Are you upholding the analytic/synthetic distinction here? — Joshs

I'm acknowledging it, not sure what you mean by upholding it? And yes, I do think that standards of rationality vary both historically and culturally. Unless you want to proclaim some kind of transcendental standard, but then I'm not sure that would accurately represent the typical meaning of rationality.

But, if you want, let me know your sense of the difference between reason and rationality and also syntheticity and analyticity and perhaps I can give a competent response. — Bylaw

To the extent that synthesis means linking together what is apparently unconnected it is consistent with the function of intuition for sure. The ordinary language use of reason captures my sense of it. Reason the noun is a faculty. But reasoning the verb also characterizes the thinking people use every day to solve challenges of every kind, from the most mundane to the most exotic. Rationalizing or rationalization, as was discussed, is more of a forcing of something to fit into a formalized schema, with the implication that the rationalization may not be accurate in some way. Rationalization has something of the procrustean about it. Whereas reason is more organic and practical.

So, most people will reject the conclusion of an argument if they dislike it, or if it conflicts with the body of beliefs they already hold, or if they think it would be immoral to believe such a conclusion, or if they find it an ugly belief to hold. And they will do that regardless of how good the argument is.

Note: the perfectly rational person is not necessarily going to be the perfect philosopher. For there may be truths about reality that we do not have overall reason to believe. The ideally rational person recognizes what they have overall reason to believe and believes it. That we have epistemic reason to believe x does not entail that we have overall reason to believe it.

So, the dedicated philosopher may not be perfectly rational — Bartricks

But standards of rationality change. Slavery was an accepted institution in ancient Greece. The slave Epictetus was a Stoic, which makes sense. But then so was Marcus Aurelius. So rejection of an argument at a social level could be the institution of a new rational standard.

Yes. Another thought is that when reasoning, there are moments of 'microintuitions'. They can be all sorts of things - moments of feeling into semantics, the 'I have checked that enough' qualia, 'it feels like some step is missing here' qualia, tiny thought experiments where one circles around a step in reasoning, quick dashes into memory looking for counterevidence and so on. All these little tweaks and checks. — Bylaw

Could this be described as alternating phases of syntheticity and analyticity? Analytic thinking seems to fit the bill as a kind of framework of rationality. Whereas syntheticity, which in its very nature involves leaps, seems better described as a process of reason.

We tend to fetishise reason as a sort of transcendental virtue. And while I think reason is non-negotiable for civilised discourse, it may also be used to achieve lamentable outcomes. — Tom Storm

And this is another aspect I think. Reason is also social and dialogic/dialectical in nature. Even when we think, we reason internally as an internal discussion.

No human being is purely one type or another, can make all their decisions according the same mode of thought, and everything they do decide is situation-dependent. So, all decisions are likely to be some mixture of rational, ethical, instinctive, emotional and coerced. — Vera Mont

I think so too. And tradition-authority influenced.

And do you think, for example, that these reason-orientations would tend to produce different orientations toward various philosophical topics, so some people might naturally lean towards particular types of solutions, others others? Then many of our antinomies could be objectifications of these different rational-types.

I'm only surprised no one has yet used the phrase "instrumental rationality," which could be defined something like, the rational selection of a course of action to achieve a given goal -- the kicker being that this means any goal, however arbitrary. Sometimes "reasonableness" is contrasted specifically with instrumental rationality in submitting to judgment also the worthwhileness of the goal and the acceptability of the means of achieving it, so a broader decision-making process. — Srap Tasmaner

I think instrumental rationality aligns closely with something I mentioned, which was situational awareness. Vera mentioned how one can think instrumentally, but within a misguided or delusive framework.

Can you briefly summarize these. That may be an unreasonable, although not irrational, request. — T Clark

It concerns the distinction between deductive nomological events which have "explanations" (are cases of laws taking place in specifiable contexts) versus the meaningfulness of human events, which can be interpreted in contexts, which are themselves meaningful (the hermeneutic circle). Mechanical causality versus freedom is another dimension of this inquiry. I wasn't citing it so much for content as an example of how disparate concepts can complement and exclude and participate in a mutual inter-definition.

I think that ambiguity is the reason I never took on the task of clarifying the distinction. There's just too much room for pointless disagreement descending into "sez you." People have a lot invested in what is considered reasonable or rational and what is not. — T Clark

I think the terrain can be mapped. I'm reading Understanding and Explanation; in exploring the contention between the scientistic and hermeutic approaches to understanding and intentionality Apel comments several times how the approaches mutually exclude to the extent that they complement. I think that the "key players" in this debate likewise all play their parts and can be profitably explored through example usages (if not reduced to simplistic definitions).

By "top level descriptor" do you mean a category at the same level as reason or rationality? Or what? — T Clark

Yes, trying to capture some kind of paradigm descriptor of thought in its purest or ideal form. I believe there are elements of logic, ethics, awareness, rationality. Reason.

Also, I don't think thinking is strategic. I'm not even sure what that means. Certainly a lot of our thinking is not goal oriented. — T Clark

I was thinking of a criminal. Who can have high situational-awareness and make complex plans. But is that sufficient to rationality?

This is how I, tentatively, see it - The discussion of anything can be rational, logical; but premises are not necessarily rational. I'd go further and say premises are generally not rational, which isn't to say they are irrational. Most of our thinking is not rational. We grasp most things without tracing our knowledge back to a source. Rationality comes into play when we have to go back and justify what we've proposed.

One way I think of reason as different from rationality, although I'm not sure it is legitimate, is in terms of broader values. Rationality is a hammer. Reason takes into account issues beyond the bare facts, e.g. clarity, civility, contemplation, cooperation. Again, that's my idiosyncratic way of looking at it. — T Clark

This tracks with me. I was continuing my inter-evaluation with ethics (which I think is another top-level descriptor). What if ethics is just the projection of one's relative degree of empathy in any given situation? Then ethics is just rationalization. To rationalize is to confine something to a mental schema (rationality is a hammer, as you put it). To reason is to solve a problem. Ethics is reasonable. And it is reasonable to be ethical. Butt may not be rational, if there is self-sacrifice is required.

I think that reason is probably the best umbrella term, if there is one.

Is ethics rational? Or is it just rational to be ethical?

The question could have been couched in more general terms. I would say the question is, Do some technologies have negative impacts on society at large? The answer to this question is yes. In which case those technologies need to be regulated. And yes the case you put is a good example.

Introduction to Systems Theory
by Niklas Luhmann

Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective
by Karl-Otto Apel

edit: @180 Proof
I see you are very familiar with this work. Not too many references to Apel on TPF either.

So this was how you argued in a democratic and legalistic civic setting. — apokrisis

This is similar to the modern concept of deliberative democracy which looks at the origins and types of legitimation, public reason, the duty of civility, principles of justice, etc. I do think the role of philosophy in the social or public good is essential.

The consensus seems to be that, whatever the philosophical project is, it ranges from informed speculation on the nature of external reality to the cultivated awareness of the nature of consciousness, and the communication (and communicability) of the information thereof.

It seems to me personally that ingesting scientific and philosophical writings is like self-programming for an open-ended task. So I'm abstractly conceptualizing this as something like the self-programming of an emergent AI, i.e. consciousness programming itself as it self-instantiates objectively (materializes). Probably not coincidentally, this aligns conceptually with the Fichte I'm reading now.

Or something along those lines....

Existential Anthropology: Events, Exigencies, and Effects
by Michael D. Jackson

↪Pantagruel and all, for better or worse, philosophy includes the philosopher improving. That's the part of the nature of philosophy that is lost if philosophy is just speculative physics. — Banno

I consider myself a natural meliorist - make of that what you will. ;)

Managing and balancing the consumption of meat based upon the awareness and understanding of the constraints of a healthy biosphere seems like a more reasonable place to start. Eating other creatures is one natural method of caloric intake. Hewing down forests to overpopulate the world with herds of cattle is another thing altogether. Clearly, globally, we do consume way too much meat.

What would a philosophy of reading or cooking look like? I would suggest that it would take something everyday and seek to place it within a more abstracted view of being.

In general, it would be the meta-view.

So that for me is the meaning of metaphysics. — apokrisis

:100:

Precisely. It is really just a matter of perspective.

My feeling is that some people object to this because they are already locked into a specific metaphysical position which they hold "dogmatically" - as Fichte puts it.

For instance, about your "Philosophy Project". A description of which, BTW, never came, although I asked for it 3 times. So I have to conclude --and I'm sorry for that-- that you don't know yourself. — Alkis Piskas

In fact I did answer it honestly and specifically. Maybe you should check your own expectations and presuppositions as they seem to be affecting your eyesight.

"But "the philosophical project" isn't something you can neatly pin down. I use it in the context of this inquiry (and in the context of a well-rounded knowledge philosophy in general) to designate the place of philosophy in my own life, which is committed to the pursuit of knowledge, at least to a significant degree."

Peace and bye.

Besides, I can't see how does all this apply to our subject. Which, we must not forget, talks about the "Philosophical Project", and which is something that remains still unexplained — Alkis Piskas

With all due respect, you are a little bit hung up on finding citations for terminology. I don't mean to be unkind, maybe it is because English is not your first language, or because you are new to the field. Yes, some terms have broadly accepted definitions (although their actual scope of application may vary widely) such as "epistemology," and especially "metaphysics". But "the philosophical project" isn't something you can neatly pin down. I use it in the context of this inquiry (and in the context of a well-rounded knowledge philosophy in general) to designate the place of philosophy in my own life, which is committed to the pursuit of knowledge, at least to a significant degree.

I realize the field of philosophy can seem vast (indeed it is), and you have to start somewhere. But I really don't feel you can read a five page online precis of a five-hundred page book and claim to have a real understanding. Anymore than you can read a one page (or one paragraph) precis about the field of metaphysics, which consists of thousands of works, and believe you have authoritative knowledge.

So life is conscious, all else is not. Based on what evidence? Plants? Amoebas? Bacteria? What besides personal prejudice proves consciousness?

Machines require sustenance (fuel). Machines can be designed to move towards light. Etc. — Real Gone Cat

Consciousness is a feature of a system that exists in a cybernetic feedback loop with its environment. This entails, among other things, self-direction and self-maintenance, minimally. When a robot can tell me not to turn it off and wanders off in search of tastier power sources, then we'll talk.

FWIW I have long believed that experiments should be conducted in this light, building machines capable of self-direction, self-modification, and self-replication. If there is any possibility of AI being realized, this is it. Of course, it is risky, for all the obvious reasons. Plus, if consciousness were to emerge as a result of our having 'set the stage,' so to speak, it isn't clear that we would have really created AI, but only facilitated it. In which case we wouldn't be any closer to actually solving the riddle of consciousness.

Well, I referred to your saying "I try to cover as much ground as humanly possible, philosophy, science, anthropology, sociology, political theory. To what end?" Why do you try do do all that? Esp. in so many different fields? You cannot get specialized in all of them, can you?

Look what happens to this place (TPF): it accepts all of the above and more. It's a garden cake. It lacks "personality". That's why there's chaos in here. This site should treat only philosophical subjects.
Besides, you mentioned that yourself: you included "philosophy" as a separate field in your list of your fields of interest. This is what TPF should do too. — Alkis Piskas

Yes, but philosophy, likewise, is an overarching field. Every field has its "philosophy" - philosophical anthropology, philosophy of science, etc. Similarly, I personally feel that the subdisciplines of philosophy ultimately accrue to metaphysical questions at the limits of knowledge. That is really the defining characteristic of metaphysics, it verges on the unknown.

No, but thanks for the recommendation.

Montaigne makes an interesting contemporary counterpoint to Rabelais, also full of good things...

Pantagruel might agree with Rabelais, seeing philosophy as serious play. — Banno

Rabelais has long been a favourite of mine.

However doubt presupposes the indubitable, don't you think? — 180 Proof

But could one be mistaken about the indubitable? Doubting is purely subjective, whereas the indubitable is objective. So wouldn't that foist a subjective property onto an objective entity. Unless the indubitable is just a representation.

:chin:

In a pragmatic sense, one has to combat doubt with certainty in order to act.

It seems we agree that metaphysics does not have the special place in philosophy ascribed to it by — Banno

Again, it really all boils down to a definition of metaphysics. Apokrisis sees the metaphysical implications of physics and so do I. Popper advocates metaphysical research programs to guide future scientific research. It seems that some people are prone to interpret the term metaphysics in order to exclude rather than embrace it.

My one liner is that the universe can exist because it is falling into its own heat sink. — apokrisis

:up:

Stability emerges by the suppression of instability. — apokrisis

I concur with everything said, but the emergence of complex adaptive systems (and negentropy in general) is still something of a mystery. I wonder if instability is somehow being captured at the systemic level as a kind of 'power source'?

So, I am asking about how much is certain and uncertain in life experiences and knowledge? — Jack Cummins

We have all met people who make certainty a way of life, sometimes very successfully. The fact that this is possible says something about the nature of the reality which we inhabit.

So, I would like to know whay are you doing all that, which rrequires an enormous and never-ending work. A Sisyphian task! — Alkis Piskas

I guess life itself is a Sisyphian task if you look at it like that....broadly speaking, the relationship between subjectivity, the evolution of understanding, and objectivity. And how that should be construed, as you point out, in the context of life.

But anyway, the is/ought thing is what humans find useful to hold true so as to make explicit the freedoms that are available because the Universe has no reason to care. But at the metaphysical level, or at least the natural philosophy branch of metaphysics, we engage with the finality that the Universe actually does embody. — apokrisis

I find your descriptions apt, but your characterization of freedom as that about which the universe does not care confuses me. Couldn't these localized expressions of freedom be part of the universal telos? Also, contexts (of freedom and law) are themselves the products of other contexts, in a nested-hierarchical fashion. It seems that freedom is something that emerges and is defined (ie. law-constrained freedom or practical freedom) through this emergent-evolutionary process.

What must reason exclude from conceiving reality as such – what is necessarily not real? — 180 Proof

The ideal as a goal is in a sense not-real though, isn't it? Fichte has an interesting approach, contrasting the "being" of the extant with the "becoming" which is characteristic of the self-positing I.

And to be able to think about reality in that fashion surely takes metaphysics to new places. — apokrisis

And if you are able to think about physics in that fashion then I surely agree.

But besides that, what's the point of metaphysics if it doesn't make a difference to what you do? Metaphysics is in the end only a tool for doing ethics. — Banno

Similarly, I feel that my pursuit of abstract ideals resonates with my actual behaviours, and vice versa. — Pantagruel

I'm pretty sure this is exactly what I just said.

I assume by illformed you meant not how you would say it. No need to be ill-mannered. ;)