On the surface level, if we have a "self" in the materialist worldview, we inevitably run into the "Ship of Theseus" problem. — tom111

Yes, and I don't see any deeper issue.

So why is it, when I look back at photos of myself from 5 years ago, I feel like the same person? — tom111

Well, why is it that when you look back at photos of your ship from 5 years ago, you feel like it's the same ship?

This is likely due to the fact that you have inherited memories from this person, — tom111

And likewise you have memories of the earlier ship.

What we are (in the materialist view) are simply piles of carbon, — tom111

Or living flesh, why not? Does a materialist have to be exclusively a physical chemist?

using past memories and ideas to compile a constant "self" that simply doesn't exist; — tom111

Agreed, if self is soul. But why can't it be the animal?

a human being is empty of essence. — tom111

Agreed.

Upon thorough examination, the idea of a "self" is as arbitrary as the idea of a "chair", or any other object. — tom111

Wobbly, sure, with no solid foundation. But not entirely arbitrary, surely? You have the vehicle's service history?

In a purely material world, concepts like these simply don't exist work — tom111

Again, of course they do, at a coarser level of description.

In a nutshell: because correlation doesn’t explain consciousness. — Art48

But confusion might.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/433444

2. Set A has a smaller cardinality than set B IFF set A can be put in a 1-to-1 correspondence with a proper subset of set B. — Agent Smith

No. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardinality?wprov=sfla1

Yes, your parsing seemed right.

No, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism?wprov=sfla1 has a list

If A then not B
If C then B
[If] C then not A — KantDane21

A, B, C ---> P, M, S

Yes. Why is that? — Shawn

Touche! :lol:

But, Santa's ontology exists in the fictional realm. Why do people conflate the two? — Shawn

Why do people conflate existing in a realm with existing in a realm-diagram or a realm-description?

Yes. So what (if not a Cartesian film show) is intermediate between what (if not a homunculous) and the world?

apprehension of the world is mediated. — 180 Proof

By a Cartesian film show?

as [a] much more subdued version of the Cartesian theatre that is more plausible to current thinking. — Moliere

More plausible how? More subdued how? Different how?

Maybe to sum up the thoughts in an unclear question: Is the brain a virtual reality machine? — Moliere

A Cartesian theatre, then?

In other words, language. Stories. Words. That's all. — busycuttingcrap

Yes. Apart from real beardy old men, and the real north pole. And real charity workers, as @unenlightened rightly points out.

As you say "people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts". — RussellA

If I may help you to grasp the point here... People can and do use the same kinds of words (e.g. names) for the purpose of referring to people or objects in some contexts and for the purpose of non-referring word-use in others.

'Real' does not always mean actually real; 'existent' does not always mean actually existent. That's just the way things are. — Herg

Does 'actual' always mean 'actually actual'? Perhaps Santa is the first but not the second?

However, it's still a fiction. — Sam26

So, false?

If you're referring to what's veridical, then they have no referent. — Sam26

Can we talk veridically about fiction?

but not all concepts have referents in reality, — Sam26

Well we were talking about words failing to refer to things in reality. I'm interested to hear about other kinds of things failing likewise. Just wondered what they are, if not words.

The only referent they might have is a fictional one, — Sam26

So they do have a referent or they don't?

What? What's the brain shiver? — Sam26

The thought. The neurological activity.

There are many concepts, especially in fiction and mythology, that have no actual or real existence or referent. The only thing that's real is the concept, or conceptual idea. — Sam26

Do you mean the brain shiver?

My mistake was duplication: I shouldn't have used both 'fictitious' and 'supposed'. — Herg

Ok, but now you've done it again, with 'real' and 'existent'.

'Fictitious supposed entity' does not accurately capture my meaning. — Herg

Ok, what does? What form of words is satisfactorily not an oxymoron?

The fact that I have never seen Santa Claus is not proof that Santa Claus doesn't exist, as is the fact that I have never seen The North Pole [likewise not] proof that The North Pole doesn't exist. — RussellA

Typo, I presume.

The question is, how do we know things without doubt that have only been described to us. — RussellA

@Shawn might agree that this is the question.

I expect it's only the question if you are a foundationalist, and assume that some absolute kind of knowledge is required.

Only when something is added to the propositional function to turn it into a proposition does the proposition become true or false, — RussellA

... such as, some indication of which quantity (e.g. none, some or all) of the world's objects are to be denoted by each denoting phrase. Whereas, your suggested examples of suitable supplementation:

... such as "[it is said that] Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "[many believe that] The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth". — RussellA

are way off. This might not affect your stuff about knowledge. But it shouts a bit.

points out that we merely suppose that there is someone called Santa who lives at the North Pole. — Herg

How is this different from saying that we merely entertain the fiction?

A fictitious supposed entity — Herg

You might as well say, a fictitious fictitious entity.

Can Santa be his own referent since he doesn't denote anything in the real world? — Shawn

Do you mean, can the name "Santa" be its own referent, since it doesn't denote anything in the real world?

Page number? I can't find the passage, and "besides from" sounds like a typo.

Anyway, I don't know much about Kant, but I won't let that stop me...

He's just fleshing out the quote from Kant.

Kant says: you can decipher the nature of a thing without seeing all its aspects. From P don't infer Q.

Guyer says: Kant does decipher the nature of the noumenon without claiming to see all its aspects. P, but we don't infer Q. And by the way, the nature thus deciphered is to manifest or objectify as human will. Whatever that means. But how this nature was deciphered isn't mentioned. You seem to be hoping the decipherment is argued or explained. It's just given, as part of P.

"Santa wears a red hat" is true. — Banno

Sure. As fiction. Fictionally true. It's a fiction that "Santa wears a red hat" is true. So, it's false. Logic with oxymorons. Great fun!

Yet, we can instantiate him freely in movies, — Shawn

Do you mean, depict him freely?

We can, but not in the sense of pointing his likenesses at him. Only in the sense of making Santa-pictures.

See https://monoskop.org/images/1/1b/Goodman_Nelson_Languages_of_Art.pdf pp. 21.

I was attempting a pun (hence the apology). Con artist. But I see now it doesn't work on the word pronounced properly.

I can point to {"winged", "godlike", "stallion"} and give it the name "Pegasus". — RussellA

But Pegasus flies. Your set of words doesn't.

I think that's quite stringent. — Shawn

The indirect reference to Santa stories and pictures and actual beardy old men is fairly free, isn't it?

Santa isn't an individual — Shawn

Do you mean there is no actual person answering to the usual descriptions and hence named by the relevant tokens of the word "Santa"? (Good.)

and yet is in the domain of discourse. — Shawn

Well perhaps you are talking here about the name "Santa" (or relevant tokens of it), and not some corresponding person? "Santa" is a name appearing in a declaration of the domain of discourse?

In the sense that fictional is not necessarily contradictory to entity. — RussellA

Fair enough. Do they say that non-actual is not necessarily contradictory to actual?

But generally speaking, this distinction is more semantic than substantive. — Manuel

What distinction? That between a thought and what it's a thought about? You've lost me. My thought about Hitler isn't substantively different from Hitler?

I'm with Quine. And Goodman. Words often refer to (or are pretended to refer to, in acts of referring, which are only a game) actual things. Sometimes they fail to refer directly to actual things. Because there's no such thing. That doesn't stop them referring indirectly (but only indirectly) to other things. E.g. to actual Santa stories and pictures, and actual beardy old men.

I don't see why Santa Claus would be a "non-thing". It's a mental construction of a person... — Manuel

So Santa is the thought? Or the person thought about? Or both, or neither?

The act of referring to a specific thing — Manuel

So we're back where we started. Among this subset of the things we do with language, the acts of referring to specific things, are there acts of referring to specific non-things?

People refer, not words themselves. — Manuel

But what do they refer to?

Do you mean, these people deny that "fictional entity" is an oxymoron? Or that they have found that reasoning with oxymorons can end well?