Superman is a well-known comic-book character, but everyone knows that he is a fictional character and so not a real person. — Ludwig V

Curious if you disagree with this: In commonsense language, then, Superman, the comic-book character, exists (in our culture) but is not real.

This since no one individual umwelt can of itself be omniscient as regards all aspects of reality in general. — javra

Perhaps so. But each umwelt is a part of the same reality in general, isn't it? — Ludwig V

Of course.

These thoughts we, at the very least at present, have no access to and cannot express in words that we ourselves have at our disposal. — javra

Fair enough. Our languages, natural and artificial, are not closed. There is plenty of room for new concepts. I don't see a problem. — Ludwig V

Yea, neither do I.

BTW - isn't the existing theory of quantum physics an example of what you are talking about? Something that is both a wave and a particle? — Ludwig V

No. Just keeping things philosophical.

We as conscious observes, though an aspect of reality at large (for we as conscious observers are indeed actual, hence real), however do not exist, not in this formal means of understanding the term, for we don’t stand out to ourselves, not even conceptually via the concepts that do exist for us. — javra

Well, you are welcome to define a new use for "exists", but if it means that we, - you and I - do not exist, I think you might find it rather difficult to sell. — Ludwig V

That's not what I said, is it? You and I are selves, and selves do stand out ... this to the consciousness embedded in each which, as consciousness, does not. One does not see "consciousness" in the mirror but only one's own physiological self.

Yes, but then a platonic number or form (e.g., the perfect circle, devoid of which there is no pi, devoid of which there is no QM) will all "stand out" to us. Whereas consciousness (via which we apprehend objects of awareness such as the, I'll here say, universal of a perfect circle) does not. Were existence to be synonymous to actuality, as per what you've said of Peirce's interpretation, this discrepancy would not be accounted for.

Do you disagree?

Existence (or Actuality) refers to the primitive dyadic fact of an object reacting against or related to something else. It corresponds to Peirce's category of Secondness (Action/Fact/Brute Force). — Wayfarer

I grant that reality, existence, and being overlap while having different referents. But, finding little to no use for Pierce’s tripartite system of firstness/secondness/thirdness myself, I don’t subscribe to the definitions you’ve provided.

Following common speech and understandings, I deem reality to consist of what is real, with real being synonymous to actual (and with real and actual sharing a common Latin root). And you’re right: when so conceived, actual/real potentials (in contrast to unreal and hence impossible potentials) and the like get very interesting, and at times frustrating, to further enquire into.

Existence, as per its etymology, I then find consists of those aspects of reality which in any way, manner, or form stand out to us as conscious observers: thoughts thereby exist, just as much as rocks do. We as conscious observes, though an aspect of reality at large (for we as conscious observers are indeed actual, hence real), however do not exist, not in this formal means of understanding the term, for we don’t stand out to ourselves, not even conceptually via the concepts that do exist for us. As another example of common speech, think of Tillich's notions regarding the existence of God, such that to affirm the existence of God is to deny the actuality/reality of God. Were existence to be synonymous to actuality, this notion could not be properly conveyed via the terms used.

Being, on the other hand, at core to me specifies all that in any conceivable way “in fact is (and is hence real)” –this to include was and will be, though how so will be contingent on metaphysics adopted. Being, though, gets tricky in certain metaphysics wherein it is not synonymous to reality, this on account of a division between “what in fact is real in an ultimate sense” and “what in fact is illusory in an ultimate sense of reality (e.g., the maya of Indian religions ). Which then chimes with the English understanding of beings being sentience-endowed, unlike anything else which is within reality at large (reality at large consisting of both maya and that which is not maya).

I am curious if you find substantial reason to prefer Peirce's account of "real" and "existing" over those I've just presented, this given common speech understandings of the two terms.

An analogy. Any integer can be named in a finite number of words. Yet a list of all the integers is not finite. Analogicaly, perhaps anything true can be said, but not everything that is true.

(All sorts of implications here, making it an interesting area of logic. Like that we can write down the set of all the integers in a finite set of words - I just did; but by stepping outside the rules for writing down the integers and using sets instead.)

Again, the payoff is that there is always more to be said. — Banno

If I read you right, I can only address the issue by pointing back to newly coined English terms that express complex enough concepts in manners that typically would otherwise require, at minimum, an entire sentence to properly express, and some requiring vast bodies of English language to so do: a meme (noun), copesetic (adjective), and words imported into English from other languages, such as the Germanic “umwelt” and “zeitgeist”. Devoid of at least some of these newly minted English terms, the concepts they convey could not be succinctly conveyed and manipulated within thoughts.

Then, so too will occur for concepts that are out of reach for the human species, as per my most recent reply to J on this thread. Language is reducible to semantics and the signs used to convey and manipulate these. So, I via reasons such as these find grounds to uphold that not everything which is an aspect of “that which is” can be currently said by us humans. Here’s but one example:

Suppose that in ontological fact time is neither linear nor recurring (i.e., circular, as in Nietzsche’s and other’s eternal return) but, instead, is a conflux of both that thereby amounts to neither. Not only would this require volumes to properly express in validly justified coherent manners (philosophically to not mention empirically) but, furthermore, the entire notion could not be pragmatically, succinctly, communicated and manipulated in thoughts devoid of an accordant term for this metaphysical understanding of time … a term which currently cannot be said for it does not yet (to the best of my knowledge) exist.

Now consider a vast spectrum of terms we've never heard of each with its own deep enough conceptual meanings all being stringed together in grammatically correct sentences so as to convey and manipulate concepts. These thoughts we, at the very least at present, have no access to and cannot express in words that we ourselves have at our disposal.

Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. "Stuff we can know as humans" and "all the stuff that can be known" are fine with me instead, as long as the two aren't supposed to mean the same thing. — J

Right. Presuming that the human species doesn’t bring about its own extinction (the pressing of a few red buttons could be sufficient for this to occur), then there’s bound to someday be a future species of life that evolves from that of the human species (no transhumanism required). Such that as regards intelligence relative to this future species we might be just as modern day chimps are relative to us. Their more refined conceptualizations and understandings then being out of reach to the human species not only in practice but also in principle.

Otherwise, there will always be something of reality which dwells beyond our own individually unique umwelt, this just as much as our collectively shared umwelt(s). This since no one individual umwelt can of itself be omniscient as regards all aspects of reality in general.

...and this and the rest is comprehensible - since you are here comprehending it. — Banno

Thanks. I’m glad to hear that what I said was comprehensible, if only to me. :grin: :wink: But then, so too is comprehensible the notion that there is yet more to discover and understand than humanity, and any individual within. has to date discovered and understood. And that some of these yet to be made discoveries and understandings might require new terminology so as to be properly linguistically communicated between us humans. (I’m with on this one.)

That said, what you mentioned about it only being an extension of reality, rather than it being outside of reality, I find very valid.

Consider the ant. Are there thoughts and experiences it cannot, in principle, have? Yes. And the badger? Yes. And the chimp? Yes. So why would this chain stop with humans? What makes us think we have access to all thinkable or sayable thoughts? — J

somewhat off the track here. I’ll try again. If an alien says something that is utterly incomprehensible, what grounds could you have to think it had said something rather than just grunted? — Banno

Assuming the alien got here by traveling faster than the speed of light in some contraption (an impossibility given the physics we know of) there’s some good reason to presume some form of communication might be attempted. In line with how we teach dogs and, to lesser extents, cats to understand us via the things we say. Yes, all they hear are meaningful grunts, but they’re still meaningful to them as far as communication goes.

Then again, what idiot believes him/herself capable of linguistically communicating complex thoughts to lesser beings of comparatively minuscule intelligence? Like, anyone earnestly trying to communicate the laws of physics or the aesthetics of a Rembrandt to an ant, dog, etc., is bound to be missing some marbles (and not the non-human animal for not understanding). Given the greater intelligence of the alien, they might want to communicate complex thoughts to us telepathically, or via some other weird manner, but not in the language they themselves speak. Otherwise, they’d be missing marbles (yes, this is conceivable: we all know that the greater the intelligence, the greater the likelihood and intensities of possible insanity).

Yup, my deep thought of the day.

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“The smiles you’ll give/and the tears you’ll cry/and all you touch/and all you see/is all your life will ever be” -- lyrics from “Breathe” by Pink Floyd

From my dealings with religious/spiritual people, I surmise that the purpose of religion/spirituality is that it's a way to have power over other people and to live a comfortable life, without actually having to work for it or deserve it by virtue of one's high birth.

And of course, there are levels to this, not everyone has the same natural talent for it. — baker

I can very much see your perspective, for, after all, there is no shortage in the world of myriad examples regarding exactly what you say.

To try to be more impartial about the subject, I’ll address non-Western cultures. In Indian religions there are people termed or else considered to be Yogi, practitioners of tantra, a very complex topic on its own but, why I bring this up:

From my learning so far in my life, I’ve seen in documentaries or else read of exemplars that, basically, live off the good-will of the cosmos (more precisely, of Brahman, in Hindu terms): nearly but-naked wanders that pretty much die (without much concern of dying to this world with a soul at peace) in absence of (what in the culture is always spiritually meaningful) handouts of food and drink from individuals in the communities they wander into. In Western understandings, a kind of perpetual beggar that does not in fact beg for anything. These I consider to either be authentic yogi of the East or, at worst, authentic seekers of deeper understanding/knowledge. Basically, they don’t live for egotistic pleasures or interests but for spiritual awakening. And then … drum roll please ... I’ve also seen in documentaries self-labeled “truly enlightened” yogi dressed in as much bling-bling as you can imagine, rich as hell, charging exorbitant amounts of cash to “heal” others’ souls/being/karma/etc … if only the others go through that “leap of faith” in granting the self-labeled “truly enlightened” maestro their property, or their blind obedience, etc. And, given what a yogi is supposed to be, but of course the latter category I then interpret to be pure charlatans that prey on the vulnerabilities of those in need

Even from a perfectly mundane and utterly nonspiritual point of view, it seems rather clear to me in the case I’ve just outlined who the ethical individuals (those at least aiming to be as ethical as possible) are and who are utterly unethical.

And all this can easily become complicated. Suppose, hypothetically, that there are some psychics in the world which are both authentic and ethical (not to be confused with omniscient). Why should they not charge modest amounts of cash for their services (which some claim can be taxing) so as to put bread on the table? And yet, this very assumption in spiritual realms (not necessarily pertaining to any one religion, if any) of course then opens up a netherworld of absolute charlatanry for those who are neither authentic nor ethical.

I, again, have no gripe against your apparent derision of both religions and spirituality in general. IMO, one would have to be blind to not see all the wrongs that get done in their name. And it’s here that I say, to each their/our own convictions on the matter. My own previously mentioned post regarding “a cosmic ultimate telos as ‘the Good’” is, to be forthright, at pith strictly concerned with a rational means of establishing ethical oughts and distinguishing them from those that are not. (Although, as previously mentioned, I find that a forum platform is no place to properly justify it.) And, other than such a telos being incompatible with physicalism as a metaphysical system (and although I myself happen to believe in the possibility of spiritual domains), I quite blatantly can find no reason why spiritual domains and the religions built around them must be in any way adopted within one’s system of beliefs, this even if one maintains the realty of "The Good" as just addressed. For that matter, if "a comic ultimate telos as the Good" happens to not make any sense to you, for my part, I’d only want that you/anyone not entertain the concept via any sort of blind faith. Basically, to preach to the choir, don’t believe things that don’t make sense to you. (So not believing, to me, is an important aspect of virtue.)

I wonder... is there a way [...] that leads the mind toward the best possible conclusion — even if only for now? — GreekSkeptic

Is there a right way to think?

He's among my favorites, so here’s yet one more of his poems:

"Think as I think," said a man,
"Or you are abominably wicked;
You are a toad."

And after I had thought of it,
I said: "I will, then, be a toad." — Stephen Crane

An analysis: Blind obedience to authoritarian others who will vilify you strictly due to your lack of obedient conformity to their authoritarian ego’s whims and mindsets is always unethical, for it can only empower unethical powers in the world. Therefore, if it ever comes up, choose to be vilified on account of the thoughts you yourself deem to be virtuous (authentic, earnest, rational, etc.) rather than conforming to such despotic egos’ wants.

Not that this covers all bases on the matter, but that’s a key way to properly think.

It is normal for me to think of both sides of an argument, not because I want to, but it just happens. — Athena

A very good way of judging the verity of ideas, etc., or so I find.

I can’t find argument with anything you’ve said, and it was a very nicely expressed.

To succinctly add my own perspectives to its contents: What Julian Huxley refers to as the “destiny” of man I for one cannot differentiate from what was previously referred to as the “cosmic (ultimate) telos”. As to Tielhard’s “omega point”, from everything I’ve so far read of it, it appears to hold an understanding of this very same cosmic ultimate telos, clothing the understanding with verbiage of a highly Christian aesthetic (and yet one that does not deny natural selection): “where all life becomes one with Christ” or something to the like. While from previous discussions I presume you’d disagree, to further, this same cosmic ultimate telos can also, in my comprehension, be at pith deemed one and the same with what in Buddhism is termed “Nirvana without remainder” (or else certain Hindu interpretations of Moksha). As I previously mentioned, to me, these being different paths of different cultural and semantic scaffolding, each with its own unique understandings, toward the very same cosmic ultimate telos as absolute good: "The Good". Which also jives with Tillich’s notion of “to affirm God’s existence is to deny the reality of God”—this such that “God” is here not a supreme deity/being but the very ground to being itself whose perfection, again, is the ultimate cosmic telos. Such that this cosmic ultimate telos is either directly or indirectly, to use Aristotelian terms, the unmoved mover of everything within the cosmos. (Nor does the Gnostic esoteric interpretations of Christ that I've so far read appear to contradict any of this, to add one more example.)

I’ll leave this as a roughly expressed food for thought as far as philosophical hypotheses go. (Justifying all this on a forum platform is a bit of a stretch … but I can hardly find any logical inconsistency in all this were the premise of a cosmic ultimate telos to be at least hypothesized as true, such that this cosmic ultimate telos is of itself real: thereby entailing that its reality of itself is then the "is" which establishes all ethical "oughts".)

The relevant word in question is aretē (ἀρετή). — Leontiskos

And yet the word used was "competence" not "virtue" (be it the Ancient Greek term for "virtue" or otherwise).

You're engaged in an equivocation between what is eristic and what is falsely believed to be eristic. — Leontiskos

How do you figure that one. Socrates was condemned to death for ...

Virtue = aretē (ἀρετή). — Leontiskos

Yes, which is, what in philosophical la-la land is termed, begging the question.

This looks like a strawman coming from a contrarian position, and you seem to have been on a contrarian streak of late. — Leontiskos

The deeper point is that indifference to competence or excellence is not a rational position, and only exists in philosophical la-la land. — Leontiskos

You have not addressed the issue other than by now conflating "competence" with "excellence". Which is a red herring.

Competence: 1 (uncountable) The quality or state of being competent, i.e. able or suitable for a general role. 2 (countable) The quality or state of being able or suitable for a particular task; the quality or state of being competent for a particular task or skill.

Excellence is far more ambiguous a term. All the same, the two terms are not synonymous.

Sorta frustrating that I need to explain this, but so be it.

That's just not true. — Leontiskos

Reality? Because no one ever found Socrates's questions eristic, i.e. provoking strife, controversy or discord? Or maybe he didn't engage in "genuine enquiries".

In any case, if you admit that there is an ultimate telos that defines ethics, then you've failed to avoid the notion of competence or excellence, for competence will just be competence in relation to your ultimate ethical telos. — Leontiskos

It was part of the definition I gave:

"competency at being virtuous" — javra

This, in contrast to being competent at performing vices, such as those of perfect crimes.

The objection that is sometimes directed to the Aristotelian position which says, "Why ought I be virtuous rather than vicious?," could be rephrased, "Why ought I be competent rather than incompetent?" Once we move out of philosophical la-la land we see that such questions make little sense. Either they have more to do with eristic than genuine inquiry, or else they rely on a strong distinction between a moral ought and a non-moral ought that the objector refuses to define. — Leontiskos

Just saw that you modified and expanded the paragraph I’ve quoted in my previous post. Assuming no further modifications to your previous post will be made:

In life as lived, many an honest enquiry will be eristic, at least to those who hold inconsistent positions.

As to “refusal to define”, myself, I was never asked, but if I were to be asked, I’d succinctly reply thus: Those oughts which further one’s proximity to the cosmic ultimate telos of perfected and complete eudemonia (one that is not just personal at expense of others, but globally applicable ... such eudemonia being interpretable as the ultimate good in both Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic philosophies) will be oughts that are virtuous and hence ethical (though not necessarily moral … as in slavery being moral in certain societies yet still unethical). On the other hand, those oughts which don’t so further, aren’t virtuous and, hence, aren’t ethical.

The objection to the Aristotelian, "Why ought I be virtuous rather than vicious?," could be rephrased, "Why ought I be competent rather than incompetent?" Once we move out of philosophical la-la land we see that such questions make little sense. — Leontiskos

Back in the la-la land of rational philosophy, many a human is, or can become, quite competent at committing so-called "perfect crimes" where all negative repercussions are evaded, including those of theft, murder, and rape, amongst others.

To most, this then again turns to the issue of "competency at being virtuous" as the standard for ethical conduct--such that crimes, perfect or not, are all deemed unethical irrespective of the competency a human has in committing them.

Our “is” — our biological and cognitive architecture — already entails competences that can be exercised well or poorly.

“Ought” simply names the direction of self-correction toward more adequate realization of those competences. — Wayfarer

In considering this in manners devoid of a “cosmic (ultimate) telos”, how would ethics not reduce to evolutionary processes of natural selection? Something I so far thought you were opposed to.

Hence, as historical facts go, paganism at root was (and yet remains) very tolerant. — javra


Might I suggest that this is an overly rosey picture? — Count Timothy von Icarus

And you could add more vilifying examples to your list. You address a lot of details, yet many details could in turn be presented against Abrahamic cultures. As just one example specific to rapes: Currently, we’re living though a silent crisis of sex slave trafficking in the West, a large portion of which are children, and our current western culture is by and large Abrahamic. Rape by clergy? Epstein and associates? But I doubt this approach might bring about any constructive ending. So I’ll try to keep my argument generalized:

I did say “at root”. What is it of polytheistic religion as a grouping—rather than the people that make use of it for their own political or else egotistic gains—which instills intolerance for different and new religious perspectives? Perfect tolerance, no, granted. But then, in contrast, can it be soberly affirmed that Abrahamic religion does not at its core, at root, maintain intolerance for different and new religious perspectives?

And yet, this view I uphold of itself can well be labeled heretical, if not far worse, by many if not the majority of Christians who "keep the faith", so to speak. I say this form experience. And it's not quite what Jesus Christ had in mind, such as via his parable of the Good Samaritan. — javra


I don't know what you mean here. You don't think that Jesus had in mind that the God of Israel is God and that, say, Jupiter is not? At any rate, "heresy" normally describes false teaching within Christianity (or is applied similarly outside this context). An Arian who denied the divinity of Christ was a heretic, a Hindu cannot be a heretic because they are not advocating for false teachings related to Christianity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What I meant is that if my views regarding the Good are not considered heretical, which they could be as you've defined the term, then they have been labeled demonic, with little ol' me being devil-possessed. And this having zilch to do with either my momentary of lifelong conduct as regards ethics.

:up: Nicely said.

But again, there are literalistic and esoteric ways of understanding. The Gnostics had a completely different way of understanding these things, but they ended up on the wrong side of history - which is, as you know, written by the victors. — Wayfarer

Yea, I very much agree, and find the Gnostic interpretations I've so far read to be far more coherent. Which reminds me: "Turn your other cheek". From what I've gathered from documentaries and such, turns out the Romans had two ways of slapping: with the back of the hand toward inferiors and with the palm toward those deemed of roughly equal worth. Interpreted in this context, to stand in front of a Roman soldier that slaps you as an inferior and turn your other cheek was a horrendously courageous act, in effect telling the armed other "hit my like an equal, not as an inferior". This in keeping with non-violent resistance, in line with that of, for example, Gandhi or MLK. And it makes a hell of a lot more sense than "repeatedly hit me till I die if you want". This being an easy to express alternative interpretation relative to common current culture.

But I wouldn't say the Gnostics were on the wrong side of history. When it comes to history, the fat lady hasn't yet sung, as they say.

Institutionalized religion seems always to become politicized, and hence corrupted, coming to serve power instead of free inquiry and practice. — Janus

:100: And the greater the political power, the greater the likely corruption. It's what checks and balances of power counteracts ... when it's not merely lip-service that gets itself corrupted: Like foxes self-appointed to guard the chicken roost.

While not denying the majority of what you’ve said, the focus on Christianity seems to me to be somewhat shortsighted. I’ll try to succinctly explain why:

The ethos and mores of democratic governance have no historical grounding in Christianity, nor in any Abrahamic religion for that matter, but does have solid grounding in the pagan culture of Athens.

Paganism, be it Greek, Roman, or Egyptian, was to my knowledge always tolerant of differing and novel religions and spiritual practices. This so long as homage was also given to the respective pantheon of the governing body. In contrast, Abrahamic religions, Christianity included, deem all differing and novel religions and spiritual practices as heretical at best, as the beliefs of nonbelievers or "infidels", with labels of “devil worship” or else of “demonic practices” punishable by eternal damnation in Hell not at all uncommon, even in today’s age. Hence, as historical facts go, paganism at root was (and yet remains) very tolerant. Whereas Abrahamic religions at root in no way are. (E.g., there is no recorded history I’m aware of wherein pagan wars were fought on account of whose deities or spiritual beliefs were real or else true. In contrast, Christianity is overflowing with wars justified precisely on these grounds.)

As to pursuit of what can get termed spiritual enlightenment, ancient pagan societies (to be clear, of the West (added because some Christians consider Buddhism and the like to be pagan religions as well, if not outright demonic)) were by comparison to Christianity replete with these—and were never to my knowledge considered heretical, this unlike is the case with Christianity. I’ve mentioned the Oracle at Delphi before, this as one well enough known example. Maybe more poignant, however, are the Eleusinian Mysteries, which lasted from who knows when in antiquity until 392 CE, when they were banned by Christian edicts. I don’t think the significance of the Eleusinian Mysteries, on their own, can be easily overstated. Cicero, an extraordinary intellect who was himself an initiate of the mysteries, for example had this to say about them:

Cicero said of the Mysteries that Athens had given to mankind "nothing finer..., and as they are called an initiation (initia), so indeed do we learn in them the basic principles of life, and from them acquire not only a way of living in happiness but also a way of dying with greater hope" (De legibus, 2.36). — https://digital.library.cornell.edu/collections/eleusis

I'll keep this short.

All that said, as with many another, I value religious tolerance and the separation of church and state. There is no "the true religion" to me; and for those who have faith that their own religion is the only true one out there, I can hardly comprehend how they wouldn't be enamored by an outright theocracy. To be clear, to me, all religions (and at least some forms of atheism to boot) can be viewed as relatively unique paths on a mountain toward it's zenith, with the zenith not being a deity (including any omni-creator deity) but what gets termed as "The Good" (or, more atheistically addressed, "absolute objectivity of awareness/being"). And yet, this view I uphold of itself can well be labeled heretical, if not far worse, by many if not the majority of Christians who "keep the faith", so to speak. I say this form experience. And it's not quite what Jesus Christ had in mind, such as via his parable of the Good Samaritan.

Again, I don't sponsor authoritarian religions. And the institutional religion of Christianity by and large has all the barrings of such ... as in its yearning for theocratic governance (more or less the historic norm of Christendom) rather than for democratic governance and the spiritual tolerance generally required for it.

In a sense, Christianity enabled the enlightenment, by engendering a moral stability. — Punshhh

My point is that Christianity provided the moral framework which enabled the development of Western civilisation. Wayfarer put it better than I could. Can anyone suggest an alternative that would have achieved that, I wonder. — Punshhh

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As a precursor, I hold great admiration for Jesus Christ, but deem Christianity per se to be the most violently hypocritical religion that has so far existed. A long story, but as just one example: A good deal of Christians who hold Christ’s spirit within—thereby revering and honoring Christ’s being (rather than the institutions that followed and their traditions)—are currently imprisoned, this for their opposition in peaceful protests against things such as nuclear proliferation. Maybe needless to add, this imprisonment takes place within a culture that is largely of a Christian-institution ethos. (How many Christians go about "turning their other cheek"? Etc.)
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Was not the Age of Enlightenment directly enabled by the Renaissance, and was not the Renaissance directly resultant of knowledge regarding ancient pagan cultures (arts, philosophies, sciences), which were preserved in the East (namely, in Byzantium and in the Islamic civilization), immigrating its way into Western Europe, this, primarily, following the fall of Constantinople—this via learned Easterners that then desired a better life? (The Crusaders, dating centuries prior, brought back some knowledge from the East, but, last I checked, by no means knowledge of ancient pagan cultures.)

This narrative, which to me so far chimes true to historical reality, would then stipulate that the Enlightenment was indirectly enabled not via the prevalence of Christian institutions but via the rediscovery of ancient pagan art, literature, myriad philosophies, sciences, societal structures (such as that of Athenian democracy), and the like.

As to what would have been of Europe in absence of institutional Christianity, here's one possible alternative: If Cleopatra would have succeeded in converging the Egyptian empire with that of Rome’s … one might have had Renaissance-like thought, art, politics, etc. throughout Europe’s history sans the so-called Dark Ages (which roughly lasted about a millennium or so, a considerable time span).

In sum: For reasons just given, I don’t find any grounds to uphold the validity of the narrative which maintains that the institution of Christianity has been any form of salvation for the West—be this intellectually or ethically. And, to come full circle, I say this while holding a great deal of veneration for Jesus Christ per se (but not for the institutional, trinity-pivoted Christianity which was birthed during the first Council of Nicaea circa 325 CE due to political strife, this for reasons partially aforementioned).

I like many of your perspectives. Still, I want to give emphasis to the following: The resolution to the “meaning crisis” cannot be authoritarian religion (such as institutional Christianity has historically been) if one does not desire a contemporaneous, and likely far more global, “Dark Ages” to ensue. And, in my take so far, viewing Christianity as having in any way been the West’s salvation can only speak in favor of authoritarian religion—whether it’s a readopting of an old one (e.g., Christianity) or else the adopting of a newly created one.

If I was overly harsh in all this, my bad. But I do find all this relevant to the thread’s topic.

BTW, as I've previously mentioned in this thread, as far as resolutions go, my own take is that the resolution should take the form of readily questionable philosophy, and not unquestionable religion.

Well, not today at least. There are times... — Moliere

Yea, OK, In partial keeping with Epicurus and, maybe more, with Lucretius, mahwidge ... a perspective: You willfully enter into a pretty sturdy cage with another, lock the door to the cage, and then throw the key far, far away. Not metaphysically impossible to get back out, but pretty darn close, usually with a lot of scars to boot if you do. Not that this is an issue if only the two end up being far more happy that sorrowful in this cage together for the span of their lives. And, if so, contentedness galore.

A somewhat humongous account to me. But, as with all humor, there's some at least personal truths embedded. It might not be "The One", as you previously commented on, but it better well be "the one for you".

Anyway, I'll try to leave others to further the thread.

But the Epicureans calmly went about doing it anyways as evidenced by the continuity of the texts from Epicurus' time to Cicero and Lucretius. How to explain that? — Moliere

Made me smile a bit. Explanations for this can be a dime a dozen, with many directly contradicting. But, again, as another example, that Christians have historically murdered galore does not make the teachings of their founder such that they allow for, much less condone, murder. (In no way equating marriage to murder, btw. :grin: ) That said, again, my interest here is in what Epicurus himself taught.

BTW, I did a brief online search to reconfirm this: The Ancient Skeptic Cicero was schooled in Epicureanism, yes, but he was nevertheless a strong opponent of it.

It's not like it's easy to summarize these ancient philosophies so they're digestible. — Moliere

OK, I can concede there. Still, improper expressions can all too easily lead to improper interpretations and the misinformation that can then follow. I do like your general rendition of Epicureanism, though.

You're disagreeing with Epicurus, in one sense of with the man himself, and you're disagreeing with 180, in the sense that his rendition is incorrect? — Moliere

Yes, that is correct.

As to the quote you presented, please notice that I did not state that "romantic love always leads to unnecessary pains" or something similar whereby it is "a bad/wrong onto itself", but that it is best shunned because in most cases, aka typically, it does. All this being fully aligned with the reference quote I gave.

No, that does not mean that marriage is a bad unto itself. — Moliere

And where did I ever mention that to Epicurus "marriage was a bad unto itself"? I've only mentioned that it is, according to Epicurus, something to be "generally shunned".

I then take it that you find Epicurus wrong in his stance that romantic ("passionate") love, and marriage, are to be generally shunned. — javra

Not really -- I'm giving an exposition of what I think a reasonable Epicurean response to your example. As in Epicurus wouldn't say "Do not marry", but would instead contextualize your action back to why you're doing what you're doing. Romantic love is not to be generally shunned -- it's not a bad unto itself. It depends upon why you're motivated towards it.

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural. — Moliere

To be forthright, I have no interest in doing a month-long debate on the matter. Much less in rereading Epicurus’s works so as to properly reference, and then again yet debate, what Epicurus taught.

But, in point of fact, in “not really” concluding that you are then concluding that peer-reviewed quotes such as this with scholarly references are erroneous.

Epicurus actively recommended against passionate love and believed it best to avoid marriage altogether. He viewed recreational sex as a natural, but not necessary, desire that should be generally avoided.[38] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism#Ethics

Boldface mine. What can I say, but that both of our predilections might be here readily showing.

Nor am I in any way interested in what those who followed Epicurus did, but have only addressed, and have interest in, what Epicurus himself taught. (In parallel to Epicureanism, that “some followers of Buddhism murdered and some still murder, therefore Buddhism allows for murder,” does not make for any serious argument, at least not to me.)

Romantic love in this division falls under "natural and unnecessary"; one may live a content life without it, and one may live a content life with it -- the important part is to live a content life. — Moliere

I then take it that you find Epicurus wrong in his stance that romantic ("passionate") love, and marriage, are to be generally shunned.

I hope I'm not misunderstanding you. If not, thanks for the reply.

Sure, but you do know you're here putting words into the mouth of a different poster. I was wanting to see what he had to say as a rebuttal, this so as to better discover were he himself stood in his own original thoughts.

As to the "correct way" to interpret Epicurus's doctrine, as I previously said, it can be argued back and forth in terms of meanings and intents. You seem inclined to defend and uphold Epicurus's doctrine. OK Can you then comment on your own stance as regards romantic love being a general wrong as per Epicurus's convictions?

His system, to me so far, seems to only lead to this very conclusion: romantic love is a wrong to be shunned, this then being indicative of wisdom.

(Which, for better or worse, then seems to have lead to the justification for Roman orgies by having the pleasure of sex in manners utterly devoid of romantic love and its likely pains. Hence, "Epicureanism" as its often connotatively understood nowadays. And no, I don't view orgies as uniform evil/bad, but I am one who much likes romantic love and the sex which comes with it; viewing the prospect of orgies as rather empty, humanistically speaking.)

As you stated, eudaimonia is hardly objective. — javi2541997

I can respect your views but, to be clear: To me, eudemonia is very much objective. The pleasures of chain smoking till you die to this world as just one relatively easy to understand example of pleasure's subjectivity vs. eudemonia's objectivity.

I thought his summation good enough, basically -- in a rough and dirty way, sure that's what the bad pleasures are, and the good pleasure is ataraxia and aponia, like the link he linked says. — Moliere

OK, I don't though. For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

Maybe this is all differences of opinion. So be it then.

Not a proper reply. Or should I point you to links regarding what Epicurus in fact stated? Time is a commodity.

I already understood, thanks to your explanation and MU and hypercin, that pleasure is subjective. — javi2541997

In many a way, yes, but, in addressing Plato, the question instead becomes one of whether eudemonia too is subjective ... or, else, if there is such a thing as objective eudemonia. It is on the latter which Platonic notions of ethics hinges (this as per the SEP reference previously given).

That's not quite right. — Moliere

I haven't read Epicurus (who, after all, was a relative ascetic) since college, and yes, many of these issues can be argued back and forth in terms of intents and meanings.

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by @180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree.

You might then want to change your written position, namely this:

"bad pleasures" are ones which cause or increase pain because they are either unncessary (e.g. luxuries, excesses) or unnatural (e.g. wealth, power, fame) — 180 Proof

So its not "unnecessary or unnatural" but something else ...

As to wealth, power, and fame being "unnatural", one can readily find them in the animal kingdom, such as among great apes, with chimpanzee politics readily consisting of power (over other) and fame (repute) as that then leads to greater personal wealth (such as in territory and mating rights).

I don't know about Plato, but Epicurus thinks "bad pleasures" are ones which cause or increase pain because they are either unncessary (e.g. luxuries, excesses) or unnatural (e.g. wealth, power, fame) in contrast to good pleasures which reduce pain and are simple but necessary (e.g. food, shelter, play, friendship, community). — 180 Proof

Don't know if you happened to read my post, but, pulled out from it: Going by Epicurus's thoughts as just outlined by you, running marathons would then be bad, this because they result in increased unnecessary pain. As does weightlifting, and a good number of other human activities often deemed to be eudemonia-increasing. The altruism to running into a house on fire and thereby risking grave unnecessary pain (to not even get into the risk of mutilation and death) so as to rescue another's life would then be bad and hence unethical?

Nonetheless, I have some questions that I would like to share and debate with you:

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato? Does this really depend on each of us and how we understand Hedonism?

Are there objective pleasures? Can these be drawn from the boundaries of good and bad? — javi2541997

To me too this is a very complex topic. I’ll add to what has so far been mentioned in the thread that happiness (our bet fit modern-day term for eudemonia) and pleasure, thought best intwined, are not identical: e.g., the great happiness of a marathon runner finishing the marathon while in excruciating pain. Nor is suffering (an opposite of eudemonia) and pain identical. I don’t yet know of a more clear cut example than the following, so please excuse the sullenness of it all: some women who are raped (always against their consent, and with a great deal of traumatic suffering incurred) can experience physiological pleasure from their penetrated genitals (such that this physiological pleasure only further traumatizes the raped women and increases her suffering). Then there is masochism, wherein consensually incurred pain is juxtaposed with heightened happiness. All these, again, being complex enough topics on their own.

But I’m writing because I take it you are in part asking for clear cut cases of “bad/unethical pleasures” that might align to being "objectively bad" ... such that not engaging in such pleasures might then be objectively good. Here are three examples that I presume most will readily acknowledge:

• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of a mass-murderer in murdering others are bad/unethical pleasures.
• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of a rapist in raping others are bad/unethical pleasures.
• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of an extreme bigot in successfully depriving others of the dignity to their own life, and this strictly on account of these others being significantly different rather than due to these others being unethical, are bad/unethical pleasures.

Given Plato’s views of the Good—which could well be argued equivalent to perfected, complete/absolute eudemonia and, hence, to perfected happiness (one reference to this effect), this rather than being in any way associated to “perfected pleasure”—all bad pleasures (and instances of bad momentary happiness) are, in ultimate terms, bad precisely because they deviate one from proximity to the Good, i.e. perfected happiness. To not here mention their affect upon others as well. And this “deviation” can at times be far more egregious than in other cases, this as per the three examples just presented.

"intents, and the intentioning they entail, are teleological, and not cause and effect" -- javra

You don't know that, but you say it like you do. I'm a programmer, and I know the ease with which intent can be implemented with simple deterministic primitives. — noAxioms

As it happens, I know it on par to knowing that 2 and 2 doesn’t equal 5 but does equal 4, and can likely justify the affirmation you’ve quoted from me much better than the latter. You could have engaged in rational debate in reply. Instead, you affirm knowledge of what I do and don’t know. And uphold this not via any sort of rational argument but via a pleading to authority, namely your own as “programmer”.

In truth, I find it hard to take the sum of your replies to me seriously, this as far as rational philosophical discourses go. So, I’ll just bail out of this thread and leave you to your philosophical musings.

Yea, you too. :up: