• A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    ↪RussellA


    So, yes?
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    Feelings are different to thoughts. Feelings are not propositional, thoughts are propositional. — RussellA

    Are feelings to thoughts as words are to propositions (and things are to facts)?

    (For you?)

    Just trying to square this with,

    the individual notes and combinations of notes in music express feelings not thoughts. — RussellA
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    There would be no public language if there were no private thoughts. — RussellA

    Interesting theory.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    But as Wittgenstein is identifying thought as proposition, in talking about propositions, he is also talking about thoughts. — RussellA

    Loosely (indirectly, residually) of course, but he (like the grade school teacher) isn't heading towards your kind of diagram, in which thoughts or any other mental units combine or map as discrete units (in the manner of word or picture tokens). Is my point.

    He's getting out of the head, into the language.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    ↪RussellA


    My comment was very broad brush, so I wouldn't be surprised to have chapter and verse thrown against it. But the only line there that I can see addressing my comment is

    4 The thought is the significant proposition — RussellA

    But I'm suggesting that, like the grade school teacher, W wants to talk in technical terms (worthy of a diagram) about the propositions and their reference, not so much about thoughts as such: as items in their own right.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    "...the actual colour that I experience in my mind, which could be green for me and yellow for you" is incoherent. — Banno

    How do you mean incoherent? Because of a homunculean regress? Or because inescapably private? Or somehow else?

    Or is "incoherent" not the criticism? "Fantastical", maybe?



    It might be helpful at this point to again look at one of the great themes, perhaps the main theme, running through all Wittgenstein's work. It's the distinction between what can be said and what can be shown. The notion permeates his work. — Banno

    But does it distinguish, simply, between literal, declarative statements and other kinds of symbol use (words, music or pictures), as it does for Goodman?

    Or does it, for W or you, have to do with the isomorphism business? (I often wonder.)



    In the Tractatus, a name is the thing it denotes. — Banno

    Is this a typo? If not, then oh dear.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    One respect in which I think it fair to say that the Tractatus anticipates the PI is in arguing in terms of "thought" in such a way as to facilitate behaviourism, as opposed to the kind of psychology indulged here -
    ↪RussellA


    W's use of "thought" reminds me of how teachers in the UK tell 3rd-graders to recognise a complete sentence: as one that expresses "a complete thought". I.e. what it reminds me of is how to use but immediately get past the psychology, and to work with language and logic instead.

    Like the teacher, he probably didn't mean "thoughts" to refer to identifiable brain events that correspond or fail to correspond to propositions. It was more a matter of putting the reference of symbols in the perfectly realistic context of our deliberate efforts to make sense of them.




    The proposition "Rembrandt is a painter" is a description of Rembrandt as a painter. By seeing a picture of a Rembrandt painting, which is isomorphic with the person Rembrandt, we gain an acquaintance with Rembrandt. — RussellA

    Does W say "acquaintance"? Or is this you critiquing him?

    And do you not think that W claims that the proposition "Rembrandt is a painter" is isomorphic to the fact of Rembrandt being a painter?
  • Is there an external material world ?
    No, classifying is descriptive. It's part of the language game. — Marchesk

    So is seeing-as. It's reaching for suitable words and pictures.

    Part of the confusion over the hard problem is failing to understand the difference between describing the world and experiencing it. — Marchesk

    Well put. The difference is artificial, like the problem.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    What does it mean to see differently other than to see different things? — Michael

    It means to classify the same things differently.

    To see different things is to carve it all differently.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    Because it seems to me that when we say that one person sees something as red and another as blue that the words "red" and "blue" are referring to the particular qualities of their individual experiences. That's colour as everyone ordinarily understands it. — Michael

    How isn't it a Cartesian theatre understanding?
  • Is there an external material world ?
    I saw this image recently: — Michael

    In a Cartesian theatre?
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    ↪Fooloso4

    I wish... I had a pair of bongos.


    As I understand it, as they are used here those symbols denote any two elemental objects. — Fooloso4

    Any two, or any two that are related in the fashion specified (by "R")?
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    Single quote marks are also sometimes used in academic writing, though this isn’t considered a rule. — Fooloso4

    Sure, but also they can be 'scare' quotes:

    Specialist terms that are unique to a subject are often enclosed in single quotation marks in both U.S. and British English. — Fooloso4

    So in a thread about distinguishing word from object, requests for clarification might be expected.

    Square brackets [ ] should be used. — Fooloso4

    Haha, fair do's.

    There are no "sign objects" — Fooloso4

    But there are sign-objects by other names, e.g. "the picture's elements", "a propositional sign [...] composed of spatial objects", "elements of the propositional sign", "simple signs", etc.

    'a' and 'b' are variables. — Fooloso4

    I expect this could be a right reading. But I'd like to know whether this means, for you or for W, that

    "a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?

    Or something else?     — bongo fury
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    He used the term 'name' in a way that is different from the way we ordinarily use it. — Fooloso4

    Ok. And you prefer single inverted commas, but the reader infers, from your use of the word "term", that you use these single marks as quote marks. We aren't sure why you decline to clarify with doubles, when invited, but never mind.

    Names referred to the simple or elementary objects. — Fooloso4

    If you mean, names were for W those symbols that referred to simple or elementary objects, that doesn't sound any different to ordinary usage of "name" in logic.

    What they are, he never said. — Fooloso4

    Also standard. Interesting, of course, if W is keen to be asked the further question.

    The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation is not a name. — Fooloso4

    Do you mean,

    The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation cannot be named (referred to by a name). — Fooloso4

    ? Or,

    The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so such a relation cannot be a name? — Fooloso4

    ? Or both?

    'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. — Fooloso4

    Do you mean,

    "a" and "b" are not names either but refer to — Fooloso4

    ... any two particular names, according to context?

    Or do you mean, "a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?

    Or something else?
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    'R' is not the name of the relation between 'a' and 'b'. What that relation is is determined by 'a' and 'b'. — Fooloso4

    Do you (agreeing with W) mean,

    "R" is not the name of the relation between a and b. — Fooloso4

    ?

    And then do you (agreeing with W) mean,

    What that relation is is pictured by the relation between "a" and "b". — Fooloso4

    ? Although that doesn't fit with the following sentence, so do you (agreeing with W if you say so, not sure I follow) mean,

    What that relation (between a and b) is is determined by a and b. Simple objects contain within themselves the possibilities of their combinations. — Fooloso4

    ?
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    an abstract counterpart to the whole truth-bearer. Not just a dog that has fleas, but an abstract referent of "that the dog has fleas". Not just a thing, but a fact. — bongo fury

    W's picture theory of meaning is that a particular one of the facts or structural features of a truth-bearer is isomorphic to (is a diagram of) its truth-making counterpart.

    This means that the truth-bearer is of interest as, or as the location of, a fact, not just as a thing. E.g. as the fact that its "a" character is in a certain spatial relation on the page to a "b" character. (3.1432.) Not just as the individual thing, the written or printed sentence token, in which that fact occurs.

    (Or, in this case, the relevant syntactic fact might be a certain spatial relation between the "dog" and "fleas" tokens.)

    The subtlety of the distinction leads W to declare, with some emphasis,

    3.14 The propositional sign is a fact.

    Notice though that this is very far from equating a truth-bearing proposition (or even the propositional sign the fact of whose structure is crucial for the picturing relationship) with the truth-making fact that it thus pictures.
    ...
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    I don't see a point to what you said more than:

    That the dog has fleas is a fact.
    "The dog has fleas" is a sentence.
    That "The dog has fleas" is true is a fact.
    "'The dog has fleas' is true" is a sentence.
    That "'The dog has fleas' is true" is true is a fact.
    ""'The dog has fleas' is true" is true" is a sentence...

    ...and so on.     — Banno

    The point is that, in the terminology of the text in question,

    That the dog has fleas is a fact and not a sentence.
    "The dog has fleas" is a sentence and not a fact.
    That "The dog has fleas" is true is a fact and not a sentence.
    "'The dog has fleas' is true" is a sentence and not a fact.
    That "'The dog has fleas' is true" is true is a fact and not a sentence.
    ""'The dog has fleas' is true" is true" is a sentence...

    Hence (but not otherwise),

    no contradiction so far in the text. — bongo fury



    Objects need not be (material) things. The exact use of "name" and "object" is contentious. — Banno

    Sure, but irrelevant thus far, for W in the text in question:

    objects (entities, things) — W



    And so a true proposition is a fact
    — Banno

    True propositions mirror or picture facts, they are not facts in themselves. This is explained in W. picture theory of meaning.     — Sam26
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    ↪Janus
    :ok:
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    "Fact" is used variously to refer to true propositions and states of affairs. — Janus

    In everyday usage, sure. But W seems clear enough here that he means "combinations of things". As opposed to individual things, and as opposed to any sentences or pictures describing or depicting them. Truth-makers not truth-bearers.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    So facts are not true propositions? — Banno

    In the text in question, indeed not. They are what true propositions picture.

    That "the dog has fleas" is true, is not a fact? — Banno

    The situation you there picture may be a fact. (For W in the text in question.) But the picture itself - the sentence - i.e. " 'the dog has fleas' is true" is merely a proposition. Just as is "the dog has fleas". (For W in the text in question.)
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    for Wittgenstein the objects and their associated properties form a thought, and hence a picture; fact — Banno
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    The facts are those propositions which — Banno

    No, not in the text in question.

    whether a proposition is true or false depends on whether it correctly pictures a fact. — Sam26

    Yes.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    When we agree on new uses for a term we are essentially creating a new context with which we use the term. — Harry Hindu

    Sure. Cherry-picking cases of past usage that help to sell our new theory.

    Weren't Newton & co. rather cheekily re-purposing psychological words like force ("courage, fortitude"), inertia ("unskillfulness, ignorance"), moment ("importance")? — bongo fury
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    So that the fact "a is f" is written f(a). — Banno

    Perhaps you mean,

    So that the fact that a is f is written "f(a)". — Banno



    , if "my dog has fleas" obtains in the world, then my dog has fleas is a fact. — RussellA

    Perhaps you mean,

    , if it happens in the world that my dog has fleas, then "my dog has fleas" is a fact. — RussellA

    (in the sense of true sentence).

    Or perhaps you mean,

    , if "my dog has fleas" is a true sentence, then it happens in the world that my dog has fleas. — RussellA

    I don't claim you won't find plenty of similar mishandling of quotation marks in my posts. But the topic here is whether we need to care.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    Does “fact” refer to the true proposition, the true sentence, which states that my dog has fleas? Yes. — Banno

    In a lot of usage, sure.

    But W seems clear enough here, in the text in question, that he would say no, he means "combinations of things". Their manners of combination, if you like. The ways they are, and inter-relate.

    As opposed to individual things, such as flea-ridden dogs, and true sentences. And as opposed to any sentences or pictures truly describing or depicting the things, which are of course themselves individual things. Such as, "my dog has fleas" (a sentence thing happening to describe a flea-ridden dog thing) or " 'my dog has fleas' is true" (a sentence thing happening to describe a true sentence thing). These are all things, not facts, according to the text in question.

    If not these, then what? What are facts in the Tractatus? Well, specifically: they are what people tend to mean by "truth-maker" when they oppose that term to "truth-bearer". They tend to think there must be an abstract thing corresponding to the whole true sentence (truth-bearer) just as there is (typically) an individual thing named by a noun in the sentence. It's my impression, anyway, that this is what those people tend to mean, and that they follow Russell and early W in conceiving of an abstract counterpart to the whole truth-bearer. Not just a dog that has fleas, but an abstract referent of "that the dog has fleas". Not just a thing, but a fact.

    Of course, plenty of philosophers of language, later W included, would rather do without the abstract counterpart. But the text in question is clearly doing with.
  • A Newbie Questions about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
    There seems to be an equivocation on the word “fact.” — Art48

    In everyday usage, sure. But W seems clear enough here that he means "combinations of things". As opposed to individual things, and as opposed to any sentences or pictures describing or depicting them. Truth-makers not truth-bearers.

    which contradicts 1.1. — Art48

    Only if you can't resist applying "fact" either to truth-bearers or to individual things. But no contradiction so far in the text.

    Cool thread :clap:
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    According to the knowability principle, a statement is true if it can be known to be true, — Michael

    Is "if" in the wrong place, or does it just need an "only"?
  • Is there an external material world ?
    If the proposition "it is raining" does not exist then it is not raining. — Michael

    Time again. There were dinosaurs and it was raining, but there were no (propositional) utterances there and then.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    what a proposition/truth-bearer is. Is it a physical entity? Is it a mental concept? Is it a Platonic Idea? Is it some magical substance that is able to "attach" to concrete utterances? — Michael

    The latter, but not magic... more like money.

    Logic is licence to print (utter) valid tokens.

    And to invalidate/falsify/exclude/delete/negate their negations.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    (1) Some affirmations of any true statement are justified.

    (2) Some future affirmations of any true statement not previously affirmed justifiably are justified.

    (3) ...................................................

    (4) Some previous affirmations of any true statement not previously affirmed justifiably are justified.


    Modalities excised (or easily so). Missing line exposed.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    ↪Banno


    Hocus pocus.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    makes it clear that the move from "knowable" to "Known" is modal. — Banno

    Yes but modality is obscure. Give us the Venn diagram.

    (1) All true statements might be known — Banno

    Or maybe

    (1) Some judgements of true statements are knowledge.

    ??
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    All true statements are knowable. (1)
    All unknown true statements are knowable. (2, from 1)
    .......................................................................... (3)
    All unknown true statements are known. (4)
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    They are just difficult — Banno

    They were conceived in sin.
  • Fitch's "paradox" of knowability
    many arguments are clearer when presented formally. — Banno

    But far fewer when the formalism is modal.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    ↪Michael


    Ah but then your usage of "sensations" implies picture-type qualities inside. Mine didn't.

    I meant, brain activity is acts of perception.

    But still yes: brain activity isn't and doesn't produce sensations in your sense.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    Are you saying that we don't have qualitative experiences? — Michael

    Yes if that means having pictures (or qualities) inside as well as outside.

    No if it means experiencing changes in perceptual readiness, i.e. learning.

    That brain activity doesn't produce sensations? — Michael

    Yes. What's wrong with: brain activity is sensations?
  • Is there an external material world ?
    the what we see in the second sense — Michael

    is the myth, the internal picture that doesn't happen.

    What happens is a readiness to order and classify and predict, along any number of respects or dimensions.

    Does that apple have the colour we see it to have — Michael

    Does it belong where we are inclined to place it in our colour scheme?

    Sure, that's not a reasonable (direct) question, but neither is (the indirect one), does that apple belong on the same rung of our colour scheme as our sensation of the apple?
  • Is there an external material world ?
    Not everyone can do that. The inability is called aphantasia. — Tate

    Not everyone can distinguish fact from fiction. But that inability is quite normal. In perception, it manifests as the mental image myth. (Leading to the binding problem.)

    If I see a rock through a TV screen then I'm seeing a rock, but I'm seeing it indirectly. — Michael

    The trouble is, 'indirect' is too suggestive of two or more 'directs'. Would it help to say 'non-direct'?

    Someone contesting indirect realism doesn't necessarily want to claim that knowledge about the rock flows specifically from the rock to the person. It might result rather from the vast network of interactions and interpretations in the background.

    Someone contesting direct realism doesn't necessarily want to claim that knowledge about the rock flows specifically from rock to TV screen to person. It might result rather from the vast network of interactions and interpretations in the background.

    aphantasia

    Didn't they have a hit with "John Wayne is big leggy"?
  • Is there an external material world ?
    they come from your imagination. — Marchesk

    So they are fictional, like characters in a fictional story? They don't literally exist?

    Good. But likewise, also, arguably, the so-called images alleged to occur when you are fully (rather than preparing or rehearsing for) using your eyes.
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