Here is some interesting video conducted by a quartet of some top theoretical physicists, including a Nobel Laureate, discussing how all the information in the universe can be stored as a holographic surface (not volume). — Rich

That's a great video, I've listened to it several times over the past couple of years. I was first introduced to the idea of a holographic universe when I read Michael Talbot's book The Holographic Universe back in the mid 90's. The holographic principle probably explains many things about our brains, which in some ways show signs of being holographic.

I know exactly how you feel BlueBanana. :D

Metaphysics is the limit of what can be discussed, described, argued. — Michael Ossipoff

I didn't say "Metaphysics is the limit of what can be discussed...," I said, "...there are limits to what can be said about the metaphysical." Wittgenstein thought that the boundary between what can be sensibly talked about is the boundary between "the world," and the metaphysical. I do disagree with Wittgenstein on this point. It sounds like you agree with him, if I understand your point.

You make it sound so obvious, as though I'm pointing out a truism. There is much disagreement about these points.

I think we all agree that metaphysics, discussion, description and argument don't cover or apply to all of Reality. — Michael Ossipoff

I'm glad you think we all agree, but you must not be paying much attention to what people write.

Much of the problem with the discussion of consciousness has to do with our epistemological ideas; and thus it's a language problem. It's a language problem because knowledge (JTB) is something that happens with propositions. However, the subjective "I" needs no justification, it's just there. Do I need a justification for my inner experiences to believe that I'm having inner experiences? How could you even doubt that which is required for the doubt to even express itself?

The second problem is also linguistic, that is, how do we describe these states or the mental phenomena behind the "I?" - behind the self. This of course brings us back to an epistemological world view that can limit how we describe what's happening. If our world view is strictly viewed from a naturalistic or physical point of view, then how we describe consciousness (the linguistic descriptions) will be limited by this view; and anything that describes consciousness outside this purview will be viewed suspiciously, and even viewed as irrational.

So science can actually limited what can be said, because it limits the language of descriptions to the field of science, which again is only one way of attaining knowledge. It's not a necessary limitation, but a contingent one based on a particular world view, i.e., science can be expanded, and is expanding beyond the natural or the physical. In a way, the science of quantum physics forces the metaphysical upon us, so it reduces everything to what's metaphysical. Even mathematics is a metaphysical endeavor produced by consciousness.

Once we understand that knowledge isn't limited to science, then we can expand our knowledge base, and expand our understanding of consciousness. However, there just may be limits to what can be said about the metaphysical, i.e., language itself may impose limits on what can be said, but it's difficult to know where those limits are, and why there are limits (if there are limits).

I definitely can't say that I haven't been guilty of similar responses.

I think we have to be careful about shutting down speech. I think you're right in that certain platforms (businesses, etc) have a right to limit what's said. Where I think we have to be careful is in the public square, and at Universities where students are there to learn and be challenged.

But there is something more going on in our society, i.e., some politicians are using the term bigot or racist to shut down the other side (this happens on both sides), so they paint their opponents as bigots or racist in order to shut down their arguments. They create a narrative about someone they don't like (justified or not) in order to shut them up, or to get others to not listen to them, or even hate them.

What I've observed, is that if you want to see racism in someone you'll find it. There are many things we say that might be interpreted as racist, yet not fully reflect a person's belief about racism, or not fully reflect how a person really acts towards others of a different race. For example, someone might say something in anger that may or may not reflect what they truly believe.

People's actions are more complicated than some might imagine. I've seen people talk in a way that's racist, and yet I've seen that same person act with kindness toward someone of a different race. Some people can struggle with immorality in their lives, and yet generally act in ways that are moral. It's more important to look at a person's actions over a long period of time than to look at a couple of isolated remarks.

What you experienced was an NDE, but it doesn't sound like you completely left your body, but you were detached. There is a purpose, it's just not a religious purpose, that is, it's not based on religious dogma. I have a thread on NDEs, but it goes beyond your experience.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body/p1

Another interesting point about lying, i.e., when I tell the judge that I didn't murder my wife (when in fact I did murder my wife), I'm expressing a belief, but the judge, prosecutor, and jury have to judge based on my actions whether it's a belief truly held by me, viz., that I'm not lying. Thus the evidence of the act reflects the true belief held by the guilty party. So lies can be determined based simply on the actions of the person, and thus what's true, in terms of the belief truly held by the guilty party, is seen in the evidence, which reflect the correct belief.

That's an interesting point Cuthbert. In some sense we can also fool ourselves about our beliefs, i.e., I can say that I love my wife, but my actions may indicate otherwise. This is also another example where an action shows the belief. Is it that it's not a sincerely held belief, or is it just not a belief at all, i.e., I can say that I sincerely believe it, but my actions say otherwise?

...what do you do with beliefs that are simply shown and not stated? We know that a belief can be stated given a linguistic context, but not all beliefs originate in linguistic contexts, i.e., they can simply be reflections of our actions, again like Wittgenstein's examples. — creativesoul

Now that I re-read my statement, it's a mistake to say that beliefs are reflections of actions, so you are correct in that actions are reflections of a belief. So I did reverse this, and this is what Wittgenstein pointed out, i.e., I see a particular kind of action, and that action reflects a belief or beliefs. I'll have to re-read my posts because I'm sure there are other errors that I made in my expressions. This though is a kind of typo more than anything else, but I also didn't realize what I'd done when I re-read what I typed.

"Wittgenstein didn't figure it out either," that's really funny, not that he wasn't wrong about some things, but that you would say such a thing. I don't know that I would have the audacity to say such a thing. His mind and philosophy, generally, was just on a different level altogether in terms of genius.

So "Jack has a red ball" must be false because Jack cannot see red? — Banno

I don't follow your logic. Jack has a red ball is not a belief that Jack would have (if Jack is a dog). If I say, "Jack has a red ball," that would be my belief expressed in language.

You're missing the point. I'm not saying that passion is intrinsically bad. I'm saying that passion has nothing to do with the conclusion of a well-reasoned argument. My passion to pursue philosophy can be a good thing, but that's different from saying passion is somehow important to drawing a proper conclusion. That's similar to saying that passion is important to the answer of what is 2x2=?. What's important to logic or mathematics is that you know how to apply the rules that lead to correct outcomes. I can have all the passion in the world and that in itself wouldn't make me good at logic or mathematics. My passion may make me study harder, in which case I may become a better logician, but that again is a separate issue.

It doesn't matter to me that reason tends to be a slave of our passions, which is probably true in many cases. But logic, which is the study of correct reasoning using propositions, it's a study that is devoid of emotional content in terms of the rules of logic. Logic doesn't care whether you're happy or sad, it doesn't care how you feel about the facts. Facts are facts apart from how you or I feel. If I say there is a glass on the table, your emotional state has nothing to do with the objective truth of the statement. Thus, my conclusion either matches with a particular state-of-affairs (a fact), or it doesn't.

Emotional states, which many use to guide their reason, can only lead astray. This is why there is so many irrational beliefs in religion, politics, ethics, etc., etc.

Moral education is about one's ethical duty apart from how you feel about moral right and wrong. Your subjective passions, which many use to guide their reason, are not what makes something moral or immoral. Abortion is a good example, it's the passions on both sides that cloud the issue.

I'm not sharing an opinion, which is what you're doing. I'm telling you what logic is, and logic by definition has nothing to do with emotional responses.

For example,
Modus Ponens in logic...
If P, then Q.
P.
Therefore, Q.

If I am human, then I am a person.
I am human.
Therefore, I am a person.

The conclusion is devoid of emotion and rightly so.

Well, all emotion does is cloud the issue, and logic is similar to mathematics; as such, it needs no emotion to come to a correct conclusion, you simply follow the rules.

Emotion is something that naturally occurs as we present arguments, but good arguments have nothing to do with emotion, and everything to do with evidence or good reasons.

Well, if that is the case, then my response is bullshit. :D

This is just an emotional response, which is bullshit, because it has no place in a philosophy forum, which is supposed to be more about correct reasoning than emotion.

I think clarity start's happening as people use their words to explain the idea.

If you accept that the concept belief takes its meaning from public behaviours, then what of your "private beliefs"? If you are merely saying that there is some internal aspect to belief, as there is e.g. an internal aspect to pain, then I agree - although I'm not sure what pre-linguistic man's internal aspect of a belief could be without language. But also, as I've said before, I think it confuses matters to use the word private here, given its Wittgensteinian usage, i.e. where something cannot be made public or can be known only by a single individual. If you accept that the word belief gets its meaning, and that beliefs can be expressed, via external, public behaviours, then it confuses matters to refer to beliefs as private, especially when the discussion is also about Wittgenstein. — Luke

Yes, that's all I mean by private, that there is an "internal aspect" to belief. But then you ask, "...I'm not sure what pre-linguistic man's "internal aspect" of a belief could be without language[?]" - It would be just that, a private belief, if kept private, or become public in two ways - first, by expressing the belief publicly via an action apart from language, or two, expressing the belief via language, which are both public.

I do except the fact that beliefs get their meaning in a public way, i.e., the concept belief is a public happening. It doesn't confuse things if you understand that there is an internal aspect to a belief that is a necessary condition for belief (here I'm separating the internal from the external). However, language itself, is not a necessary condition for belief, although it's necessary for the linguistic application, or the expression of a belief, which are public.

I don't think I confused the issue of what I meant by private beliefs, but I can see how others confused the issue. The problem as I pointed out to Banno, was that the concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from the private mental happening. I explained how this idea a couple of times, and how it differed from what Wittgenstein was saying. Now, could I have worded it more accurately, probably, I would have to go back and look at what was written.

If all belief consists of statements/propositions, then Jack has no belief for he has no statements/propositions.

If Jack has belief, then not all belief consists of statements/propositions, for Jack has no statements/propositions. — creativesoul

I say that it is clear that Jack has belief. Therefore, it is not the case that all belief content is propositional. — creativesoul

Exactly, couldn't have said it better myself. Very precise, and very clear.

It does not follow from the fact that Jack cannot argue for his own belief that he has none. It does follow from the fact that Jack cannot justify his own belief that he does not have the means for doing so. It does follow from the fact that Jack has belief and no language that not all belief is existentially dependent upon language. It does follow from the fact that Jack has belief and no language that not all belief content is propositional/statements... — creativesoul

Again, I like it Creative, very direct and to the point.

I would say that you have this exactly backwards. Behaviours reflect belief. — creativesoul

I don't understand why you would say this, especially since in what you quoted I said, "...they [beliefs] can be reflections of our actions. I've been saying this all through this thread. :-$

I can unite the two, but trying to get people to understand my point on this is a struggle as it is. My metaphysics would be another exercise in futility. :-$

It's the "slightly different" that I'm concerned about. :-O

There is a sense where I would say that my comments are both true and not true also, but that has to do with my metaphysics. Ultimately I believe that at the bottom of everything is consciousness. In fact, I think it's the unifying principle, but this is a discussion for another thread.

I'm not much of a fan of Searle, but I think Austin made some important contributions. Have you read Sense and Sensibilia?

One way to think of what I'm saying is this: We talk about facts using the concept fact, and that concept refers to states-of-affairs, but even without the concept, or without minds to apprehend the facts, there would still be states-of-affairs in the universe. Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. Moreover, the concepts that refer to that reality, get their meaning from how we use the words in language-games.

This is a consequence of what a belief is - a part of the explanation of an action. Explaining is not the sort of thing we can do without language, surely. — Banno

Of course you can't explain a belief apart from language, that's what an explanation amounts to. I'm not talking about an explanation of a belief, I'm talking about how people can show beliefs apart from statements, and thus apart from explanations. Read my reply to Luke.

Some of you seem to be confusing the fact that we can talk about beliefs, share beliefs, explain beliefs, and we're doing this in this thread; but this is quite different from how we show beliefs. Forget about everything prelinguistic, we show our beliefs everyday.

Okay, but it seems much more reasonable that the word "belief" gets its meaning from, and refers to, public behaviours in much the same way that sensation words like "pain" do. And I would assume that the word originally referred to human beliefs before anything else. This would make your attribution of beliefs to other animals and prelinguistic man an anachronism, a potential misuse of the word "belief", or at least an error in Wittgensteinian grammar. — Luke

I'm not saying the word or concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from public behavior, of course it does.

When I sit on a chair, am I not showing that I believe a chair is there to sit on? No one has to state the belief to know that the person showing the belief, has the belief. You can state it, or I can state it, but that doesn't mean there is no belief prior to the statement. It's often seen in our public actions even before it's stated.

Are you saying that a concept cannot refer to something prior to it's linguistic creation? When I read what others are saying it seems they're implying this, as though beliefs can't exist apart from the concept belief, or the linguistic use of the term belief.

Sorry I misread that proposition, you're correct. It's getting late for me. I need to go to bed. lol

I do agree that all beliefs are stateable. The overwhelming majority of beliefs are propositional(take the form thereof... belief statements). Where you and I differ, as well as Sam and I(I think), regards the content of belief. Sam notices and attempts to make sense of how language gets off the ground without belief. If all belief has only propositional content, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language(which they are on my view), then so too are all beliefs(which they aren't on my view). I think you agree here. — creativesoul

All beliefs are stateable. I'm not sure what that means. If an animal has a belief, can the animal state the belief? No. So there is one example where a belief is not stateable, unless you deny that animals have beliefs. Now if you're saying that in some linguistic context any belief can be stated, of course I agree with you on that. You can always stick any belief in a linguistic context and say, see, it's stateable. However, what do you do with beliefs that are simply shown and not stated? We know that a belief can be stated given a linguistic context, but not all beliefs originate in linguistic contexts, i.e., they can simply be reflections of our actions, again like Wittgenstein's examples. Language enables us to share our beliefs, but the belief itself doesn't necessarily originate in language. It originates in the mind of the person who has the belief. Then if language is a part of that person's life, it is expressed to others in the form of a statement/proposition. Beliefs aren't simply generated because there is a language, if that was the case, then we could say that computers have beliefs simply because they can make statements.

The point about hinge-propositions is that they're not really propositions. This is seen not only in my discussions about them, but in the discussions of other philosophers.

Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. — Banno

Proposition are statements that can be true or false, and we agree on this point. However, "The present king of France" is a proposition, it's a proposition because it does have one of the features put forth in the definition, viz., that of being false. What you stated above is contradictory based on the definition you put forward. Thus, the definition is correct, but your example in not.

This is inaccurate, my mistake.

Ya, Prichard thinks they're beliefs too, but again I disagree.

I'm going to contrast my reading of OC with other readings, so in that vain I'm going to start by discussing Dr. D. R. Prichard's reading of OC as presented in the IEP (which is peer reviewed). Many of my thoughts are similar to Dr. Prichard's, so I will start here.

As a side note, I did have a short email conversation with Dr. Prichard about something I wrote.

Quotes are taken from this link: http://www.iep.utm.edu/witt-epi/

"Wittgenstein’s reflections on the structure of reason have influenced a more recent “Wittgenstein-inspired” anti-skeptical position, namely Pritchard’s “hinge-commitment” strategy (2016b), for which “hinges” are not beliefs but rather arational, non-propositional commitments, not subject to epistemic evaluation."

Here I agree with Prichard's account of OC that hinges are "...arational, non-propositional commitments, not subject to epistemic evaluation." However, where we disagree is with the idea that hinges are not beliefs. My position is that they do reflect beliefs, but not stated beliefs, beliefs that are shown by our actions; and I point to Wittgenstein's statements in OC 284 and 285 as such examples.

"The question that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were the hinges on which those turn [….] that is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted [...] If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 341–343).

"As per Pritchard, here Wittgenstein would claim that the same logic of our ways of inquiry presupposes that some propositions are excluded from doubt; and this is not irrational or based on a sort of blind faith but, rather, belongs to the way rational inquiries are put forward (see OC 342) . As a door needs hinges in order to turn, any rational evaluation would then require a prior commitment to an unquestionable proposition/set of “hinges” in order to be possible at all."

The idea that some propositions (non-propositions, non-propositional beliefs for me, non-propositional commitments for Prichard) rest on what is immune from doubt. These arational hinges, are the foundation for any commitment to epistemological constructs. They are also foundational to doubt itself, that is, we start with certain commitments or beliefs, and this allows us to construct an epistemological inquiry, or to raise doubts.

"A consequence of this thought (2016b, 3) is that any form of universal doubt such as the Cartesian skeptical one is constitutively impossible; there is simply no way to pursue an inquiry in which nothing is taken for granted. In other words, the same generality of the Cartesian skeptical challenge is then based on a misleading way of representing the essentially local nature of our enquiries."

"But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 343)."

"This maneuver helps Pritchard to overcome one of the main problems facing Williams’ “Wittgensteinian Contextualism.” Recall that, following Williams, the Cartesian skeptical challenge is both legitimate and unsolvable, even if only in the more demanding philosophical context. On the contrary, argues Pritchard, as per Wittgenstein, there is simply nothing like the kind of universal doubt employed by the Cartesian skeptic, both in the philosophical and in the, so to say, non-philosophical context of our everyday epistemic practices. A proponent of Cartesian skepticism looks for a universal, general evaluation of our beliefs; but crucially, there is no such thing as a general evaluation of our beliefs, whether positive (anti-skeptical) or negative (skeptical), for all rational evaluation can take place only in the context of “hinges” which are themselves immune to rational evaluation."

I wholly agree with Prichard here. For someone to properly understand this, it is crucial to understand the Wittgensteinian connection between knowledge and doubt, which Grayling also mentions.

Some points against a strictly relativistic view of On Certainty. Much of this comes from the idea that the foundation, which everything is based on, is contingent, and if that is so, then reality could be different from what it is. Thus from this view it seems that the skeptic has an important point about what we claim to know.

The rebuttal to this is that although reality could be different from what it is, it still doesn't mean that anything can count as true. Moreover, within language-games there are still necessary and contingent truths. And our linguistic views arise within a culture of shared experiences and common knowledge, which are as sure as one can get. That said, there are relativistic aspects to all of this, but they fit within the scope of knowledge (some of this knowledge is relativistic), which has many uses across a wide platform of language-games, including the objective and subjective.

One of the things we need to keep in mind about Wittgenstein's later writings, is his lack of emphasis on sharp boundaries. He emphasizes the changing and fluctuating nature of language, within a kind of continuity, which is based on the logic or rules of language. Sometimes having sharp boundaries keeps us focused to intently on some things. It's like getting tunnel vision, we don't see the periphery which can make all the difference.

Grayling:
"My exegetical task is effected by suitably anatomising OC. The view I shall call OC1 and which constitutes a version of a foundationalist refutation of scepticism, and therefore a contribution to the theory of knowledge, has two components, the first of which is that scepticism is answered by appeal to the fact that beliefs inhere in a system, and the second of which is that this system of beliefs rests on foundations which give those beliefs their content. Here are some passages exemplifying the first component of OC1 (all emphases are Wittgenstein's):"

and OC 2 by Grayling:

"OC2 is relativism. Relativism is the view that truth and knowledge are not absolute or invariable, but dependent upon viewpoint, circumstances or historical conditions. What is true for me might not be true for you; what counts as knowledge from one viewpoint might not do so from another; what is true at one time is false at another. Paragraph 97 arguably shows that the relativism implicit in this aspect of OC is of a classic or standard type. Its presence in OC is entirely consistent with its presence elsewhere in the later writings: one remembers the lions and Chinese of PI. What was left open in those earlier relativistic remarks was the degree of strength of the relativism to which Wittgenstein was committed. OC2 constitutes a claim that the framework within which claims to knowledge and challenges of doubt equally make sense is such that its change can reverse what counted as either. That is classically strong relativism."

Continuing with Grayling:

"These considerations rule out relativism. They therefore rule out OC2. There is no other way of taking OC2 than as a seriously strong relativist argument ('the river-bed of thoughts may shift' ... 'a language-game changes with time'). In the ideal state of things, therefore, OC1's offer of a response to scepticism is elected to stand, and OC2 is ditched. But as the text of OC was left to us, Wittgenstein was developing arguments for both, so the next question is: is there any way they could be made to reconcile, further up the road where their parallels meet?"

"But if one does not supplement the response to scepticism (OC1) by some such strategy, the exercise in OC is at best partial, at worst self-defeating, with the self-defeat stemming from acceptance of OC2. As OC stands, it stands defeated in just this way, for it only deals with scepticism at the lower, less threatening level, and fails to recognise that scepticism in its strongest form is, precisely, relativism."

Grayling proposes a third option as a way out of the conundrum as he sees it.

"There are hints in OC of an alternative better way out: namely, some version of naturalism–in Hume's, not Quine's, sense; that is, as appealing to natural facts about our psychological make-up (not, as in Quine, as appealing to the deliverances of current theory in natural science: although the latter form of naturalism takes itself to absorb the former). See 287: 'The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well.' This hint is strengthened by 505: 'It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something' and the paradigmatically Humean 277: '"I can't help believing ...".' If one re-reads the practice-cum-form-of-life entries in the light of these–a twist of the kaleidoscope–a plausibly naturalistic thesis comes fully into view."

I agree with Graying that there are competing interpretations within OC, but Banno, my view of OC isn't strictly OC 1 or OC 2, it's a combination. There is a way of fitting Wittgenstein's views within a framework, but one has to be careful about theorizing about what Wittgenstein is saying, which is why I try to be careful about equating some of what I'm saying with Wittgenstein.

There are relativistic views in OC, and there is also a kind of foundationalism in OC, and this can be seen in the quotes in this article... http://www.acgrayling.com/wittgenstein-on-scepticism-and-certainty

For me to completely iron out some of my views would probably take a few hundred pages of writing, because most of my writing on OC has been strictly an exegesis. However, I've also gone beyond the exegesis into my own theory of knowledge. There is no doubt that some of what I've been putting forth in this thread does fit within OC 1 as explained by Grayling, and my views are closer to OC 1 than OC 2, but there are important elements in OC 2 that can be explained in terms of a foundational view. When I say foundational view, I'm talking about my foundational view, which has many elements of Wittgenstein, but with a twist on the prelinguistic.

You got me Sophist, I went Trump university. :B

There are no parts. It is one wholistic life form. — Rich

That's your argument, there are no parts? I'm glad you're saying this, because people can see how silly this is. You make my argument for me. So you just use language the way you want, and you define words the way you want. Well, that's fine, but if you want to seem reasonable you might want to join the rest of the world, who would say that there are parts, and that there are distinct parts. If there aren't parts, what are we naming when we say, that's a heart, that's a lung, that's liver, that's a brain?

I think I'm on Australia time. lol It's 4:20 am here.