Apparent reality is just such an indirect view of what is real. Spinoza taught us how we come to know an outside physical world; it was by the world of objects making alterations to the state of our biology, our bodies, this, processed through the understanding is our everyday reality or apparent reality. For us, it is our only subjective reality and for us, there is no direct knowledge of reality. I propose that apparent reality is a biological readout, a self-simulation for the world of objects that is indirect in that it is the world's or the cosmos' energies altering our bodies that give us the impression of there being objects. Those energies are objects only to biological consciousness, a melody played that only the conscious subject hears or rather sees. So, the apparent reality is how we experience the energies around us, but the fact remains, all there is, is energy. If we saw this energy as simply energy, that would be direct realism, a place/state/field of no things.

When I talk about seeing red I mean it in the same sort of sense as when I talk about feeling pain, and the red I see, like the pain I feel, isn't a property of external world objects. That's the argument I have been trying to make. — Michael

Right. so if it's not a property of external world objects, then what's your theory as to why we sense it? And how do you justify undermining the current paradigm that the brain senses external states in order to predict the results of interaction with them? what's the evolutionary advantage of a system where the brain spends time detecting the state of other parts of itself?

Right. so if it's not a property of external world objects, then what's your theory as to why we sense it? And how do you justify undermining the current paradigm that the brain senses external states in order to predict the results of interaction with them? — Isaac

I don't understand the issue. Pain isn't a property of external world objects. I feel pain. There's no problem here. Colours aren't a property of external world objects. I see colours. Suddenly there's a problem?

When our nerves are stimulated in certain ways, we feel pain. That pain, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.

When our temperature is lowered sufficiently, we feel cold. That cold, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.

When our eyes are stimulated in certain ways, we see red. That red, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.

what's the evolutionary advantage of a system where the brain spends time detecting the state of other parts of itself?

I'm not saying that the brain "detects" the state of other parts of itself. I'm saying that external stimulation triggers brain activity, and that this brain activity is either identical to or causes "the feeling of pain", and that this pain isn't a property of the external stimulation but is a property of that brain activity (or some supervenient mental phenomena, if there is such a thing). The same with feeling cold and seeing red.

Seems to me that in the example provided they're all apples. That's because you're putting the apple to use to argue against a particular position. They are no longer apples the moment we stop calling them apples. Say when the last picture was thrown into the trash and no one called it an apple anymore. (unless we want to, of course -- the apple can be resurrected in words at any time, just as it never needed to be cast into words to be itself)

In order to judge whether "apple" is the right term at a time we have to have access to the apple. And at any time, even if there is a substrate which holds the properties of the apples beneath perception and cognition and language, then all my use of "apple" will only be embedded in the shared world where the apples change, where we have perspectives, and we have no substratum to settle how it is we should use words. We remain at the surface, which we have direct access to. (surely we have direct access to the indirect reality? In which case, couldn't we just call this the real, and the other the unknown?)

Most of the time I think the indirect realist inserts more than is needed into an ontology. We might as well be anti-realists at that point -- the real is outside of perception, and all we have is perception. But the indirect realist wants to assert, all we have is perception, and there's something real out there underneath it all as an inference, as I understand it in this thread, starting from naive realism -- that what we see is what's the case, modified to our perception.

But if so I think it has to be established by some other means than by looking at change, difference in opinion, or difference in perception because these are realist things -- the realist would just note that things do, in fact, change, or do, in fact, look different at different times, which is why we select different words at different times. What's needed isn't change, but the substratum. Given all the changes we perceive, all the perspectives we have, and that we know true sentences -- how is it we know that the sentence "Reality is experienced indirectly" is true? The direct realist won't deny change or anything we experience or the mechanisms of perception, because these are all part of the world as we experience it.

Only the little story about the Real being beneath the real-- that's what's being doubted.

For us, it is our only subjective reality and for us, there is no direct knowledge of reality. — boagie

I guess the question then, is: how do you know this?

Frank,
Perhaps you could tell me what is certain. Philosophy is wonder, mine is just reasonable conjecture. If you find the reasoning faulty, by all means, enlighten me.

Perhaps you could tell me what is certain. Philosophy is wonder, mine is just reasonable conjecture. If you find the reasoning faulty, by all means, enlighten me. — boagie

I'm just asking what the justification would be for "for us, there is no direct knowledge of reality." What prompts you to say that? What's the grounding for it? If you were arguing for it, what would your argument be?

Spinoza taught us how we come to know an outside physical world; it was by the world of objects making alterations to the state of our biology, our bodies, this, processed through the understanding is our everyday reality or apparent reality. For us, it is our only subjective reality and for us, there is no direct knowledge of reality. — boagie

Hmm...
If stated as knowledge, then the statement can't be reality, since otherwise it would be contradictory, yes?
(Not referring to Spinoza, just the no-knowledge part.)
In my reading (which could easily be wrong), the statement partitions everything into ehh my/our subjective experiences and reality (mutually exclusive), but maybe the verbiage covers more...
We need not become something else to attain knowledge thereof, right?

we have private experiences, so removing the colours inside the heads is to deny a fact. — Michael

But, in principle, this claim cannot be verified as either true or false, so we are not talking about facts here.

But, in principle, this claim cannot be verified as either true or false, so we are not talking about facts here. — Richard B

I don't think facts depend on verifiability. It just either is or isn't the case that private experiences exist.

I suppose some anti-realists might disagree, but then I don't think anti-realists are going to be direct realists anyway.

I may be absolutely certain of what I am seeing, whether a tree or snooker balls on a snooker table, but knowing the present effect doesn't allow me to know the preceding cause. — RussellA

I believe you are saying the following, “Conversely, most realists (specifically, indirect realists) hold that perceptions or sense data are caused by mind-independent objects. But this introduces the possibility of another kind of skepticism: since our understanding of causality is that the same effect can be produced by multiple causes, there is a lack of determinacy about what one is really perceiving…”

But this is a tough pill to swallow given the suppose cause and effect being discussed here:

Effect: private sense data that cannot be publicly verified as either true or false.

Cause: an unknowable something that is out of reach because all we know for certain is our private sense data.

Wow, I would not want to use that example to teach a kid what “cause and effect” means.

I don't think facts depend on verifiability. It just either is or isn't the case that private experiences exist. — Michael

If you do not like verifiability, how does this fact establish its truth or falsity? One can make claims, but we do need to know how to establish whether it is a fact or not.

If you do not like verifiability, how does this fact establish its truth or falsity? One can make claims, but we do need to know how to establish whether it is a fact or not. — Richard B

I don't understand the question.

It is either a fact that intelligent, extra-terrestrial life exists or it isn't.
It is either a fact that private experiences exist or they don't.

Whether or not intelligent, extra-terrestrial life or private experiences exist has nothing to do with what we can or can't verify. The world just either is that way or it isn't.

It is either a fact that private experiences exist or they don't. — Michael

You said this is a fact. Is that because you have testified to this, and thus, it is a fact because you say so?

You said this is a fact. Is that because you have testified to this, and thus, it is a fact because you say so? — Richard B

No, I'm saying so because I believe it to be a fact. And because it is a fact, what I say is true.

No, I'm saying so because I believe it to be a fact. And because it is a fact, what I say is true. — Michael

Why do you say it is a fact and it is true?

Why do you say it is a fact and it is true? — Richard B

Because I believe it to be so.

They are no longer apples the moment we stop calling them apples — Moliere

As an Indirect Realist, my belief is that as apples exist in the mind, exist in perception, cognition and language and not in a mind-independent world. As you say, they can therefore be brought into existence and removed from existence just by the power of thought.

But the indirect realist wants to assert, all we have is perception, and there's something real out there underneath it all as an inference, as I understand it in this thread, starting from naive realism -- that what we see is what's the case, modified to our perception. — Moliere

I agree that there is the surface of perception, cognition and language which is real and we have direct access to, and there is a substratum which is also real. The Indirect Realist believes that they can only make inferences about what exists in this substratum, whilst the Direct Realist believes they can directly perceive what exists in this substratum.

But if so I think it has to be established by some other means than by looking at change, — Moliere

There are different approaches to Direct Realism. Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) is an direct perception and direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world. Semantic Direct Realism (SDR) is an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world.

As language is one aspect of cognition, the change in object from apple to non-apple is more relevant to SDR than PDR. As you say " They are no longer apples the moment we stop calling them apples".

However, I agree that change is not as relevant to PDR as it is to SDR. The following is more relevant to PDR.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that the substratum is real and exists. They both perceive, cognize and talk about "apples". The Direct Realist believes that apples exist in a mind-independent world, the Indirect Realist doesn't.

I can perceive things that I don't have words for. For example, exotic fruits of Asia. Therefore, it's possible to be able to perceive an apple without knowing that it has been named "apple".

As both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree they perceive change, we cannot use change to determine who is correct. Therefore, just consider the picture at 230 days. As both the Indirect and Direct Realist are able to perceive things they have no name for, remove any reference to the name" apple". The Direct Realist would argue that the object at day 230 exists as it is seen in a mind-independent world, whilst the Indirect Realist would argue that it doesn't.

The thing perceived at 230 days is part ochre at the top and part umber at the bottom, contained within a circle and supporting a short vertical line above. Reducing, we have a straight line, a circle, some colour and relationships between them.

The Indirect Realist would propose that these features exist only the mind. The Direct Realist would propose that these exist not only in the mind but also in a mind-independent world. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that these features exist in the mind, however the Direct Realist also proposes in addition that these features also exist in a mind-independent world.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that we gain all our information about a mind-independent world through our senses. The Direct Realist argues that just from a knowledge of our sensations, we are able to have a veridical knowledge of the cause of these sensations. I would argue that from knowing just an effect, it is impossible to directly know its cause.

We know we perceive the colour red, yet the Direct Realist argues that the cause of our perceiving red is a colour red existing in a mind-independent world. We know we perceive a circle and line, which are particular spatial relationships between individual points, and we know we perceive particular spatial relationships between these shapes, yet the Direct Realist argues that the cause of our perceiving spatial relations is the ontological existence of spatial relationships in a mind-independent world.

For PDR to be a valid theory, it must justify at the least that colours and spatial relations ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.

I agree that there is the surface of perception, cognition and language which is real and we have direct access to, and there is a substratum which is also real. The Indirect Realist believes that they can only make inferences about what exists in this substratum, whilst the Direct Realist believes they can directly perceive what exists in this substratum. — RussellA

In the set up I think I understand the distinction between direct and indirect realist. However, I think I'd call myself a realist, rightly, yet deny there even is a sub-stratum. The surface is all there is which we have direct access to, and there's no reason to believe there's a substratum. That's because without access to the substrate there's no way to check our inferences, or a way to check if there is a relationship between the substrate and the surface. We could only check it against the surface. It may match the substrate, but we'd never know due to its indirectness.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that the substratum is real and exists. They both perceive, cognize and talk about "apples". The Direct Realist believes that apples exist in a mind-independent world, the Indirect Realist doesn't.

I can perceive things that I don't have words for. For example, exotic fruits of Asia. Therefore, it's possible to be able to perceive an apple without knowing that it has been named "apple".

As both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree they perceive change, we cannot use change to determine who is correct. Therefore, just consider the picture at 230 days. As both the Indirect and Direct Realist are able to perceive things they have no name for, remove any reference to the name" apple". The Direct Realist would argue that the object at day 230 exists as it is seen in a mind-independent world, whilst the Indirect Realist would argue that it doesn't. — RussellA

I feel like this notion of mind-independent world gets too much emphasis for a direct realist's way of putting things. It feels like how the indirect realist interprets the direct realist, rather than how the direct realist defends their view.

I wouldn't reduce reality to either phenomenology or semantics (or science). "Surface" is a metaphor without a counter-part in my way of understanding. I might go so far as to say -- it's all surface! No matter how deeply you dig into the earth, or bite into the apple, or build the transcendental conditions of experience it's just another surface. It's because the surface changes that we reach for these stories about in/direct reality: we like stability. We like being able to predict things. But the world is only partially predictable, and even when it is we frequently change our minds later about how we should predict change.

Rather than adding something in-between myself and reality, I'd just say reality is wider than some system of thought. Systems of thought are build to cohere, and reality is far from coherent. That's why it makes sense to say it's independent of ourselves, at least. We like coherency, and the world resists.

When our nerves are stimulated in certain ways, we feel pain. That pain, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.

When our temperature is lowered sufficiently, we feel cold. That cold, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.

When our eyes are stimulated in certain ways, we see red. That red, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly. — Michael

What if we cut out the middle man ? 'Seeing red' is acting accordingly, etc. We wise others decide that you saw red because you stopped at the light. (Stopping at the light is part of seeing red.)

What if we cut out the middle man ? 'Seeing red' is acting accordingly, etc. We wise others decide that you saw red because you stopped at the light. (Stopping at the light is part of seeing red.) — green flag

This is the kind of Wittgensteinian nonsense that I just don't get.

You put a red ball and a blue ball in front of me. I can see that one is red and one is blue. I don't need to do or say anything that you can interpret as me "seeing red" or "seeing blue". Me seeing red and seeing blue has nothing to do with you or your judgement. It only has something to do with me and what's going on in my head.

What if we cut out the middle man ? 'Seeing red' is acting accordingly, etc. We wise others decide that you saw red because you stopped at the light. (Stopping at the light is part of seeing red.) — green flag

If you stopped at the light because you saw that it was red, seeing was the cause and stopping was the effect. How can the effect be part of the cause? That appears to be an abuse of language.

If you stopped at the light because you saw that it was red, seeing was the cause and stopping was the effect. How can the effect be part of the cause? That appears to be an abuse of language. — frank

Exactly that. I take aspirin because I'm in pain. It's not that me being in pain just is me taking aspirin.

Exactly that. I take aspirin because I'm in pain. It's not that me being in pain just is me taking aspirin. — Michael

:up:

You put a red ball and a blue ball in front of me. I can see that one is red and one is blue. — Michael

But if you said, “I can see that one is green, and one is yellow”, can you be said to being seeing at all.

But if you said, “I can see that one is green, and one is yellow”, can you be said to being seeing at all. — Richard B

Yes, I'm just not seeing what you're seeing. Much like with the case of some people seeing the dress to be white and gold and others seeing it to be black and blue.

This is where it gets interesting. How divergent can someone get with their apparent language of colors where we begin to think that we are not talking about “colors”, or “seeing colors” anymore.

You put a red ball and a blue ball in front of me. I can see that one is red and one is blue. I don't need to do or say anything that you can interpret as me "seeing red" or "seeing blue". — Michael

But perhaps you need to have brain activity that succeeds in associating the red ball with red surfaces generally, and the blue ball with blue surfaces generally?

Having red or blue mental images in the brain, to meet that purpose, is kind of having a ghost in the machine.

Having the brain reach for suitable words or pictures, isn't. And, even better, it suggests a likely origin of our tendency to imagine that we accommodate the ghostly entities.

Having red or blue mental images in the brain, to meet that purpose, is kind of having a ghost in the machine.

Having the brain reach for suitable words or pictures, isn't. — bongo fury

And I appreciate this. You don't have to think of experience as a collection of ghosts, though. You can just note that you do see red, and leave it unexplained exactly how.

Semantic direct realism is afflicted with multiple realizability issues on steroids.