I mean to get back to a close analysis of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's book. — Banno

Let me know what you think because her views are very similar to my own.

Ya, there is no way to know what passages would have been eliminated if he had edited those notes.

As I said in page 7 of this thread I'm trying to complete a series of videos starting with a summary of the Tractatus, a summary of his transitional period (starting around 1930), a summary of the PI, and ultimately ending with an in depth look at OC. I'm not sure I'll finish it, but I'm giving it a go.

What follows is the beginning of my work on OC, it's a revision of a paper I wrote some years back. I'll post at least some of it here.

edited on 5/15/23
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Post 1

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance

In what follows, I will try to set out an epistemological theory that enunciates a particular set of propositions, which are derived from Wittgenstein’s final notes called On Certainty (OC published in 1969). These bedrock propositions (often called hinge propositions) were identified mainly by Wittgenstein in the final years of his life (1949-1951). I am not claiming anything original in my thesis except to point out that these statements or bedrock beliefs (as I refer to them) have an important epistemological role that will advance the subject of epistemology in ways that few philosophers, if any, before the writing of OC, have considered.

Bedrock beliefs form the substructure of our epistemic language. In other words, they provide the bedrock to create sophisticated epistemological language constructs or language-games. For example, our understanding of knowledge and how we use phrases like “I know that such and such is the case” and “I doubt that such and such is the case” in certain social linguistic contexts and not in others; and how not understanding the proper use of words like know and doubt can cause conceptual or linguistic confusion. The underpinnings of these beliefs are crucial to understanding what it means to know and where justification ends with our epistemology. Answering such questions helps clarify the limits of reasoning (the infinite regress problem), and it also solves the problem of circularity.

As pointed out, many of the ideas presented here, are derived from OC, which begins as a response to Moore’s papers, A Defense of Common Sense (1925), and Proof of an External World (1939) in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty. Propositions such as the following: “Here is one hand” and “There exists at present a living human body, which is my body.” These propositions supposedly provide Moore a proof of the external world, and as such, they seem to form a buttress against the radical skeptic. Moore says, “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples. But did I prove just now that two human hands were then in existence? I do want to insist that I did; that the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one; and that it is perhaps impossible to give a better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever. …(G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World, 1939).”

It is undoubtedly the case that OC goes beyond Moore’s propositions, so it is not just about Moore; it is about knowing, doubting, making mistakes, reality, empirical statements, certainty, acting out beliefs, rule-following, etc., so it covers a range of topics in relations to what we know, and how it fits into our language. So, it is essential to note that not everything in OC should be seen as a response to Moore.

It is not only Moore’s claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein criticizes but his use of the word know. Wittgenstein also spends much of his time critiquing the radical skeptics, specifically, their use of the word doubt. Wittgenstein emphasizes an essential relationship between the word know and the use of the word doubt as part of the language games of everyday epistemology.

Even though Wittgenstein levels his attack against Moore’s argument, he is not entirely unsympathetic. However, he argues that Moore’s propositions do not accomplish what Moore thinks they do, namely, to provide proof of the external world, which in turn is supposed to undermine the doubts of the radical skeptic.

OC begins with the following statement:

“If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest (OC 1).”

Wittgenstein grants that if Moore knows what he claims to know, then Moore’s conclusion follows. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues throughout his notes that Moore does not know what he thinks he knows. However, we are all inclined to agree with Moore; at least our intuition seems to lean in Moore’s direction. After all, if we do not know this is a hand, then what do we know? This inclination to use the word know, as Moore uses it, causes Wittgenstein to question Moore’s argument. Is Moore justified in believing his claims are true? It certainly seems so, but Wittgenstein has other ideas.

“From it seeming to me—or to everyone –to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.

“What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it (OC 2).”

We begin with Wittgenstein’s juxtaposition of the word know against the word doubt, that is, if knowing does not make sense in Moore’s context, then does doubting make sense as a rebuttal against Moorean propositions.

If there never arose a doubt in connection with a knowledge claim, would it be a knowledge claim? What would be the purpose of a justification if a doubt never arose, or if the question “How do you know?” never raised its head?

“We just do not see how very specialized the use of “I know” is.

“—For “I know” seems [my emphasis] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.

“For it is not as though the proposition “It is so” could be inferred from someone else’s utterance: “I know it is so”. …[F]rom his utterance “I know…” it does not follow that he does know it
“That he does know takes some shewing (OC 11-14).”

It is certainly the case that one’s knowledge does not follow from the mere assertion that one knows. As if the truth of a statement follows from merely uttering “It is so.” It is this tendency to emphasize one’s conviction with the phrase “I know…” as if it guarantees that our statement is a piece of knowledge. However, as Wittgenstein points out, “That [we] do know takes some [showing] (OC 14).”

Wittgenstein puts Moore’s statements into the category of an expression of conviction because it seems obvious to Moore that we know these propositions (I will often go back and forth between saying these propositions are propositions, as opposed to what I believe they are, viz. basic beliefs), even though Moore offers a kind of proof. It is often the case that we claim to know that something is the case, but later find out that we were wrong. Hence, Wittgenstein’s pointing out the phrase “I thought I knew (OC 12).” Understanding this points to how a doubt can enter our claims of knowledge, but the doubt must be justifiable. It cannot be used in the same way that Moore is using the word know, that is, as an expression that can stand alone without demonstrating how it is that one knows. In other words, “I know that something is the case,” should be justifiable, just as doubting should be justifiable, it is just how the language-games of knowing and doubting work, at least as a function of how Moore is presenting his argument, and also as a function of the criticisms of Moore’s argument, that is, the radical skeptics criticism.

In a video asking the question What is Philosophy Good For, philosopher Hans-Georg Moeller gives an answer: questioning religion. He even suggests that it’s part of a good definition of philosophy, but at the very least he’s saying that questioning religion is historically one of the things that philosophy has done well, and is one of the most valuable things it does. — Jamal

I would disagree that "questioning religion" should be part of a good definition of philosophy, no more than questioning atheism should be part of a good definition of philosophy. Philosophy questions everything, and nothing should be off the table. In fact, there should be more questioning of much of the academic thinking in our culture, and the cultures around the world.

I agree that metaphysics has taken up much of philosophy, especially when it comes to religious beliefs, but that's because it's so pervasive. The questioning of metaphysical beliefs is a good thing, and the questioning of physicalism or materialism is also a good thing, both play an important role in trying to sort out what's factual. It's true that any belief that is as pervasive as religious belief will take up a large portion of philosophical thinking, but that doesn't mean that part of the definition should include "questioning religion." Part of the definition of philosophy is a critical analysis any belief.

Philosophy, for me, is any critical analysis, using philosophical principles (reason, epistemology, etc), that analyzes any belief or system of beliefs. My definition is much broader in scope than academic philosophy, and it includes the man on the street questioning his neighbors beliefs. Obviously most people are not trained in philosophy, but we're all philosophers to one degree or another. There are just not many that are very good at it.

Answers

(Answers to Life’s Most Perplexing Questions)

That’s right, I’m going to give you the answers to many of the questions that are asked about life and this reality. I know it seems rather arrogant to think that I have some of the answers, but it comes from much of the evidence that I’ve given in this thread, and much more evidence that I haven’t given. Much of what I answer goes against the standard model of reality, including many of the models of consciousness, and who we are as individuals.

These questions and answers are in no particular order, and some of these answers are only partially answered. No one has the complete answers to all these questions.

I’m writing the answers as they come to mind.

1) What is this reality?
We are in a kind of holographic simulation.

2) Who created this reality?
We participated in creating this reality.

3) Is there a God?
There is no God as most religions think of God, but there probably is something akin to the concept. To say that God is love is probably closest to the truth. However, most religions distort this picture with other beliefs.

4) What is at the base of reality?
Consciousness or mind is at the base of reality. We are all part of that consciousness, and yet we also maintain our individuality.

5) Where is our origin?
Our home is definitely not here in this simulation, it’s in the base reality and the immediate surrounding reality or realities that are not part of any simulation, of which there are many (many simulations).

6) Do we choose to come here?
Yes! We chose to come here. In fact, we plan much of our lives. Moreover, we choose our parents, we choose the kind of body we’ll have, and we choose many of the hardships we’ll experience. By the way, this is why there is no problem of evil, because we know what we are getting into before we come. Evil is a construct of this reality, and probably other created realities, but it’s not part of the base reality.

7) Why did we come here?
There is no one answer to this question, but there are several very general answers to this question. We come here to have human experiences, and to learn from these experiences. We come not only for what we will learn from the experiences, but what we will help others to learn from the experiences. Much of this is still a mystery. We definitely don’t come here to have fun. The idea that the goal of life is to be happy is misguided. Life is meant to be a struggle. It’s meant, at least for most, to be difficult and challenging. The struggle is mostly with yourself. There is much more that can be said about this, but I’m trying to keep the answers short.

8) Who are we?
One thing is for sure, we are much greater beings than we realize. We are beings with great knowledge and power, not gods, but much greater than this human version of ourselves.

9) Is death anything to fear?
Definitely not, you are simply returning to your home or your original form.

10) Why don’t I remember who I am?
Probably because it would interfere with your learning experience here, and with the learning
experiences of others.

11) Do we choose when we will die, that is, is there a set time to die?
Yes. Although it’s not set in stone, it’s somewhat flexible for some. For others, when your time is up, it’s up, it’s agreed upon before you come here.

12) Can prayer alter someone’s death time?
In some cases, yes, in most cases, no.

13) Can prayer alter your life?
Yes, but as in the case of praying to save someone’s life, it just depends on what agreements were made before coming here. Also, you may only have access to a certain number of interventions in this life through prayer. On the other hand, no amount of prayer will change some things.

14) Will AI become conscious?
No. Consciousness is not composed of the material of this simulated reality. The only way something in this reality can become conscious, is if consciousness enters it. The same way we enter this body.

15) Can we access other realities?
Yes. There are several ways, including NDEs, DMT, mushrooms, meditation, the other side communicating to us, and deathbed visions.

16) Do animals have an afterlife?
Yes.

17) Do we sometimes see our dead loved ones?
Yes. In fact, this is probably why the disciples thought Jesus rose from the dead. They had visions after his death.

18) Do our loved ones know what’s happening here?
Yes, they are always with you. Remember we are all part of the same consciousness, so they have access to everything that’s going on. We don’t have the same access because we are a dumbed-down version of ourselves with very limited knowledge.

19) Are there children in the afterlife?
No. We only experience being a child in this simulated reality, or some other simulated reality.

20) Have we experienced other lives?
Yes. Some of us have experienced many lives in this reality and in other realities.

21) Are we eternal beings?
Yes. We probably will always exist.

22) Does evil exist?
Yes and no. In this reality evil surely exists as a concept describing certain actions, but in ultimate reality there is no evil, no sin, no damnation, no devil, and no demons. No harm can ultimately come to you. Sure, you can experience pain and harm here, but it’s just temporary, a function of this reality; and much of what you experience in terms of pain and harm is something you knew about before coming.

23) Is what people see in an NDE the afterlife?
Yes and no. In other words, what people see in their NDE is sort of an in between, viz., where we go after we immediately die. It’s like going to the train station, you’re between destinations. It’s a place you can return from, i.e., you can still be connected to your body while being there. There is a further boundary, where if you cross that boundary, you can’t return, it’s often encountered in NDES. It’s the place where you are completely disconnected from your body. People often see a silver cord connecting them to their bodies. Once the cord is broken, then you are probably severed from this simulation. It’s like being unplugged. If you’re still plugged in, there’s time to return to the body and continue living.

24) Do miraculous healings occur?
Yes. Some healings are seen in the recovery of people who have had serious illnesses that led to their NDE. In fact, sometimes doctors are guided by beings on the other side to help in their recovery.

25) Are the people in my life, viz., family, friends, enemies, and acquaintances part of who I’m supposed to interact with while I’m here?
Yes. Many, if not all of them, were part of the plan before coming here. We all play a kind of role with each other, but it’s an important role. Even those whom you detest are playing a role, for you, and for them.

26) What about suicide?
If you take your life, you are interrupting the agreement you made before coming here. Moreover, you may have to come back and live your life all over again with many of the same problems, possibly worse problems. So, suicide is not an answer to escaping the problems of life.

27) What is the most important part of life?
Love, it’s at the heart of reality. It’s not like the religious love you hear about, viz., I love you, but if you reject me, you’re going to hell forever.

28) Do we have free will?
Yes, but limited free will. There are also those things that are deterministic, i.e., those things that are determined before you come into this life.

29) Does time pass differently in the afterlife?
Yes. What may be only a few minutes or a few seconds here, maybe much longer there. Time passes, seemingly, at a faster rate there, or at the very least it passes in a non-linear way. The only way there would be no time is if we’re experiencing everything at once, including being everywhere at once. I’m not sure if that’s possible.

30) Does coming here help us in some way?
This question is related to the question, “Why do we choose to come here?” It helps us to advance in experiential learning or knowledge in ways we won’t understand until we return home. My speculation is that we also add to the experiential knowledge of the core consciousness, and that experiential knowledge can be accessed by all of us. There is no end to what we can experience. If the core mind can imagine it, it can create it, and then, we can experience it.

31) Are all realities as difficult as this reality?
No. Some realities are probably fun, and some realities are probably even more difficult to experience than this reality. If you wanted to experience hell you could probably do that. However, whether you do is up to you. Some people are warned about coming here. They’re told that it’s very difficult. It’s not for the faint of heart.

32) Last question is speculative, but very possible. Is everyone you see in this reality real? In other words, are some human bodies just NPCs?
If this reality is an advanced holographic program of sorts, then it’s very possible that not everyone you see is real or conscious. Maybe there are billions of NPCs. If this is true, and it may be, then it’s very possible to create AI that appears conscious in almost every way, but in fact is not really conscious. Maybe the only way to know would be to look at reality from outside the program.
I’ve just answered many of life’s mysteries, but this is just the tip of the iceberg, or maybe just an atom on the tip of the iceberg.

I'll use an argument formed from Anselm's text to show the argument isn't sound. It's taken from the English text of the Proslogion chapter 2. I think this is a better version of the argument, but it still doesn't work.

Premise (1) The fool hears and understands "a being than which none greater can be thought."

Premise (2) If the fool hears and understands, then it exists in his understanding.

Intermediate Conclusion: (3) The being than which none greater can be thought exists in the fool's understanding. Follows from (1) and (2) Modus Ponens

Premise (4) The being than which none greater can be thought exists in the understanding alone. (This would be the atheist's position according to Anselm.)

Premise (5) A being of which none greater can be thought can exist in reality.

Premise (6) A being that exists in reality is greater than a being existing in the understanding alone.

Intermediate Conclusion: (7) The being of which none greater can be thought existing in reality would be greater than the same being existing in the understanding alone. Follows from (5) and (6)

Final Conclusion: (8) A being than which none greater can be thought existing in reality would be greater than the same being existing in the mind/thought. Follows from (4) and (7)]

This presumably shows that the atheist position is contradictory, and therefore false. Why? Because the atheist's position is that a being than which none greater can be thought exists in the understanding alone. However, this cannot be so, because one could add a further attribute that would make it greater, viz., existing in reality. Thus, it can't exist in the understanding alone. It would be similar to saying that 10 is the greatest number. However, someone replies, no, I can add 1 to the number 10 and get 11, so 11 is the greatest number.

Since this argument is deductive it is valid. However, it must also be sound, i.e., the premises must be true, to be a good argument. The first premise with a problem is (2). How can a being exist in the understanding? Only a concept can exist in the understanding. We have the concept unicorn, but that doesn't mean unicorns are running around in my mind. Moreover, if you change the premise to only the concept existing in the understanding, then the argument is no longer valid. Why? Because if you add to the concept existing in reality you would still just have a concept existing in reality, not the being itself.

Finally, many find the argument dubious for other reasons, viz., trying to prove the existence of something from the concept alone, which others have pointed out in this thread, is very problematic to say the least.

This is another good video of an MD (she was an atheist) having an NDE. Much of what she experiences confirms my own conclusions on this subject. As for God and religion, although I don't believe any religion has it correct, there is something that people experience while having an NDE that could fit the bill of God (or source, or consciousness, or mind). However, it's much different than our human understanding of God, especially any religious understanding of God.

There are some that think that Sam's getting old and he wants to latch onto these beliefs as a way of having hope, nothing could be further from the truth. I've believed in these experiences for over 45 years, so it has very little to do with getting older. It's just that I've been studying these experiences more since I've been retired, but they have always interested me.

If you have even a slight interest in these experiences this is a good video to listen to.

The first proposition (T 1) is a kind of metaphysical basis for truth. Any proposition that doesn't fit the world of facts is metaphysical.

The tractatus is showing us how things are, not saying how things are. — Banno

That's an important point often overlooked. W. is doing both in the T., viz., showing using metaphysical propositions (which is why we throw the ladder away at the end of the book), and also telling us that the limit of what can be said amounts to the whole of natural science. The showing part is all the metaphysical language used in the T. Once you take the journey with him, then you can toss all the metaphysical propositions away in terms of what can be said. He treats the metaphysical propositions as normal at first, but once you understand him (T 6.54) you can discard them.

So, I should have said that if a proposition is to be correctly counted as a fact, it must be true. — Janus

But propositions are not facts, they either mirror a fact, or they mirror or picture a possible fact. It sounds like you're conflating true propositions with facts. Do you agree that propositions and facts are two separate things? Propositions, as I see it, are claims about facts.

Facts, considered as true propositions are necessarily true. If a propositons or description is false it is not a fact. Facts considered as actualties are not true or false, they simply obtain. — Janus

I agree with everything, except, I'm not sure what you mean by the first sentence. Are you saying true propositions are necessarily true?

I may have at some point in the past. Why do you ask?

But hence TLP 6.5... "to say nothing except what can be said". — Banno

We can talk about anything that exists, including the metaphysical, as long as we have access to it, so I disagree with W. on this.

Not quite. At issue is realism against antirealism. Things can be true and yet unsaid; there are unstated facts. — Banno

Ya, we're very far apart on this. If truth is a property of certain kinds of statements, viz., propositions, then truth is not something unsaid. I can see how you arrived at this though, at least I think I do. It seems to come from your idea of potential propositions. If you believe proposition have form prior to their use, then I can see where you get the idea that truths can be unsaid. Facts, on the other hand, have an ontology that is separate from statements/propositions.

Seems to me that if something is the case, then it is in a form that can be put into a proposition - whether it has been or not. IF you prefer, the world is proposition-ready... — Banno

We agree that it can be put into a proposition. Where we disagree is that it has propositional form before being used as a proposition. Propositional form is nothing more than a particular kind of statement, and it doesn't exist prior to becoming a statement (to repeat myself) Because something has the potential to become X, it doesn't follow that it is X before its potential is realized.

It seems to me that if something can be put into a proposition, then by that very fact, it has a propositional form — Banno

How can it have propositional form without being a proposition, without being used as a proposition? Are you saying that animals are communicating via propositions? I think we've argued about this before.

Truth is a property of propositions, and given that propositions, as used between people, are always used in a context, then truth is context dependent. I don't think you can separate truth from a context. Facts, on the other hand, are quite a different story, facts can stand alone, even without language.

Not sure who you're responding to, maybe both of us. All I'm doing is trying to show that logic is not only part of W's thinking in his early philosophy, but it's also part of his later philosophy as well. seems to want to deny this, or dimmish it. There is ample evidence that logic is important to W's later thinking. First and foremost W. is a logician and a mathematician.

As for your comment that rudimentary communication can be put into a proposition, it's true of course, but the point is that it's not a proposition until it's used as a proposition.

What he being said when the baby cries? It it communicating but is it trying to communicate and what is it saying? — Fooloso4

You're leaving out an important part of what I said, viz., "...the logic is seen in both forms of communication..." the primitive forms that you site, and the propositional forms that I'm emphasizing. One doesn't have to communicate via propositions, that's a given, but even in these primitive forms of communication the logic is seen in the activities associated with them. OC 402 does nothing to diminish my point. Obviously the deed is first. We wouldn't get to language without the deed being first.

I would argue that the logic of our most primitive forms of life lies foremost in the activity, what is done, rather than what is said. — Fooloso4

It's both, the logic is seen in both forms of communication, i.e., in very primitive forms of life or communication and more sophisticated forms of communication (e.g. propositions). You can't separate what is said (propositions) from what is done, which is why language-games are connected with our forms of life (activities). For communication or language-games to have sense they must be connected with other activities, this includes primitive communication.

What do logics basically consist in, if not intelligible regularities? — Janus

Logic, viz., propositional logic, is an act of inference using propositions. Not all of our actions are of this type, which I'm sure you know, and not all regularities are of this type. My thinking was that there is a kind of logic, not propositional logic (formal logic), behind reality, this was the thinking of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Logic in the T. is the starting point, and this W. inherited from Russell and Frege.


My original point, is that logic still plays a significant role in W's later thinking, is, I believe, an important continuation for W. In W's. later thinking logic is "...everything descriptive of a language-game... (OC 56)." My contention, and the contention of others, is that logic still plays a central role in W's later thinking, and it's the chief method of investigation, not only in the T., but also in the PI and beyond (especially in OC). So, in the PI and beyond, logic is seen in the various uses of the proposition in our forms of life. Logic, then, is still about the proposition, but it's internal to the various uses we give to the proposition. Logic, is intrinsic to how we use propositions in various settings, and it's what gives propositions their sense.

If you or some other animal were to try doing this it would not be because you or they are acting illogically but that there is something neurologically wrong. — Fooloso4

That certainly is true, there could be something neurologically wrong. However, my point, and maybe I'm pushing logic a bit to far here, is that apart from some neurological problem, there seems to be a kind of logic built into the world around us and how we interact with that world. I maybe looking at logic as something transcendental, this maybe a mistake, not sure. I have to think more about it.

If we ask the person who claimed they are following definite rules will he be able to say what the rules are? If we ask the people who were playing, what would they say? — Fooloso4

Maybe I'm not being clear. I'm not saying that every game is defined by a set of rules, this is obviously not the case. My point at the start of this conversation is that logic still plays a role in W's later philosophy, although it's not the formal system that is used in the T. Even in the quote from the PI there is still a kind of logic built into the actions, it's harder to define, granted, but it's still there. You seem to want to point out the exceptions as though I'm speaking dogmatically about rules and logic, but I'm not. Rules in some cases can and do dictate some of the logic involved in games, but the logic does extend further than just the rules. When I speak of logic, I'm not referring to formal logic, but the logic that is seen in our actions. For example, there is a kind of logic that dictates, in a sense, that when I leave my house I don't try to walk through walls, but use the door. The logic of the T. is a priori, whereas the logic of W.s later philosophy is more of an a posteriori logic seen in our general experiences, especially as it relates to language.

Theology as grammar (PI 373)

this is not an appeal to logical syntax. It is, instead, about looking at how theological terms are used. What they mean for those who use them. The role they play in the life of those who believe. One might devise or derive rules, but the game is not determined by rules, but rather by what is felt and experienced and believed, by how the words resonate, by how one is moved, by how one is compelled, by how they matter. — Fooloso4

I agree that it's not an appeal to logical syntax. When I say the logic of language, it not only includes logical syntax, but Wittgenstein's deeper sense of logic, which includes other kinds of actions, beliefs. etc.

The game is partly determined by the rules. The rules in a sense set the game in motion, but the logic of the game has a much wider sense, in that it includes other kinds of actions. These other actions are closely related to our "forms of life."

I don't think I agree with "...the game is not determined by the rules." I agree that there are other factors involved, but there would be no game of chess without the rules that dictate how, for e.g., a bishop moves. It wouldn't be the game of chess as we know it. It would be a different game. The same is true for the language-game given at the beginning of the PI. The rules dictate how one should respond to the calls of the builder. It matters not how I feel, what I believe, or how the words resonate, it only matters that I respond in the correct way to the calls.

This is an amazing story of an NDE and its transforming power.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oDNGOwC3AFM

Analogously, the rules of chess are not an underlying logic of the game. — Fooloso4

It's partly what makes up the logic of the game, i.e., without the rules there wouldn't be a logical move. In fact, there would be no game.

Of course, I'm not saying that playing chess necessarily leads to logical moves, but if you know how the pieces move this is part of the logic of the game. The same is true of a language-game. In fact, some language-games, are simply illogical. This doesn't take away from my main point, that there is an underlying logic to language, viz., in the use of grammar (syntax) or the expanded grammar that Wittgenstein refers to.

So what is the perfect definition of knowledge? — Cidat

There is no perfect definition of knowledge, and if you're trying to find a perfect definition you're going to be disappointed. Look at it in terms of use, how is the word knowledge or know used across a wide spectrum of subjects or contexts. In one case someone might say "I know..." to emphasize a conviction, which is simply a subjective point of view, or simply an expression of their feelings about a particular belief. In such a case the person may not have good evidence or reasons, and so their belief isn't justified. In fact, in this e.g. one could even challenge this particular use as being knowledge at all, as Wittgenstein did in his notes called On Certainty.

Another use of know that is stressed by philosophers is acquiring knowledge through correct reasoning or the use of logic (inductive and deductive reasoning), which is also used in science. Much of science is based on inductive reasoning as a result of experimentation or observation.

A third use of know refers to knowledge gained by testimonial evidence. This is used in courts of law where the testimonial evidence is challenged or accepted depending on its strength. People often forget that this kind of evidence comes in the form of lectures, books, friends and family, etc. Without testimonial evidence much of what we believe would simply collapse. Being able to evaluate good testimonial evidence is a skill, because testimonial evidence can also be very weak. However, on the other hand it can be very strong depending on the circumstances.

A fourth way of knowing is pure reason or pure logic, viz., I know based on the logical structure. An e.g. is a tautology, "Either dogs are animals or they are not animals" is a tautology. It has the form either X is true or Y is true (X or not X).

Another use is that which is known by sensory experience. For e.g., "I know the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it."

Another use of know is linguistic training, i.e., I know is based on the correct public use of words or concepts.

In many of these uses there is considerable overlap. For e.g. in science sensory experience is part of observation.

So there are a variety of uses of know depending on the language-game, as Wittgenstein would say.

What does logic consist of in W. later philosophy? This is not easy to pin down because it’s not a formalized system like the logic used in the Tractatus. The logic of the PI is seen in, for e.g. the language-game, grammar, our forms of life, and all the actions that correspond with each of these activities. The logic of the PI is broad in its scope, but it’s definitely not a formalized system .

As an e.g. we might think of the logic of chess, i.e., what does the logic of chess look like? First, the rules of chess, viz., knowing how to move a piece based on the rules is part of the logic. Knowing where to place the pieces on the board, and knowing who moves first; knowing which move is best in a particular situation is also part of the logic. So, one could say that the logic of the game, although not spelled out, is intrinsically connected with the rules, the pieces, the board, the clock, the color of the pieces, the shape of the pieces, combined with our actions, etc, etc.

The logic of the PI, although much different from the logic of the T. is seen in the use of language in our everyday lives, and what governs this logic, again, it's a multitude of things that connects to W. concept of forms of life, grammar, and our actions as a people within the language game. This is how I see the logic of language in the later W.

Sounds about right. :grin:

I agree with much of what you're saying, and where we disagree it's seems to be more about the nuances of his thinking, at least that's how I see it.

In terms of Wittgenstein's picture theory and truth function theory of language "[t]he world is all that is the case," at least in the Tractatus. He still believes that the truly important (e.g., ethics, aesthetics, the mystical), that which is beyond the world of facts, is not part of this world in terms of what can be said, it can only be shown. My point about T. 1 is a propositional point, it's not meant to include the transcendental or mystical. There is what is mystical, but it's not a point of fact, i.e., there is no fact beyond the limit of the world, which is the limit of what can be said in the T. I'm not saying that everything W. talks about is covered under the umbrella of T. 1, that's obviously not the case.

In his later philosophy the proposition is still limited to the world, but the way it functions, the way it has sense, is not through the a priori method of analysis given in the Tractatus (the picture theory and truth function theory). As you know it's more social, but it's still in the world, and I believe that what can be said in his later philosophy is still limited to the world. He still has little patience for factual talk about the metaphysical, even though the metaphysical has importance to him. So, again these are propositional points about the limit of language.

My goal in my video is to try to explain, as simply as possible, his picture theory and truth function theory of the proposition; and to show that he is still holding on to the traditional view of meaning in the T.

I think of passages like the following: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical use to their everyday use (PI 116)" And also, "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language (PI 119)."

Passages like this make me think that there is still a strong sense that "The world is all that is the case (PI 1)" in his later philosophy." But there are other passages that seem like he's saying something else, which is why there is so much controversy over interpretation. I think what should be emphasized is his method of doing philosophy in his later works, as opposed to some philosophical theory or truth. However, the tendency is to look for some philosophical theory or truth, which I've done in OC.

There is no doubt that W. repudiated much in the T., but for me there is some continuity. I guess it depends on what you're emphasizing. Anyway much of this is beyond the scope of what I want to say in my video.

A good book that gives a basic understanding of W.'s early and later philosophy, and it's one that I've mentioned before, is K.T. Fann's book called Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy.

What I'm saying is, he still believes that the "world is [still] all that is the case," that there is a limit to what can be said in terms of the metaphysical. Although the limit in his later philosophy is confined to the language-game, grammar, and forms of life for example.

So, the continuity is there in terms of what can be said about the metaphysical, and it's still part of his thinking. He has an affinity with the mystical for example, but would still, even in his later philosophy, bemoan arguments for the existence of God because, I believe, he still held that there were no facts to latch onto. He still sees the world of facts as quite separate from the metaphysical, which is something that can only be shown, not factually stated.

As I said a few posts ago I think there is continuity between Wittgenstein's early philosophy and his later philosophy, but there is also much that he rejects. One of the ideas that W. seems to keep is proposition 1 in the Tractatus, viz., "The world is all that is the case." My understanding of his later philosophy is that he still believes there is a limit to what can be sensibly said, which is why I think T. 1 is still something that he holds on to.

The other claim that I and others maintain is that the logic of language still has sway in his later thinking. However, the logic of language in his later thinking equates to the rules grammar, but his use of grammar is not the standard use. This confused G.E. Moore, who remarked that W. was using the word grammar in a very non-standard way (Moore made this remark in one of W.'s lectures), and he was correct. Wittgenstein expands grammar to more than just syntax, i.e., he expands grammar to the public use of words or language-games, which is much more than mere syntax. If we think of a simple language-game, like the one W. gives us at the beginning of the PI (between the builder and his assistant), we can, I believe, understand that the use of particular calls (pillar, block, etc) require certain responses beyond syntax. The logic of this language-game expands the use of grammar to how the assistant responds to the calls of the builder, and how the assistant may even use the word pillar or block. So, the rules of grammar in this case are what is meant by the logic of language. Just as the rules of chess make up the logic of the moves.

I do want responses, and they are appreciated, but I also know when an issue isn't going to get resolved within a few posts. Even if we spend hours and hours writing we're probably not going to make much headway. If you've been observing my responses you'll find that I don't spend a lot of time arguing, especially when I know that's it's a waste of time, but I do take note of the responses.

Interpretation can't be avoided, and I wouldn't claim that my interpretation is always correct, but at some point one just settles on an interpretation, unless there is a clear mistake. I think I understand the main thrust of the Tractatus. As for continuity, they've been arguing over this for the last 100 years. Even W. when asked what he meant by this or that couldn't always remember his thinking around a particular passage. I don't mind the disagreements, but I don't always have the time to argue through each issue.

Again, I appreciate any response I get.

I'm not going to get into a long drawn out discussion about interpretation. We'll never resolve that issue. Besides this is beyond the scope of what I'm trying to do. I suspect this has a lot to do with the different schools of interpretation.

Without too much exaggeration, the only thing they have in common is the word 'logic'. — Fooloso4

So, the word logic is empty to you? You see no thread in terms of the logic of language that goes from his early thinking to his later thinking? That flies in the face of almost everything I've read.

The transcendental logic of the Tractatus is not simply the logic of language, it is the logic of the world. — Fooloso4

That's strange since W. clearly says in the preface "The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reasons why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood." It's the logic of language and how it connects with the world of facts. The logic of language is demonstrated in his picture and truth-function theory of language.

I'm not sure why you keep using the term "transcendental logic," its simply truth functional logic that he's using. It shows, he believes, how a proposition has sense.

The latter Wittgenstein rejects the transcendental logic of the Tractatus. This is not a continuation but a repudiation. — Fooloso4

I agree, which is why I said "what is meant by the logic of language in his early thinking is much different from the logic of language in his later thinking." However, there is still the "logic of use" in his later thinking, i.e., logic still plays a role, but not the same role. I would have thought that was clear from what I wrote.

I'm sure we have disagreements on some of this, but I'm sticking to my guns.

There are probably more than 15 ideas in the T. that Wittgenstein rejected, but there is also continuity between his early ideas and his later ideas. Are you saying that Malcolm didn't think there was continuity between W. early and later philosophy? I don't think that's true.

There are at least two points of continuity between W. early and later philosophy, and probably more. The two points I'm emphasizing has to do with the logic of language and that there is a limit to what can be said. I think most scholars would agree with this. Although, what is meant by the logic of language in his early thinking is much different from the logic of language in his later thinking. What seems clear is that logic has an important role in both the early and later W.

That said, you will always find disagreements about the connecting threads of his early and later philosophy. My goal is to make the T. as simple to understand as possible.