Interesting post, a different direction. For exegetic purposes, Russell, and hence Wittgenstein, where reacting against Bradley. I think you may have hit on the core problem of the Tractatus, but coming at it, as it where, from behind. I suggest the solution is found, again, in Philosophical Investigations §201, that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not found in expressing or analysing the rule but in implementing it, in the doing, in the use.I have never come across a persuasive argument that external relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, and am persuaded, in particular, by F H Bradley's regress argument against external relations. — RussellA
If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside! The honorable thing to do is put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the rest.
— Wittgenstein Culture and Value
'R' is not the name of the relation between 'a' and 'b'. What that relation is is determined by 'a' and 'b'. — Fooloso4
"R" is not the name of the relation between a and b. — Fooloso4
What that relation is is pictured by the relation between "a" and "b". — Fooloso4
What that relation (between a and b) is is determined by a and b. Simple objects contain within themselves the possibilities of their combinations. — Fooloso4
This sounds incredibly arrogant. — Tate
2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.
2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.
In the Tractatus, objects are only understood in terms of their relations to each other; we talk about, and hence understand, objects only indirectly via their relations. Fooloso4 seems to disagree with this, but that runs against the text of the Tractatus. — Banno
Sure, all that. It's not clear to me what you are saying, or even if you are agreeing or disagreeing with the suggestion I made. — Banno
... while for Wittgenstein the simples are states of affairs. — Banno
I suggest the solution is found, again, in Philosophical Investigations — Banno
I don't think relations "reside" somewhere. They're properties, aren't they? The apple's property of redness doesn't have a location. If the apple is red, that's a fact. It's a true proposition. It's an abstract object. Abstract objects are not residents of time and space. They don't move or age. — Tate
From 6.3 onwards he discusses Newtonian mechanics and physical laws, — RussellA
The world is independent of my will." — RussellA
He used the term 'name' in a way that is different from the way we ordinarily use it. — Fooloso4
Names referred to the simple or elementary objects. — Fooloso4
What they are, he never said. — Fooloso4
The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation is not a name. — Fooloso4
The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation cannot be named (referred to by a name). — Fooloso4
The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so such a relation cannot be a name? — Fooloso4
'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. — Fooloso4
"a" and "b" are not names either but refer to — Fooloso4
Relations are not of necessity properties
I can say "there is a relation between my pen and the Eiffel Tower", but this does not mean the relation between my pen and the Eiffel Tower is a property. — RussellA
If the world is an abstract object, it would be independent of my will and mind, but still not a physical thing. — Tate
It seems that Wittgenstein conceived philosophy to be an activity rather than a belief. — RussellA
Ok. And you prefer single inverted commas, but the reader infers, from your use of the word "term", that you use these single marks as quote marks. We aren't sure why you decline to clarify with doubles, when invited, but never mind. — bongo fury
https://grammar.yourdictionary.com/punctuation/rules-for-using-single-quotation-marks.htmlSingle quote marks are also sometimes used in academic writing, though this isn’t considered a rule. Specialist terms that are unique to a subject are often enclosed in single quotation marks in both U.S. and British English. This is very common in specific disciplines, particularly philosophy or theology.
If you mean, names were for W those symbols that referred to simple or elementary objects, that doesn't sound any different to ordinary usage of "name" in logic. — bongo fury
2.02 Objects are simple.
3.22 In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.
3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.
The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so a relation cannot be a name? — Fooloso4
Do you mean,
The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation cannot be named (referred to by a name).
— Fooloso4
? Or,
The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so a relation cannot be a name?
— Fooloso4 — bongo fury
3.221 Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives.
Do you mean,
"a" and "b" are not names either but refer to
— Fooloso4
... any two particular names, according to context?
Or do you mean, "a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?
Or something else? — bongo fury
'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. — Fooloso4
Single quote marks are also sometimes used in academic writing, though this isn’t considered a rule. — Fooloso4
Specialist terms that are unique to a subject are often enclosed in single quotation marks in both U.S. and British English. — Fooloso4
Square brackets [ ] should be used. — Fooloso4
There are no "sign objects" — Fooloso4
'a' and 'b' are variables. — Fooloso4
"a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?
Or something else? — bongo fury
I expect this could be a right reading. But I'd like to know whether this means, for you or for W, that
"a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation? — bongo fury
...just what those relations are is left unsaid and cannot be said unless we know what the simple objects are. — Fooloso4
That seems to be beside the point. — Banno
2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori.
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