Pam's nde, part 1 and 2

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNbdUEqDB-k

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osfIY4B3y1U

I really do wonder what impressed Keynes so greatly that he exclaimed that God [Wittgenstein] stepped out of the train [at some time]. — Wallows

He was just much smarter than your average bear. The whole family was a bunch of geniuses, mostly in music though.

Finally, someone else said it. It's really a great saying IMO. Somewhere up there with a rising tide lifts all boats, and there's no free lunch. And maybe even topping, you can't have a cake and eat it too. — Wallows

I just ate my cake. Chocolate, with a think layer of chocolate frosting.

There is really no such thing as "what Wittgenstein is saying". But if we were to look for "what he is saying", wouldn't that just be the theory he puts forward, "his method of linguistic analysis"? — Metaphysician Undercover

To me, it doesn't make sense to say, "There is really no such thing as 'what Wittgenstein is saying.' I think it's plainly contradictory, at least in terms of how we normally use the word say. Also, Wittgenstein is not putting forth a theory, that seems clear also. As usual MU we are far apart on Wittgenstein, but you seem to thrive on living in your private world. Whatever floats your boat.

Why would you assume this, that we are looking for a precise meaning? Have you not attended philosophy seminars? The goal is to discuss the variety of interpretations, in an attempt to understand the various perspectives of understanding, brought to the table by the different backgrounds of the different participants. Sometimes we may be influenced to alter our understanding based on the perspective of another. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm saying that it's easy to get so involved in what Wittgenstein is saying that you forget that he's putting forth a method, so it's the method, and not so much what he's saying in this passage or that, although it's that too. Sometimes it's about the right balance between what he's saying here or there and the overarching picture of his method of linguistic analysis.

In the Tractatus, he is under the mistaken assumption that every proposition must have a definite sense. That a statement must have a fixed sense is reflected in his analysis, that is, the one-to-one correspondence between a name and an object. He inherited this thinking from Frege, as per Frege's idea that a vague concept is not a concept at all, just as a vague boundary is not a boundary at all. However, in the PI Wittgenstein demonstrates that because a proposition is not clear, that does not mean that it has no function (PI, 71). Sometimes being unclear or inexact (in terms of a statement) is precisely what is needed. The method of analysis, as presented in the Tractatus, forces a view of language that is just mistaken, and Wittgenstein begins to realize this in the very early 1930s.

So, philosophers have a tendency, as did the philosopher of the Tractatus, to analyze language as if one is doing mathematics. This method of analysis rears its head all the time. In fact, when interpreting the PI, as is done in this thread, and in my thread on OC, we are making the same mistake. We are looking for that precise exegesis, which leads to a discovery of Wittgenstein's meaning. It does not mean that the work is all bad, it means that sometimes we are searching for the very thing Wittgenstein is criticizing. We think we eliminate misunderstandings by making our analysis more exact. When what we need is a general idea of his method, the PI method. Wittgenstein criticizes philosophers often for looking for the real artichoke beneath the leaves or layers (BB, p. 125). This criticism only goes so far though, because much of the time we are re-wording his writings to look at it from a different angle.

I don't think it is possible for time to be eternal - that would require everything (matter etc...) to exist 'forever' which does not seem possible: — Devans99

There sure isn't anything contradictory in saying that time could be everlasting. You couldn't have time if at some point there was no time. You would have to go from no change to change, how could that be possible? You couldn't get a universe from a completely static state.

If you can talk about it, then you can philosophize about it. It's that simple.

I thought I would quote something from K. T. Fann's book, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy.

"Wittgenstein himself wished to publish the Tractatus and the Investigations together because, as he puts it, '...the latter could only be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again..., I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in the first book' (P.I. p. x).

"The relation between the Tractatus and the Investigations is a matter of controversy. On the one hand the passage just quoted has been interpreted to mean that 'Wittgenstein himself viewed...[the Investigations] as a development or deepening of [the Tractatus], and in fact, ... both the one and the other only makes sense when they are seen as complementary.' On the other hand, the majority of commentators seem to agree with Hartnack in maintaining that 'No unbroken line leads from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations; there is no logical sequence between the two books, but rather a logical gap. The thought of the later work is a negation of the thought of the earlier.'

"One asserts that the Investigations, as a whole, is a 'development' of the Tractatus while the other claims that they are 'negations' of each other. Both interpretations are radically mistaken. Wittgenstein himself used to say that the Tractatus was not all wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that did not tell you the right time. It is important to distinguish clearly the part of the Tractatus which was repudiated from the part which was not. Wittgenstein merely advises us to contrast his later work with his old way of thinking - i.e. his old method of philosophizing. It is quite true that his new and old ways of thinking are poles apart. The Tractatus follows the methods of traditional theoretical construction (even though to construct only a 'ladder' to be abandoned at the end) while the Investigations employs what can best be described as the method of dialectic. However, there is an important continuity in Wittgenstein's conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy. The views arrived at in the Tractatus (that philosophical problems arise from our misunderstanding of the logic of our language, that philosophy is no science but an activity of elucidation and clarification, etc.) continued to serve as the leading thread in Wittgenstein's later works. Thus, Wittgenstein's later conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy can best be seen as a 'development' of his earlier views, while his later method should be regarded as the 'negation' of his earlier method. This, I think [K. T. Fann], is the key to a clear understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole (Preface p. xii, xiii)."

I think this is important.

I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning. — Fooloso4

I would agree with that.

Hi folks. It’s an argument in two parts. First I argue time has a start, then I argue eternalism (believe that past, present and future are all equally real) is true. — Devans99

I think it's contradictory to say that time had to start. I say this because change is analytic to time, i.e., time is simply the measurement of change. There would be no "starting" without time, that is, there would have to be some type of change to start the mechanism of time. In my view time is eternal, it's a necessary part of reality, this reality or any reality. The flow of time may be different in different places, but still there could not have been a time when there was no time or change.

You can think of statements as if they are pieces of a puzzle, they will only fit where they are meant to fit, and if you force them into places where they don't belong, then you distort the picture, or should I say, you distort the meaning. There's probably a better way to say this, but you get the idea.

Agreed, which is why I distinguished between suitable and unsuitable contexts. — Luke

Yes, I believe we are in agreement.

My view of OC 348 is that statements get their meaning from correct context, that is, not just any context, which is why, it seems, Wittgenstein said, it "...stands in need of such determination." The correct use of the phrase "I am here" is driven by a certain kind of situation. If you hear someone say that context drives meaning, this isn't quite right, if it were, then any statement would have meaning simply because of context. Remember that incorrect uses take place within a context. The statement fails to have meaning unless it's in the proper context. The logic behind the correct use of this phrase will not work in just any situation or context. Hence, again, the need for Wittgenstein to say that it "...stands in need of such a determination."

I didn't claim you did. I said, your exposition is littered with caveats which are not present in the text. 109 says we must do away with all explanations. — Isaac

This is why I said that "some" of what I said pertains to 109,110, and 111. I'm looking at what Wittgenstein says from a wide range of his texts, not just what's in those particular quotes. I try, unsuccessfully or not, to look at his writings from beginning to end. And I'm sure all of you are trying to do the same thing.

Wittgenstein does not claim that explanation must be mostly replaced with descriptions. He does not say that philosophy discovers some new facts, just not that many. — Isaac

Where did I say any of that?

We have to be careful, which I fell prey to in some of my analysis of On Certainty, that we don't turn the exegesis of the PI into the kind of analysis Wittgenstein is fighting. I believe that if we understand the general ideas of Wittgenstein's methods this will go a long way to help clear some of the confusions that arise in philosophical discussions; and it will go a long way in helping to understand his general points. We have to be careful not to stress this or that point to the exclusion of the overall picture.

This is some of what I extract from PI 109, 110, 111.

We get in a muddle due to our need to be precise, that is, we want to turn our philosophical ideas (expressed in language) into a kind of science, as if we’re doing a kind of mathematics. This kind of philosophy, which Wittgenstein fell prey to in the Tractatus, is very attractive, and can hold us within its power. We think we’re doing something empirical, that is, we think we’re extracting something from language that must be dug out through a logical investigation - as if the meaning is something hidden. Language has a kind of mystical quality due to the inner workings of the mind, but much of the confusion is simply “grammatical illusions.” Why? Because we tend to misinterpret the forms of our language, as if there is something deep within, but it’s simply (at least some or much of the time) a chimera, we tend to chase shadows. Wittgenstein’s method helps dispel these shadows, not all, but much of what passes as philosophical problems. Understanding the method is the medicine that dissolves some of the problems that hold us captive.

This doesn’t mean that there aren’t genuine philosophical problems, it just means that we should be careful of our analysis, which takes hold of us as if we’re doing an empirical investigation. And even when we’re doing an empirical investigation these philosophical problems, some of which are chimeras, can invade and confuse the investigation.

I wouldn't go as far as Banno, although I do think much of philosophy is just bulls***. It's true that Wittgenstein told many of his friends who were inclined to become philosophers, to not do it. He would rather they pursue something else - something more useful or productive.

Yes, but does he not go on to say "It is clear that I know what I mean by the vague proposition", I think the one-to-one correspondence is part of the aim, and I would probably say that makes a significant enough difference. — Isaac

If you're asking this in reference to the Tractatus, the answer is, I believe, yes, that is, even a vague proposition in the Tractatus had a very precise nexus to the world of facts.

Tractatus Wittgenstein saw language as the screwdriver, Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein sees it as the stick. — Isaac

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein sees language in very precise terms, that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the names within a proposition and the objects that make up facts. So, he sees propositions in very exact terms in the Tractatus, that is, it's more of an a priori investigation. His aim is to justify the vagueness of propositions (Nb p. 70), which is also his aim in the Investigations, although the method in the PI is more of an a posteriori investigation. His goal is the same, but the methods are very different (to repeat).

It's probably the case that teaching children in the early 20's helped him view language in a much more pragmatic way. We know that children have understood a word by how they use the word in a variety of situations and contexts.

I very much dislike readings of Wittgenstein which equate him with saying that language is a 'rule governed activity'. There is a sense in which this is the case, but it's a sense that must be so heavily qualified and so massively underwritten by conditionals that I think it does far more to obscure and mislead than clarify the issues. One of the things Witty does in the PI is to expose the differential nature of rules, the fact that rules can and do play different roles in language (e.g. §54), so to say something like "For using words in speech is a rule-governed activity" is not so much wrong as simply empty - this says nothing in particular. Furthermore, Witty's constant refrain about rules governing rules ad infinitum (e.g. §84, §86) - and the ridiculousness of such an idea - also shows, to me anyway, what little stock he put in the idea of rules 'governing' language. — StreetlightX

Good point Streetlight. This is why it's difficult to develop a theory that fits Wittgenstein's ideas, that is, there are too many variables involved. To say that language is governed by rules, is like saying chess is governed by rules. It's tautological, and it doesn't tell us much about the game itself. There is much more to a good move in chess than just understanding the rules. One must be careful not to turn Wittgenstein's words into dogmatic jargon.

Even when we do an exegesis of Wittgenstein's writings the tendency is to interpret his words in a way that violates the very things he is fighting against. In other words, our analysis of what he's saying tends to be the kind of analysis that Wittgenstein is criticizing, not always, but much of the time. We tend to look at his thinking in terms of - is this true or false, but there is a sense where it goes beyond this kind of bipolar thinking.

Sam...there was a time when almost everyone alive on the planet...from every culture, context, and experience...would have "offered testimony" that the Earth was a pancake flat object in the center of the universe and that the sun, moon, and stars circled 'round it. There was a time, ONLY A HUNDRED YEARS AGO...when most scientists would have offered testimony that our galaxy was the entirety of the universe. — Frank Apisa

Almost everything you believe was arrived at through the testimony of others. When you read a book that's testimony, when you sit in a class that's testimony, when you listen to the news that's testimony, so testimony is the primary way we learn things. Of course not all testimony is good testimonial evidence, and in another 100 years what we believe today will be overturned. There are ways of evaluating testimonial evidence, and it's very similar to evaluating an inductive argument. To reject testimonial evidence as a primary source of evidence would be to reject much of what you know. You sure didn't do the scientific experiments involved in quantum physics, you rely on the testimony of those who have done the experiments.

Much of this depends on what it means to know, so it's an epistemological question. As such, it depends on what you count as good evidence. Many people limit their knowledge to science, but there are plenty of ways of knowing apart from what science tells us. In fact, one of the main ways of attaining knowledge is through the testimony of others. And while it's true that testimony is the weakest way of knowing, it can also be very strong depending on the number of people making the claim, the consistency of the claims, whether the claims are taken from a variety of cultures, contexts, and experiences, etc. The way we evaluate the claims is similar to the way we evaluate a good inductive argument.

Besides good evidence or reasons for such a belief, one must also take into account psychological factors or causes for belief. Psychological factors can and do override the best arguments. Furthermore, most people have a difficult time looking at evidence objectively, that is, they tend to be wed to a particular world view.

Neither religion or atheism are good world views. Both of them are incorrect, and both tend to be too dogmatic about their beliefs. Moreover, both views rely on fallacious thinking. I'm not going to say why I believe this in this thread, because I've written about it in other threads, and other forums.

In my studies of NDEs this subject comes up frequently. People often report that they are aware of living other lives. I do not like the term reincarnation because it carries religious baggage. People also report choosing to come here, i.e., to live a human life. The body seems to be more of a receptacle. Once you leave this life your memories come back, it is similar to waking up after a dream.

If she was genuinely fearful for whatever cause or reason that doesn't amount to racism. However, there is no way to know what's going on in her head. At the very least her fear is unfounded. Many on the left love labeling people they disagree with as racist, not that that is what happened here. Anyone can be racist, power has nothing to do with it.

Russel thought we could build a faultless language could be based on sense data. Wittgenstein I thought it could be built from names for simple objects. Davidson thought we might translate English into a first order language.

SO, could it be done? — Banno

Wittgenstein never thought that there could be a perfect language. Russell thought that Witgenstein was trying to construct a perfect language in the Tractatus, but Wittgenstein commented somewhere that Russell misinterpreted the Tractatus. Any language for everyday use will have some of the same problems that our current language has. I'm not sure what you meant by faultless, I interpreted it to mean perfect.

Whose head can you get into at any time? No one but your own. That's why doubt is justified. And, no matter how high one's IQ is, we all make mistakes, and sometimes it's the person with the low IQ who points out the mistake of the person with high IQ. It's just a matter of how we see the same things in different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ya, and if we look throughout history it's the people with the low IQ's who have corrected the Newton's, the Beethoven's, the Einstein's, and the Plato's of the world. Even on something so obvious as this your wrong. What a silly thing to say. And of course everyone makes mistakes, that's obvious, but according to you, you know so much more, right, MU?

If we think of this in chess terms, it's like comparing a 1600 rating with someone who is rated 2700 or above. We don't have a clue. We think we do, but we're stumbling in the fog. You may have a few opening moves that you memorized, but the middle and end game eludes you.

It's interesting that even Wittgenstein couldn't remember what he had in mind in certain passages. So, the fact that we can't quite grasp what Wittgenstein was saying in a particular passage isn't anything unusual. Wittgenstein's IQ was probably somewhere around 190, so to think we can get into his head all the time is a fool's errand. And for anyone to think, as MU does, that he was wrong about this or that thing, is just silly. I don't think any of us can keep up with his thinking. It wouldn't surprise me that we're wrong about 50% of the time, in terms of paraphrasing his thoughts.

If we can just grasp bits of his method, I think that would be progress.

There is a kind of foundationalism in On Certainty, but it's not traditional foundationalism. It's a foundationalism driven by language-games and context. So, if we were to look at chess as an example, the rules, the board, and the pieces are foundational to the game. One doesn't need to justify the rules, no more than one needs to justify the statement "This is my hand," it's just part of the background in which we act. There are many foundational statements in our language. One can generally spot them because knowing and doubting are for the most part senseless in relation to these kinds of bedrock statements.

Is Wittgenstein putting forth a theory of foundationalism, of course not, but it seems to follow from many of his thoughts. Many philosophers have interpreted Wittgenstein in this way, but they're careful about how they frame the idea. There is no doubt, at least as I interpret Wittgenstein, that Moore's statements
do fall into a kind of foundational thinking. Whether a statement is foundational depends on the context, and in Moore's context, viz, "This is my hand," it is foundational.

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It seems like this thread is just an argument with MU.

What I'm saying is that use in itself doesn't always determine meaning. If that was the case, then how would we be able to determine that someone was incorrectly using a word? What we would have to say, is that their use is so far outside the boundary of correct use, or so far outside the rules normally associated with correct use, that its lost its sense or meaning. However, what if a group has been incorrectly using a word or concept for years, how does one correct that, or does one correct it? Or has the meaning of the word evolved into something else? But what if the meaning of the word as they define it, is associated with some mental object - that would surely be incorrect, even if they had been doing it for years.

So all I'm saying Banno, is that examining use is not necessarily going to resolve the problem, again what if it's an incorrect use? I do agree that generally use gives us the correct sense or meaning, but can we say that dogmatically. Can every case of incorrect use be resolved using Wittgenstein's method? Would Wittgenstein himself say such a dogmatic thing? I'm not sure. I'd be interested in what you and others think.

I'm not saying that there aren't problematic ideas within Wittgenstein's thinking. No method, not even Wittgenstein's, will solve every problem, but his method comes as close as you can to solving linguistic problems of the sort he's talking about.

The way you talk about rules seems confusing to me.

I think Streetlight, Luke, Fooloso4, and myself are pretty close in our interpretation as far as I can tell, but your interpretation seems a bit off. Wittgenstein isn't exactly the easiest to interpret, but it's not beyond our reach either, at least generally.

On the whole I think the thread is going well. I hope we don't give up on it like so many other threads.

MU, what you're saying goes way beyond what I'm saying, so don't equate the two.

I know that most of us agree that Wittgenstein wants us to see meaning or sense in terms of use, but I think it's a mistake to say that meaning equates to use (at least dogmatically). I've said it myself, but we have to be careful, i.e., if meaning equates to use, then it would follow that anyone, or any group who used a word or concept incorrectly, could make the claim that their use of the word is the correct use. So, use must be seen in the wider social context, but even here it can be difficult to say that one use is correct over another use. Especially if we're acknowledging that words (sense or meaning) don't always have clear borders. Moreover, given this, there can be genuine disagreement over a particular use of a word.

If you think Wittgenstein is incorrect, then it doesn't apply.