S1: The water is cold.
General reference/meaning is indicated, specific not.

S2: ទឹកគឺត្រជាក់។
General not, specific not.

S3: The water in Lake Michigan is cold.
Both indicated.

S4: The water in Lake Michigan is ironic.
Specific reference/meaning is indicated, but general not: we are unable to infer the general application of both "water" and "ironic" in the event that they intersect.

General and specific can each be independently known or unknown.

that S refers to a specific bit of water, not water in general. — hypericin

Yes, or as I put it: that you mean a specific bit of water, and we don't know which.

But, as you say, we all still know, as English speakers, what it means for the water (whichever it is) to be cold. Or, as I put it: we all understand your reference to cold things in general intersecting with water in general.

Simply, we English speakers all know what S means. It is basic English. But we don't know to what it refers.

Therefore, meaning and reference are distinct concepts, and must not be conflated. — hypericin

I suggest they're interchangeable. We all know that your sentence S refers to water in general, and cold things in general. We just don't know which bit of water you mean.

And yet, despite our clear understanding of S, we have no idea what the referent is. What water is cold? The relevant context is unknown. S has no clear referent and yet is perfectly understandable. This can only be the case if meaning and referent are different: only then can we make sense of understanding the one without knowing the other. — hypericin

So reference is to some particular item (e.g. glass of liquid), whereas meaning is reference to a wider class or extension (e.g. of water)?

We can refer to the wider extension (know the meaning of "water") without being able to refer to the particular item? Although wouldn't that (being so able) be knowing which item you meant?

We seem to agree that "snow is white" is a sentence — Banno

Yes if we agree to clarify that the string without quotes is what we're calling a sentence, while the string with quotes is a name facilitating talk about the smaller string (the calling it a sentence).

and that snow is white is a fact, — Banno

Yes if we agree to clarify that the string itself is not what we're calling a fact, at least, it is not the fact which, as a sentence, it represents. That would be as silly as confusing the name "Fido" with the dog which, as a name, it represents. The string is a sentence, representing or corresponding to the fact.

yet you seem to need to slip something else in between the bolded bit and the white snow. I don't. — Banno

If the bolded bit is the bolded string, and slipping something else in between that and the white snow is choosing to distinguish the two, I enthusiastically plead guilty.

meaning and reference — hypericin

Try this

https://fdocuments.in/document/goodman-likeness.html

So meaning is both purely imaginary and not in the head, an imaginary lightning bolt from symbol to object — hypericin

Yep, why not?

... which is also the object? — hypericin

Eh?

Then how does he deal with sentences with no referent? "The cat in the hat" has meaning but no reference in the world. — hypericin

See the link above.

(For Goodman's solution. I'm not sure how Putnam deals with it. Good question. :smile: )

the very same thing can be marks on a screen, a string of letters, a sentence and a fact. — Banno

Sure. Just not the fact which, as a sentence, it represents. Except of course in cases of self-reference: "this sentence has thirty one letters" etc.

The very same thing can be marks on a screen, a string of letters, a noun or noun phrase, and a thing. Just not the thing which, as a noun or noun-phrase, it represents. Except when it is "word" etc.

Now, I happen not to believe that there are such things as facts, which are represented (your word) by whole sentences, analogously to how such things as cats and dogs are represented by names or nouns. But I don't mind discussing or making a diagram about them. For the sake of argument.

You appear to be motivated by a similar scepticism, hence:

It's clear that the thing on the right is not the name of a fact. — Banno

Surely, a sentence doesn't work like a name? Agreed. Unfortunately you think you have a better idea, but you don't perceive that it involves equivocating, as is borne out by

the very same thing can be [generally, not just exceptionally] marks on a screen, a string of letters, a sentence and a fact [the one it also represents]. — Banno

So how did this happen?

"Snow is white" is not a fact; it is a sentence. That snow is white is how things are, and so, it is a fact.

Now the bit in the above sentence that I italicised is a string of letters, "snow is white", and it is not dissimilar to the bit I bolded. — Banno

Yes, but the bolded string and the italicised string both represent (allegedly) a non-linguistic fact. Only the slightly larger string that includes quote and unquote represents a string. So,

"Snow is white" is not a fact; it is a sentence. [But only the string without quotes is a sentence. The string with quotes is a name, facilitating talk about the sentence.] That snow is white is how things are, and so, it is a fact. [But only the fact represented by the string is how things are. The string is a sentence, talking about the fact.] — Banno

Then where is it located? — hypericin

Wherever we pretend it to be located. In a diagram we might draw an arrow between our depiction of a symbol and our depiction of the corresponding object. We may or may not pretend some corresponding bolt of energy passes between the symbol and object themselves.

But I'm treating meaning as synonymous with reference, and I notice from your discussion with @Joshs that you baulk at that. I think Putnam points out a history of the supposed distinction, through denotation vs connotation, sense vs reference, and others more ancient. And recommends dropping it.

And it seems that others (@Michael) have tried to make the same point to you. — Banno

I don't think so. @Michael grudgingly accepted the very same clarification you continue to reject. I don't know if this is because you also reject truth-makers corresponding to whole sentences. On which the clarification is premised. So do I. Maybe @Michael only accepts them for the sake of argument. So can I. And so you seemed to do here:

"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact. — Banno

So I used your word "represents" to clarify

The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

as

The thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact.

But whereas @Michael found this manner of clarification too obvious for words, you start critiquing correspondence theory:

It's clear that the thing on the right is not the name of a fact. — Banno

I wouldn't mind, if you wouldn't keep on equivocating between the factual literature on the right hand side of the T-schema and its worldly subject matter.

Meaning is not something in the world either, — hypericin

Agreed.

it is something in the head — hypericin

It is invented, or pretended, by people using their heads, but that doesn't locate it in the head.

(otherwise, how can we make sense of abstractions, lies, or fictions?). — hypericin

See the link above.

Sentence, meaning, worldly referent are all not identical, do you agree? — hypericin

The second is our pretended connection between the first and third.

Are scrawlings on a page or vibrations in the air true? — hypericin

Some of them are sentences, and some of those are true, yes. Meaning, some them are what we choose to point the word "sentence" at, and some of those are what we choose to also point the word "true" at.

Absurd, this is an obvious category error. They are symbols, only their interpretations can be true or false. — hypericin

What are interpretations? I would say: sentences that help us construe symbols as pointing at things. What would you say?

and meaning rests on definition — RussellA

I think the heap puzzle is a clear enough counterexample to that general assertion.

Meaning rests on, or is, usage: some of it agreed, some controversial. Whether 10 grains constitutes a heap is controversial. But a million grains is an obvious case. And obvious cases and obvious non-cases are sufficient to guide usage, for many words. We don't need a dictionary or manual.

The Sorites Paradox is only a paradox because it requires a definition that does not exist. — RussellA

If by definition you now mean threshold or cut-off point, then yes, and I agree. But then it's "only" a paradox because ordinary usage is perfectly meaningful without such definition.

metalanguage — Banno

I'm not sure, but: you mean object language? The interpretation is that fragment of the metalanguage that interprets terms of the object language?

A heap is defined as "a large number of". Large is defined as considerable. Considerable is defined as large. Definitions become circular. — RussellA

Yes, although the circularity perhaps only reflects the fact that definitions are unnecessary. The game asks for judgements, but not reasons.

I suggest that the brain's ability to fix a single name to something that is variable is fundamentally statistical. — RussellA

Fair enough. My interest is more in the linguistic community's ability to fix the name. Recent research in the area is indeed statistical.

Such statistically-based concepts could be readily programmed into a computer. — RussellA

Or, even better, developed by evolutionary algorithms that simulate cooperative language games. The results are indeed similar to your picture, or mine here:



But, as such, they all fail the sorites test, which requires some perfectly absolute intolerance, as well as tolerance. Is my gripe. As discussed.

I mentioned this to you because you seemed to be wrestling with the tension between individual (Humpty Dumpty) judgements and general norms. And I think that's what the sorites puzzle is about. As your reply maybe supports.

That should be obvious to any competent English speaker. Most of us understand the difference between use and mention. — Michael

I disagree. Never mind.

Perhaps the consequent of (b) is a fact, similar to how the subject of (a) is a person. — Michael

Well sure, but a consequent is a sentence (or proposition). So you now reject

I don't think it correct to say that the proposition is the fact. — Michael

as tiresome pedantry? Ok. Since you don't claim to be denying corresponding truth-makers for whole sentences, I shall be less suspicious of equivocation.

It is not a fact that snow is green. — Michael

Without truth-makers for whole sentences, this is unproblematic. It just means that " 'snow is green' is true" and "snow is green" share false instead of true as their common truth value.

And if you want more (rather than pure deflation) try

"True" applies to "snow is green" iff "green" applies to snow.

This talks about practices of classification.

c) unicorns are green

"True" applies to "unicorns are green" iff [more careful formulation, still false]

Fiction is literally false. Figurative truth translates usefully into literal truth about second-order extensions.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/556693

I wouldn't say that the subject of the sentence corresponds to a person. — Michael

Well I would recommend it, in any discussion of semantics, as "subject" is notoriously ambiguous between word and object, and often clarified for example by use of "grammatical subject" versus "logical subject". (Which at least serves to flag up the issue.)

I mean exactly what I said; that snow being green isn't a sentence. — Michael

If you don't see how my clarification might prevent people from thinking you were talking about the word string "snow being green" not being a sentence, then I must suspect you are becoming enchanted by systematic equivocation.

Something else.

Snow being green isn't a sentence. Snow being white isn't a sentence. Vampires being immortal isn't a sentence. — Michael

Do you mean that some alleged (truth-making) non-word-string corresponding to or referred to by the word-string "snow being white", or indeed by the word-string "snow is white", isn't a sentence?

I think that was @Luke's point, but fair enough. So you would clarify thus:

Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequent is does correspond to a fact, — Michael

?

Or are you still unsure whether it's correct to call a (truth-bearing) sentence or proposition a fact?

I'm unsure.

Snow being green isn't a sentence, so what is it? — Michael

Do you mean the word-string "snow being green" or something else? Are you unsure about that?

Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequent is a fact, — Michael

Oh gawd, now you're doing it.

I don't think it correct to say that the proposition is the fact. — Michael

Which one, then? Please choose, and not equivocate. E.g.

So, "p" is true iff p. What sort of thing is p? — Michael

p the truth-bearing sentence/proposition/consequent, or p some corresponding, truth-making non-word-string?

Truth is relative. There is no absolute truth. — RussellA

An interesting puzzle, though, is how, relative to a language game, truth can be absolute as well as relative.

"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact. — Banno

So this is what you now say.

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat

The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

In light of your new reflections, then, do you endorse the following clarification?

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat

The thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact.

And what of (II)? — Banno

Am I wrong?
— Banno

Yes. — bongo fury

(II) is nonsense.

Address the other.

Am I wrong? — Banno

Yes. (I) is fine, as I say:

That would be basic correspondence theory, yes. My picture 1. — bongo fury

Now read on...

See this reply.

You mean that "snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, like that snow is white, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact? — Banno

That would be basic correspondence theory, yes. My picture 1. Something I thought that neither of us agreed with but only one of us was capable of discussing coherently.

Isn't that what I have been arguing? — Banno

Cough, splutter...

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact.
[...]
Now, where in any of this does a sentence correspond to a fact?
What might that correspondence be? — Banno

Perhaps (in the light of your new reflections) you meant "the thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact"? (Similar to the clarification offered here.)

But then that would be exactly where a sentence does correspond to a fact. (According to the theory being discussed though not espoused.) And the correspondence might be whatever you just called representation.

I think the issue is that facts aren’t always things, e.g material objects. — Michael

That's a related issue, sure. I'm less unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts that are physical events (objects in the larger sense of regions of space-time). But I'm unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts generally, and even less sympathetic to their being smuggled in by systematic equivocation.

It is a fact that unicorns don’t exist, — Michael

I think we agree here.

, but the non-existence of unicorns isn’t a thing that exists. — Michael

Neither is the existence of cats a thing that exists.

Is there a distinction between the fact that unicorns don’t exist and the sentence “unicorns don’t exist” being true? — Michael

What do you think?

The T-schema works with a coherence theory, too. — Michael

Hence my quoting Goodman, earlier. And note that my second picture is consistent with the T-schema. Even though it doesn't have whole sentences referring (or corresponding).

This possibility doesn't excuse the equivocating, between strings of words, and alleged things or situations that aren't strings of words.

That string of words refers to a fact. — Michael

(My emphasis.)

Exactly. According to correspondence theory in this kind of context.

For me, the words on the right of "iff" in '"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' point to the grounding fact of snow being white (or not). — Janus

(My emphasis again.)

See, Pie and @Banno? It's not hard not to equivocate, if you don't want to: — bongo fury

Perhaps it isn't quite right to say that the right-hand side of the T-schema refers to a fact. — Michael

Of course perhaps it isn't at all right.

Hence my second picture, just as one plausible alternative. Following up the option that whole sentences don't refer at all.

So what does "snow is green" refer to if not a fact? A fiction? — Michael

Plausibly it is fictional literature.

Not at all. I criticised (1).

Specifically, here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/732016 — bongo fury

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

No, the thing on the right of the T-schema is a string of words. — bongo fury

"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno

1. snow is white - fact — Banno

No more questions, your honour.

No.

Wittgenstein does that to you! Oui? — Agent Smith

Absolutely not. Wittgenstein is scrupulous.

It's all the arrows. What are they doing? — Banno

Pointing.

And the splotch down the bottom - what's that? The thing-in-itself? — Banno

The (alleged) thing that's not also a string of words.

The thing in my hand is a knife or a piece of metal. We mark the difference by the context. — Banno

Sure. Two words for one thing. No problem. If we're ready to clarify.

The string [snow is white] is a fact or a sentence. We mark the difference by the context, but in addition we can use quote marks. — Banno

Fine, if you would stick to that. Two words ("fact" and "sentence") for one thing (string). But you keep doing one word ("fact") for two things (string and alleged thing that's not also a string). And refusing to clarify, and then basking in people's incomprehension.

I point to the that. — Banno

Mystical babble.

You say " Are you pointing at the knife or the piece of metal? " — Banno

No, you said that. I showed here that it was beside the point.

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are the same. — Banno

Not at all. I criticised (1).

Specifically, here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/732016

No equivocation. — Banno

I can have it both ways because it works both ways. — Banno

Are you pointing at the knife or the piece of metal? — Banno

If I say

A piece of metal is a knife. — Banno

then I'm pointing "piece of metal" and "knife" at a metal knife.

If I say

The string of words is a fact. — Banno

then I'm pointing "string of words" and "fact" at the true sentence.

...and? — Banno

And stop doing it, please. The equivocation.

You don't have to accept the alleged corresponding entities. But stop having it both ways, and basking in people's incomprehension.

What's that? — Banno

It's saying, are you pointing the word "fact" at the true sentence or at some alleged corresponding entity?

But a wise fellow once said, concerning pointing, — Banno

Word and object have no inherent connection, but only a mystic confuses the two. — bongo fury

snow is white - fact — Banno

Equivocal pointing of "fact".

between true sentence and more occult alleged entities. — bongo fury

or what it is to point — Banno

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/350131

Word and object have no inherent connection, but only a mystic confuses the two.