Yes, she sees fine, but her memory and imagination do not include visual images. — T Clark

Also, ask her to describe a route, say out of the house to the nearest post box?

And what happens if she were to draw (the post box, say) from memory?

P is true is just fancy talk for P. — Pie

"true" denotes "snow is white" iff "white" denotes snow. — bongo fury

Went with describes, but denotes may less jarring for the naming by quotation.

I may be asking for trouble with the dotted arrows anyway.

Trouble welcome.

So you want to link nouns to objects maybe ? — Pie

Of course. And variables to their values (which are things out there, not more language).

And so on.

extensional — Banno

Yes, or even nominalist ("hyper-extensionalist" in Goodman's rhetoric).

I feel a diagram coming on, tomorrow.

I'm offering denotation (of sentence-parts) as a better way (to examine how language relates or corresponds with bits of reality) than truth of whole sentences.

Bug.

I'd just say that "snow is white" is true if snow is white. — Pie

Yes, which is deflationary, and what could possibly be wrong with that! Well, it's a bit smug, if there's stuff to say about how a sentence refers to other stuff. And mystical, if we end up equivocating between truth-bearing sentence and truth-making state. Which I'm quite sure none of us ever would...

My intuition would be that 'true' would merely describe and not denote in that case. — Pie

Same difference. In Quine (see above), Goodman, Elgin.

Denotes, describes, applies to, refers to, points to, ...

Me neither, but I gather he invented sense vs reference, with the latter pointing to true or false as you describe. So?

Is this a Fregean idea ? — Pie

Not that I recall.

I'm not sure it's unobjectionable.

I remember thinking something like it when trying to grasp Tarski's expositions. So if it's not badly wrong it'll be from there.

If it seems alien, I can get supporting sentiments from Goodman and Quine, I think.

Woodger's term, p.17, is 'shared name'. Martin, in Truth and Denotation, Ch. IV, speaks of divided reference as multiple denotation. I applaud that use of 'denote', having so used the word myself until deflected to 'true of' by readers' misunderstanding; and Martin's 'multiple' obviates the misunderstanding. — Quine: Word and Object, p 90n.

Ah and this is what reminded me:

Truth for singular sentences, consisting of a name and an arbitrarily complex predicate, is defined thus: A singular sentence is true iff the object denoted by the name satisfies the predicate. Logical machinery provided by Tarski (1935) can be used to turn this simplified sketch into a more general definition of truth—a definition that handles sentences containing relational predicates and quantifiers and covers molecular sentences as well. Whether Tarski’s own definition of truth can be regarded as a correspondence definition, even in this modified sense, is under debate (cf. Popper 1972; Field 1972, 1986; Kirkham 1992, chaps. 5-6; Soames 1999; Künne 2003, chap. 4; Patterson 2008.) — SEP

P is true is just fancy talk for P. — Pie

But P talks about truth, as well. Or denotation. It says, e.g., "white" denotes snow, i.e. "white" is true of snow, or snow satisfies "white".

Plausibly.

And, "true" denotes "snow is white" iff "white" denotes snow.

Thus defining true as a predicate, in terms of is-true-of or denotes.

OK, hold up. — Tate

So, no?

Ok. Will you be getting back to waxing analytical any time soon?

There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.) — Pie

Is this my fault? Have I lowered the tone?

It doesn't seem to make any sense. Are you joking?

Ah, thanks for the indulgence but no, it was just, why should I answer yours if you won't answer mine.

I've only been arguing for avoiding the perennial equivocation re

1 truth-bearing sentence/proposition

2 truth-making event/state of affairs/proposition — bongo fury

Ah, solving that question
Brings the priest and the doctor
In their long coats
Running over the fields.

I'd say the quoted part is [about] some specific act of assertion, and the disquoted part is [about] a state of affairs that corresponds to the assertion. — Tate

Is this what you meant?

:ok: haha I get it now

Which one, right ? — Pie

Might be the day before you came here that everyone was quoting

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition. — the big W

at each other.

I'd say the quoted part is some specific act of assertion, and the disquoted part is a state of affairs that corresponds to the assertion. — Tate

Still? You're still saying the disquoted part of a sentence is a disquoted part of the world, whatever that means?

My question is: how does (the meaning of ) a true statement depict reality ? What is this representational, optical metaphor doing or trying to do ? — Pie

I seem to recall, someone had a theory about that.

It would be some state of the world. — Tate

What would? What you're calling "the disquoted part"?

Some state of the world is a disquoted part? Part of what? Part of the world?

So "part" didn't mean "part of the T schema"?

You have to specify the context in which you're using the T-sentence rule. Is it Tarski? Redundancy? Are you try to make into correspondence theory? — Tate

Er,

If you're interpreting the t-sentence rule as a rendering of correspondence theory, then — Tate

Now then, in that context, your context, did

the disquoted part — Tate

refer to the sentence constituting the second part of the biconditional or to some corresponding event or relation, or something else, or all 3 (because it doesn't matter)?

I think we humans are pretty good at doing that too. — Pie

Let's see...

I wasn't trying to use it. I took Banno to be asking if we should interpret the quotes as signaling a specific act of assertion. My answer was that you can do that, you just need to explain that to the reader. — Tate

Ok so you were talking mainly about the first half of the biconditional. Even so, did

the disquoted part — Tate

refer to the sentence constituting the second part of the biconditional or to some corresponding event or relation, or something else, or all 3 (because it doesn't matter)?

I definitely need that explained.

I just meant that we can still drop "proposition".

My point was that you need to look for how an author is using the t-sentence rule. Use varies. — Tate

I was asking how you were trying to use it. Whether

the disquoted part — Tate

referred to the sentence constituting the second part of the biconditional or to some corresponding event or relation, or something else, or all 3.

Glad to hear it.

Then why say "both"?

Meh... Why would propositions be timeless? — Olivier5

You said

Is truth a property of sentences (which are linguistic entities in some language or other), or is truth a property of propositions (nonlinguistic, abstract and timeless entities)?
— Pie

Both, because propositions are in fact a class of sentences. — Olivier5

propositions are in fact a class of sentences. — Olivier5

Sure. But a sentence is already a class: of tokens, or copies. So you don't need another name for the more inclusive class.

Allowing translations into the class won't matter at all if they are parsed and interpreted the same. It's no different to letting symbols stand for the sentence-parts.

If you want a proposition to be a class of differently parsed paraphrases, then, why? And what? Non-linguistic? Abstract? Timeless?

and the disquoted part is a truth maker. — Tate

Not so fast. The sentence in the second part is a truth maker? Or it picks out a truth maker?

Seems to me the problem stems from treating propositions as individuals.
— Banno

Why is that problematic? — Tate

How is it clear? Is such an individual: truth-bearing sentence, truth-making event or relation, or something in between, or (as so often carelessly implied) all at once.

Tarski offers this example:

The sentence "snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white. — Michael

Quite. "Sentence" is fine. Drop "proposition". (Everyone!) If not why not?

there's just true claims ? — Pie

Yes. No corresponding relations or properties.

I think N is the wrong way to go. I think we agree ? — Pie

Yes if N is a totality of corresponding facts. No if it's a totality of things that I ought to tidy. But they correspond merely to sentence-parts.

Could we all just drop "state of affairs" and "proposition"? Serious suggestion. Because even the former ends up standing for "sentence". — bongo fury

Ambiguously.

Not that you said "states". Events? Less ambiguous.

Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value. — Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters

and N to be the set of non-linguistic reality bits. — Pie

States, then? States of affairs?

Is this just an issue with use versus mention ? — Pie

"Just"???

Try to correspond with real things or events. Cats, mats and cat-on-mat events. Celebrate your confidence in the correspondence by positing actual entities that are truly called "a cat", "a mat", "a cat-on-mat-event" or are truly related verbally by "is on the".

"The cat's being on the mat" is the controversy. Any such entity?

Sounds a bit straw-manish, admittedly. Can we agree, then?

So. Sentences. Things/events.

Sentences true or false. Things/events corresponding to names or other sentence-parts.

No entities corresponding to whole sentences. No truth-value attaching to things or events that aren't sentences.

I thank you.

Alternatively propositions are expressions, — Michael

Yes please!

in which case the T-schema only applies when something is expressed, — Michael

So, whenever there is a T-schema expression, at least?

Problem?

one of my concerns, truth-makers, which seem like unnecessary entities. — Pie

:up:

Controversial!

"Is truth a property of sentences (which are linguistic entities in some language or other), or is truth a property of propositions (nonlinguistic, abstract and timeless entities)? — Pie

Or is it a property of a state of affairs, whether conceived as a concrete event (region of space-time) or something more abstract? Which latter might be what many people mean by proposition. What a quagmire!

1 truth-bearing sentence/proposition/fact

2 truth-making event/state of affairs/proposition/fact

Not that we have to acknowledge truth-makers corresponding to truth-bearers. Just flagging up the likely misunderstandings coming down the line.

Could we all just drop "state of affairs" and "proposition" and "fact"? Serious suggestion. Because even the first ends up standing for "sentence". At least with those perhaps disavowing correspondence but prone to having it both ways.

There are clear enough reasons to prefer a logic with precisely two truth-values.

But you'd be right that this oughtn't to influence our choice of scaling or classification (of things or values).

Does it though? Colours? Tones? Aren't we multivariate with those?

And your political examples are non-binary too, in a way, as either-or always exchanges for more-or-less. Any fairly entrenched contrast makes way for a spectrum. E.g. either-left-or-right acknowledges how-left-wing?

Maybe what you want is a concept of a spectrum with more than two poles?!

I made it clear I’m not a solipsist (if I was why would I be talking to you?) but I need a logical way to dismiss it. — GLEN willows

Where do you stand on Neurath's boat?

Not too near the edge :lol:

But seriously...

Philosophy once aspired to set all knowledge on a firm foundation. Genuine knowledge claims were to be derived from indubitable truths by means of infallible rules. The terms that make up such truths were held to denote the individuals and kinds that constitute reality, and the rules for combining them into sentences and for deriving some sentences from others were thought to reflect the real order of things.

This philosophical enterprise has foundered. Indubitable truths and infallible rules are not to be had. Philosophy cannot expect to underwrite the assertions of other disciplines, for its own assertions are no more secure than the rest. Nor can it reasonably aspire to certainty. For without indubitable starting points, certainty is beyond our reach. — Catherine Z Elgin

And scientists no longer expect any ultimate foundation or certainty for their theories.

On the other hand... they, and anti-foundationalist philosophers, still seek to systematise, or axiomatise. Not because they expect their theories to derive truth and certainty from their laws or axioms, but the better to evaluate, test, and improve the theories.

Hence @Pie's interest in "fixing the cogito", probably.

But yeah, I suppose if you do accept Descartes' more occult cogito as an indubitable truth, then you are bound to demand a logical demonstration of any claim that a refutation of solipsism is available on that basis.

Let me just start by saying I don't deny private experiences. — Pie

Only if you admit you are admitting defeat.

Haha, this comment is about ten days old. Posted accidentally now. Wrong thread, too. Forgive me. Been enjoying it, but... why cling to the mentalist talk in a "manner of speaking"? Why not be literal? And eliminativist?