• The Turing P-Zombie
    What's the problem with referents?TheMadFool

    Whether they are things out in the world, or merely more words referring to those things.

    The clear liquid that flows in rivers and the oceans that at times becomes solid and cold, and at other times is invisible vapor is the referent of the word "water".TheMadFool

    Yep. So what is it that a computer so easily (according to you) links to the word "water"? The referent you just described, or merely the description?
  • The Turing P-Zombie
    Well, I don't know why people make such a big deal of understandingTheMadFool

    It's about

    referentsTheMadFool

    They (and I) mean things out there, you mean just more words/data.
  • The Turing P-Zombie
    I hope you reply soon to this query.TheMadFool

    Why? A quick reply isn't usually a thoughtful one. In my case at least. Actually, I think the site should instigate a minimum time between replies, as well as a word limit.

    They don't have to be but they can be, no?TheMadFool

    I don't think I've been understood, here. (Take more time?) I was trying to explain why @A Raybould was non-plussed by your statements about semantics. See also @InPitzotl's recent posts here.
  • The Turing P-Zombie
    I expect that you, like "they" in the story, haven't even considered that "referents" might have to be actual things out in the world?
    — bongo fury

    Yes, I did consider that.
    TheMadFool

    Ok...

    Referents can be almost anything, from physical objects to abstract concepts.TheMadFool

    Ah, so after due consideration you decided not. (The referents don't have to be things out in the world.) This was Searle's frustration.

    You can be sure you are in the respectable company of his critics at the time. Also of a probable majority of philosophers and linguists throughout history, to be fair.
  • The Turing P-Zombie
    Searle's argument doesn't stand up to careful scrutiny for the simple reason that semantics are simply acts of linking words to their referents. Just consider the sentence, "dogs eat meat". The semantic part of this sentence consists of matching the words "dog" with a particular animal, "eat" with an act, and "meat" with flesh, i.e. to their referents and that's it, nothing more, nothing less. Understanding is simply a match-the-following exercise, something a computer can easily accomplish.TheMadFool

    I wish I could locate the youtube footage of Searle's wry account of early replies to his vivid demonstration (the chinese room) that so-called "cognitive scripts" mistook syntax for semantics. Something like, "so they said, ok we'll program the semantics into it too, but of course what they came back with was just more syntax".bongo fury

    I'll have another rummage.

    I expect that you, like "they" in the story, haven't even considered that "referents" might have to be actual things out in the world? Or else how ever did the "linking" seem to you something simple and easily accomplished, by a computer, even??? Weird.
  • Lazerowitz's three-tiered structure of metaphysics
    Do you deny the existence of universal concepts in our language?Marchesk

    I really have no idea how to answer that question.Snakes Alive

    I thought this was fine...

    Is the question, for example, how we can use the same word for multiple things? How it is that 'apple' can refer to multiple fruits, for example?Snakes Alive
  • Lazerowitz's three-tiered structure of metaphysics
    It's an interesting line of investigation for sure,Isaac

    Hey thanks.

    particularly the actions AI would have to demonstrate before we're prepared to label them 'rational'.Isaac

    Ah well that's more of a Turing Test approach, which I was aiming to avoid. I'm less concerned about our common judgements about people's reasoning and more about the reasoning itself. Hence my proposed clarification of rational as semantical, in a sense further clarified. But then this is a good example of how an armchair method (the Chinese Room) could conceivably be of help.

    But that's a very different topicIsaac

    So I agree :wink:

    and I don't want to derail the thread talking about it.Isaac

    The OP will be grateful.

    What is also interesting about this, and more related to the thread,Isaac

    More relevant than my posts, then, which are about whether non-metaphysical philosophy has plenty to contribute to investigations into the human condition? :wink:

    , is the way in which the criteria for the term 'rational' are being created post hoc to reflect the way we'd like things to be.Isaac

    Yes, just like reading a post the way we'd like it to be. :wink:

    We've all been using the word 'rational' (or it's equivalent) for 2000 years. What on earth is a discussion about what it means doing 2000 years later!Isaac

    Helping to understand the human condition. E.g. the sense of consciousness. :meh:
  • Lazerowitz's three-tiered structure of metaphysics
    This claim is either meaningless or amenable to empirical evidence. Is our ability to reason and navigate grounded in our ability to discern meaning? If it isn't, what would be different about the world, how would we notice?Isaac

    magical thinking [...] "animals don't think rationally like us because.... I really, really don't want them to"Isaac

    I agree it's empirical, but I think what the crows (and current AI) are able to do is less than we are able, which we might distinguish as "rational" but I would propose clarifying as semantical: the ability to discern meaning in the sense of discerning what symbols are supposed to be pointed at.

    I agree that I should suggest kinds of supporting evidence if anyone were actually going to dispute my claim.

    On the other hand, I might first appeal to mere armchair devices like the Chinese Room, to
    ascertain what would count as evidence for my disputant.
  • Lazerowitz's three-tiered structure of metaphysics
    Is the question, for example, how we can use the same word for multiple things? How it is that 'apple' can refer to multiple fruits, for example?
    — Snakes Alive

    That’s close!
    Wayfarer

    Yep, and by taking the plunge and facing the further truth that reference is never a matter of fact but a sophisticated social game of pretend, you get, if you want, to avoid metaphysics but discover a world of useful work for philosophy.

    foundations of math, psychology of consciousness, theory of reference, theory of learning, logic of induction, semiotics etcbongo fury

    And ethics, of course.

    Some important-seeming questions of the 'globalising' variety will always arise. The trick is to be prepared to recognise when one's efforts have developed the symptoms described in the OP, and to then have the humility (or strategic sense) to retreat to more solid ground.
  • Eternalism vs the Moving Spotlight Theory
    I don't see that there is anything in eternalism per se that precludes motion, unless you define it as such.ChatteringMonkey

    And in which case, mightn't this be turned around:

    ... objects are arranged in space in an orderly way. Their arrangement can be described without referring to "passage of space" or some equivalent of motion.Echarmion

    ...?

    Spatial patterns just as well can be described in terms of change and motion and passage. The rectangle changes (moves, passes, travels) from red to yellow, from left to right; and a rate of change is measured with respect to a horizontal position, which may represent time or (just as easily) any variable you like (hence we say the rectangle is coloured with a "gradient").
  • Lazerowitz's three-tiered structure of metaphysics
    Thanks. Links or recommendations welcome. What did he (or you) think of philosophy that tends to avoid metaphysics? E.g. currents in foundations of math, psychology of consciousness, theory of reference, theory of learning, logic of induction, semiotics etc? Or don't you agree that plenty of philosophy is cheerfully non-metaphysical?
  • If you wish to end racism, stop using language that sustains it
    I didn't want to allude some sort of is-ought-fallacy, where racism or xenophobia are (more) acceptable because they are in some way "natural".Echarmion

    No I know you didn't. You made it clear you want to guard against the innate tendency. I just suspect the tendency isn't innate at all, and that that might be relevant to the question how best to guard against it.

    I just wanted to point out, partially from personal experience, that not being prejudiced is really hard,Echarmion

    I'm not sure this kind of breast-beating (if that's the figure; pardon if I'm over-doing it) is necessary or helpful.

    and that there are mental mechanisms (wherever they come from) that introduce and reinforce prejudice, of which racism is a subtype.Echarmion

    So, do you at least see how, if I were right about the whole innateness hypothesis being (gladly or not) a racism-serving myth, that repeating these psychologisms might be counter-productive?

    Just refusing to say the word "black" won't keep your brain from noticing that "these guys over there look different", and if you don't pay attention, your brain may turn "different" into "dangerous".Echarmion

    Ditto, really.

    Not sure whether I agree at all with the OP about tweaking the language. But the innateness thing gets in the way.
  • If you wish to end racism, stop using language that sustains it
    Racism is part of the human condition.Echarmion

    It may be, now, but were there any pseudo-scientific theories of racial superiority disseminated widely prior to the advent of the trans-Atlantic slave trade?

    If not, do you perhaps mean rather that some more general and symmetric relation of xenophobia is innate?

    I doubt that anyway (here), but the kind of racism that I imagine I would find especially hard to bear politely would be the kind that dared to assert my natural inferiority. (And compounded the error to the nth degree by seeing my resultant social subjugation as evidence for the theory.)

    So I am especially suspicious of the claim of innateness if it is meant to apply to that kind of racism.

    Anyway, perhaps by "human condition" you don't mean innate?
  • Will A.I. have the capacity of introspection to "know" the meaning of folklore and stories?
    OK. I guess my point is that if we ultimately reduce 'semantic' to pointing symbols...that at some point AI may satisfy our intuition.path

    My point also. And @InPitzotl's, I thought.

    The Chinese Room (and the chips and dip?) just (or partly) cautioned against conflating the mere production of tokens with the actual pointing of them.

    The fact there is no 'actual' about it is what makes the social game of pointing so sophisticated. (imv.)

    IMV, Derrida was making the kind of point that I'm trying to make, dissolving some pure subject or consciousness into social linguistic conventions.path

    If that means trying to explain our sense of consciousness as a natural effect of our thinking and conversing in symbols, then hooray, cool.
  • Newcomb's Paradox - Why would anyone pick two boxes?
    But you can at least believe that more risk-averse people might prefer to (in effect) bank the grand.

    I doubt we'd call that a paradox though, without the "infallible" mis-direction. The OP has a point.
  • Newcomb's Paradox - Why would anyone pick two boxes?
    I think roughly half of us are indignant that the problem is clearly stated as,

    There is an infallible predictor,...

    ... but then,

    Nozick avoids this issue by positing that the predictor's predictions are "almost certainly" correct, thus sidestepping any issues of infallibility and causality.

    E.g. this,

    It isn't possible to win $0 or $1,001,000 and so those alleged outcomes ought not be considered.Michael

    is perfectly true but for the switch (to fallible).
  • Will A.I. have the capacity of introspection to "know" the meaning of folklore and stories?
    The A.I. produces “elaboration graphs" on a screen. For the MacBeth question, the program produced about 20 boxes containing information such as “Lady Mac­beth is Macbeth’s wife” and “Macbeth murders Duncan.” Below that were lines connecting to other boxes, connecting explicit and inferred elements of the story.Frank Pray

    I wish I could locate the youtube footage of Searle's wry account of early replies to his vivid demonstration (the chinese room) that so-called "cognitive scripts" mistook syntax for semantics. Something like, "so they said, ok we'll program the semantics into it too, but of course what they came back with was just more syntax".

    I think Searle was a bot.path

    (And still is, presumably.) A machine with a sense of / illusion of consciousness? Agreed. He himself would of course reject "illusion of", and even "sense of" except in the narrower sense of "accurate sense of". Not "machine": he embraces that.

    Why is he so sure that he is swimming in something semantic? An appeal to intuition? 'I promise you, I can see redness!'path

    Yes, he might be wrong trusting that kind of intuition... but... be right about swimming in something semantic: namely, the social game of pointing symbols at things. I think he would be right that Genesis and the chinese room fail at that.

    And what do those symbols refer to? Not the symbols themselves, but actual chips and dip. So somehow you need to get the symbols to relate to actual chips and dip.InPitzotl

    Yes, and that (the getting the symbols to relate) will be an elaborate social game of agreed pretence, as there will be no matter of fact about the relation. As you say, it will require vast experience of interaction with symbols and the things we learn to agree (to pretend) they are pointed at. Never heard this called "agency", but I get it. Searle calls it "intentionality" and thereby embraces unnecessary mentalisms. But he definitely exposed the problem for any AI that fakes a proper semantics.


    Great essay against the old, pre-connectionist, symbolic computer model of brain function, which I shall cite next time (and it won't be long) that I want to scorn the ancient myth of pictures in the head. Not an essay espousing the existence of ghosts (in machines), though.

    BTW,

    I challenged researchers there to account for intelligent human behaviour without reference to any aspect of the IP metaphor. They couldn’t do it, and when I politely raised the issue in subsequent email communications, they still had nothing to offer months later. They saw the problem. They didn’t dismiss the challenge as trivial. But they couldn’t offer an alternative. — Robert Epstein: The Empty Brain

    They should have looked here.
  • Does systemic racism exist in the US?
    I'm not sure that being sexually attracted to other races is proof of lack of racism.Hanover

    Agreed, put like that, it could be a kind of racism, or an aspect of it.

    But (to put the premise differently) the fact of our sexual attractions not being noticeably reduced by signs of genetic diversity at least calls into question the too-universally acknowledged 'truth' that racism is somehow innate.
  • Does systemic racism exist in the US?
    The racism of me subconsciously favoring my tribe is a universal problem facing us all,Hanover

    Then why is exotic erotic?
  • If God(s) existed.. and he played a scenario in his head....
    Modern philosophy (e.g. here) offers therapy for the ancient delusion that humans have pictures inside their heads.

    For gods it may be a different ball-game, of course.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    So the picture one might chooseunenlightened

    This one?
  • The Turing P-Zombie
    Well, I did try to keep my wordcount to a minimum.TheMadFool

    :ok:

    Perhaps that's where the fault lies.TheMadFool

    Never, ever.
  • The Turing P-Zombie
    I heard there is a growing online campaign to seek a posthumous apology from Turing for his Test.

    :snicker:
  • What is procrastination? Does the mind have inertia? Could it require momentum?
    :point: :ok:

    Also, wasn't it the other way round, to some extent? Weren't Newton & co. rather cheekily re-purposing psychological words like force ("courage, fortitude"), inertia ("unskillfulness, ignorance"), moment ("importance")? (Cherry-picked from Online Etymology Dictionary.)
  • What is Philosophy?
    A clear distinction cannot be vague. Clear and vague are antonyms.David Mo

    I think that's wrong, in an interesting way. Antonyms are a good example of how two (or more) concepts can be vague in having fuzzy borders, but yet also be clearly distinct and mutually exclusive, because their fuzzy borders are kept a sufficient distance apart.

    Thus, black and white may each have a vague border with grey, but in that way remain perfectly distinct from each other. More here.

    Pardon my interjection. I doubt that anyone here is claiming science and philosophy to be mutually exclusive in any particular respect. :chin:
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    What Whitehead would call perception in the mode of symbolic reference which comes after causal efficacy and immediate presentation.prothero

    Sounds cool. Will drink.

    And this is why using "consciousness" (self knowledge, self reference, self awareness) as a synonym for "experience" creates a problem.prothero

    My point exactly. Please read the context.

    Consciousness is a special kind of experience but without the lower orders of experience there would be no consciousness.prothero

    This is obvious, but is also what lulls people into the sleep from which this consideration,

    It [panpsychism] “explains” why my socks and bubblegum are conscious, even though no one thought they were, but it doesn’t explain why the human brain is conscious the way the human brain is conscious, which is what we actually want to know.Zelebg

    ... really ought to rudely awaken them.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    By 'an experience' do you mean 'a conscious experience'?

    I was going to add: ... or the kind of experience a sock can undergo?... but I gather that cuts no ice.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    Really? So get a newborn, poke it with a sharp stick, does it feel anything?bert1

    Feel consciously, I'm prepared to doubt. Not firmly. Just casting a preliminary vote.

    If it might elicit a vote from you (because you weren't a panpsychist) I might ask you whether a snail poked with a sharp stick (and hardly lacking in responses quite rightly earning our sympathy) feels consciously.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    At what point in the chain of being “existence” or “life” do you think this ability disappears working your way down. Do higher animals have experience? Ants? Bees? Flowers?prothero

    Excellent question.

    Somewhere below Primates, Cetaceans and possibly Elephants.Isaac

    My vote, FWIW... where human infants acquire competence in pointing symbols (including samples) at things, so that a red thing is perceived as an example of red things.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?


    Ok, well I did my best to get you to notice where I think your argument tricks you into thinking it is deflationary while it is anything but. Something which is hard to notice, and needs focus... which we've lost.

    Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.
    — Pfhorrest

    No, but it is usually implied by it.
    bongo fury

    Which direction do you mean that implication to go?Pfhorrest

    :roll:
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    Eliminativism is the view that consciousness is not realbert1

    And usually reached on physicalist grounds. As I said, the one implies the other, so the comment about non-identity was rather pointless.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    Ok, so "first person perspective" wasn't some innocuous physical concept to do with frames of reference.
    — bongo fury

    I , as a panpsychist, think it is.
    Pfhorrest

    Your position is about studiously having it both ways, so that's hardly surprising.

    It’s only emergentism that makes it out to be anything metaphysically weird.Pfhorrest

    No, you admitted that an eliminativist (usually a physicalist) would rule it out.

    not invoking anything in addition to physical stuff, just a different perspective on that physical stuff.Pfhorrest

    Yes, an extra, 'meta' perspective.

    Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.Pfhorrest

    No, but it is usually implied by it.

    That person is not providing any answer at all to the question of phenomenal consciousness.Pfhorrest

    For someone who has defined that question in metaphysical terms, perhaps not.

    We don’t know if they think there is no such thing,Pfhorrest

    Ditto.

    if it somehow emerges from nothingPfhorrest

    Remember, it doesn't have to be a substance: a physical goo or a metaphysical woo.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    And this perspective was already on the physicist's menu, or not?
    — bongo fury

    It depends on the physicist’s philosophical views.
    Pfhorrest

    Not really. I merely want to establish whether the panpsychist does need after all to take ownership of

    some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspectivePfhorrest

    as I alleged, and not pretend that they are tidying up after other people's metaphysical confusions.

    If he’s an eliminativistPfhorrest

    Good... if he's prepared to stick to the physicist's menu, yes? Go on...

    then no, he denies that there is such a thing.Pfhorrest

    Ok, so "first person perspective" wasn't some innocuous physical concept to do with frames of reference. I wanted to check.

    So ownership is needed.

    If he’s an emergentist then yes,Pfhorrest

    Possibly. But what about the "weaker" of this species, who is either functionalist or has some other (e.g. @Pantagruel's "systems" or my "symbolic competence") explanation for the emergence, which doesn't at all require that what emerges is anything but an aspect of material behaviour?

    These kinds of emergentist won't be taking ownership of,

    some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspectivePfhorrest

    Nor of,

    where that completely different metaphysical thing started happeningPfhorrest

    ... and the like.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    Panpsychism simply says that...Pfhorrest

    No, I think it has already also required,

    "some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective"
    — Pfhorrest

    but doesn't seem keen to admit it.
    bongo fury

    It says that there is a first person perspective that is had,Pfhorrest

    And this perspective was already on the physicist's menu, or not?
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    Panpsychism simply says that [...]Pfhorrest

    No, I think it has already also required,

    some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspectivePfhorrest

    but doesn't seem keen to admit it.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    It [panpsychism] “explains” why my socks and bubblegum are conscious, even though no one thought they were, but it doesn’t explain why the human brain is conscious the way the human brain is conscious, which is what we actually want to know.Zelebg
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    So what we think of a asPantagruel

    then you can begin to see how immaterial things can participate in what we call consciousnessPantagruel
  • Is Daniel Dennett a Zombie?
    I actually felt sorry for him! This sounds exactly like a machine figuring out that this whole consciousness thing was just something it was programmed to espouse.hypericin

    I must admit I did a slight double take the first time I read this:

    Sometimes a psychologist's most assiduous accounts of phenomena of mental imagery have the flavor of tracts by impassioned believers in flying saucers. — Goodman: Sights Unseen

    ... introducing an analysis that concludes, with apparent satisfaction:

    The 'image' and the 'picture in the mind' have vanished; mythical inventions have been beneficially excised. — Goodman: Sights Unseen

    Could this be a different Nelson Goodman from the Goodman of A Study of Qualities (a qualia construction), and Languages of Art, and this:

    After we spend an hour or so at one or another exhibition of abstract painting, everything tends to square off into geometric patches or swirl in circles or weave into textural arabesques, to sharpen into black and white or vibrate with new color consonances and dissonances." — Goodman: Ways of Worldmaking

    Or had the same author experienced some philosophical conversion or neurological accident, or both?

    Well, no. Understanding our conscious experiences simply doesn't have to mean allowing the most literal interpretation of our customary habits of talking of those experiences: validating, in particular, the ancient (perhaps universal) myth of mental images or "impressions". Understanding the experiences doesn't have to mean supplementing the naturalist's usual menu of physical ingredients with an even more generous menu. It doesn't need to deny the experiences; but neither does it need to accept received notions of their "content" uncritically.


    Here's an account by a man who, at 30 years old, realized that other people could visualize things without seeing them.

    https://www.facebook.com/notes/blake-ross/aphantasia-how-it-feels-to-be-blind-in-your-mind/10156834777480504/

    He never could, and was unaware that anybody else could. He thought that phrases like 'mind's eye,' were figures of speech.

    The medical term for this condition is called aphantasia.
    The Great Whatever

    Yeah, maybe... but as with alleged condition synaesthesia I suspect that the ready defining and near-pathologising merely reflect the dire state of our understanding of thought processes in all their normal variety.

    I'm torn. I want to identify as synaesthetic and to describe the visual Mondrians and Pollocks of my musical experiences to anyone prepared to listen; but I'm afraid that that kind of indulgence encourages assumptions about brain function that are far too narrow and too innatist and too modular-ist. Where fans of synaesthesia allege "cross-talk" between folds of cortex (so what?) I prefer this kind of talk:

    How our lookings at pictures and our listenings to music inform what we encounter later and elsewhere is integral to them as cognitive. Music can inform perception not only of other sounds but also of the rhythms and patterns of what we see. Such cross-transference of structural properties seems to me a basic and important aspect of learning, not merely a matter for novel experimentation by composers, dancers, and painters. — Goodman: Languages of Art

    (My emphasis.)

    My issue with "aphantasia" is roughly the converse of this. If the invention of "synaesthesia" betrays our poor grasp of the potential variety of human cognition, the even newer invention might just be a symptom of our over-readiness to indulge the myth of mental images uncritically.

    The author is admirably insightful about this objection, though, so we can be fairly sure there is more to his... well, condition. He pretty fairly considers (and rejects) what might have been my objection: that he wasn't ever deficient in a common faculty, merely less given to the prevailing but wrong folk-psychology of it. Even so, one wants to know more detail. Which it links to. So thanks for sharing. (I notice my thanks here are directed to a banned member. :gasp: Oh well.)

    I am not sure if Dennett's is an anti-representationalist stance.Graeme M

    I express the same uncertainty here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/390575 (where there are interesting links on the topic).