And as soon as one asks what a fact is, or what it is to point, the equivocation resumes. — Banno
Snow is white. That's a fact. — Banno
Could we all just drop "state of affairs" and "proposition"? Serious suggestion. Because even the former ends up standing for "sentence". At least with those perhaps disavowing correspondence but prone to having it both ways.
Oh, and "fact", as well. — bongo fury
Note that we don't want a string of words to correspond to cat-on-the-mat-ness. — Pie
For me, the words on the right of "iff" in '"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' point to the grounding fact of snow being white (or not). — Janus
The thing on the right is a fact. — Banno
The meaning of 'P' is P. — Pie
If 'P' is true, then P is the case, — Pie
and P is a piece of the world. — Pie
The issue is what to make of arguments that go like this:
1. P.
2. (1) might be wrong. — Srap Tasmaner
2. It is unacceptable to say that we can have knowledge that is not certain
3. It is unacceptable to say that we can have knowledge that is not necessarily true — Michael
3. Kp (premise)
4. ¬□p (premise)
5. Kp ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4) — Michael
3. p (premise)
4. ¬□p (premise)
5. p ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4)
And what I say is true even if I am not wrong. — Michael
5. Kp ∧ ◇¬p (from 3 and 4) — Michael
We then conclude that I could be wrong even if I know everything (and assuming that some p is not necessarily true): — Michael
It seems that Searle is saying then that consciousness creates the independent fact — TheVeryIdea
which I suppose ties in with the quantum mechanics observation effect — TheVeryIdea
firstly "is true" looks clearer than either "denotes" or "describes" — Banno
and secondly we can ask if it is true that this "describes" or "denotes" that, — Banno
Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value. — Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters
But am I not interpreting marks on the paper or in my brain when I do the calculation without using a machine? — TheVeryIdea
E.g. if I add 2 + 2 and get 4 then that is just a fact, a property of the universe — TheVeryIdea
that a conscious entity had to construct the calculator — TheVeryIdea
someone had to read the result from the electronic calculator — TheVeryIdea
Your drawing gives me some insight, but it'd help to hear more about how you conceive or deal with truthmakers. — Pie
Not that we have to acknowledge truth-makers corresponding to truth-bearers. — bongo fury
If we jettison apparent nonsense like the world-in-itself...the world is just that which is the case. To me this is not correspondence. There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.) — Pie
Yes, she sees fine, but her memory and imagination do not include visual images. — T Clark
P is true is just fancy talk for P. — Pie
"true" denotes "snow is white" iff "white" denotes snow. — bongo fury
I'd just say that "snow is white" is true if snow is white. — Pie
My intuition would be that 'true' would merely describe and not denote in that case. — Pie
Is this a Fregean idea ? — Pie
Woodger's term, p.17, is 'shared name'. Martin, in Truth and Denotation, Ch. IV, speaks of divided reference as multiple denotation. I applaud that use of 'denote', having so used the word myself until deflected to 'true of' by readers' misunderstanding; and Martin's 'multiple' obviates the misunderstanding. — Quine: Word and Object, p 90n.
Truth for singular sentences, consisting of a name and an arbitrarily complex predicate, is defined thus: A singular sentence is true iff the object denoted by the name satisfies the predicate. Logical machinery provided by Tarski (1935) can be used to turn this simplified sketch into a more general definition of truth—a definition that handles sentences containing relational predicates and quantifiers and covers molecular sentences as well. Whether Tarski’s own definition of truth can be regarded as a correspondence definition, even in this modified sense, is under debate (cf. Popper 1972; Field 1972, 1986; Kirkham 1992, chaps. 5-6; Soames 1999; Künne 2003, chap. 4; Patterson 2008.) — SEP
P is true is just fancy talk for P. — Pie
There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.) — Pie
1 truth-bearing sentence/proposition
2 truth-making event/state of affairs/proposition — bongo fury
I'd say the quoted part is [about] some specific act of assertion, and the disquoted part is [about] a state of affairs that corresponds to the assertion. — Tate
Which one, right ? — Pie
3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition. — the big W
I'd say the quoted part is some specific act of assertion, and the disquoted part is a state of affairs that corresponds to the assertion. — Tate
My question is: how does (the meaning of ) a true statement depict reality ? What is this representational, optical metaphor doing or trying to do ? — Pie
It would be some state of the world. — Tate
You have to specify the context in which you're using the T-sentence rule. Is it Tarski? Redundancy? Are you try to make into correspondence theory? — Tate
If you're interpreting the t-sentence rule as a rendering of correspondence theory, then — Tate
the disquoted part — Tate
I think we humans are pretty good at doing that too. — Pie
I wasn't trying to use it. I took Banno to be asking if we should interpret the quotes as signaling a specific act of assertion. My answer was that you can do that, you just need to explain that to the reader. — Tate
the disquoted part — Tate
My point was that you need to look for how an author is using the t-sentence rule. Use varies. — Tate
the disquoted part — Tate
Meh... Why would propositions be timeless? — Olivier5
Is truth a property of sentences (which are linguistic entities in some language or other), or is truth a property of propositions (nonlinguistic, abstract and timeless entities)?
— Pie
Both, because propositions are in fact a class of sentences. — Olivier5
propositions are in fact a class of sentences. — Olivier5
and the disquoted part is a truth maker. — Tate
Seems to me the problem stems from treating propositions as individuals.
— Banno
Why is that problematic? — Tate
Tarski offers this example:
The sentence "snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white. — Michael