Are scrawlings on a page or vibrations in the air true? — hypericin

Some of them are sentences, and some of those are true, yes. Meaning, some them are what we choose to point the word "sentence" at, and some of those are what we choose to also point the word "true" at.

Absurd, this is an obvious category error. They are symbols, only their interpretations can be true or false. — hypericin

What are interpretations? I would say: sentences that help us construe symbols as pointing at things. What would you say?

and meaning rests on definition — RussellA

I think the heap puzzle is a clear enough counterexample to that general assertion.

Meaning rests on, or is, usage: some of it agreed, some controversial. Whether 10 grains constitutes a heap is controversial. But a million grains is an obvious case. And obvious cases and obvious non-cases are sufficient to guide usage, for many words. We don't need a dictionary or manual.

The Sorites Paradox is only a paradox because it requires a definition that does not exist. — RussellA

If by definition you now mean threshold or cut-off point, then yes, and I agree. But then it's "only" a paradox because ordinary usage is perfectly meaningful without such definition.

metalanguage — Banno

I'm not sure, but: you mean object language? The interpretation is that fragment of the metalanguage that interprets terms of the object language?

A heap is defined as "a large number of". Large is defined as considerable. Considerable is defined as large. Definitions become circular. — RussellA

Yes, although the circularity perhaps only reflects the fact that definitions are unnecessary. The game asks for judgements, but not reasons.

I suggest that the brain's ability to fix a single name to something that is variable is fundamentally statistical. — RussellA

Fair enough. My interest is more in the linguistic community's ability to fix the name. Recent research in the area is indeed statistical.

Such statistically-based concepts could be readily programmed into a computer. — RussellA

Or, even better, developed by evolutionary algorithms that simulate cooperative language games. The results are indeed similar to your picture, or mine here:



But, as such, they all fail the sorites test, which requires some perfectly absolute intolerance, as well as tolerance. Is my gripe. As discussed.

I mentioned this to you because you seemed to be wrestling with the tension between individual (Humpty Dumpty) judgements and general norms. And I think that's what the sorites puzzle is about. As your reply maybe supports.

That should be obvious to any competent English speaker. Most of us understand the difference between use and mention. — Michael

I disagree. Never mind.

Perhaps the consequent of (b) is a fact, similar to how the subject of (a) is a person. — Michael

Well sure, but a consequent is a sentence (or proposition). So you now reject

I don't think it correct to say that the proposition is the fact. — Michael

as tiresome pedantry? Ok. Since you don't claim to be denying corresponding truth-makers for whole sentences, I shall be less suspicious of equivocation.

It is not a fact that snow is green. — Michael

Without truth-makers for whole sentences, this is unproblematic. It just means that " 'snow is green' is true" and "snow is green" share false instead of true as their common truth value.

And if you want more (rather than pure deflation) try

"True" applies to "snow is green" iff "green" applies to snow.

This talks about practices of classification.

c) unicorns are green

"True" applies to "unicorns are green" iff [more careful formulation, still false]

Fiction is literally false. Figurative truth translates usefully into literal truth about second-order extensions.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/556693

I wouldn't say that the subject of the sentence corresponds to a person. — Michael

Well I would recommend it, in any discussion of semantics, as "subject" is notoriously ambiguous between word and object, and often clarified for example by use of "grammatical subject" versus "logical subject". (Which at least serves to flag up the issue.)

I mean exactly what I said; that snow being green isn't a sentence. — Michael

If you don't see how my clarification might prevent people from thinking you were talking about the word string "snow being green" not being a sentence, then I must suspect you are becoming enchanted by systematic equivocation.

Something else.

Snow being green isn't a sentence. Snow being white isn't a sentence. Vampires being immortal isn't a sentence. — Michael

Do you mean that some alleged (truth-making) non-word-string corresponding to or referred to by the word-string "snow being white", or indeed by the word-string "snow is white", isn't a sentence?

I think that was @Luke's point, but fair enough. So you would clarify thus:

Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequent is does correspond to a fact, — Michael

?

Or are you still unsure whether it's correct to call a (truth-bearing) sentence or proposition a fact?

I'm unsure.

Snow being green isn't a sentence, so what is it? — Michael

Do you mean the word-string "snow being green" or something else? Are you unsure about that?

Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequent is a fact, — Michael

Oh gawd, now you're doing it.

I don't think it correct to say that the proposition is the fact. — Michael

Which one, then? Please choose, and not equivocate. E.g.

So, "p" is true iff p. What sort of thing is p? — Michael

p the truth-bearing sentence/proposition/consequent, or p some corresponding, truth-making non-word-string?

Truth is relative. There is no absolute truth. — RussellA

An interesting puzzle, though, is how, relative to a language game, truth can be absolute as well as relative.

"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact. — Banno

So this is what you now say.

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat

The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

In light of your new reflections, then, do you endorse the following clarification?

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat

The thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact.

And what of (II)? — Banno

Am I wrong?
— Banno

Yes. — bongo fury

(II) is nonsense.

Address the other.

Am I wrong? — Banno

Yes. (I) is fine, as I say:

That would be basic correspondence theory, yes. My picture 1. — bongo fury

Now read on...

See this reply.

You mean that "snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, like that snow is white, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact? — Banno

That would be basic correspondence theory, yes. My picture 1. Something I thought that neither of us agreed with but only one of us was capable of discussing coherently.

Isn't that what I have been arguing? — Banno

Cough, splutter...

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact.
[...]
Now, where in any of this does a sentence correspond to a fact?
What might that correspondence be? — Banno

Perhaps (in the light of your new reflections) you meant "the thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact"? (Similar to the clarification offered here.)

But then that would be exactly where a sentence does correspond to a fact. (According to the theory being discussed though not espoused.) And the correspondence might be whatever you just called representation.

I think the issue is that facts aren’t always things, e.g material objects. — Michael

That's a related issue, sure. I'm less unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts that are physical events (objects in the larger sense of regions of space-time). But I'm unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts generally, and even less sympathetic to their being smuggled in by systematic equivocation.

It is a fact that unicorns don’t exist, — Michael

I think we agree here.

, but the non-existence of unicorns isn’t a thing that exists. — Michael

Neither is the existence of cats a thing that exists.

Is there a distinction between the fact that unicorns don’t exist and the sentence “unicorns don’t exist” being true? — Michael

What do you think?

The T-schema works with a coherence theory, too. — Michael

Hence my quoting Goodman, earlier. And note that my second picture is consistent with the T-schema. Even though it doesn't have whole sentences referring (or corresponding).

This possibility doesn't excuse the equivocating, between strings of words, and alleged things or situations that aren't strings of words.

That string of words refers to a fact. — Michael

(My emphasis.)

Exactly. According to correspondence theory in this kind of context.

For me, the words on the right of "iff" in '"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' point to the grounding fact of snow being white (or not). — Janus

(My emphasis again.)

See, Pie and @Banno? It's not hard not to equivocate, if you don't want to: — bongo fury

Perhaps it isn't quite right to say that the right-hand side of the T-schema refers to a fact. — Michael

Of course perhaps it isn't at all right.

Hence my second picture, just as one plausible alternative. Following up the option that whole sentences don't refer at all.

So what does "snow is green" refer to if not a fact? A fiction? — Michael

Plausibly it is fictional literature.

Not at all. I criticised (1).

Specifically, here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/732016 — bongo fury

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

No, the thing on the right of the T-schema is a string of words. — bongo fury

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

1. snow is white - fact — Banno

No more questions, your honour.

No.

Wittgenstein does that to you! Oui? — Agent Smith

Absolutely not. Wittgenstein is scrupulous.

It's all the arrows. What are they doing? — Banno

Pointing.

And the splotch down the bottom - what's that? The thing-in-itself? — Banno

The (alleged) thing that's not also a string of words.

The thing in my hand is a knife or a piece of metal. We mark the difference by the context. — Banno

Sure. Two words for one thing. No problem. If we're ready to clarify.

The string [snow is white] is a fact or a sentence. We mark the difference by the context, but in addition we can use quote marks. — Banno

Fine, if you would stick to that. Two words ("fact" and "sentence") for one thing (string). But you keep doing one word ("fact") for two things (string and alleged thing that's not also a string). And refusing to clarify, and then basking in people's incomprehension.

I point to the that. — Banno

Mystical babble.

You say " Are you pointing at the knife or the piece of metal? " — Banno

No, you said that. I showed here that it was beside the point.

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are the same. — Banno

Not at all. I criticised (1).

Specifically, here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/732016

No equivocation. — Banno

I can have it both ways because it works both ways. — Banno

Are you pointing at the knife or the piece of metal? — Banno

If I say

A piece of metal is a knife. — Banno

then I'm pointing "piece of metal" and "knife" at a metal knife.

If I say

The string of words is a fact. — Banno

then I'm pointing "string of words" and "fact" at the true sentence.

...and? — Banno

And stop doing it, please. The equivocation.

You don't have to accept the alleged corresponding entities. But stop having it both ways, and basking in people's incomprehension.

What's that? — Banno

It's saying, are you pointing the word "fact" at the true sentence or at some alleged corresponding entity?

But a wise fellow once said, concerning pointing, — Banno

Word and object have no inherent connection, but only a mystic confuses the two. — bongo fury

snow is white - fact — Banno

Equivocal pointing of "fact".

between true sentence and more occult alleged entities. — bongo fury

or what it is to point — Banno

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/350131

Word and object have no inherent connection, but only a mystic confuses the two.

And as soon as one asks what a fact is, or what it is to point, the equivocation resumes. — Banno

Only for the mystic, addicted to systematic equivocation.

Snow is white. That's a fact. — Banno

"Snow is white" is a sentence, and we point the word "true" at it iff we point the word "white" at snow.

"Fact" is ambiguous between true sentence and more occult alleged entities.

Could we all just drop "state of affairs" and "proposition"? Serious suggestion. Because even the former ends up standing for "sentence". At least with those perhaps disavowing correspondence but prone to having it both ways.

Oh, and "fact", as well. — bongo fury

Note that we don't want a string of words to correspond to cat-on-the-mat-ness. — Pie

Who don't? I think they do. I think they're wrong. But not obviously wrong. And they obviously do.

For me, the words on the right of "iff" in '"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' point to the grounding fact of snow being white (or not). — Janus

See, @Pie and @Banno? It's not hard not to equivocate, if you don't want to:



If you don't want to. But mysticism is a hard drug.

The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

No, the thing on the right of the T-schema is a string of words.

The meaning of 'P' is P. — Pie

Yes, the denotation of a sentence adjoined to quotation marks is the string of words itself.

If 'P' is true, then P is the case, — Pie

But if P is the case, then P.

and P is a piece of the world. — Pie

What is, exactly? A state of affairs corresponding to the string of words? Why not say so, like @Janus? Why the desperate urge to confuse it with the string of words? Do you feel clever when people can't follow your drift?

The issue is what to make of arguments that go like this:

1. P.
2. (1) might be wrong. — Srap Tasmaner

Such as

(p ∧ ¬□p) → ◇¬p

To be fair.

Or even

1. p
2. ¬□(p)

Or

1. p
2. ¬□(1)

2. It is unacceptable to say that we can have knowledge that is not certain
3. It is unacceptable to say that we can have knowledge that is not necessarily true — Michael

So K becomes a modal operator?

(Or might as well.)

E.g. Kp (or □p) meaning not even secretly not p (or ¬◇¬p).

By analogy with necessarily p meaning not even possibly not p.

Then omniscience is cool, because there are no secret errors. Green zone gone when all p are Kp (□p):



Just as you are observing that omniscience will be cool if there are no possible errors.

Either way, no error problem.

You might object: but my green zone doesn't really contain any errors. It isn't inside the not p circle. So my 'secret errors' (absent omniscience) are no such thing.

But that was my point about your 'possible' errors being unintuitive enough, already. Their being both p and possibly not p is sufficient grounds for worrying at length about relevant angles on "might be wrong". We don't need to assume that modal logic will solve the problem, though. Modality is the problem.

3. Kp (premise)
4. ¬□p (premise)
5. Kp ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4) — Michael

What about

3. p (premise)
4. ¬□p (premise)
5. p ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4)

Isn't that unintuitive enough?

I mean, do you want it to be true, even if you're not wrong that p?

And what I say is true even if I am not wrong. — Michael

Green zone is p ∧ ◇¬p. Imagine the complement-donuts on the left are un-wound to make their own circles on the right.

5. Kp ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4) — Michael

We then conclude that I could be wrong even if I know everything (and assuming that some p is not necessarily true): — Michael

Is it relevant that your K is an ordinary predicate not a modal operator? Sending the modal operator (or rather a corresponding extension) on the same adventure of enlargement would push back the territory of ◇¬p

It seems that Searle is saying then that consciousness creates the independent fact — TheVeryIdea

Yep. Is that fact.

which I suppose ties in with the quantum mechanics observation effect — TheVeryIdea

I wouldn't know! But this is you not Searle?

firstly "is true" looks clearer than either "denotes" or "describes" — Banno

Which is clearer: "word and object" or "sentence and situation"?

You might say the second is more suggestive of 'fit'. Fair enough. That hardly makes it clearer though.

and secondly we can ask if it is true that this "describes" or "denotes" that, — Banno

Sure, and hence the relevance of

Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value. — Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters

Whether a word fits an object is a matter of whether an individual use - say, Humpty's - fits or coheres with the general.

But am I not interpreting marks on the paper or in my brain when I do the calculation without using a machine? — TheVeryIdea

Sure. With or without.

So no "transition".

E.g. if I add 2 + 2 and get 4 then that is just a fact, a property of the universe — TheVeryIdea

You and your brain interpreting the symbols is the independent fact, not the maths itself. I think. From memory. Quote specifically if I'm wrong on this point, and Searle espouses mathematical Platonism.

that a conscious entity had to construct the calculator — TheVeryIdea

No.

someone had to read the result from the electronic calculator — TheVeryIdea

And interpret the marks as symbols with meaning, yes.

Your drawing gives me some insight, but it'd help to hear more about how you conceive or deal with truthmakers. — Pie

Picture 1 is meant to explain ordinary usage of "truth-maker/truth-bearer".

Not that we have to acknowledge truth-makers corresponding to truth-bearers. — bongo fury

Hence picture 2. Nonetheless, picture 1 is (or so I thought) the usual shared assumption when people use those terms (competently), or when they invoke the use-mention distinction for whole sentences. And in cases like this:

If we jettison apparent nonsense like the world-in-itself...the world is just that which is the case. To me this is not correspondence. There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.) — Pie

I'm hoping the picture will help us agree whether your P is truth bearer or truth maker or both or neither? What are the odds, I wonder... :grin: