If you're referring to what's veridical, then they have no referent. — Sam26

Can we talk veridically about fiction?

but not all concepts have referents in reality, — Sam26

Well we were talking about words failing to refer to things in reality. I'm interested to hear about other kinds of things failing likewise. Just wondered what they are, if not words.

The only referent they might have is a fictional one, — Sam26

So they do have a referent or they don't?

What? What's the brain shiver? — Sam26

The thought. The neurological activity.

There are many concepts, especially in fiction and mythology, that have no actual or real existence or referent. The only thing that's real is the concept, or conceptual idea. — Sam26

Do you mean the brain shiver?

My mistake was duplication: I shouldn't have used both 'fictitious' and 'supposed'. — Herg

Ok, but now you've done it again, with 'real' and 'existent'.

'Fictitious supposed entity' does not accurately capture my meaning. — Herg

Ok, what does? What form of words is satisfactorily not an oxymoron?

The fact that I have never seen Santa Claus is not proof that Santa Claus doesn't exist, as is the fact that I have never seen The North Pole [likewise not] proof that The North Pole doesn't exist. — RussellA

Typo, I presume.

The question is, how do we know things without doubt that have only been described to us. — RussellA

@Shawn might agree that this is the question.

I expect it's only the question if you are a foundationalist, and assume that some absolute kind of knowledge is required.

Only when something is added to the propositional function to turn it into a proposition does the proposition become true or false, — RussellA

... such as, some indication of which quantity (e.g. none, some or all) of the world's objects are to be denoted by each denoting phrase. Whereas, your suggested examples of suitable supplementation:

... such as "[it is said that] Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "[many believe that] The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth". — RussellA

are way off. This might not affect your stuff about knowledge. But it shouts a bit.

points out that we merely suppose that there is someone called Santa who lives at the North Pole. — Herg

How is this different from saying that we merely entertain the fiction?

A fictitious supposed entity — Herg

You might as well say, a fictitious fictitious entity.

Can Santa be his own referent since he doesn't denote anything in the real world? — Shawn

Do you mean, can the name "Santa" be its own referent, since it doesn't denote anything in the real world?

Page number? I can't find the passage, and "besides from" sounds like a typo.

Anyway, I don't know much about Kant, but I won't let that stop me...

He's just fleshing out the quote from Kant.

Kant says: you can decipher the nature of a thing without seeing all its aspects. From P don't infer Q.

Guyer says: Kant does decipher the nature of the noumenon without claiming to see all its aspects. P, but we don't infer Q. And by the way, the nature thus deciphered is to manifest or objectify as human will. Whatever that means. But how this nature was deciphered isn't mentioned. You seem to be hoping the decipherment is argued or explained. It's just given, as part of P.

"Santa wears a red hat" is true. — Banno

Sure. As fiction. Fictionally true. It's a fiction that "Santa wears a red hat" is true. So, it's false. Logic with oxymorons. Great fun!

Yet, we can instantiate him freely in movies, — Shawn

Do you mean, depict him freely?

We can, but not in the sense of pointing his likenesses at him. Only in the sense of making Santa-pictures.

See https://monoskop.org/images/1/1b/Goodman_Nelson_Languages_of_Art.pdf pp. 21.

I was attempting a pun (hence the apology). Con artist. But I see now it doesn't work on the word pronounced properly.

I can point to {"winged", "godlike", "stallion"} and give it the name "Pegasus". — RussellA

But Pegasus flies. Your set of words doesn't.

I think that's quite stringent. — Shawn

The indirect reference to Santa stories and pictures and actual beardy old men is fairly free, isn't it?

Santa isn't an individual — Shawn

Do you mean there is no actual person answering to the usual descriptions and hence named by the relevant tokens of the word "Santa"? (Good.)

and yet is in the domain of discourse. — Shawn

Well perhaps you are talking here about the name "Santa" (or relevant tokens of it), and not some corresponding person? "Santa" is a name appearing in a declaration of the domain of discourse?

In the sense that fictional is not necessarily contradictory to entity. — RussellA

Fair enough. Do they say that non-actual is not necessarily contradictory to actual?

But generally speaking, this distinction is more semantic than substantive. — Manuel

What distinction? That between a thought and what it's a thought about? You've lost me. My thought about Hitler isn't substantively different from Hitler?

I'm with Quine. And Goodman. Words often refer to (or are pretended to refer to, in acts of referring, which are only a game) actual things. Sometimes they fail to refer directly to actual things. Because there's no such thing. That doesn't stop them referring indirectly (but only indirectly) to other things. E.g. to actual Santa stories and pictures, and actual beardy old men.

I don't see why Santa Claus would be a "non-thing". It's a mental construction of a person... — Manuel

So Santa is the thought? Or the person thought about? Or both, or neither?

The act of referring to a specific thing — Manuel

So we're back where we started. Among this subset of the things we do with language, the acts of referring to specific things, are there acts of referring to specific non-things?

People refer, not words themselves. — Manuel

But what do they refer to?

Do you mean, these people deny that "fictional entity" is an oxymoron? Or that they have found that reasoning with oxymorons can end well?

I attempted treating the problem as a reference issue between fictional entities [...] — Shawn

I mean, I'm guessing that didn't end well, as "fictional entity" is an oxymoron?

Conatus : a natural tendency, impulse, or striving : conation. used in Spinozism — Gnomon

and by conatists

(Sorry)

Altogether now:

It's like a mode of speeeeeech
That you just can't define...

Set your criticism out. — Banno

I did.

I suspect that in this case you failed to see I was using quote marks to clarify reference to -F-r-o-d-o- tokens, and then to talk about the supposed referent of such tokens. Not caring for the niceties of use and mention, you might well have taken my -"-F-r-o-d-o-"- tokens to refer to one or more -"-F-r-o-d-o-"- tokens, and then supposed that I was talking about the referent of these: i.e. -F-r-o-d-o- tokens. Had that been an appropriate reading, I would indeed have been talking about the mechanics of quotation. But I was using quotation, to attempt clarity (god help me). Not mentioning it. — bongo fury

I always do.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/search?Search=Banno+use+mention&expand=yes&child=&forums=&or=Relevance&discenc=&mem=&tag=&pg=1&date=All&Checkboxes%5B%5D=titles&Checkboxes%5B%5D=WithReplies&or=Relevance&user=bongo+fury&disc=&Checkboxes%5B%5D=child

But Banno is, so far as I observe, confusing the referent of "Frodo" in the real sense with the referent of "Frodo" in the Ryle sense. — bongo fury

What's certainly not the case is that the distinction between fiction and nonfiction is to do with quotation, as ↪bongo fury seems to think. — Banno

I wasn't claiming to explain fiction according to some theory of quotation. I was alleging that your reasoning about fiction and nonfiction is spoilt by your not bothering to distinguish use and mention, nor to follow the usual guidance of quote marks for that purpose.

I suspect that in this case you failed to see I was using quote marks to clarify reference to -F-r-o-d-o- tokens, and then to talk about the supposed referent of such tokens. Not caring for the niceties of use and mention, you might well have taken my -"-F-r-o-d-o-"- tokens to refer to one or more -"-F-r-o-d-o-"- tokens, and then supposed that I was talking about the referent of these: i.e. -F-r-o-d-o- tokens. Had that been an appropriate reading, I would indeed have been talking about the mechanics of quotation. But I was using quotation, to attempt clarity (god help me). Not mentioning it.

I refer him to Davidson's landmark dismissal of Quine's account of quotation, with
Quine says that quotation"...has a certain anomalous feature""
— Quotation — Banno

This supports the foregoing diagnosis. You seem to hope that Davidson achieved or intended a landmark dismissal of all pedantry concerning use and mention. To say nothing of distributing quote marks in pairs.

It was an interesting paper, even though off-topic here, as explained above. But I don't see how his own proposed treatment of

Quine says that quotation "...has a certain anomalous feature"

reveals it as anything more problematic than an indirect quotation containing a direct one.

(As if the entire text of Lord of the Rings were but one proper name.) — Banno

See above.

Ryle objected somewhere to my dictum that to be is to be the value of a variable, arguing that the values of variables are expressions and hence that my dictum repudiates all things except expressions. Clearly, then, we have to distinguish between values of variables in the real sense and values of variables in the Ryle sense. To confuse these is, again, to confuse use and mention. Professor Marcus is not, so far as I observe, confusing them. — Quine, Reply to Professor Marcus

But @Banno is, so far as I observe, confusing the referent of "Frodo" in the real sense with the referent of "Frodo" in the Ryle sense.

Likewise anyone who says, which happens quite a lot round here, something like "to be is to be the subject of a sentence".

And his point was that the referent (if any) of "Fido" is the dog so named, whereas people (and at least half of philosophers) think this can't be right: reference, being logical after all, must be from word to other word.
— bongo fury

Like who? — Srap Tasmaner

Ok... from word to other word, or to idea or concept. Then who not? You, me and Goodman and Quine, apparently.

All the trouble is caused by the theory that nouns typically stand for things or persons. Refer to them. Denote them. Point to them. Correspond to them. What have you.

It's true, or worth assuming. But it has limitations, and also an inherent technical complexity, which is the distinction between use and mention. This is conveniently (and often harmlessly) ignored, even in technical discourse like maths. So maintaining it requires considerable skill, but isn't always necessary for the practical success of the discourse. And in the end the underlying theory (word denotes object) loses plausibility.

Its limitations get exaggerated. E.g. the idea that it can't explain fiction without spoiling it. (Not proven.)

And it gets to seem far-fetched, itself. Poor Quine, after taking such pains to clarify and simplify existence claims, with his famous formula, found that people's natural understanding of "value of a variable" wasn't his. He had meant (by analogy with algebra) the number itself, not a numeral or some expression suitable as a substitute. And his point was that the referent (if any) of "Fido" is the dog so named, whereas people (and at least half of philosophers) think this can't be right: reference, being logical after all, must be from word to other word.

But we shouldn't be surprised. Getting one thing to stand in for another is asking for trouble. Even where we immediately clarify the distinction between the two, we resort to proxies. Perhaps we draw a diagram, with an arrow joining a "Fido"-inscription to a dog-picture. Well, this makes sense. Surely we hadn't wanted to draw an arrow in the air from the token to the slobbering mutt itself?

And hence the descent into "to be is to be the subject of a sentence" etc.

one thing, in this argument (as such) we are dealing with an exclusive disjunction right?? — KantDane21

Well,

(P ∧ -Q) ⋁ (Q ∧ -P) — bongo fury

isn't an argument but does imply the exclusive disjunction of P and Q. (Denying their conjunction.) Whereas

1. (A → ~B) v (A & B)
2. (A → ~B) v ~(~A v ~B)
3. (A → ~B) v ~(A → ~B) — Srap Tasmaner

is an argument but doesn't imply the exclusive disjunction (doesn't deny the conjunction of P and Q). Rather, it takes that denial for granted:

B = x is a noumenon (and ~B = x is an appearance) — Srap Tasmaner

But yes, mutual exclusivity of P and Q is needed to get from

P ⋁ Q — KantDane21

to

P→ -Q
Q→ -P — KantDane21

(deleted)

"Either all cognition is cognition of appearance, in which case there can be no cognition of noumena, or there can be cognition of the noumenon, in which case cognition is not essentially cognition of appearance"

P- all cognition is of appearance.
Q- [there can be] cognition of noumenon. — KantDane21

(P ∧ -Q) ⋁ (Q ∧ -P)

(Not an argument)

How many resemblance relations are there? Just the one? Or (e.g.) one for each property?

Ah well it might be what you're looking for? Constructing qualities/properties from (and reducing them to) similarity data? (Link to pdf now fixed.)

But is there any reason why not identify the universal with the resemblance relation itself? — litewave

Are you (and others) referring to Carnap's Logical Structure of the World ?

The chatter of resignation, "They don't mean to but they do", always plays to me to the tune of Stardust: google tells me the line is "and I am once again with you".

I'm not sure we have an everyday word for only being disjoint, that is, being a subset of the complement. — Srap Tasmaner

antonym — bongo fury

Antonym — bongo fury

antonym — bongo fury

antonym — bongo fury

antonym — bongo fury