(Although in practice, and on Forums, what metaphysics usually does is result in interminable and irresolvable debate.)[/quote]

You will always have endless debates on these subjects, so what matters, at least for me, is, am I satisfied with what I've discovered. The tendency is for people to think that because one cannot resolve these problems with others, that that means they are not resolvable. Even if you (Wayfarer) had all the answers on these subjects, you would still have just as many disagreements.

But isn't something intrinsically valuable because it's not tied to anything else, like needs or desires. Needs though would be better connected than desires.

I agree, our desires may align with the intrinsic worth of a thing, but desire is not what gives something value. If that were the case my desire to murder would have value.

Well, we can desire things that have both intrinsic value and extrinsic value. Much of what we desire has some value whether real or perceived.

Honestly, when I think of intrinsic value I always ask, according to who or what? Because objectively speaking, reality has no intrinsic value, and by virtue of saying so is tantamount to a person holding superstitious believes positing that something has some sort of "meaning". The word intrinsic implies belonging to or innate to something. When we value something, we desire said thing. The question is who does it belong to, why and how? — Susu

Pleasure is something that is valued by humans, and there is an objectivity to the pleasure, so others can see it and participate in it. For example, people derive pleasure from music, we can objectively see it as we watch others, and we can experience it directly. Reality has intrinsic worth for us, at least much of it does - for example, watching a beautiful sunset. Without persons reality would have no intrinsic worth, because as you say, intrinsic value to whom?

So, how does one differentiate from what has instrumental value over intrinsic value? After all one could say reasonably that everything is of instrumental value to the self interested man. — Posty McPostface

Well, the way I see it is as follows: It's not a matter of what I think or believe that makes something intrinsically valuable - if that were the case, then one could claim that injustice has intrinsic worth or value.

Yes, many things that have intrinsic value have extrinsic value also. Paper money has extrinsic value, but very little, if any, intrinsic value.

The pleasure you get from wine or other things has intrinsic value. It's your experience regardless of where it come from.

To have intrinsic value is to be desirable in and of itself, independently of whether it leads to anything else. The primary example of something that has intrinsic value is Pleasure. Hedonism is the Value-Theory that asserts that Pleasure/enjoyment is the ONLY thing that has intrinsic value. Can you think of anything else that has intrinsic value? — Mitchell

Knowledge, love, persons, virtue, are other examples of things that have intrinsic value.

Actually Rich ad hominem attacks are fallacies related to arguments, not just any statement.

What you have to remember is that most people who believe in God don't arrive at their conclusion or conclusions based on good arguments. They believe for a variety of causes or reasons based on how they were raised, culture, who they respect, etc. So their foundation for belief is much different from those who come from a philosophical perspective, which generally uses the rules of correct reasoning to come to a conclusion (logic). Moreover, the terms used in philosophy tend to be more precise then what the general public uses, so reasoning as defined by the general public tends to be very subjective.

So when you say "share your reasoning" I assume you're talking about the use of good argumentation based on logic, not an opinion based reasoning. After spending roughly 40 years within the Christian community and teaching Christian apologetics in some churches over the years, it's my belief based on analyzing the arguments that there are no good arguments for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God. Of course that's not to say there isn't any evidence to support Christian beliefs. For example, there is sufficient evidence that Christ was a real historical person, and that he had disciples, but that doesn't mean there is sufficient testimonial evidence to support the claim that he was God incarnate, or that he rose from the dead.

I'm also not limiting my belief to knowledge acquired through the use of logic. I say this to point out that there are other ways of acquiring knowledge, logic is only one tool, but it's a very good tool. It's possible of course that someone could have a direct experience with God, but of course how could you show that your experience is valid? People do claim such experiences, but they tend to be very subjective, and open to a wide variety of interpretations. For example, I've been in churches where people are singing and praising God and as a result of an emotional experience they believe the Holy Spirit is speaking to them. Another example is that many within a religious community will read the Bible, and maybe a passage or verse generates an emotion, and as a result, they'll interpret this as God speaking to them. I say all of this to point out that although sensory experiences are valid ways of acquiring knowledge, internal experiences are very subjective an open to a wide variety of interpretations. You can always interpret some internal experience in terms of your religious belief. It then tends to become self-sealing, and not subject to being falsified.

Finally, many within the church will claim that it's not a matter of evidence or correct reasoning, etc, but it's a matter of faith, i.e., they believe their faith speaks to something higher than reason or evidence. However, there is a huge problem with this kind of thinking, i.e., it's very subjective an open to all kinds of claims. This kind of thinking can lead to almost any kind of religious belief. One can always avoid well reasoned arguments against one's religious beliefs based on the idea that it's a matter of faith. It's true that people acquire their religious beliefs in this way. However, most rational people want to know if it's a fact that God exists, an objective fact.

Have you studied logic, it's not opinion based. I would agree that the general public uses the word logic in a very subjective way, but there are clearly defined rules that stipulate how one should draw conclusions from statements. In some ways, it's very similar to mathematics. If logic was subjective, as you're saying, then yes, there would be no objective criteria that would define good arguments, but that's just not the case. Lookup on Youtube, classes on symbolic logic, and you'll see what I mean.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M14ReHfPFUw

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1asxHpewYi8&t=230s

It's not about competition any more than mathematics is about competition. Sure for some people it's about who's the best, but in philosophy, ideally, it's about truth, at least partly.

Also, when I talk about objective criteria, I'm referring to the rules and principles of logic. So the criteria for well-formed arguments is not a matter of opinion, at least for the most part.

I agree with other posts "thinking better" is relative to the subject matter. However, if what we are referring to are philosophical arguments, then there are objective criteria that are important. Also, intelligence is important, but being knowledgeable, all things being equal, will win the day over intelligence. There are many intelligent people who can't think logically, or they can't do it well. Also, because someone is an expert in biology, history, or any other subject that doesn't mean they know how to form good arguments. I've listened to biologists arguing their points about this or that, and they can't argue to save their life.

Finally, just because someone has studied philosophy, that doesn't mean they can form good arguments either, it takes a lot of practice, it's a skill. So thinking well in philosophy requires the ability to analyze and form good arguments, this, it seems to me, is the backbone of philosophy.

I agree, falsifiability, as far as I know is only applied to arguments or theories. Moreover, not all arguments necessarily have to be falsifiable.

I would agree that knowledge of our own minds isn't falsifiable, but I would disagree that knowledge of someone else's mind isn't falsifiable. It's certainly logically possible, and probably metaphysically possible that other minds could turn out to be a very advanced computer simulation. Is it likely the case, of course not, but we're talking about what's possible.

Thanks Creative, but it's all I can do to keep from screaming at people. Most of the time I can control my anger, but sometimes it comes out in sarcasm. I have to walk away from computer before posting to cool down sometimes. Believe me, I'm not always that great with my responses, but I'm always trying to improve. I use to crackup watching fiveredapples posts, because he would write what I would only think. I have to really be careful because I'm thinking "You IDIOT, do you even know what you're talking about," or "How LONG have you been studying philosophy!?" - so as you can see I'm not as innocent as you might think, but I do appreciate the kind words.

Here's an interesting thought related to this - have you ever noticed how sometimes people's jokes reveal what they really think of you? The joke seems to be a way of telling people in a non-confrontational way that they're an idiot. Listen to people's jokes about you, they sometimes reveal how people really feel about you.

Sorry, this is way off topic.

I try to look at what's foundational to our experiences, i.e., the interaction between sensory experiences and the world around us. This is how we come into contact with the world. I believe there is a causal relationship between our sensory experiences and very primitive or basic beliefs (pre-linguistic beliefs), and since they are pre-linguistic they are prior to epistemological concerns. It's in this sense that many of these beliefs are foundational or basic.

Once language enters into the picture we form linguistic concepts that are rule-based (language-games), and many of these concepts serve to describe reality - concepts such as fact, truth, knowledge, justification, objective, etc. Thus, what I've done is try to build an epistemological system that rests on foundational beliefs that are outside of any system of justification. This epistemology rests on, or is grounded in very basic kinds of beliefs, which solves the problem of an infinite regress or circularity caused by other kinds of epistemological theories.

I don't believe that any theory of knowledge can capture every possible situation in which it can be said that we know X, no more than a definition of game can capture every possible use of the term game. So my theory is more of a guide, or a general rule that's meant to give us some measure of confidence in terms of how we use the term know, and what it means to know.

I don't believe knowledge is restricted to any one area of study. For example, science provides only one way of attaining knowledge, but I also have knowledge based on sensory experiences. I have knowledge that I'm sitting at a desk typing quite apart from any experiment done in a lab. Furthermore, much of what we come to know is based on testimonial evidence, which comes to us in a variety of ways, and this also is quite apart from any deductive or inductive reasoning.

What's absurd is that you think that you can apply this idea to an amoeba. Amoeba's don't have the complexity of actions that humans have. Moreover, not all actions that lifeforms perform show beliefs. Not all of our (modern man's) actions show beliefs. If we were to watch primitive humans build things we could infer that they believe certain things by observing their actions. For example, they might go to a certain area of the forest and cut down trees and reshape them to build something, or they might measure one log by laying it alongside another, confirming that they are roughly the same size.

How does one even get to a language without having beliefs prior to having a language?

Obviously there is a difference between actions that are instinctual and one's that are not. How does one know the difference - by observation.

Both belief and doubt are conceptual, actions are inadequate to express these. An observer might infer them from the actions of one whose language is not developed, such as a child having an idea that a treat under a cup, but the belief that the treat is under the cup is not a belief in the child. — charleton

Belief and doubt are only conceptual if you believe that they're products of language. However, it's been the case generally that beliefs (I would also add doubts) are states-of-mind, and states-of-mind are not dependent on linguistic concepts. It's not as though primitive man, before the advent of language, didn't have beliefs and/or doubts. Part of what it means to have a language is to put thoughts into words, thinking is prior to language, and prior to concepts.

Doubting is a state-of-mind just as a belief is a state-of-mind, and one can show states-of-mind apart from language.

Thought and belief are prior to the ability to doubt what one is being taught during language acquisition. Thought and belief that is prior to the ability to doubt does not include the ability to doubt. All doubt is belief based, and it consists in/of doubting the truth of something or other. — creativesoul

I do believe that one can have thoughts and beliefs prior to learning language. I argued this in my Wittgenstein threads. I'd be careful in expressing the limits of these beliefs though. No doubt that sharing a belief with others in terms of statements is a necessary feature of language.

It sounds like you're saying that we cannot express doubts without language. If this is the case, I don't think it's true. One can express doubts by one's actions, just as one can express beliefs by one's actions. The act of digging in the ground, for example, shows my belief that something is there (beliefs being states-of-mind). The act of doubting can also be observed. For example, one might have buried something in the ground (primitive man for e.g.) only to find that the object isn't where one thought it was. You may see the person quit digging, for example, look pensive, trying to figure out where the thing is buried. So the expression of doubts isn't necessary to language. It does seem to be a feature that's closely related to memory, that is, the person digging might be doubting their own recollection of where they buried a particular object.

The concepts of doubt and belief are something that requires language. However, one can show one's belief or doubt by one's actions apart from the concepts or apart from language. So at a primitive level one's beliefs are shown through actions, but as we acquire language, we not only show our beliefs by our actions, but we show them by using concepts and/or statements.

What you're giving is an opinion, not an argument.

I think a point you’re missing is that there might be things that can only be known in the first person, that are true, but not necessarily ‘objective’. I mean, if you restrict the criterion for what constitutes an ‘objective fact’ to the empirical sciences, then basically you’ve fallen into some form of positivism. — Wayfarer

Actually I would acknowledge that there are truths that can be known in the first person. There are plenty of experiences that we have, that can only be known in the first person. For example, there is no way that I can demonstrate objectively, whether scientifically of otherwise, that I had certain private experiences yesterday or probably at any time in the past. These can be fit within the context of what I'm saying, that is, they're not purely subjective, they have an objective component.

Also, if you've read my posts, you would have seen that my epistemology includes ways of knowing that do not fit a scientific model. For example, testimonial evidence, our knowledge through sensory experience that a piece of candy is sweet, and also linguistic knowledge.

Finally, and I'm very familiar with Dr. Alexander's book, I would contend that what people are seeing in these NDEs does constitute an objective reality, so what constitutes or makes up an objective fact is not limited to our spacial temporal reality (our universe). Any possible world, reality, or universe that has a spacial component would necessarily have an objective component, that is, mind-independent things associated with that reality. Moreover, since other people have seen similar things within the NDE framework or experience, I believe it shows an objective reality apart from ours. The logical positivists would definitely disagree with my philosophical ideas in terms of NDEs.

Sam, we are closer. I haven't fully read the article myself and the only thing emerged from it to me is the weakness of testimonials. Nevertheless we don't need them, strong or weak. Yes I am subjective because I have recently found it's more important than being objective. Finally what's the most important on earth anyway? Isn't that yourself, or your - self? I referred to proofs or strongest testimonials just to let them down. — Dzung

Actually we are very far apart in terms of how we should arrive at correct beliefs or true beliefs. It may be true that our beliefs are similar, that is, that we both believe that NDEs are real. However, where we differ, and I think this is a major difference, is in how we determine whether a statement or belief is true. So in technical jargon, we have major epistemological differences, which I pointed out, somewhat, in my last post. For example, there are subjective truths, I wouldn't deny that, but when it comes to evaluating the truth of testimonial evidence, it isn't about what someone happens to believe, it's about whether these beliefs are objectively true. Just because someone believes that something is true, that doesn't make it true. Generally speaking subjective truths depend on the subject, what they think or feel is true, that is, it's minds or mind-dependent. If truth was a matter of what you or I believe is true, then anything can be true or false depending on what the subject believes. Given this idea, it would naturally follow that truth would largely have no foothold, that is, it would be meaningless.

If we compare a subjective truth to an objective truth the contrast couldn't be more stark. For example, it's objectively true that the Earth has one moon, the truth of this statement has nothing to do with your subjective belief. Your subjective belief may or may not line up with objective reality. Subjective truths, once again, depend on the subject, for example, "I like oranges" is a subjective truth. The truth of the statement is dependent on the subject "me," it's not like the statement "The Earth has one moon," which is not dependent upon a mind or minds, but is dependent upon the nature of objective reality.

I don't think pantheism is quite what I'm talking about, especially since pantheism is mostly identified as a religious idea.

Wow, sorting through all of this would be a monumental task, especially given how vague some of these words are. I'm not sure that there is any one answer that will satisfy philosophers generally, given the wide spectrum of theories and definitions. That said, you seem to looking for more modern views of Realism. It's an interesting topic, and I would be interested in hearing what others say about it.

My own view, is that consciousness, or a mind or minds is at the bottom of all reality. So whether we're talking about universals, abstract objects, particulars, etc, it all proceeds from consciousness. To be clear, I'm not coming from any religious point of view, only that consciousness is the unifying principle that unites all of reality, including the way we talk about reality. Since I haven't kept up with some of these theories myself, I'm not sure how my own ideas would fit within context of your question; and I'm not sure how modern my ideas are in terms of past ideas.

The evidence that I cite is not a proof, that is, it's not deductive but inductive. So what I'm saying is that what I claim to know is based on what's probably the case, as opposed to what's necessarily the case. I'm not claiming that we know with absolute certainty in this case.

I understand that you agree with the testimonials for NDEs, but you don't agree that we can know it to be the case, that is, know it as true (maybe subjectively in your case, I'm not sure).

I agree with much of the sentiment in the article you cited, but much of it doesn't apply to what I'm saying. If you have specific questions, I'll answer, but I'm not going to go through that complete article and cite everything I agree with or don't agree with. It would take too much time. It sounds like our disagreement is epistemological in nature.

It's a good question. It's not as though most people filter their moral choices through some moral theory. However, I think it helps us think more about these questions, and some of the problems that arise. In my own life it's helped me think more about how to act, and I believe its become part of my own thinking. For the general public this probably isn't so, but for those of us who like doing philosophy the thinking is that some of this filters down into society. How much of it is practical is a really good question, but you can ask this of most philosophical theories.

Finally, it's probably the case that even if you don't have a well thought out system of ethics, you're moral actions probably are associated with a system of rules that you learned from family, friends, and society. So in this sense it's probably a theory in a loose sense of the word.

Yes it's ambiguous, and it's a problem (not that you're doing this) when we try to make definitions precise when they tend to be ambiguous. Many philosophical problems arise as a result. The word time is just such an example. There are just too many uses of some of these words to give a precise definition that fit every possible use of the word. The same is true of the word game, as Wittgenstein pointed out.

Your five points can't stand up with such a research.I don't need to argue about flaws here and there. It appears in your elaboration there is a mix-up between social science and natural science while the two are yet to merge.
For example, "Testimonial evidence" should be replaced by a scientific evidence I believe. At least because it comes from legislative meanings. — Dzung

The link you provide that gives an overview of different kinds of evidence isn't a very good one. What we want to know, and what I'm concerned with is the different ways in which we arrive at knowledge (justified true belief). There are many ways to justify a belief, and testimony is one of the ways we justify believing that something is true. In fact, much of what we believe is a matter of testimony. When you sit in a class room listening to a lecture you're listening to the testimony of an expert on the subject (hopefully), or at least someone who is knowledgeable. Granted testimonial evidence is not scientific evidence, and much of the time it can be very weak, but my point at the beginning of this thread was to show what kind of testimonial evidence is strong, that is, what makes for strong testimonial evidence. Furthermore, much of what makes for strong testimonial evidence is the same as what makes a strong inductive argument. So I'm applying rules that make testimonial evidence strong to NDEs, because my concern, and the concern of others is about truth, that is, is it true that people who experience an NDE are experiencing something real. No doubt they're having a real experience, just like people who have dreams have real experiences, but the question isn't whether it's a real experience, but is it an objective reality. For example, would it follow from these experiences that consciousness survives bodily existence? My contention is that there is overwhelming evidence that these experiences give strong evidence of the survival of consciousness after the death of the body, and that we retain our individuality.

Also I'm not mixing up social science with natural science, in fact, I make a distinction between scientific knowledge and the knowledge that comes in other ways, namely, knowledge that comes from testimonial evidence. And since testimonial evidence is seen in just about every subject area it is something that isn't confined to one area of study. It is seen in virtually every area of study. In fact, it's so pervasive that to doubt much of it would collapse most of what we know.

If you mean by universal that it applies absolutely, then I would respond that any moral code is dependent upon the nature of reality, and the nature of the beings it's being applied to. Thus, it may not be absolute. On the other hand, if by universal you mean that it applies equally to all humans, I'll buy into that. Moreover, a universal moral code is dependent on some objective criteria, unless you can get all of humanity to subscribe to a set of moral rules or principles, which is highly unlikely.

Many of our moral principles do come from religious ideas, but some do not, depending on the culture or society. Other moral principles or rules come from theories of morality, and there are different competing theories about what's moral and/or immoral.

For me, what's immoral or evil, and this takes into account intentional and/or accidental immoral acts, as well as natural evil, always involves some kind of harm to those involved or even those not involved. In these cases the harm done can be objectively observed, at least most of the time. Sometimes it requires a great deal of thought to understand that harm as occurred. For example, the harm done to one's character or psyche is hard to quantify, nevertheless I believe it does occur.

Moral actions are closely connected to what we value as humans, or what is intrinsically valuable. For example, kindness has intrinsic worth, and most people recognize that it does. Thus, we value it as part of a ethical code of conduct. Furthermore, I believe it can be demonstrated that kindness is not a matter of subjective beliefs, but has objective characteristics that can be demonstrated. Also moral actions are always intentional, which is why they are praiseworthy. One doesn't praise someone for a good that results from their unintentional acts. It's a good, just not one that resulted from a morally good action, that is, an intentional moral act.

Yes, I agree that the harm done is expansive, and may include others. I'm sure that it would be difficult to work out the net harm, but in courts of law they often do this in civil cases, or in other kinds of cases.

I definitely agree with the idea of cultivating virtues. There is much more to the story than what I've written, I was just having a hard time demonstrating that harm is a property of immoral acts. Moreover, in terms of harm, moral action is different altogether, so we're closer than you might think. I also agree that moral action is much more than just avoiding harm.

No, definitely not. It's closer to a duty or rule based ethic.

But you've made my point, why wouldn't you want them in your society? Why, because of the harm done to the society. How do you know it's bad, what is the reasoning that makes it bad if it's not that people are harmed? You're are simply saying we know it's bad because we have evidence it's bad, but what's the evidence other than the harm done to societies and cultures? Your argument is a bit circular.

If everything is determined, that is, all of our acts of free will are simply a delusion, and if we are not free to choose otherwise, then it would follow that there would be no right and wrong, moral or immoral actions. You would simply be something akin to a programmed thing doing this or that based on deterministic forces or influences. In fact, nothing you do would be worthy of praise or criticism, no more than you could praise or criticize a robot for acting the way it's programed to act. A complete removal of freedom of choice completely destroys the idea what's moral. It completely destroys the idea of any act being the right course of action. There would just be acts, that's it - finito. Even our arguments in this thread would be completely meaningless, because what you believe would also be determined, nothing would change in terms of what you believe unless it was determined to be so.

I have partially dealt with the problem of immoral acts that don't seem to cause harm in previous posts. Let's take the example of attempted murder, I plan out how I'm going to do it, say an assassination, but the rifle misfires, and other circumstances keep me from carrying out the murder. I agree, that in cases like these it's more difficult to ascertain the harm, but I would contend that there is harm done. For example, if you're caught and go to prison you have done harm to yourself, that is, your freedoms have been taken away, and your loved ones are also harmed by your removal from society and from their lives. However, let's consider an act of attempted murder where you're not caught, that is, you get away with it. In this case is there harm done? I would contend that there is harm done to your character and/or to your psyche, that is, any normal thinking human being would know and understand that since they were willing to take the life of another that that diminishes them in some way. Over time, I think any normal functioning person, would be affected by the memory of such an act.

Let's take another example, let's say that the person is incapable of feeling empathy, and as such there character and/or their psyche is not affected by this act. Moreover, there is no detectable harm done, then I would say that the act was not immoral. It's not immoral, not only because there was no detectable harm, but it's probably not immoral because this person's brain is not normal, that is, they're impaired in some way. It's still a crime, but the person may not be morally responsible (at least in theory).

Finally, it would take a lot more writing to flush this out completely, but I think my point is made.

No, I'm saying that what makes something immoral is the harm done. Here's where you go wrong, namely, you think that if I say "harm is what makes an act immoral," that that somehow equates to "harm causes immorality." That doesn't follow, all I'm saying is that in every act of immorality, there is harm done. If what you were saying were true, that is, that harm causes immorality, then if I accidentally cut my finger, then that would be immoral, but that's obviously not true.

I've tried explaining this several ways, but it doesn't seem to get through.

I've reached a point where there's not much more to say, and you don't seem to be following my point. I never said "harm causes morality," which can be seen in many of my posts. But that's okay, it was a good discussion, and it gave me a chance to flush out a bit more of my thinking.

So your position is that an immoral act is always harmful because the person that causes the immoral act always harms themselves. In your view, is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral? If the former, then how do you know they harm themselves? If the latter, then what makes the act immoral besides intention? — Samuel Lacrampe

If there is no harm done when one acts, then I don't see how an act can be called immoral, i.e., what would make it immoral other than the harm done? Also, in an earlier post I showed how intent is not necessarily a feature of an immoral act, the example being an accident where one didn't intend to cause harm, but harm happened nevertheless. Most immoral acts that people commit are intentional, but not all, is what I'm saying. This is the point of calling some immoral acts accidental, it's an accident because someone didn't intentionally set out to harm someone, as opposed to intentionally doing something to harm someone. This is clearly seen in a drunk driving example, or even in an example where someone is not paying sufficient attention to what their doing. In each example one is held accountable for their actions in spite of not intentionally harming others.

Since I believe that all immoral acts have the property of harm, that is, that harm is necessarily a property of an immoral act. Thus, both your questions, ("...is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral?") are answered in the affirmative. I've already explained how intention isn't necessarily a feature of an immoral act. The latter part of your question is essentially the same as the former. It's the same as A=B and B=A.

What's essential to a moral act is not essential to an immoral act, and it's here that people are getting confused. All moral acts have the necessary feature of intentionality, but not all immoral acts. Why? Because one cannot accidentally do what's morally correct. What makes moral actions praiseworthy are their intentionality. If one does the right thing unintentionally, then it's not a moral action, but it can be called a right action. Although it's the case that all moral actions can be called right actions, or correct actions, not all right or correct actions can be called moral actions. For example, I can choose to turn right, which is the correct choice if I want to go to Boston, but whether I go left or right is not a moral question.

It must be said that one's view of what makes an act immoral is essential to whether or not harm is a necessary property. For example, if I believe that all immoral acts proceed from what people decide is immoral, then harm is not an essential property of all immoral acts. However, if one believes that what makes something immoral is the property of harm, and that harm can be shown objectively, then it can and does follow that harm is an essential property of immorality. Calling something immoral doesn't make it immoral. Some religious people think that dancing is immoral, given their ideas about gyrating bodies leading to sexual contact.

Another important point of what makes something both immoral and accidental is responsibility, I'm held responsible for the act of driving drunk and causing harm to someone or myself, because of what I could have reasonably foreseen in terms of my actions. Thus it not about intention, but about what one should have known about certain actions, and thus we are responsible for actions taken that could lead to harm.