubt your existence, which again, is nonsense, who would be doing the doubting, if not you? Presumably a proof is supposed to give you knowledge of your existence? I mean, if you could doubt your existence, then surely you could doubt the very words you're using to form the proof. There are certain beliefs that are so fundamental, so bedrock, so basic, that they need no justification, i.e., they fall outside the domain of epistemology. These beliefs form the very backdrop needed to have these kinds of conversations. If you can't be certain of your own existence, what could you be certain about? Nothing! Even being certain would lose all meaning.

Saying some of the same things again, from a slightly different angle.

If Wittgenstein is correct about meaning, viz., that it’s a rule-based use that happens in social settings, then it’s an error to think that one’s use of know is based on some internal mechanism of the mind. In other words, the association of the word know with some internal or subjective mechanism gives us the false idea that we have privileged internal access to knowledge. This idea removes the concept know from its social foundation where its meaning, again, is derived.

Wittgenstein asks the following question in PI 243, “…could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” He’s not asking if we can use the language that we’re familiar with, to write down our private feeling, moods, etc., obviously we are able to do this. He’s asking if we can use words “…to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.” So, the person in this example is using a completely private language, to refer to his/her private sensations. Remember, no one else understands the language of this person, it’s completely devoid of any social context.

Next, Wittgenstein asks, “In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense (PI 246).” It’s wrong to think that people “surmise” you’re in pain, as if they have to guess it, i.e., they see your screams of agony, or they see your injury - it’s not a matter of surmising. Of course, someone could be faking their pain, or lying, but generally it’s true that for the most part we know when someone is in pain. Wittgenstein’s interlocuter asks, “Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself (PI 246)!” It’s here that we get to the crux of the matter, for what could such a statement mean? Do I discover or learn that I’m in pain? Having knowledge, or the process of knowing, is a process of discovery. Again, do I discover that I’m in pain, or learn that I’m in pain? This seems to be, and is, nonsense. Wittgenstein asks, “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain (PI 246)?” The adding of the word know is meaningless in this situation. It’s as if you’re discovering your own awareness, “Oh, I’m in pain, gee, I didn’t know that until just this moment.”

Could you be in pain and not know it, then somehow discover it? The closer we look at these kinds of statements, the more nonsensical they become. We need to ask, “What would it mean to not know I’m in pain?” One of the ways to understand the use of the word know, is to consider its negation, again, “I don’t know I’m in pain.” Knowing and not knowing have to be seen in juxtaposition. This seems to be why “I know I’m in pain,” amounts to no more than, “I’m in pain.” Why? Because there is no not knowing I’m in pain. I’m either aware of my pain, or I’m not aware. It’s part of being conscious.

No harm done.

That's true, but not applicable here. If I tell you I've solved the hard problem, you wouldn't just take my word for it. — RogueAI

Ya, you're right, it isn't applicable to the hard problem. I was just addressing something Janus said as a side issue.

I was pointing out that in certain circumstances, just telling someone what's in your back yard doesn't cut it as a good explanation. As the stakes go up, the need for verification increases. — RogueAI

Of course there are exceptions where we need to verify someone's account of things, but my point is, that there are many instance of knowing that don't involve the perspective of science.

What if your life somehow depended on guessing correctly that there is a tree in my yard? Would you just take my word for it if I said there wasn't, and that answer would get you killed? Wouldn't you want to verify my answer? — RogueAI

But my life doesn't depend on guessing correctly, if it did then things would be much different in terms of what we know.

they cannot be counted as explanations, because a good explanation should be testable. — Janus

If I explain what's in my backyard, isn't that most likely a good explanation of what's in my yard, or do you need to test it. There are plenty of good explanation we use everyday that don't need testing. This gets back to the notion that somehow if science can't do experiments to confirm one's claim, then it can't be knowable, or it's somehow not real knowledge.

Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Sam26

Getting back to the reason this thread was started, which had to do with the idea or belief that knowing can be something coming from within, i.e., it can be generated from the mind, a kind of self generation of what it means to know. I think this confusion may arise from the use of the word know as a kind of subjective certainty. In other words, one may say, "I know X is true," as a way of emphasizing one's subjective certainty. Hence, one confuses one use of the word know with another. In the case of the quote above, Gertie equates know with an experience, but not a sensory experience, but a kind of pointing to something unknown, the beetle-in-the-box kind of thing. Often religious people do this when they say that the Holy Spirit revealed something to me.

The reason the PLA was invoked was to dispel the notion that meaning can arise in this way. It seems then, that using know as an a kind of emphasis, can be shown in the way one expresses the word know, or gestures as one uses the word know. This is legitimate use, but it shouldn't be confused with objective knowledge or objective certainty.

It's as if Gertie has some private interpretation of know, an epistemological use without any objective confirmation.

Looking again at the matter of rule-following, and its importance in determining how a word is used, and how use is related to meaning. This must be seen the idea that meaning somehow arises in the mind, as an idea, or some other mind-dependent phenomena. The tendency is to give too much credit to one’s own mind as the determining factor in meaning. Although the mind is crucial, meaning is not a function of one’s own mind, rather, it is a function of many minds working in conjunction with one another. Many minds being the correlate to a group of language users, and how the practices of language users determines meaning. Its these practices that show the rules of the language-game. Just as the movement of the pieces in chess, show or demonstrate the implementation of the rules of the game.

What needs to be emphasized over and over, is the idea that meaning is an outward manifestation of language as a “form of life.” Forms of life have to do with “customs (uses, institutions),” namely, those things Wittgenstein cited in PI 23 (giving orders, reporting an event, play-acting, telling a joke, speculating, testing a hypothesis, etc.). The focus should be on what is happening in language from us as individuals. This change of focus, helps us to see the nature of meaning, i.e., it changes the focus from what is happening in my mind, to what is happening as the group functions in social settings (going from the internal to the external).

What is problematic is that since language is an activity of the mind, in the sense that it is me who is speaking, one wants to overemphasize the importance of the “me” or “I” in terms of meaning. However, it is not the “me” or “I,” it is the interaction of each of us with others, viz., the other language users. It is this interaction, that gives us a regularity, or a norm of use.

Another confusion that seems to raise its ugly head, is, my intention, what was, or is my intent as I use the words, i.e., some think that intent drives meaning, or has a significant role in meaning. However, this is also a misunderstanding. Our intentions have nothing to do with meaning. We learn the meanings in social settings, and use what we’ve learned to convey our intentions.

But hobbits are part of a shared game, the rules of which, although set by Tolkien, are subject to modification; Hobbits are a communal exercise. — Banno

Well, people so all sorts of strange things, maybe hobbits are running around in people's minds. :wink:

existence is not treated as a predicate in logic. That is, there is no simple way to parse. "Xtrix exists". — Olivier5

I think it's correct to say that existence is not a predicate or a property to be ascribed to individuals such as God, unicorns, Abraham Lincoln, or any other individual (fictional or not). When we say that X exists, we're saying something about the concept, i.e., either the concept has an instance in reality or it doesn't. This would seem to be the case in order to make sense of the statement, "Hobbits do not exist." In other words, for a claim to have meaning it must be about something, but since Hobbits don't exist, what could the statement be about? Simply put, it's about the concept, Hobbits. Thus, existence is not something individuals possess, but is rather, a way of expressing something about concepts.

A question for due consideration is whether Wittgenstein thought that language games were incommensurable. — Banno

I don't think there is a yes or no answer to this question. Some language-games are commensurable, and others are not. It seems clear that Wittgenstein thought that using the language-game of science to judge religious language-games is incommensurable. However, there would have to be something in common with the language-games of both to be able to have a conversation, i.e., there has to be some overlap. If the religious person, for e.g., is using the word know the way you're using it, as say, an objective justification, then both language-games are commensurate. However, if they're using the word know as a subjective justification, then it would seem to be incommensurate. It would be like one person playing chess, and the other is playing checkers.

There is no standard by which we could judge all language-games, there are just the games themselves. Each game has it's own rules, but there is a certain amount of overlap. There are rules that apply to all language-games, and there are rules that apply only to the language-game being played. There is no asking, "Which language-game is better?" It depends on what you're trying to do, or how you're using the concepts within the game. This doesn't mean that it's all relative, you can't just do what you want and expect to mean something with your words. There are norms of use, but you have to be careful just how far you extend that norm, just as with any concept.

Well, both of those questions could be asked within the same game. I'm asking if there is some standard by which we can judge the language-game itself. For myself, I don't think this is a legitimate question. Although, I haven't fully come to terms with it, but I'm leaning this way. I might be missing something, not sure.

There doesn't seem to be any absolute standard by which we judge one language-game over another. I don't believe this leads to a kind of relativism as some suggest. It's like asking if there is some standard by which we judge chess games. The standard would seem to be the actions within the game itself, the moves we make, etc.

Lately I've been trying to answer this question for myself. I've thought of possible answers, but nothing definitive. My problem is that most of my studies of Wittgenstein have been in isolation from much of what has been written. Mostly I've tried to read just Wittgenstein (the primary sources) just to see how my interpretation would later compare with others.

I ran into this problem on my own without reading what others have said, and have been puzzling over it.

Just a further remark about sense.

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense.

For example, I might use the word know in the following way, viz., to reflect my feeling of subjective certainty, which is reflected in the way I respond or gesticulate. This is far removed from how I might use it in terms of an epistemological justification for what I believe. The problem is that we try to apply a sense that's applicable in one language-game, but not applicable in another language-game. This is probably why Wittgenstein was against religious arguments. He seemed to think that we were applying the language-game, say of science, to the language-game of religion. The two language-games are just different games with different moves. Some of the moves would obviously have to be the same, but some of the moves are just different, with different senses.

You might think that this is just another way to say that context drives meaning, but it’s not. In other words, use is normative, but context is not, you can’t just change a words sense, by giving it just any context.

The question I am focused on is whether, in denying that a sentence is useful in some circumstance, do we deny that it is meaningful? Do we deny that it could carry a truth-value? — Srap Tasmaner

Depends on how we're using the term meaningful. In other words, I could use a sentence that isn't meaningful to demonstrate what is meaningful. So, in such a case the claim that, for example, "I know I have a headache," is meaningful in the sense that it's use shows where we go can go wrong. I would generally say though, that it has no truth-value, especially if the use is vacuous.

One alternative might be to say that "I know I have a headache" is necessarily true, and that the apparent failure of the negations or of the 'doubt' version, regardless of context, show that. The peculiarity of saying "I know I have a headache" would not be, then, due to a semantic catastrophe (that it's nonsense) but something else. — Srap Tasmaner

This doesn't seem right, viz., that "I know I have a headache," is necessarily true (not that you're necessarily saying this :smile:). So, the statement, "I know I have a headache," would be similar or the same as "All triangles have three sides," or "All bachelors are unmarried." In the case of "All triangles have three sides," what we mean by triangle is by definition, having three sides. However, you can't think that this is the same as, "I know I have a headache?" At least not in these cases. Is there something else you have in mind?

I can't seem to get my question across, because people keep telling me what I already know. I'll chalk it up to my inability to convey my question in a way that's clear. :smile:

If I say: "bad means good", is that in accord with or contrary to the rules of the language game? That depends on the language game is being played. A musician might understand what it means if someone says "that guy's a bad mofo", but someone unfamiliar with the language game might well think it means something very different. — Fooloso4

Of course it depends on the language-game being played. The meaning of a word IS its use in a language-game. Obviously there are various kinds of language-games that can occur with the same word, and even though this is the case, we still say meaning occurs within those specific language-games.

Moreover, not every use of a word has to accord with a rule, no more than every action in a game accords with a rule. For example, (Searle uses this e.g.) there is no rule that governs how high a ball is thrown when serving in tennis.

That said, no one seems to be following my point about language-games. It's been said that there are only language-games, not incorrect and correct language-games. Wittgenstein doesn't talk this way, supposedly, and this may be correct, but I'm not sure just yet about this. It seems weird to refer to language-games without reference to correctness, and it seems self-sealing. I can always say someone else's language-game isn't a language-game, because the word is not doing anything. And, in many cases this can be demonstrated, but in other cases, it's not an easy thing to do. Does this mean that there are cases that will never be resolved? Maybe that's just what it means. Is that just the nature of language. It seems to be. This is the point about my post.

I have no doubt about that, but I'm wondering if it's a problem. It doesn't seem to be easily resolvable.

You've missed my whole point. I guess I didn't explain it well enough. :lol:

Language-games

I believe that Wittgenstein’s methods in the PI are important, and at least for me, I see him applying his methods in OC. He points out subtleties that are very difficult to apprehend (which is seen in various interpretations), and very difficult to use.

That said, what I’m trying to convey here is based on the conversation I had with @StreetlightX earlier in this thread.

Most of us agree that W. puts forward the idea that meaning is derived from use in social settings; which is the setting where rule-following takes place. So, use and rule-following are two sides of the same coin; and they form the basis of the language-game. The corresponding analogy is the game of chess, i.e., the pieces move, but they move in accordance with the rules of the game. If you’re not moving the pieces in accordance with the rules, then obviously you’re not playing the game. By analogy, if you’re not using your words in accord with the rules of the language-game, then you’re not doing anything with your words – your words lack meaning. And moreover, not just any use conveys meaning, which brings me back to what I said originally to TMF, viz., the notion of correct use, which seems to be trivial, as @StreetlightX pointed out, but is it?

Aren’t many of our arguments over the correct use of a word? Even those of us who claim to understand Wittgenstein, argue over what the meaning of knowledge is. In fact, philosophers have created all kinds of language-games to convey what the word means. However, language-games are only language-games if they are language-games proper. Not every use of a word that occurs in a social setting can be said to be a language-game. Again, the analogy being, just because you’re playing what looks like a game of chess, that doesn’t mean you are. However, this analogy breaks down (as many analogies do), because the rules of chess are very explicit, and easy to understand. But, understanding which language-games are THE language-games, i.e., those language-games that are language-games proper, is what’s most difficult to discern. In terms of our use of the word knowledge there are many different language-games that convey how the word know is correctly used. There is no one language-game that will give you the correct use, i.e., the essence of the word know. And, this corresponds to what W. said about the definition of the word game, i.e., there is no exact definition that will convey every possible use in our language.

The real question is, how does one know if a particular language-game is correct or not. It’s easy enough to say that meaning occurs in language-games, but there is no easy method for determining what looks like a language-game from that which IS a language-game. There has to be some criteria by which we judge correctness here. And yet, nothing is definitive. Obviously, some cases are clearly not being played by the rules of the game, but language is much more complicated. There doesn’t seem to be any firm ground that isn’t slippery in some setting.

It seems to me, to say, that X isn’t a language-game, so there is no correct use in this context, begs-the-question, doesn’t it? Maybe there just isn’t any precision here. It’s just like the command, “Stand here!” There is no X that marks the spot, but this response can’t be satisfying, at least not to me.
So, is there a problem in what Wittgenstein is saying? Are there insurmountable problems in what W. is trying to communicate? I’m not sure, just thinking out loud.

Insanity is coming here everyday thinking you'll find answers. :worry:

It is clear from remarks he wrote elsewhere, that
he thought that if he could come to believe in God and the Resurrec­tion - ifhe could even come to attach some meaning to the expression of those beliefs - then it would not be because he had found any evidence, but rather because he had been redeemed. — Joshs

So, what's your point, and how does this lead to me recanting or reconsidering what I said. I've read enough of Wittgenstein to know that he had a mystical side. All you would have to do is read my thread on NDEs, and you would know that I'm not against the mystical. And by the way, the "make me ill" comment could also easily be made against the materialists, naturalists, and many atheists who think that their way of seeing the world is somehow intellectually superior to any view that looks beyond the material world. So, to be fair I'll add that little bit to the mix. And, I don't think that Wittgenstein is some kind of god, i.e., even if you pointed to something W. said that contradicted my point, that somehow isn't going to make me think I'm wrong. I enjoy W., and I think he contributed some important things to philosophy, but I don't think he was correct about all his musings. I'm sure you don't either.

I don't know whether there is a God or not, but it seems to me that if you're going to claim such a thing, you need some kind of justification. And, I don't think anyone is warranted in believing in some kind of inner knowing or inner justification.

What makes me use the phrase "makes me ill" in relation to religious belief is the conviction that they have some special access to knowing that the rest of us don't; and where this kind of thinking logically leads.

Justification is a linguistic concept, and the use of the concept takes place within our epistemological language, viz., propositions. The idea that justification is something within us, is just anathema to me, and to my way of understanding W. If you don't get anything out of W. surely this would be the one thing that sticks out for most student of W., viz., that meaning doesn't arise from within. Meaning by its very nature, is public; and, recently this has been argued about in the many threads that have sprouted up about W.'s thinking.

Second, as I've mentioned in the first post that kicked this recent tranche of posts, comparing the proposition "I have hands," to "God exists," in terms of W's bedrock or hinge-propositions is a bit of a stretch (which is what Pritchard is implying). One can see this if you compare doubting that one has hands to doubting that God exists. Hell, even Christians doubt their belief in God from time to time, but I'd find it amazing if they doubted the existence of their hands in ordinary circumstances from time to time. The key, at least the way I'm interpreting W., to understanding what a basic belief (or Moorean proposition) is, is that doubting them doesn't make sense, at least generally.

Now of course you can retort and claim that you have direct experiences with God, and if this is really true, then you would have access to something most people don't. However, most of these claims are very subjective, and are open to many different interpretations. Not only that, but they tend to be self-sealing, you can make any experience you have conform to a belief in God in some way. I compare this to the way many Christians, not all, but many, think of answers to prayer. There isn't a non-answer, every event in their lives is made to conform with an answer, i.e., even if they didn't get what they specifically prayed for, it was an answer, specifically a no answer. It's a self-sealing view. It doesn't allow for counter-evidence. What would a non-answer look like? In the same way, if every experience you deem to be of God, is of God, how would you know if you're wrong. These kinds of experiences are even worse than pointing to something internal and saying, "There is my pain." Why? Because at least with a pain there is something external to latch on to, a cry or a scream. But, the experiences many religious people refer to as "an internal knowing" have nothing external to latch on to. There is no corresponding ouch or other kind of thing that attaches externally to the experience, other than a claim. Surely this is the proverbial beetle-in-the-box, maybe worse.

I'm joking. Geez. Can't you tell by my body language?

You may be querying the basis of the way in which Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas but I find your claim that it makes you 'ill' as a bit extreme, even though I realise that you may be speaking metaphorically. — Jack Cummins

No, I literally threw up. :groan:

Extreme or not, I find their interpretation of W. to be very problematic to say the least.

I was going to post a paper I wrote, but decided to wait. Instead I would like to evaluate a video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x0j3uoH_-A8) in which Dr. Duncan Pritchard (background is seen here: https://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=6341) sees Wittgenstein's views in OC as a kind of support for religious epistemological views. So, Wittgenstein is seen in OC as giving us arational supports for our epistemology, and many philosophers, including myself, believe this is the case.

So, there are some Christian philosophers who are saying that there are very basic arational beliefs that support Christian conclusions. This would mean that the statements "This is a hand," and "God exists," are equivalent, neither require a justification in that they are arational. I don't see this as a correct interpretation of what Wittgenstein is putting forward in OC.

I don't see that Moore's statement, "I know this is a hand," is equivalent to "I know God exists," i.e., I don't agree that Wittgenstein's critique of Moore's statement would be the same critique of "I know God exists." In the former statement the doubt makes no sense. It's hard to imagine such a doubt. Note though, in the latter statement (I know God exists."), it makes perfect sense to doubt that such a being exists. It's not in any way equivalent to "This is a hand." Many Christians want to say that their inner sense of God is equivalent to having a hand, i.e., it's so basic that it's foundational to their beliefs. So, in this sense it's beyond knowing, it's a kind of arational belief that goes beyond the epistemological.

This to me is an attempt to escape the required justification for the existence of God. And, many Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas to claim that many of their beliefs are this way. This makes me ill. :sad: