The following is something I want to put in my thread A Wittgenstein Commentary, but it has important implications for what's being said here too.

In PI 304 Wittgenstein replies to the following: "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain" - Admit it? What greater difference could there be? "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is nothing." Here is Wittgenstein's response that I think is important - he continues with..."Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.

"The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please."

Note that Wittgenstein does not deny the mental goings on, but denies how our grammar forces us to think about the mental goings on, in the same way as thinking the word chair applies to the object we are pointing at. It's not the same, but the grammar fools us into thinking it is.

The this portion is a proposition. A proposition contains that special verb to be. — frank

I'm not sure what your background is, but when philosophers use the term proposition, they're referring to a particular kind of statement, viz., one that can be said to be true or false. You seem to be using this term differently.

It's hard to argue that there can be belief without some accompanying mental state. Its the object of belief: the proposition that is the same across believers, not the experience of believing. — frank

I wouldn't deny that there is mental activity going on in all language users, what I would deny is that how we use words in language, and the associated rules of use, is done in the open (socially); and there is nothing in your head, i.e., any mental activity that's going to give the word it's meaning other than how we use it in different statements. Correct usage is not mental, but linguistic, so as you express what's going on in your mind, it's governed by the correct usage of words within a rule governed activity.

Think of playing a game of chess, you think about the moves in your head, but what governs those moves (brings them into the open) is not some internal mental activity, but the rules of chess as it's played with others. What's going on in the head is governed by rules so that we can share our private mental activity. Without language, and the rules of use, you wouldn't be able to share your thoughts. So language has a use quite separate from what's going on in the mind/brain, there is nothing in the head, that gives meaning to the words you use. You simply use language to get the mental activity out in the open.

A bit wordy, but I think you get the idea.

But that is just plain utterly inadequate for any in depth discourse about that belief. — creativesoul

It's not inadequate, inadequate to whom? And what is inadequate here? You seem to want to get to the essence of the belief. Here's how I see what we're talking about: Let's again use Wittgenstein's example of a game. I'm looking at baseball, chess, patience, monopoly, children playing catch, etc., as examples of games, which is the same as looking at people and animals doing a variety of things apart from language that are examples of beliefs. One can say, but there's much more to the game than these examples, the intentions of people, the correlations being made, the poor gamesmanship, the coach, but, I don't need to know all of this to properly use the word game. It seems to me that you are over-analyzing the word as if you're trying to find some precise definition that gives the word belief some final meaning, or some meaning that is special to your idea of belief. It doesn't exist. You also seem to be making the mistake that Wittgenstein said was one of the cardinal problems of philosophical analysis (viz., definitions and theories), i.e., that there is some final analysis that explains these concepts, but that's like looking at a family and thinking that there's some final analysis that will explain the many family resemblances there are between family members.

So your response that my use of the word belief is inadequate as I use it to say this or that example IS an example of a belief, is like saying that the word game is inadequate as I use it to say this or that IS an example of a game. Moreover, even your use of the word inadequate is improper. All you're saying is that it's inadequate to you. Can I use the word chair, without completely analyzing what the chair is composed of, or what examples of things we sit on are really examples of chairs? And how is the statement "That's a chair," as simplistic in it's use as it is, inadequate? It's not. The same is true of my contentions about beliefs.

As Wittgenstein pointed out in PI 66, "And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." And in PI 67, "But if someone wished to say: 'There is something common to all these constructions - I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: 'Something runs through the whole thread - namely the continuous overlapping of those fibers'.

I'm tempted to say that while the brain might be in the head, the mind isn't - at least not entirely.

In a way that is an (extreme?) outcome of Wittgenstein's view. — Banno

I don't understand your points here. Banno, one or two sentences aren't going to explain these ideas. :nerd:

I don't think you're denying that nothing is going on in the head, only that when it comes to language, it's not dependent on what's going in the head. Is that correct? — Sam26

This isn't as precise as I would like it to be, viz., the phrase "...it's not dependent on what's going on in the head." This may be where Banno and I disagree, I'm not sure. There is a sense where language is dependent on minds, i.e., without minds/brains there would be no language. This however, has to be separated from the mistaken idea that language points to something internal, or that the concepts, words, and statements, are internal. So there is a dependence on the internal nature of one's mind/brain to get the ball rolling, but once language starts to roll it's nature is almost entirely social.

It's difficult for people to get away from the idea that a concept represents something in the head/mind. It's even difficult for those of us who have studied Wittgenstein to do it, let alone those who don't understand Wittgenstein. Most of the confusions on this forum are the result of not understanding the nature of language, which is why I bring it up in almost every discussion.

The problem, and it's something that Wittgenstein only dealt with on the periphery, is that we know that something is going on in the mind/brain, i.e., we have conscious awareness. However, this has to be separated from how language (concepts, words, statements, etc.) are learned. The learning of a language is a social thing, and it follows that the rules of grammar, etc., are also social. I learn pain behavior by using it correctly within a linguistic setting. I don't learn pain behavior from my own pains, or by somehow pointing to some internal thing that is associated with the pain. This is hard for some people to grasp, and it has to do with several of Wittgenstein's ideas, viz., the problem of a private language, and the idea of rule-following and making a mistake.

To tackle the problem and the confusions that result is a monumental task, unraveling linguistic confusions is not easy to do. Even if you explain it, which I've done many times, people will not see it; and even those of us who claim to have insight are subject to the same problems. We are also subject to taking some of Wittgenstein's ideas and carrying them too far.

There's only so much you can say Banno, which is why I tend to disengage with some people. What happens is that you end up just repeating yourself over and over. It's not personal, it's just sometimes a waste of time.

But I am not claiming that nothing is going on in people's brains. Some people, anyway. — Banno

:up:

So based on your last reply, I'm not sure if you agree or disagree?

This seemed to go unaddressed, so I will continue my line of thought.

If we follow Wittgenstein's injunction to look to the use rather than the meaning, the dilemma I set up here dissipates.

You and I both use the word "heavy"; The concept, so far as there is one, is not one thing in your head and another thing in my head, but our shared use of the word.

Conceiving of a concept as an item in one;s mind, or a pattern in the firing of one's neurones, or in any other way that makes it a thing inside the head, is ill-conceived.

If concepts are to be anything, they must be shared.

And that means that what we thought was in our heads, isn't. — Banno

You are correct, any concept, which by necessity is based on a language, and the shared rules of that language, is social in nature. This social nature necessitates that the concepts are not some phantasm based in the head, but live and breathe in the social nature of language.

I don't think you're denying that nothing is going on in the head, only that when it comes to language, it's not dependent on what's going in the head. Is that correct?

Any belief, including the beliefs of creatures that do not have the capacity for language, can be placed in the form of a relation between an individual and a proposition, by a creature with the capacity for language. — Banno

I agree Banno.

Do you agree that we need to determine as precisely as possible what non-linguistic belief contains and/or consists of; the content? — Sam26

For my purposes I don't see the need. — Sam26

How then can you claim to know what you're saying about it? — creativesoul

For me it's simple, and not as complicated as most people are making it. We see the actions of animals and humans, and based on these actions we can reasonably infer that they have beliefs apart from statements/propositions. When we communicate these beliefs with one another we use language, but beliefs aren't necessarily dependent on language. Beliefs are only dependent upon language if we want to communicate that belief.

Another way to put it is the following: Pain behavior is not dependent on language, but our talk of pain behavior is. Pain can be observed apart from language, and so can beliefs, both are shown in the acts of both humans and animals.

So to answer your question, "How can I claim to know...?" - I can claim to know based on observation. I don't need to know every aspect of what a belief consists of to draw this conclusion. If you want to be more precise about it that's fine, but just remember that it's not necessary to have a precise definition to be able to talk about these concepts, we do it all the time. The word belief spans a wide array of language-games, so precision, although important, may escape you.

My guess, and it's only a guess, is that money will morph into something completely different at some point, ala some kind of cryptocurrency, which will be a worldwide currency. Of course this may take some time because governments are wedded to paper money.

The argument is:

P1. Ticket 1 won't win
P2. Ticket 2 won't win
P3. Ticket 3 won't win
P4. There are 3 tickets
C. No ticket will win

(Except with more than 3 tickets, obviously). — Michael

All I'm saying is that the above argument follows, but the conclusion would change based on the number of tickets bought. Originally you included P4 as Pn, which would mean a range of possible numbers, and its this range which would change the conclusion. The conclusion that no ticket will win depends on the range of Pn, and if the range is high enough, then your conclusion would be false. It's true, given this e.g., but it may be false given your other example. If this doesn't relate to your point, then I'm not sure what you're saying.

The argument is:

P1. Ticket 1 won't win
P2. Ticket 2 won't win
P3. Ticket 3 won't win
P4. There are 3 tickets
C. No ticket will win

(Except with more than 3 tickets, obviously). — Michael

This argument I can agree with, but it's more complicated than that. Here we're talking about what's probably the case, and the inductive argument above is weak, so the conclusion that no ticket will win follows. However, if my argument is based on P1, P2, P3...P4 (P4 being the total number of tickets bought, viz., 1.2 x 10^8), out of a possible number of possibilities of 1.5 x 10^8, then what conclusion do you think follows? It certainly isn't that C. No ticket will win. It's then probable (my e.g.) that you have a winning ticket based on the number of tickets you've bought in relation to the total number of possible combinations.

The question then arises, "Are you justified in believing that you have a winning ticket?" The answer is, you are justified in believing that you have a winning ticket, i.e., it's based on what's probably the case. Much of our knowledge is like this, I can say, "I know..." based on what's probably the case, not what's necessarily the case. It's another use of the word know, this somewhat connects to what's already been talked about in this thread.

Part of the problem with Gettier is that there seems to be a disconnect between how we define knowledge (JTB for e.g.), and a claim to knowledge, as you know they are very different animals.

That wasn't my argument, though. My argument was that if P1 won't win and if P2 won't win and if P3 won't win ... and if Pn won't win then no ticket will win. — Michael

If all your saying is that no one ticket will win, obviously that's true, but the argument doesn't appear to be saying that.

It does. If for each ticket "this ticket won't win" is true then no ticket will win. — Michael

While it's true that for each ticket that ticket won't win, it's not true that if you buy P1, P2, P3,...Pn that no ticket will win. That's like saying if I buy every possible ticket, no ticket will win, again it doesn't follow.

Do you agree that we need to determine as precisely as possible what non-linguistic belief contains and/or consists of; the content? — creativesoul

For my purposes I don't see the need. This discussion, if I remember correctly, started in my thread on epistemology, and one of my points was that there are beliefs that are pre-linguistic. I was trying to establish that there are beliefs that are basic or foundational and outside the need for justification.

Assuming a lottery of n tickets, the premises are:

P1. Ticket 1 won't win
P2. Ticket 2 won't win
P3. Ticket 3 won't win
...
Pn. Ticket n won't win

From this we can deduce:

C1. No ticket will win

It's a valid inference. — Michael

The conclusion doesn't follow. Validity is a component of deductive arguments not inductive arguments. I think the way one should look at this argument is the following:

As each ticket is bought it increases the probability of winning, so the conclusion that follows from P1, P2, P3...Pn does not lead to the conclusion that "No ticket will win." It leads to the conclusion that one or more tickets will win. In an inductive argument, as the number of supporting premises increases so does the strength of the conclusion (e.g., it increases the probability of winning). Obviously if you buy ten tickets it would be a weak inductive argument to say that the next ticket you buy will be a winner. However, if I buy 100 million tickets, then you strengthen the probability of justifying the conclusion that you will win.

Are you justified in believing that if you buy 100 million tickets that you will win? It depends, if the chance of you winning is 1 in 110 million, then you are justified. Even if you lose, you were still justified in believing you would win, because of the strength of the justification. Most of what we claim to know is based on inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning doesn't require that you know with absolute certainty. Not that you're claiming this, I'm just making further points.

.

Ya, I think the idea that money has to be backed by gold is incorrect. Trust in a currency is probably more important than anything else. If trust is undermined, then all bets are off.

I think that Japan is the case experiment for the MMT. If it gets into trouble with it's huge domestically owned debt and Abenomics sometime in the future, that's bad for MMT. — ssu

Yes, I think many economists keep an eye on Japan. Many predictions about what would happen when carrying as much debt as Japan didn't happen. Many of the past economic models probably need to be re-thought. People compare the debt of a country with household debt, but there is a vast difference, especially given fiat currencies. Sometimes I wonder whether a country might be able to have unlimited spending power in some sense. Not sure, just thinking outloud.

Given that Witty worked from the conventional notion of JTB, and that notion claims that the content of belief is propositional, then what I've been arguing ought add some understanding with regard to that... — creativesoul

I don't think it's accurate to say that W. worked from the conventional notion of JTB. He examined the notion of knowing using a variety of language-games, and not all of them can be neatly fit into JTB, some can, but some not. I use JTB because it generally works.

The content of non-linguistic belief cannot be propositional. — creativesoul

I agree.

All beliefs are meaningful to the one who has them, but I don't see how this adds anything to the discussion.

I'm not saying it's not meaningful. I'm just saying that it's seems weird to talk of beliefs in this way. All beliefs are meaningful in some way, it's a kind of truism.

I don't think that I would agree with this bit. Referents are about one 'kind' of meaning. While all thought and belief must be meaningful to the believer(otherwise how does it possibly count as such), I'm not too keen upon referents being prior to language. — creativesoul

lol You don't like referent, and I don't like the phrase "meaningful to the believer." It's interesting, at points I think there is agreement, then someone will spell in more detail what they mean, and I'm again confused about what their talking about.

All I'm going to say is there are beliefs that refer to actions apart from statements/propositions, and leave it at that.

However, we cannot claim that our reports are equivalent to the belief itself. That is my issue with claiming that belief is a relation between a proposition/statement and the believer. The only relation that non-linguistic beasties have with that is one we make. — creativesoul

I agree with this Creative. So it appears that you agree with the idea (extrapolating from what you stated) that we can observe beliefs in animals and in pre-linguuistic man, and even in our own actions on a daily basis. This is what I believe Wittgenstein was saying in some of my early quotes, i.e., we can show our beliefs in our actions apart from language. Language is just another medium of expression, and I'm here equating expression as being twofold, in that it also includes one's actions apart from language.

I guess I don't fully follow the distinction. The pre-lingual man leaves food for his prey to entice him near his arrow. Is that not an understanding of the concept of hunger? — Hanover

The way I think of concepts is in relation to words, but you seem to want to say that concepts are much broader in scope. How do we normally use the word concept? I think there is an understanding apart from language, we see this in the behavior of animals and pre-linguistic man, but I'm not sure that that is in relation to concepts. Maybe the difference has to do with concepts verses being conceptual, there is a difference. I'm not sure Hanover. Moreover, what's the difference between understanding something and conceptualizing something? I haven't clearly thought through some of this, but it's interesting.

The other problem I see in this thread and in other threads, is the idea that we can come up with some clear cut definition that's going to explain all of this. There are a variety of uses of the word belief, but there is not going to be some definitive definition that's going to straighten this issue out. All I want to say is that I believe the word believe is wider is scope than what we express in language, that's my only point.

I don't follow the significance of what you're saying. An animal has no concept called anything because it has no language. They nonetheless have concepts, just no word that attaches to that concept. — Hanover

My point is that they have no concepts because concepts are a necessary feature of language. What is a concept apart from language? I have no idea what that would be.

They fully understand what food is, yet they have no word for it. They may fully understand what a belief is, yet have no word for it. If they don't, that speaks to the simplicity and limited understanding of the animal, but I don't see where it's necessarily the case that a language-less creature could not understand the distinction between what he thought was true and what turned out to be actually true, thus drawing a distinction in his mind between what he believed to be true and what was actually true. Maybe I don't get what you were getting at. — Hanover

I'm making a distinction between concepts and beliefs, in the sense that beliefs can be shown in our actions apart from language, but concepts not. It's clear to me that animals have understanding apart from language, but what that entails I don't know. I think this brings up the question, "What is consciousness apart from language?" What does it entail? I definitely don't know the answer to this question.

Firstly, it does not follow from the fact that we use a given word, that there is a something to which the word refers. For example, "red".

Secondly, there is the issue of the link between a belief and an action. Beliefs do not happen on their own, and given a suitable set of auxiliary beliefs, any action can be made compatible with any belief. — Banno

I understand that not all words refer to objects, but some words are used in this very way. Think of how we teach certain words to children. We teach some words by ostensive definition, but not all words, as Wittgenstein pointed out, but he never denied that some words are used in this way. In fact, Wittgenstein very first example of a language-game at the beginning of the PI reflects the fact that some words have a direct correlation between the concept and an object.

I don't see the connection between your second point and my comments.

I think we agree. However, you didn't respond to the most important part about referent. What do you think of this point?

I claim that metaphysics is a precise and scientific subject, and that there's no need to use words with vague or unknown meaning. — Michael Ossipoff

Your posts are so long it's difficult to reply to everything. I don't necessarily believe it's a bad thing, because some of my posts are long too. The problem though, as I read through your post, is that just when I think we have a point of agreement, I see that we are very far apart on some of these issues. The only way I see to even begin to clarify some of our disagreements is to take it one step at a time.

First, as you know I spend a lot of time discussing and studying Wittgenstein, so my view of language comes from him, mostly. Therefore, some of my disagreements with you have to do with the way you're using certain words/concepts. For example, we are far apart on the idea that metaphysics is a precise and scientific subject, i.e., I look at it as having some precision, but also having areas of blurred boundaries. And even the word precise falls into the category of being blurred, depending on context/use. For example, I can say, "Stand precisely here," without having an exact spot in mind, i.e., if you come over and stand roughly where I was pointing, that will do. I'm not going to say, "No, your not standing exactly where I pointed," as you get down and point to a piece of gravel. Now of course sometimes we do have an exact spot in mind, but the point is that much of language is very vague, and yet we use these concepts in ways we understand, we do it all the time.

Second, let's consider the statement "God exists." My contention is that we can refer to such a being without having a very precise definition, and still have an idea of what we're talking about, at least generally. To explain this further let's use this example: For the sake of argument let's suppose that we were having an argument about whether Augustus Caesar existed, do we need a precise definition of who we're talking about in order to have a sensible discussion/argument? What kind of definition could one give that someone else couldn't say, that's not very precise? Someone might ask you, "Who or what is Caesar," i.e., give me a definition? Whatever definition you give, surely it isn't going to explain Caesar's exact nature or character, but it's probably going to be close enough for us to have a sensible conversation. My point would be that this is true of the concept God, and it's true of many other concepts we use. Vagueness is built into many of our concepts, and philosophers who think that they can come up with exact definitions to explain things are shooting at the moon. This is part of what Wittgenstein was arguing against in much of his work, and I think it's an important point of understanding. This isn't to say that we shouldn't be precise as possible, but that precision isn't always possible or even warranted.

My disagreement is mainly with the idea that metaphysics is a precise subject, not necessarily with the idea that it's can be scientific.

On my view, it points out a certain kind of belief:One that is clearly existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

I agree that there are beliefs that are existentially dependent upon language, viz., beliefs that are linguistic (statements/propositions). Thus, if I say, "The Earth has one moon," by definition that is a statement of belief. I think we all agree with you on this.

It harks to what is state-able, and works from the long held view that all belief content is propositional. That vein of thought, however, can lead one astray when s/he begins to attempt to put a non-linguistic creatures belief into words/propositions. I mean, clearly an animal who does not speak English cannot have an attitude towards a proposition written in English. If we attempt to claim that the creature has a belief, and belief is a relation between the creature and a proposition, then we are saying that the creature has a relation to something that it doesn't understand. If it doesn't understand the proposition, then the only relation between it and the proposition is one that we draw. That would be meaningful to us, not the creature. It makes no sense to claim that a creature has a belief if that belief is not meaningful to the creature... — creativesoul

I also agree that what's leads us astray is that we are using language to talk about the beliefs on non-linguistic animals, including pre-linguistic man. However, I'm not sure what you mean by "...having a belief that is not meaningful to the creature," i.e., maybe you mean in terms of language, it's not meaningful to the creature?

You seem to be saying what I was saying a while back, i.e., that people seem to be confusing beliefs, the linguistic expression of beliefs, with an act that shows the belief apart from language. There is no way for these creatures to understand the belief as we understand the belief, since the belief as we are expressing them are necessarily linguistic. They have no concept called belief. So part of the problem is that our talk of these beliefs is a necessary function of language, which in turn leads to the assumption that the belief itself, as shown in the animal/human, is a necessary function of language. It is a necessary function of language if we are to express beliefs using language, but that doesn't mean that an act cannot show a belief apart from a linguistic understanding.

Another way to think of this, is when we talk about the Earth having one moon, we can only do this in language, i.e., the concept has an instance in reality. So the concept has a referent (i.e., the object Earth) quite apart from the concept and the linguistic use. In the same way, there is a referent to the word belief, viz., particular actions that an animal expresses in life. We see these same actions (a kind of referent) in us, i.e., in our daily actions. I open the door, shows the belief that a door is there, regardless of any expression of the belief in language. So the action is the referent, granted, it is different from the referent Earth, but it's still part of reality as something that is instantiated. Thus, these acts are referred to in language by the concept belief/s. Just as we use the concept Earth to refer to the object. Maybe this helps, not sure.

Yeah but we're not tenured as 'professors of philosophy'. — Wayfarer

Very true.

Maybe I'll be arrested. :wink:

I haven't read any of that since my college days, which was quite a while ago. Wittgenstein gives me enough of a headache. Leibniz would drive me insane. :gasp:

then an immaterial consciousness poses no problem for physicalism/naturalism (provided that said consciousness is not of a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort). — Arkady

I'd be interested in understanding what you mean by "...provided that said consciousness is not a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort." Do you mean by this that consciousness is not something we can point to and say, "This is consciousness," i.e., it's not like pointing to a tree and saying, "That is a tree."

I agree with much of what you're saying Wayfarer, especially the part that says that Dennett spouts a bunch of learned nonsense. However, it's not unusual, I think many of us do the same thing.

I find that much of the discussion of consciousness is just confusion, and I say this from a Wittgensteinian point of view, i.e., that much of the confusion lies in the way we discuss the issue, and the way we use many of the words/concepts involved. So we create a world view with seemingly clearly defined words, this then shuts out others who have a more expansive use of the word/concept. Now it's not always as simple as this, but this is part of the problem.

Also what's weird about our discussion of what's material or natural, when looking at some of this stuff on the quantum level it seems to morph into the metaphysical. So there is no clear cut boundary when talking about what's metaphysical or not at a certain level of discussion. So the use of words I think on some level confounds us, and this is why I think we need to be careful about being too dogmatic about some of these ideas.

Real” isn’t metaphysically-defined. I have no idea what people at a philosophy forum mean by it. I try to avoid that word. Or, when I mention it, I emphasize that I don’t know what it would mean—as I did in the passage that you quoted. — Michael Ossipoff

Sorry I don't always get back to every response. On some of these ideas we're in agreement, or at least close, but in other areas we seem far apart, but I guess that's natural. One area of disagreement has to do with the use of the word real as it pertains to metaphysical questions. The word real isn't always as clear cut as we would like it to be, but that doesn't mean we can't use the word in reference to metaphysics, i.e., simply because it has no clear cut meaning. The word real is vague by it's very nature, even when used in reference to the physical universe. However, it does get even more problematic when discussing metaphysics, but that doesn't mean we can't know what people mean by real in terms of the metaphysical. You seem to want to limit its use because it's vague, but many words are like this, and yet we understand their use. For example, we often ask, "Is God real?" without any precise definition that applies, and yet we seem to understand the implications of the question.

I haven’t heard of those. I’ve read a few books on NDEs, and haven’t heard of ones that suggested knowledge about past lives. So probably not a high percentage of NDEs report that. — Michael Ossipoff

I've divided NDEs into three categories - category 1 is just a very basic NDE where someone might experience an OBE and observe things taking place around them while their body is unconscious. Category 2 has more information, i.e., they may see deceased relatives, go through a tunnel, experience a life review, etc. And then there are category 3 NDEs, which give us even more information about the experience. An example of a category 3 NDE would be Dr. Eben Alexander's NDE, which gives more detailed information about the experience, but there are many category 3 NDEs that give more information than is generally known. Many of my conclusions about past lives has come from what people have said about their category 3 experience, and yes, this category isn't as pervasive as category 1 and 2 NDEs, but there are still many thousands of them. So there is plenty of evidence, but not enough to be dogmatic about it. All I can say is that it seems to be the case that based on these testimonials that certain conclusions follow. Moreover, there is also testimonial evidence of past lives from people who have experienced DMT, and these experiences are closely related to NDEs, i.e., they have some of the same experiences and more.

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