I do agree that all beliefs are stateable. The overwhelming majority of beliefs are propositional(take the form thereof... belief statements). Where you and I differ, as well as Sam and I(I think), regards the content of belief. Sam notices and attempts to make sense of how language gets off the ground without belief. If all belief has only propositional content, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language(which they are on my view), then so too are all beliefs(which they aren't on my view). I think you agree here. — creativesoul

All beliefs are stateable. I'm not sure what that means. If an animal has a belief, can the animal state the belief? No. So there is one example where a belief is not stateable, unless you deny that animals have beliefs. Now if you're saying that in some linguistic context any belief can be stated, of course I agree with you on that. You can always stick any belief in a linguistic context and say, see, it's stateable. However, what do you do with beliefs that are simply shown and not stated? We know that a belief can be stated given a linguistic context, but not all beliefs originate in linguistic contexts, i.e., they can simply be reflections of our actions, again like Wittgenstein's examples. Language enables us to share our beliefs, but the belief itself doesn't necessarily originate in language. It originates in the mind of the person who has the belief. Then if language is a part of that person's life, it is expressed to others in the form of a statement/proposition. Beliefs aren't simply generated because there is a language, if that was the case, then we could say that computers have beliefs simply because they can make statements.

The point about hinge-propositions is that they're not really propositions. This is seen not only in my discussions about them, but in the discussions of other philosophers.

Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. — Banno

Proposition are statements that can be true or false, and we agree on this point. However, "The present king of France" is a proposition, it's a proposition because it does have one of the features put forth in the definition, viz., that of being false. What you stated above is contradictory based on the definition you put forward. Thus, the definition is correct, but your example in not.

This is inaccurate, my mistake.

Ya, Prichard thinks they're beliefs too, but again I disagree.

I'm going to contrast my reading of OC with other readings, so in that vain I'm going to start by discussing Dr. D. R. Prichard's reading of OC as presented in the IEP (which is peer reviewed). Many of my thoughts are similar to Dr. Prichard's, so I will start here.

As a side note, I did have a short email conversation with Dr. Prichard about something I wrote.

Quotes are taken from this link: http://www.iep.utm.edu/witt-epi/

"Wittgenstein’s reflections on the structure of reason have influenced a more recent “Wittgenstein-inspired” anti-skeptical position, namely Pritchard’s “hinge-commitment” strategy (2016b), for which “hinges” are not beliefs but rather arational, non-propositional commitments, not subject to epistemic evaluation."

Here I agree with Prichard's account of OC that hinges are "...arational, non-propositional commitments, not subject to epistemic evaluation." However, where we disagree is with the idea that hinges are not beliefs. My position is that they do reflect beliefs, but not stated beliefs, beliefs that are shown by our actions; and I point to Wittgenstein's statements in OC 284 and 285 as such examples.

"The question that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were the hinges on which those turn [….] that is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted [...] If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 341–343).

"As per Pritchard, here Wittgenstein would claim that the same logic of our ways of inquiry presupposes that some propositions are excluded from doubt; and this is not irrational or based on a sort of blind faith but, rather, belongs to the way rational inquiries are put forward (see OC 342) . As a door needs hinges in order to turn, any rational evaluation would then require a prior commitment to an unquestionable proposition/set of “hinges” in order to be possible at all."

The idea that some propositions (non-propositions, non-propositional beliefs for me, non-propositional commitments for Prichard) rest on what is immune from doubt. These arational hinges, are the foundation for any commitment to epistemological constructs. They are also foundational to doubt itself, that is, we start with certain commitments or beliefs, and this allows us to construct an epistemological inquiry, or to raise doubts.

"A consequence of this thought (2016b, 3) is that any form of universal doubt such as the Cartesian skeptical one is constitutively impossible; there is simply no way to pursue an inquiry in which nothing is taken for granted. In other words, the same generality of the Cartesian skeptical challenge is then based on a misleading way of representing the essentially local nature of our enquiries."

"But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 343)."

"This maneuver helps Pritchard to overcome one of the main problems facing Williams’ “Wittgensteinian Contextualism.” Recall that, following Williams, the Cartesian skeptical challenge is both legitimate and unsolvable, even if only in the more demanding philosophical context. On the contrary, argues Pritchard, as per Wittgenstein, there is simply nothing like the kind of universal doubt employed by the Cartesian skeptic, both in the philosophical and in the, so to say, non-philosophical context of our everyday epistemic practices. A proponent of Cartesian skepticism looks for a universal, general evaluation of our beliefs; but crucially, there is no such thing as a general evaluation of our beliefs, whether positive (anti-skeptical) or negative (skeptical), for all rational evaluation can take place only in the context of “hinges” which are themselves immune to rational evaluation."

I wholly agree with Prichard here. For someone to properly understand this, it is crucial to understand the Wittgensteinian connection between knowledge and doubt, which Grayling also mentions.

Some points against a strictly relativistic view of On Certainty. Much of this comes from the idea that the foundation, which everything is based on, is contingent, and if that is so, then reality could be different from what it is. Thus from this view it seems that the skeptic has an important point about what we claim to know.

The rebuttal to this is that although reality could be different from what it is, it still doesn't mean that anything can count as true. Moreover, within language-games there are still necessary and contingent truths. And our linguistic views arise within a culture of shared experiences and common knowledge, which are as sure as one can get. That said, there are relativistic aspects to all of this, but they fit within the scope of knowledge (some of this knowledge is relativistic), which has many uses across a wide platform of language-games, including the objective and subjective.

One of the things we need to keep in mind about Wittgenstein's later writings, is his lack of emphasis on sharp boundaries. He emphasizes the changing and fluctuating nature of language, within a kind of continuity, which is based on the logic or rules of language. Sometimes having sharp boundaries keeps us focused to intently on some things. It's like getting tunnel vision, we don't see the periphery which can make all the difference.

Grayling:
"My exegetical task is effected by suitably anatomising OC. The view I shall call OC1 and which constitutes a version of a foundationalist refutation of scepticism, and therefore a contribution to the theory of knowledge, has two components, the first of which is that scepticism is answered by appeal to the fact that beliefs inhere in a system, and the second of which is that this system of beliefs rests on foundations which give those beliefs their content. Here are some passages exemplifying the first component of OC1 (all emphases are Wittgenstein's):"

and OC 2 by Grayling:

"OC2 is relativism. Relativism is the view that truth and knowledge are not absolute or invariable, but dependent upon viewpoint, circumstances or historical conditions. What is true for me might not be true for you; what counts as knowledge from one viewpoint might not do so from another; what is true at one time is false at another. Paragraph 97 arguably shows that the relativism implicit in this aspect of OC is of a classic or standard type. Its presence in OC is entirely consistent with its presence elsewhere in the later writings: one remembers the lions and Chinese of PI. What was left open in those earlier relativistic remarks was the degree of strength of the relativism to which Wittgenstein was committed. OC2 constitutes a claim that the framework within which claims to knowledge and challenges of doubt equally make sense is such that its change can reverse what counted as either. That is classically strong relativism."

Continuing with Grayling:

"These considerations rule out relativism. They therefore rule out OC2. There is no other way of taking OC2 than as a seriously strong relativist argument ('the river-bed of thoughts may shift' ... 'a language-game changes with time'). In the ideal state of things, therefore, OC1's offer of a response to scepticism is elected to stand, and OC2 is ditched. But as the text of OC was left to us, Wittgenstein was developing arguments for both, so the next question is: is there any way they could be made to reconcile, further up the road where their parallels meet?"

"But if one does not supplement the response to scepticism (OC1) by some such strategy, the exercise in OC is at best partial, at worst self-defeating, with the self-defeat stemming from acceptance of OC2. As OC stands, it stands defeated in just this way, for it only deals with scepticism at the lower, less threatening level, and fails to recognise that scepticism in its strongest form is, precisely, relativism."

Grayling proposes a third option as a way out of the conundrum as he sees it.

"There are hints in OC of an alternative better way out: namely, some version of naturalism–in Hume's, not Quine's, sense; that is, as appealing to natural facts about our psychological make-up (not, as in Quine, as appealing to the deliverances of current theory in natural science: although the latter form of naturalism takes itself to absorb the former). See 287: 'The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well.' This hint is strengthened by 505: 'It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something' and the paradigmatically Humean 277: '"I can't help believing ...".' If one re-reads the practice-cum-form-of-life entries in the light of these–a twist of the kaleidoscope–a plausibly naturalistic thesis comes fully into view."

I agree with Graying that there are competing interpretations within OC, but Banno, my view of OC isn't strictly OC 1 or OC 2, it's a combination. There is a way of fitting Wittgenstein's views within a framework, but one has to be careful about theorizing about what Wittgenstein is saying, which is why I try to be careful about equating some of what I'm saying with Wittgenstein.

There are relativistic views in OC, and there is also a kind of foundationalism in OC, and this can be seen in the quotes in this article... http://www.acgrayling.com/wittgenstein-on-scepticism-and-certainty

For me to completely iron out some of my views would probably take a few hundred pages of writing, because most of my writing on OC has been strictly an exegesis. However, I've also gone beyond the exegesis into my own theory of knowledge. There is no doubt that some of what I've been putting forth in this thread does fit within OC 1 as explained by Grayling, and my views are closer to OC 1 than OC 2, but there are important elements in OC 2 that can be explained in terms of a foundational view. When I say foundational view, I'm talking about my foundational view, which has many elements of Wittgenstein, but with a twist on the prelinguistic.

You got me Sophist, I went Trump university. :B

There are no parts. It is one wholistic life form. — Rich

That's your argument, there are no parts? I'm glad you're saying this, because people can see how silly this is. You make my argument for me. So you just use language the way you want, and you define words the way you want. Well, that's fine, but if you want to seem reasonable you might want to join the rest of the world, who would say that there are parts, and that there are distinct parts. If there aren't parts, what are we naming when we say, that's a heart, that's a lung, that's liver, that's a brain?

I think I'm on Australia time. lol It's 4:20 am here.

I think I was asking after evidence not to say you were committing a fallacy, but rather because I think the question of how we count examples is precisely why disagreement is often difficult to discuss. Once one counts living items of nature as designed then there really are an incredibly large number of examples that seems to confirm the inference. Likewise, once one counts living items of nature as not-designed, the products of physical forces and nothing more, there are an incredibly large number of examples that confirms the inference. So, in both camps, it's easy to look at the other camp as irrational or dogmatic or confused, or any many other possible psychological explanations which are far from flattering (and certainly miss the point anyways) — Moliere

While it's true that there are a large number of examples in both camps, what makes the argument to intelligent design so strong is that we know based on what we've observed, that we only get artifacts that display the properties of premise one in this way. And while it's true that evolutionary processes are at work in nature, this in itself doesn't mean that objects of nature don't show evidence of design. Objects of nature not only show that they evolve, but they also have the features of premise one, which is enough to conclude rationally that they too are the result of intelligent design.

If one could show that the properties as enumerated in premise one are not the properties of intelligent design, then those who argue against the argument to intelligent design may have a point. However, the analogy is perfect. In fact it's hard to imagine a better analogy.

I'd contend that objects of nature, like a tree or a cat, do not have a structure where the parts are so arranged that the whole can achieve or be used to achieve a higher order than the parts alone. Or, really to put it better and keep our positions linguistically distinct, I think I'd add more to this definition of intelligent design than what you've laid out here. — Moliere

I don't understand? How is it that a cat doesn't have parts, e.g., legs, heart, lung, liver, etc. that work together to achieve higher order functions than any single part alone, and the same can be shown with the tree.

I make a distinction between respecting the person, and respecting their beliefs. I may show respect for a person I don't agree with, but I don't necessarily have to respect what they believe. They have the right to have any belief they desire, but I or we have the right to reject that belief.

At some point I just stop engaging with certain people (MU for e.g.), because I don't see that we agree on much, even the use of certain words, e.g., the post above (objective certainty and objective certitude). There has to be some basis for agreement, otherwise it seems pointless. So I just keep posting for those who are reading the thread and are not necessarily responding.

The way I'm using the term indubitable, is in the sense of being undoubtable, which is exactly what Wittgenstein was getting at with Moore's propositions. Now whether you agree with this or not is up to your interpretation, but it's not just my interpretation, but many other philosophers believe these bedrock propositions are indubitable. I don't see how this cannot be the case.

My conclusions about prelinguistic beliefs are that some are causal in nature and some are not, and I explained the difference in another post. The point though is that these beliefs form a kind of world picture for us. So that I have two hands is a world picture belief, and is demonstrated in our actions apart from propositions/statements, and is also demonstrated in our use of propositions/statements.

This is not true. Wittgenstein does not answer this question with "No". It is very clearly implied that the answer here is "Yes". And that's why he replaces "objective certainty" with "objective certitude" at 270. If the answer were "No" he wouldn't need to replace "certainty" with "certitude". It is only because the answer is yes that he is forced to seek something other than "certainty", and that is "certitude". — Metaphysician Undercover

When he talks about objective certainty and objective certitude, it's basically the same thing. Both are epistemic in nature, and certitude is a synonym of certainty, so what are you talking about? Why do you think they are two different words? There can be a slight difference, but when used in terms of objective certainty or objective certitude as Wittgenstein is using it in this quote, and in the quotes that follow 270, there is very little or no difference. So again my argument stands.

MU much of what I'm saying isn't just my interpretation, but what other philosophers familiar with Wittgenstein's On Certainty are saying. Now that in itself doesn't make it right, but it sure lends support to this interpretation. On the other hand, I have read nothing in support of your interpretation, and if there is writing that supports your interpretation, please share it with us, because I for one would love to read it.

There are different philosophies of psychology that may or may not work, one would have to do some research on the outcomes of different theories of psychology. Moreover, some theories may have better results with certain illnesses, but not good outcomes with other illnesses. But there is a philosophy behind almost every belief system, which is why is good to have some background in evaluating good arguments.

The infinite regress problem arises when people start asking for an infinite number of explanations on how you know what you know. — Magnus Anderson

Right, the infinite regress is about justifications. For example, how do you know X is true, because of A, B, and C. How do you know A, B, and C are true, because of D, E, and F, and so on; but my theory ends with statements or propositions that are outside of any epistemic considerations. I don't think this would solve all infinite regress problems, but some, or many.

I made my meaningless statement a bit clearer.

Yes, I can choose to violate the rules, I can move the bishop like the castle, but then who will understand what I'm doing? My talk and actions would be meaningless. At least meaningless in a chess game, and by extension language-games.

My theory of knowledge rests on these Moorean propositions, or as Wittgenstein calls them, hinge-propositions. It's a kind of foundational theory that rests on our acting, and thus the certainty that that brings into the epistemological language-games. As I said early on it solves the problem of circular reasoning, and it solves the infinite regress problem.

The language-game of certainty can be confusing because sometimes people are referring to their subjective certainty, i.e., an attitude of certainty, which Moore seems to be expressing. There is also the kind of certainty that's akin to knowledge, that is, objective certainty, in this case certainty can be used as a synonym for knowledge or knowing. However, there is another kind of certainty that is demonstrating in our actions. "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there... (OC 7)." Wittgenstein grapples with these propositions. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game (OC 204)." These kinds of propositions are not expressions of an attitude, nor are they expressions of knowledge. This certainty lies in the way we act. Our actions show our certainty.

"But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded (OC 194)."

To know the answer to Wittgenstein's question, "Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" is "No," is to think about not only what he said here, but what he said elsewhere. However, there are a couple of important points to be made. First, there are two kinds of statements involved when considering this quote. Moore's statement, which isn't according to Wittgenstein an epistemological statement (although Moore thinks it is), hence in this context, that is, Moore's context, a mistake is ruled out. It's ruled out because Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's statements aren't the kind of statements we generally doubt. Thus, not only are these statements not a matter of knowledge, but they're outside the purview of doubt, which works alongside knowing.

Moore puts his propositions in the arena of knowledge, and it's in this arena that doubts can arise. What does this mean? It means that if you claim to have knowledge, it must be demonstrated that you do indeed have it, that is, objectively demonstrated (OC 14). What's the purpose of objectively demonstrating that one does know what one claims to know. It's to assure those of us who hear your claim, that there's no reason to doubt your claim. When we see your reasons or evidence it is supposed to alleviate the doubt. Once I too see that you have objectively demonstrated your knowledge, then the claim is validated, and the doubt is alleviated. However, if I don't agree with your assessment, then the doubt about your claim to knowledge remains. One must show that a mistake hasn't been made in your reasoning.

Remember that Moore is demonstrating his knowledge to the skeptic, and as such, he is allowing the doubt in the door. The skeptic wants to know how it is that Moore knows (hence, the doubt)? Wittgenstein is saying that both are incorrect in Moore's context, because the statements Moore is making are not epistemological, that is, there is something different about these statements. It's not only the case that Moore is in error, but the skeptic is also in error. Why? Because of the nature of these kinds of statements or hinge-propositions. The language-game of knowing and doubting are inappropriate when using them in Moorean contexts.

Now note that in OC 194 Wittgenstein's question is about objective certainty, and as such, when he asks about a mistake being logically excluded, the answer to his question is no, and we know this by looking at his assessment of Moore's propositions. Surely one's doubt isn't dismissed simply by someone telling you that one knows X. My claim to knowledge isn't a guarantee that I know, which is why we want to know how it is that you know, thus the doubt.

So if you don't care why are you in this thread?

There is an interesting insight in OC 402 where Wittgenstein seems to reject that Moorean propositions are empirical propositions. Wittgenstein seems to indicate that Moorean propositions are a kind of foundational proposition, but not foundational "...in the same way as [a] hypothesis which, if they turned out to be false, are replaced by others."

Reality itself is a kind of framework that allows us to act in certain ways, it is bedrock to a way of life. Language and language-games develop within this framework, which seems to indicate that what we come to know, what we are certain of, happens based on this framework. I'm allowed to form epistemological language-games because of the existence of the framework. Reality is the hinge upon which everything else swings. The certainty that is the result of the reality we find ourselves in, doesn't fit within our epistemology, but our epistemology is allowed to occur because of it. My subjective certainty which may be expressed by an attitude of certainty, does seem to reflect the feelings we have about Moorean propositions, a kind of sureness about his propositions, but it's not epistemic. "There is something universal here; not just something personal (OC 440)." It's this universality that makes it more than my subjective certainty, more than an attitude, that attitude is able to gain a foothold because of it. Just as objective certainty (knowledge) is able to gain a foothold because of it.

Wittgenstein says in OC 415 that "...certain propositions underlie all questions and all thinking." It's this thinking that makes me think of Moorean propositions (bedrock propositions) as a kind of foundation. If we think of the foundation and the framework of a house, it is because of the framework and the foundation that life within the house occurs. It's foundational to all that occurs within. It's not part of the life that occurs within, but allows that life to occur - it is bedrock or foundational in an important sense.

For some reason this last paragraph shows up as italicized, but I have no idea why.

↪Michael ↪Sam26
Keep in mind how Wittgenstein defined certainty in On Certainty, as logically excluding the possibility of mistake. At this point it is implied that this is what is required to render doubt unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein, as far as I know, never defined certainty as logically excluding the possibility of a mistake. In OC 194 Wittgenstein asks, "But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" The answer to this question is seen in the way Wittgenstein deals with these questions throughout OC. There are propositions, bedrock propositions, and they are grounded in a way of acting, they are not grounded in some epistemic or psychological certainty (objective or subjective certainty). So when he is talking about a mistake being logically excluded, it's not in reference to knowledge or certainty, but in reference to his hinge-propositions, which are outside any epistemic considerations. In fact, doubt is something that is part and parcel to knowledge, which is why Moore's propositions aren't the kind one can know, and it follows that they're not the kind that one can doubt. The answer to his question is in the negative, and that is seen in the overall picture of what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish.

Again I answer these questions in my other thread on OC.

I could be wrong but I think the central point of this thread is Wittgenstein's claim that Moore's propositions such as "Here is a hand" are neither true nor false. — Magnus Anderson

I agree with this statement, but maybe not in the way you think.

One way to interpret it is as an analytic proposition where "Here is a hand" simply means "let this [the experience of a hand] be one of the things the word 'hand' symbolizes". It appears to me this is how Wittgenstein interprets it. — Magnus Anderson

Wittgenstein isn't saying that Moore's propositions aren't true or false because they're analytic propositions. This is clear if you read the complete text of OC. He's saying that they're not true of false, or not knowledge claims, because these propositions hold a special place in our language.

I have a thread under Philosophy of Language, called A Wittgenstein Commentary that explains this in much more detail.

I'm not sure if you're using the term "doubt" the same way that MU and others are. What they mean by it is "not certain". Are you saying that "you can't find reason to [not be certain of] the chess expert in some situations"? I don't think that's right. If it is possible that what they're telling you isn't true then there is a reason to not be certain that what they're telling you is true (even if you nonetheless strongly believe them). Being certain of something that isn't certain seems unreasonable. — Michael

If I say, "I am not certain that the chess expert knows what he's talking about?" - how is this different from "I doubt what the chess expert is telling me?" Expressing a doubt about X, in many cases is the same as saying, I'm not certain of X. There are also cases where one could replace the words "I know X..." with "I'm certain of X," and mean the same thing. However, there is a difference between an expression of certainty as an attitude, which might be expressed in the way one emphasizes words, or it might be expressed in the way one gesticulates. However, even the expression of an attitude of doubt in my chess example seems out of place.

Yes, I'm saying that in some contexts or situations there are not good reasons to doubt the expert's claims. I gave an example above, namely, when the chess expert is explaining the basic rules of chess. However, that doesn't mean that we can't find contexts or situations in which it would be meaningful to doubt the chess expert.

I don't agree that because it's possible that the expert could be wrong, that that in itself is sufficient reason to doubt the expert. The same is true when it comes to knowledge. I for example, could make the claim that I know my car will start, but it's certainly possible it might not. So because it's possible that I could be wrong, does it follow that I don't know it? Do knowledge claims require absolute epistemic certainty? No. The same is true with regard to doubting, just because it's possible that the expert could be wrong, that in itself doesn't give me good reasons to doubt the expert. What's possible does not give sufficient reason to doubt, or to make a knowledge claim.

I'm not saying you should be certain of something that isn't certain. The problem is that you're using the term certain in a way that requires absolute knowledge. You seem to think that one can reasonably doubt something even if we have a very high probability that we're certain, or that we know. I definitely would disagree with this. For example, would it be reasonable to doubt the car will start if there's a 99% chance that it will start? The answer is no. It would not be reasonable to doubt the car will start, especially based on the notion that it's possible it will not start.

Let's give another example, it's logically and ontologically possible that I'm the only mind in the universe, but does that possibility mean that I have good reason to conclude that I am the only mind in the universe, or to doubt that there are other minds? No.

And yes, I am using the term doubt different from how some are using it in this thread

Sure. The issue is whether or not certainty as a propositional attitude is justified. If there's a 10% chance that something will happen, is it reasonable to be certain that it will happen? What if it's 99%? What if it's 100%? The claim MU and others are making is that if something isn't certain to be true then it is reasonable to be uncertain (doubt). Of course that's not to say that it's reasonable to believe that it's false, which is where I think there's been a misunderstanding between you and them.

I can strongly believe that something is the case and still have doubt. The skeptic can still believe all the same things you do; that this is a hand and that there's a cat on the mat. — Michael

One's attitude, may or may not be justified, it depends on the reasonableness of the doubt, which is part of what you seem to be getting at. The attitude itself doesn't justify anything, not that you're making this claim, at least you don't seem to be. If there is a 10% chance that something will happen, then generally it would be unreasonable to claim that it will happen, and one's doubt that it won't happen seems reasonable enough. Would it be reasonable to doubt whether you will survive a fall if there is a 10% chance of survival? Most people would probably say no. Though the lines can get a bit blurry between what's reasonable and not reasonable to doubt when we're talking about a 50, 60, or 70% chance. So let's say your 70% sure that X will happen, would it be reasonable to express an attitude of doubt in such a situation, sure, even though you're reasonably sure that X will happen.

Whether someone can strongly believe something, and still express a doubt, depends on the situation or context. I can understand a doubt if one is only 70% certain that X will happen, so an expression of an attitude of doubt in such a situation is reasonable, as already mentioned. However, my belief that I'm sitting at my computer typing these words is beyond doubt. Doubt in such a situation seems senseless. Moreover, if you could doubt such a thing, then maybe you could even doubt that you're having the doubt. The fact that you doubt, shows your existence, so there are some doubts that are senseless or meaningless.

Whether one can strongly believe X, and still reasonably express one's attitude of doubt, depends on what we're talking about. My earlier example of someone doubting the expert chess player as they teach chess, is just such an example. The point isn't that you can't find reason to doubt the chess expert in some situations. We can always create a scenario in which it would be reasonable to doubt the chess expert. Most people, especially if we have good reasons to believe that the person is a chess expert, wouldn't doubt that the chess expert knows the basic rules of chess. Thus, to doubt the expert's explanation that bishop's move diagonally, and that bishops always remain on the same color in any given game, is an unreasonable doubt.

There are some propositions, in some contexts, that are not only immune to doubt, but also immune to knowledge claims. Such propositions, as Wittgenstein pointed out, are bedrock, i.e., they provide a backdrop which enables us to talk about knowledge and doubt. They are in a way, required, if we are to have meaningful discussions on epistemology, and by extension, meaningful discussions of what it means to doubt.

It's a well built vehicle, but I just didn't like the look, very subjective. I love the 911 turbo though.

That's a nice looking car. What year is that?

Yes, that's exactly the point! Have you no idea how sampling works? — Pseudonym

I'm going to make one more remark, then I'm moving on. Most reasonable people would understand that the sampling size I'm using is huge. It doesn't need to be equal to the number of objects I'm comparing it too. So to say that I don't know how sampling works, is, well, how shall I say, CRAZY!! But I digress, and moreover, I rest my case. The argument stands, and it's a good argument in spite of these criticisms.

Analogous arguments are not automatically valid, they are measured by the strength of their inference. as I outlined; — Pseudonym

Well, first we shouldn't be using the term valid in reference to inductive arguments. When I first used it in my remarks I was using it very loosely. Validity is a property of deductive arguments, not inductive arguments. To be precise, when talking about inductive arguments, they are either strong or weak, that is, the evidence that supports the conclusion is either strong or weak. I'm making the claim that the evidence for intelligent design is extremely strong, so strong that it's irrational to believe otherwise.

1. The relevance of the similarity is weak because things which do not belong in set A can also be shown to have been designed (a person could by design place a pile of rocks specifically to look as if they had occurred naturally). the property 'having been designed' is not unique to set A objects, so its relevance is weak. — Pseudonym

How do random rocks show evidence of design, even if placed there by a person? It's a strange use of the term "by design" in reference to something placed randomly. They might have been placed there purposely, but that in itself doesn't mean that they show intelligent design.

2. The degree of similarity is weak. Human manufactured objects are similar to natural objects only in that they are made of parts that together perform a higher order function. They are dissimilar in many other important aspects.
Human manufactured objects have a clear history of manufacture and can all be traced back to a human to whom we can ask "did you design that?". It is from this data that we get our knowledge that all human-made object in set A are designed. Natural objects have no history of manufacture and cannot be traced back to a manufacturer whom we can question. — Pseudonym

So let's see if I have this correct. Your saying that there is an important dissimilarity that I'm leaving out that makes the argument weak, that is, products of humans have a history of manufacture. I presume this is meant to imply that we know it's designed because of this history, whereas, artifacts in nature do not have such a history. I say this has nothing to do with knowing that something is designed. I don't need to know the history of the manufacturing of watches to infer design, this is just silly. You mean if you traveled to another planet and found something that looked like a vehicle, having wheels, what appeared to be an engine, what appeared to be fuel, etc, that we couldn't conclude intelligent design because we know nothing about it's manufacturing history? You expect me to take this criticism seriously.

Natural objects are all significantly more complex than human manufactured objects.
Natural objects (that perform higher order functions) can all replicate themselves in a process which causes random variation to the make up of the object and one in which objects whose parts do not perform a useful higher order function will cease to exist. A process which we can logically see could feasibly result in only those objects whose parts do combine to perform a higher order function existing at any one time. We can deduce pretty accurately from our knowledge of evolution that there must have existed billions of natural objects whose parts did not come together to perform a higher order function. — Pseudonym

All this shows is that a higher intelligence was involved in the design, it doesn't necessarily mean that there was no designer. Moreover, humans are beginning to design things which can't be distinguished from objects of nature. One can also imagine a time, maybe in a 1000 or more years, where the things we create will be even more like the artifacts of nature. This criticism fails too.

As far as the last sentence in this paragraph is concerned, I don't see how this takes away from the argument either. So what if there are many artifacts that nature has discarded, especially since nature decides that the artifact doesn't work, or it has no use for it. The same things happen in design, we often do this when creating things.

3. The amount of instances that form the basis is extremely weak, so much so as to be completely damning to the analogy. Human artefacts represent a tiny proportion of all things in set A. There is an estimated 300 trillion tonnes of human artefacts in the world. There are an estimated five million trillion trillion bacteria. Even if we average human artefacts at just 1g, bacteria alone outnumber human artefacts by five trillion trillion times. All the failed organisms from the process of evolution outnumber human artefacts. by several trillion times more than this. It is ludicrous to suggest that anything about human artefacts tells us something about natural objects by strength of analogy. It would be like claiming you knew something with great certainty about all architecture because you studied one brick. — Pseudonym

I don't follow how this point is even relevant. So because there are more artifacts in nature, as opposed to human artifacts, this demonstrates that there isn't a large enough sampling of human artifacts, what?! You can't expect me to respond to this.

This is what I mean by the arguments against intelligent design being ludicrous. I have been arguing with people about intelligent design for over 40 years, and these are the kinds of arguments they put forward. Even Richard Dawkins arguments are poor, in terms of intelligent design. He may know something about biology, but he knows very little about forming good arguments.

You keep using human beings and the things they have designed as examples of intelligent designers who were also designed themselves by some other designer. If humans are intelligent designers AND were designed themselves, then why aren't all intelligent designers designed themselves? Saying that you don't have to apply the same reasoning just shows that you are being inconsistent. — Harry Hindu

It doesn't follow that all intelligent designers have been designed because some intelligent designers have been designed. You're assuming that if we discover the designers, then they must have been designed, how does that follow?

And why does it follow that because another group of designers was designed themselves, that this necessarily leads to an infinite regress of designers. There isn't any way to know that. We don't know enough about the designers. Maybe they've always existed, or some of them have always existed.

So I'm not being inconsistent at all.

Where in the world did you get that reasoning from? To know that this is incorrect all you have to do is apply it to any analogical argument that we know are valid, and we can see this doesn't work at all. If this had merit how would any analogical argument hold water? It would mean that I couldn't infer properties in one group to another group. The only nonsense is that you think that this actually works.

Your problem is that you can apply the same "logic" to the intelligent designer, too. Now you have to explain the existence of the intelligent designer by using another intelligent designer, and so on, ad infinitum. — Harry Hindu

There is no reason that you have to apply the same reasoning to whomever created the universe, that doesn't follow at all. If we know who created this universe, that answers the question about the creation of this universe. For example when we answer the question, who created this watch, do I then say you can't answer that question because we don't know who created you, of course not.

You've then simply declared that the two subsets must share all properties - if one subset is designed then so must the other subset be, but you haven't provided any logic as to why that should be the case. — Pseudonym

The logic (the inference) is very simple, straight forward, and compelling, which is why most people believe it's true. The point is that when we look at human productions that exhibit the features named in premise one, they are the result of intelligent design. In fact, even if you had never seen a watch before (Paley's argument), and stumbled upon one, you surely wouldn't conclude it happened by chance. Why? Because we are very familiar with the evidence of intelligent design. Again, the evidence that is spelled out in premise one. Moreover, it's not just how complex the item is, it can be very simple or very complex, but all, or nearly all manmade productions have this property (as stated in premise one).

Now the argument is analogical, that is, we make an inference based on a likeness or analogy between objects or groups of objects to infer the existence of a further likeness. This kind of reasoning is done all the time in logic, so to say that there is no logic to the argument, is to not understand logic.

All we know about these two subsets, is that they must share at least and only the one property that makes them both part of the same set i.e that the parts are so arranged that the completed whole is able to achieve or be used to achieve activities of a higher order than any part alone. There's no reason, inductive or otherwise, to presume that they will share any other properties, such as being designed. — Pseudonym

We will concentrate on the last sentence of this paragraph, which misses the point of the argument. The property as put forth in premise one, is the evidence of intelligent design. Thus, if it is the evidence of intelligent design, then it follows with certainty, that is, with a high degree of probability that other artifacts exhibiting these same features are also intelligently designed.

The logic is there, and only those who are committed to a dogmatic world view refuse to see the evidence. This is why I say these kinds of naturalistic world views, are just as bad as religious dogmatism.

Again, the argument is inductive, and clearly inductive. Anyone who has had even a basic course in logic can see this.

Let's analyze the strength of the argument:

1) Number of items used as evidence, and the number of items used as evidence are human artifacts and objects of nature; they are innumerable.
2) The number of analogies (similarities) shared by the objects compared. Virtually all of the objects are complex consisting of many parts, some are more complex than others. Moreover, the parts fits with some degree of precision.
3) Number of disanalogies (dissimilarities) between human artifacts and natural artifacts. "I do not know of any disanalogies between all human productions, on the one hand, and all objects of nature, on the other. Some objects of nature are alive, but not all are. Some have a mental life, but not all. Similarly, some human productions are also alive, as in the case of genetically engineered plants and animals."
4) Variety of items used as evidence, namely human productions. The variety is endless.
5) The issue of relevance of the features or structures compared, namely the parts are so arranged that the whole can perform higher functions than any part alone, to the activity of design. Does design cause such structure? The relevance, of course, is perfect, for what is the activity of design but the arrangement of parts so the whole can perform a higher function than any part alone?
6) Scope of the conclusion - the conclusion is the narrowest and most conservative possible, namely, that there are one or more designers of natural objects.
7) Truth and cogency of the premises, i.e., knowledge of the truth of the premises. Nearly every human adult knows the premises are true.
8) Cogency of the argument structure. Can the argument be followed? The argument is very simple and easy to follow.
9) Psychological impact or compellingness of the argument. My experience is that most find it compelling; only committed agnostics and atheists do not, and they are few and far between. They just refuse to draw the proper conclusion

The result of the analysis is that the argument is a very strong argument. It is hard to imagine a stronger argument than this. It is probably one of the reasons why so many people believe the argument. The only way to get around the strength of this argument is to keep repeating "There is no evidence." You say it enough times, then others will repeat it and believe it. Reminds of politics, the politicians know if they keep repeating a narrative, a certain segment of the population will believe it. And the narrative that atheists and agnostics (by the way I'm an agnostic) keep repeating, is, "There is no evidence.," among other insulting remarks.

I will set forth the challenge once again. If their rejection of the argument (mostly atheists and agnostics) isn't based on a prejudice apart from the evidence, then they should be able to stipulate what additional evidence would count as evidence of intelligent design in the universe. In other words, what evidence is lacking that would warrant believing in an intelligent designer/s?

If they cannot stipulate what is lacking, then their belief is an irrational prejudice sealed off from the evidence. They would be committing the fallacy of the self-sealing argument.

And if nothing would count as evidence of intelligent design, then their argument is unfalsifiable.

It's not that difficult to argue intelligent design. In fact, it's very easy to defeat the counter-arguments, and there is no need to argue against evolution. The problem is that many people are afraid to argue these points, especially in a university setting, because they get laughed at by those who have swallowed hook, line, and sinker a particular world view. Let them laugh, they're the ones being irrational.

Nice car, but a new one is still more than I want to spend. I want to keep in under 85k, unless I can find a good used one.

Yes, I owned one a few years ago, didn't like it.

Ya, that's a bit out of my price bracket. :-O

When you're as good as me, you look forward to karmic paybacks. — Hanover

You must be doing something right. :D

lol