Sorry, but I'm through responding, this is going nowhere but around in circles. Thanks for all of the responses.

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English. — Banno

I don't believe the cat "takes it to be the case that the floor is solid," it acts as if the floor is solid. Maybe it means the same thing to you, but for me it's a strange way to say it. It's probably not even aware that it's acting in such a way. The cat just does what it does.

Also if a dolphin inspects itself in the mirror, the shows the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection. — Marchesk

I don't think the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection, reflection involves concepts that the dolphin doesn't have. It believes it's seeing another dolphin, or some such thing.

I might ask you the same question I asked Banno. If they refer to "things" what are these things, for you? Where are they, what do they consist of? How do they come into existence? — Isaac

I don't know how many times I have to answer this question, for the umteenth time, beliefs manifest themselves in our actions (nonlinguistic or linguistic, both are actions). So, if I open the door, then that act shows that I believe there is a door. Or, if I tell you my belief via language, then the act of telling you reveals what I believe. Meaning also is revealed in how we use words in social contexts. These are the "things" I'm referring too.

Hence it might be that at some future time belief comes to refer usually to neural networks. — Banno

I don't see this being the case at all. It is similar to saying that meaning can be associated with neural networks. Beliefs and meaning both refer to things apart from the mind. In fact, they give evidence that we have a mind.

There's much liability for confusion thereabouts. Does showing have a broader reach than saying - are there things that can be shown but not said? — Banno

I think Witt believed that there are things can be shown but not said, because he believed there was or is a limit to language. I disagree with Witt on this point.

Ya, I do believe that showing has a broader reach than saying (at least it seems so), but that doesn't mean that we can't put it into words. Any belief portrayed in our actions, or in the actions of others can be put into words. However, the fact that a belief can be put into words, doesn't take away from the idea that it need not be put into words in order for it to be a belief. I can't make any sense out of the idea that before there was a language there were no beliefs. It's true that the concept belief didn't exist, but that doesn't mean the belief itself didn't exist. Again, the belief is in the showing, or the action apart from language.

Do you think it is possible that Witt was making a concerted effort to make sense of Moore's knowledge claim while remaining consistent? — creativesoul

Witt was sympathetic to Moore's propositional claims, but I don't think he was trying to make sense of Moorean propositions. On Certainty shows throughout the book that the grammar of Moore's propositions is just incorrect, so no, I don't think Witt is trying to make sense of Moorean propositions.

Do you agree with my earlier explanation regarding Moore's language use? Was he showing you what he believes or was he showing you what his belief is about? — creativesoul

I don't see how we can show you what we believe without showing you what the belief is about.

I really don't know how to make it any more clear than I already have. Nonlinguistic beliefs are simply those beliefs shown in our actions. This is closely related to Witt's idea of showing vs saying.

You can keep using this thread, I really don't have much more to say.

I may be completely off the mark here but you seem to be surprised by how "foundational" beliefs differ with domain and that some of them are, in your words, "structurally more significant". Could it be, is it possible, that you're under the spell of, in a Wittgensteinian sense bewitched by, language? — TheMadFool

Well, if it is the case, then one would have to show how it is the case. Many things are possible, but that does not give us reason to suppose they are true. If I was to boil all of this down into one fundamental thing, it would have to do with the nature of belief, i.e., what do we mean by belief? How do we normally use the word belief in a variety of contexts, we would have to look at it in terms of its Wittgensteinian grammar.

I do think I am correct about my hypothesis, but of course I could be completely off the rails. I am not the only philosopher who has raised the issue of pre-linguistic beliefs, there are others. However, it is not something that is prevalent. It is good to think outside the box, but often we are wrong; sometimes we get it right, but it takes a while for the idea to catch on.

↪Sam26
I found jamalrob to be quite clear:

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement.
— jamalrob

Therefore, beliefs are not pre-linguistic or non-linguistic. Unless a belief is something else? — Luke

Ya, that statement is clear.

All he is saying, is that he believes, beliefs are statements. I'm saying, as you know, that beliefs can be reflected in non-linguistic ways. We don't need language to show what we believe, at least in terms of these very basic beliefs. Can you tell me how opening a door doesn't reflect a belief about doors, regardless of any statement. There are millions of things we do that reflect our beliefs apart from language. How does language even start without basic beliefs about the world around us?

I really don't know what else to say, or how to respond to some of your responses. It's as if we're talking past one another. I tried to simplify my position, but some of you didn't even respond; and if you did respond, I didn't understand the connection between what I said, and your response. I don't know what else to say without repeating myself.

Then I'm not sure I understand your objection.

Yeah, then he sets out 286, showing that he was having a bad day. — Banno

Ya, it could have been a bad day. :gasp:

So if you want to avoid this possibility, you'd have to declare it axiomatically, or demonstrate how it cannot be the case by conflict with some other definition. It's not valid to declare that it simply does not have anything to do with pointing to something in the mind, it doesn't follow from what you have specified so far about beliefs. Unless, of course I've missed (or misunderstood) the argument dismissing such a definition. — Isaac

My only point in saying that it has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind is to address the beetle-in-the-box question, i.e., it's not like the beetle-in-the-box question, because our actions point to beliefs, viz., something happening in the world. So, for example, if I open the door, the action of turning the knob reflects the belief that there is a door. If I sit in a chair, that action reflects the belief that there is a chair.

I'm not saying there isn't something going on in the mind. I'm only saying that we don't point to things in the mind to defend the idea that we have beliefs. No more than we point to something in the mind to define a word. There are things that occur in the world that reflect these things. In particular, certain kinds of actions that give voice to what is happening in the mind.

I'm presuming that from your answer to Banno's earlier questions, you're not referring here to beliefs which cannot form statements or propositions, but rather beliefs which are not statements or propositions? But also, given the above, beliefs which also are not features of the mind (otherwise we very well could point to them in exactly the manner you rule out)?

So what forms are we left with that a belief might take? — Isaac

I am referring to beliefs which are not linguistically formed, not that they can't be, but that they need not be. All beliefs that are reflected in our actions (linguistic or non-linguistic actions) are products of the mind. In fact, that we have a mind is reflected in our actions.

There are three ways beliefs can be demonstrated, (1) simple actions, as in the opening of a door, (2) stating one's belief, and (3) writing out the belief. All are actions of a sort.

We seem to be going in circles, so let me see if I can boil this discussion down to its essence. Can a belief (a state-of-mind as I define it) have form apart from language? This has nothing to do with pointing to something in the mind, but everything to do with our actions. So, the further question is, do our non-linguistic actions reflect beliefs apart from statements or propositions? My answer to both of these question is yes. If I'm wrong about this, then my conclusion is false. This is where the argument should start.

Our looking for something shows that we believe that something is there to be found. Here, Witt offers a candidate that is statable, for it is a belief that has propositional content. He gets kudos from me for attempting to remain consistent. — creativesoul

Forget the idea that we can state the belief, we can see or observe the belief without the stating. I don't think he is offering a candidate that is statable, just the opposite. As far as I can see, there is nothing inconsistent here. It's just a different kind of belief, i.e., a state-of-mind reflected in our actions.

Perhaps Sam. That would seem to be incommensurate with his talk of hinge propositions... wouldn't it? — creativesoul

Wittgenstein's hinge-propositions aren't propositions in the normal sense. In fact, one could argue they aren't propositions at all. They look like propositions, but don't function as propositions. Moore, of course, would argue that they are functioning propositions, but W. is saying that they are something very different.

As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional. — creativesoul

I don't think this is true. I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions. But of course this isn't the thrust of OC.

I can't think of any beliefs that are un-statable. What prompted this question?

The structure would look something like the following:

(1) The World
(2) Minds
a) Beliefs (prelinguistic and/or nonlinguistic)
b) Beliefs (linguistic and nonlinguistic)

While it is true that Wittgenstein doesn't delineate the idea that there are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs, this doesn't mean that the idea is not present within the scope of his writings. For example, as I have pointed out on numerous occasions, OC 284 clearly states that actions clearly point to beliefs apart from saying or expressing such beliefs. Moreover, the idea of showing a belief also contains this idea, i.e., one shows what one believes by doing, or by acting in a certain way. For instance, the act of praying shows that one has certain mystical or religious beliefs. Or, as Wittgenstein pointed out in OC 285, "If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows [my emphasis] that he believes that what he is looking for is there."

I'll have to find that book.

It was a very good article. I'm glad Luke pointed it out to me.

The point of me saying, "keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein," is that they are my thoughts, not necessarily Wittgenstein's. It doesn't concern me if Wittgenstein had an interest in prelinguistic beliefs or not. I'm exploring the idea because I find it interesting in terms of what is bedrock.

The only point I'm trying to make about prelinguistic beliefs, is that they are the starting points of all beliefs. They are the most basic of all beliefs. The structure of all beliefs rests on prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs.

At least part of the reason for my posting this was because I tend to agree with what others have said re: your comments on beliefs not being in line with Wittgenstein's philosophy; or a "shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core", as mcdoodle put it. — Luke

You'll have to explain this a bit more. Keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein. I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's ideas, and I'm trying to go my own way on some of his thinking, for better or worse.

I read almost all of that article (Wittgenstein's grammar: through thick and thin, by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock), and find it fascinating, thanks. I see it as another thread linking his early philosophy with his later philosophy. It would be interesting to explore this further. My understanding of the Tractatus is very general, and I'll have to admit I haven't seen this aspect before, i.e., the grammar of the Tractatus. I do see the connection, albeit rather vaguely, with what this thread is about. So, if I understand that article, Moore's propositions lack sense in that they don't properly reflect the rules of grammar, i.e., in Wittgenstein's broad use of the term.

It's a difficult thing to see, viz., that grammar goes beyond the proper use of, say, the verbs was and were, and extends into the arena of sense itself. The logic of sense is a grammar in and of itself. One can see this in his later works, especially in On Certainty.

I like this because it expands my thinking a bit more.

I read the Tractatus to be motivated by hyper-pschologizing philosophy, which are forms of scientism. But as I mention, I do not foundationally believe that's true. — boethius

You've now switched back to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, which really has nothing to do, or very little to do with his last work called On Certainty. Moreover, the Tractatus is not motivated by "hyper-psychologizing philosophy." I have a thread that summarizes the Tractatus, that should give you some idea of what the Tractatus is about.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8056/a-summary-of-the-tractatus-logico-philosophicus/p1

I'm not disagreeing with this.

We know what we believe in the sense that we know it because we believe it. We do not know it in the sense that we have carried out some chain of reasoning. — boethius

You seem to be contradicting yourself, to know is to give a justification in some form. I'm saying and I believe Wittgenstein is saying that we don't know it period, i.e., in any form of knowing.

Wittgenstein was addressing the various psychological scientisms that was the rage of his day; pointing out it's mostly just confusing and new knowledge beyond ordinary understanding of these things is impossible. — boethius

Where did you get this idea from? On Certainty, which was written in the last year and half of his life was addressing Moore's propositions.

I don't. Both "belief" and "knowledge" and "justified" are applicable to our "foundational belief"; our ordinary language has no normal utility to name what we won't normally ever inspect. — boethius

When it comes to bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs, my point has been consistently that they are not beliefs that can be known, i.e., they are not epistemological. They are beliefs that are shown in our actions. The best way to understand this, is to think of them nonlinguistically, as I have already pointed out in other posts. The difference is connected with Wittgenstein's saying and showing.

In Wittgenstein's critique of Moorean propositions (common sense propositions) he points out over and over again that it is improper to use the word know in reference to them (at least generally). For example, it is generally improper to say "I know I have hands," but one can say, "I believe it." I need not give grounds when I say "I believe p," but when saying "I know p," it is normally a requirement, i.e., how do you know. Saying "I know..." often means that I have the proper grounds, as Wittgenstein points out.

What is known rests on a chain of reasoning, however, that chain comes to an end at some point. That end point is what is bedrock, viz., a bedrock belief. No further grounds can be given, no further doubts entertained.

What Wittgenstein found interesting about Moore's propositions is that they seem to play a peculiar role in our epistemological framework. Bedrock beliefs fulfill a special logical role in epistemology. They support the structure of epistemology. Understanding this, solves two problems, 1) the infinite regress problem, and 2) the problem of circularity.

I found an interesting video that is worth watching if you have an interest in this thread.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sPGZSC8odIU

Ya, because it's so obviously wrong that it's like saying 2+2 doesn't equal 4.

:up:

Are you suggesting that someone who just jumped into ice cold water to save another person's life mightn't feel at all good about themselves? That they might just do so robotically, because it's the right thing and remain dispassionate in the face the praise they later receive (either from others or from their own self-appraisal)? — Isaac

No, that is not what I am suggesting. I am saying, as per the OP, my emotional state probably has nothing to do with risking my life to save another, i.e., I do it because it is the right thing to do. Moreover, we judge whether the action was heroic, not based on the emotions involved (and there are emotions involved), but based on the action itself. It is the act itself that we judge good or bad, right or wrong.

The belief that our "...[e]motions are the only perceptions of good, bad, beauty, etc." is just silly. Moreover, the reasoning is childlike.

So what would guide people's behaviour if not making them feel good, doing what's right? — Isaac

Sometimes doing the right thing has nothing to do with how you feel, and that's the point. It may not feel good to jump into ice cold water to save another person's life, but you do it in spite of how it makes you feel. Feeling good may be a byproduct of most good acts, but not all the time.

At least your sticking to your argument, that takes commitment. Why are you arguing for your conclusion, since it doesn't matter what others think. Your emotional response is the only thing that matters. Unless you want the reinforcement of other positive emotional responses to your post.

It would seem to me to be a sad thing if people just pursued those things that made them feel good.

Why shouldn't it be done, i.e., it is a good emotion for the serial killer. Moreover, if everyone understood positive emotions as good, then they would have to agree that it's good for the serial killer. All positive emotions are good, therefore the serial killer is correct to pursue this positive emotion, even if some people wouldn't see it as positive.

So, the good is equivalent to whether or not I have positive emotional response (rhetorical question). If a serial killer gets a positive emotional response from torturing someone, that emotion is good for him or her, i.e., he or she should continue to pursue that emotional response?