The door is shut. — Banno

It can be used as a statement and as a fact.
— Banno

What can? — bongo fury

I don't understand what you are asking. — Banno

It can be used as a statement and as a fact.
— Banno

What can? — bongo fury

That is a statement. — Banno

It is also a fact, because the door is indeed shut. — Banno

It can be used as a statement and as a fact. — Banno

Where did I go wrong? — Banno

The T-sentence. Statement mentioned on the left, — Banno

state of affairs, fact, statement used, on the right. — Banno

state of affairs, fact — Banno

state of affairs, fact, statement used, on the right. — Banno

state of affairs, fact... statement used to mention which, on the right. — Banno

Statement mentioned on the left, — Banno

Aristotle never used the term metaphysics. — Joshs

I'd have thought that metaphysics starts from the assumption that all the physics is settled, — bongo fury

The ‘meta’ is the formal synthetic framework which organizes the understanding of ‘physis’ (nature). — Joshs

Hegel regarded his dialectical method or “speculative mode of cognition” (PR §10) as the hallmark of his philosophy. — Joshs

When it wasn't part of an insult? Who coined it? — bongo fury

Since the Greeks? — Joshs

Speculative dialectics deservedly got a bad rep when... — Joshs

wasn't part of an insult? — bongo fury

As far as its speculative role, this term became fashionable after Hegel.
— Joshs

Ah! Interesting, :party: thanks. Any examples? — bongo fury

The ‘meta’ is the formal synthetic framework which organizes the understanding of ‘physis’ (nature). — Joshs

It need make no claims for a particular content of science being settled or unsettled. — Joshs

As far as its speculative role, this term became fashionable after Hegel. — Joshs

His dialectic was interpreted as explaining the movement of natural and cultural history without recourse to empirical evidence. — Joshs

If I sort some pebbles by size, and put big ones here and little ones there I am imposing a pattern. — unenlightened

the idea that the whole movement foundered because of an obvious logical inconsistency is just bizarre — Nagase

Now, laughing friends deride
Tears, I cannot hide
Oh-oh-oh-oh
So, I smile and say
"When a lovely flame dies
Smoke gets in your eyes"

Because to recognise a pattern is to simplify, — unenlightened

This short 10min video is a great primer in systems thinking, — Pop

and it answers why entropy is not enough. — Pop

As well as being a term that strictly speaking says all sorts of interesting things that - in the present context which is physics - can and should be stated perfectly well in terms of entropy. — bongo fury

The black hole information paradox is where my interest in it started. — frank

As you have probably noticed, I didn’t say anything about information. That’s because really the reference to information in “black hole information loss” is entirely unnecessary and just causes confusion. The problem of black hole “information loss” really has nothing to do with just exactly what you mean by information. It’s just a term that loosely speaking says you can’t tell from the final state what was the exact initial state. — Sabine Hossenfelder

entropy is the _number_ of microstates available to explore. — Kenosha Kid

The actual microstate occupied by a system would be the totality of its information, — Kenosha Kid

and is not specified by the system's entropy. — Kenosha Kid

in physics — bongo fury

Not something I've heard said, — Kenosha Kid

but I guess any microstate is a unique collection of information. — Kenosha Kid

What is information? — Pop

A common failing in scientific philosophical writing is to blur the line between nouns and verbs. Through a process called nominalization, we morph verbs (and sometimes adjectives) into abstract nouns. This process robs our writing of energy and clarity. — Crystal Herron, blog

horses for courses — bongo fury

• All polyhedra are Eulerian
• x is a polyhedron
• x isn't Eulerian

To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality — G Russell

• All natural discourse makes conjunction introduction intuitive
• SOLO is convincing as natural discourse
• SOLO makes conjunction introduction unintuitive

If you think that properties are collections then reality consists only of collections, which are concrete things, because properties as abstract things that have instances don't exist. — litewave

The nominalist cancels out the property and treats the predicate as bearing a one-many relation directly to the several things it applies to or denotes. — Goodman, p49

If what matters most according to the correspondence theory of truth, is the accurate portrayal of a particular or general 'state of affairs' - through language - of reality, — Shawn

and therefore what can be platonically described as the mind's eye — Shawn

From a retired mathematician who still dabbles with it, — jgill

That sequence of electronic dots has a kind of "physical" existence but is still in a way non-physical. How does this fit into the current discussion? — jgill

But what all those people (Quine, Williamson, Preist, Kleene...) have in common is they think there's one logic, and, the one they like, that's the one. — 2:10

[1] Tell me, do you think that a language game that assumes no logical law whatsoever deserves to be called a logic?

[2] Perhaps not, but it's moot, because either it or a game with precisely one such law will definitely be a very weakest logic. Granted, 'weak logic' has the flavour of an oxymoron, but its instances clearly have at least mathematical interest, and might include also certain poetry, music, mime etc. What's the big deal?

[1] Ah, but the trouble is, I'm assuming that: to be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality. You say 'horses for courses' so you probably don't agree?

[2] Relative to the totality of courses, guilty as charged. Only an absolutist, who didn't appreciate that truth is relative to a discourse, would agree. But on a course, in a discourse, which is good enough, a principle will indeed hold in complete generality if I call it logical. That's what I mean by logical: completely general (within the discourse) in governing inference from one statement to another.

reminiscences, — Fine Doubter

Meaning the experience is an event taking place in the perceiver, while the tomato is an object with potentially some property related to the perceiver seeing red. — Marchesk

the red we see, — Marchesk

to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to some distinctively philosophical tools that are useful in tackling the problem of color realism and, second, to clarify the various positions and central arguments in the debate.

When someone looks at a tomato in good light, she undergoes a visual experience. This experience is an event, like an explosion or a thunderstorm: it begins at one time and ends at a later time. The object of the experience is the tomato, which is not an event (tomatoes don't occur).

I think Chomsky avers (somewhere on youtube) that Hume and Heraclitus were privy to the same insight [the inscrutability of reference]. Of course he draws a different lesson from it than Quine. But he doesn't say the doctrine itself is mistaken, or even that it is behaviouristic. And it isn't. It points out that you can't objectively ground reference in behaviour. — bongo fury

In psychology one may or may not be a behaviourist, but in linguistics one has no choice … There is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behaviour in observable circumstances. — Quine, Pursuit of Truth

Given Quine's own formulation of his theses, it appears open to a non-behaviorist to regard his arguments, if he accepts them, as demonstrations that any behavioristic account of meaning must be inadequate - it cannot even distinguish between a word meaning rabbit and one meaning rabbit-stage. — Kripke p57

But if Wittgenstein is right, and no amount of access to my mind can reveal whether I mean plus or quus, may the same not hold for rabbit and rabbit-stage? So perhaps Quine's problem arises for non-behaviorists. This is not the place to explore the matter. — Kripke p57

• of composition,

• of views.