Nicely worded. — Tom Storm

Thank you!

Do you find this model resonates? — Tom Storm

As I just described the big picture aspect of things, though I don't limit myself to Neoplatonic thought, yes, the notions resonate with me - the Good thus generally understood being what grounds my understanding of non-relativistic ethics. Although there are portions or Plotinus' writings which, in addressing the details of his own metaphysical understandings, I remember not resonating with me all that much. Its been a while since I've read him, though.

I guess some more nuanced information on what it means to say God is Being itself. What does it mean to say God is the fundamental existence or essence that underlies everything in the universe? — Tom Storm

Although its details are not easy to explain via the soundbites of forum posts (and I have no current interest in presenting them), one possible example of such "God is Being itself" outlook will be the following:

The Neoplatonist notion of "the One", aka "the Good" will be pure being itself of infinite, limitless, quality and magnitude that is divinely simple (devoid of any parts) and beyond both existence and nonexistence - this being a priority monism wherein the fundamental essence that underlies everything in the universe can also be conceptualized as God, this, for example, due to being a) of itself unmovable (i.e., a forever fixed, determinate, aspect of existence at large) and b) that which moves all that exists (this when understanding all that exists to be in significant part teleological and, hence, partly determined by final causes). Although open to various interpretations, this worldview then generally holds that the infinite (i.e., in no way limited or finite) pure being which is the One is the fixed and ultimate final cause of all existents, i.e. the unmoved mover of all existents to use Aristotelian terms (which as ultimate telos is thereby always contemporaneous with existence at large for as long as existence has been).

Of possible importance, the One then cannot be a deity - even when the One is expressed as being God - for a deity can only hold some existential finitude as a psyche, minimally, a limit of being by which it as deity is other than, say, an ameba's mind, a tree's life, or a human being in total (which as human might obey or otherwise listen to the deity's decrees as other than him/herself - a deity who in turn holds awareness of the human as other). The One is then at direct odds with any notion of an omni-creator deity - that said, with most nowadays understanding the latter to be what is addressed by the term "God" and having little to no comprehension of the former.

Thank you for the explanation. Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be (this having read the OP's quotes - thanks for reposting them) - such as when devoid of any sense of self (which, as a sense of self, would then proto-experience or else be proto-conscious of that which is not self). But I'll here put those questions aside.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.) — javra

You and everybody else in the world. :grin: All speculation. — Patterner

To be honest, given that life evolving out of non-life can only be part and parcel of the non-physicalist philosophical views I hold, I too end up speculatively concluding that pansychism is in fact the case. Still, as previously mentioned (and as you yourself also note) - as with everybody else - I don't presume to have any understanding of how it might work. Hence my questioning in regard to what proto-experience / proto-consciousness might be. :wink:

What is happening did not start with Trump, and we might look behind the curtain to see what is really going on and who is in control. — Athena

As far as my personal observations and perspectives go:

Anti-democratic sentiments have been simmering for quite some time in certain aspects of the US, in all sorts of ways. From not wanting to partake in civic duties (e.g., in jury duty) to an outright denouncement of democracy as a system of governance.

Many, maybe too many, people value authoritarian power. Deeming the populace (of which one might say they too belong to) to be idiots and blindly led sheep. That thereby need to be domineered.

Bad parenting – e.g., parents who laugh at teachers who tell them to restrain their children from cursing in school (to say the least) – tends to result in more selfish adolescents who put their own narrow and selfish interests before those of all others without much if any empathy for others, and with bullying on the rise, sometimes taking extreme forms. Which in turn leads to even more bad parenting.

Justice here is no longer that which is seen as applying to all equally (justice for all) but, instead, is that which empowers one’s own agendas so as to conquer all those that oppose your own will, this irrespective of the double standards involved.

The next generation of adults then hold these attitudes that were accumulated during their formative years, and then they vote, often this to empower authoritarian causes.

Then, there’s the vested interest of the authoritarian powers that be – political, economic, makes no significant difference – that the plebs at large are as uneducated and as fragmented as possible (no sense of community or solidarity among the plebs). Not only does this deprive commoners of any nobility of being but, more to the point, it facilitates greater capacity for authoritarian power-over and the financial wealth thereby accumulated – this, again, by the authoritarian powers that be. And all this is pivoted on an economy that is a global Ponzi scheme of sorts: a global economy that assumes infinite growth via infinite resources (by which new entrepreneurs supposedly have a chance to themselves get as big as the the biggest). And, as with all pyramid schemes, it will eventually go bust – but, here, on a global scale of economic devastation.

I wish I’d be – or at least find reason to be – more optimistic about the times we’re living in. I’m not. And I haven’t even started on the increasing calamities which will accompany increased global warming.

Unless a global cataclysm – e.g., a nuclear catastrophe, but there are other means of accomplishing the same cataclysm – reverts all of humanity back to segregated hunter-gather tribes of a dozen people or so – this being something which seems extremely unlikely, to not mention utterly undesirable, such as due to all the advances that will then be lost – in time there will indeed be a global governance. I’m thinking in terms of a few generations from now, more or less – but not in terms of millennia. Like the notion of not, it’s inevitable – this given our ever increasing interconnectedness via technology, economy, and the like. That stated, the concern here is that this global governance will not be a democratic republic, one that thereby aims for optimal justice for all citizens of the planet and seeks to give all citizens an equal voice in how they get to be governed. But that, instead, this global governance will turn out to be fully Orwellian, with pervasive fascistic structures and with injustices galore. And if such authoritarian power is ever acquired over all others on a global scale, it will be unimaginably hard to do away with.

As backdrop to this forethought, as things currently stand, globally, governments are turning increasingly authoritarian – this, obviously, on the backs of many who then unjustly suffer or else unjustly die.

I don’t mean to bum you or anyone else out by all this – and I’m sure some will find the just stated an all too laughable fantasy or, else, see no problems with authoritarian governance to begin with. It’s just that, while I view some humanitarian causes lost in the relative short-term, in the long-term I yet find that there is yet much to struggle for. This, at least, for those who care about future generations of children and the like.

OK, but then you might want to explain what “subjective awareness” can possibly mean when completely devoid of any kind of tacit understanding*.

* By “subjective” I so far understand there being the minimal requirement of these two types of tacit understanding on the part of the subjective awareness in question: a) a tacit understanding as pertains to what is and is not self (this sense of self being the subjectivity in question), and b) a tacit understanding of this self as to whether this self experiences something of significance to it in its environment (rather than, for example, experiencing nothing of significance). Neither of which necessitates the occurrence of memory, btw.

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I’m not antithetical to panpsychism, btw, but if it were to be real, I don’t so far deem it possible that a rock, for example, would have a subjective awareness of its own and thereby be endowed with subjectivity - this for reasons previously mentioned. (Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.)

The Mind/mind to me is not a set of thoughts, ideas, percepts, etc. — MoK

Nor did I explicate that that's all which mind is, but these are certainly what I consider to be aspects of mind, rather than aspects of mater.

This then seems to me the crux of where we differ.

Mind, to me at least, consists of both (agency-endowed) awareness - not all of which pertains to consciousness - and, to simplify, the immaterial means via which these awarenesses (the awareness of consciousness, which is distinct from the awareness of one's conscience, from the different agencies - each awareness-endowed - of one's unconscious mind, etc.) then interact, combine, diverge, and communicate.

Differently approached, the term "mind" etymologically stems from the notion of memory, and memory too is a bundle of percepts - perceived by oneself as conscious awareness, which is thus aware of the memories one has.

All these thoughts, ideas, percepts - which are immaterial rather than being mater - are themselves experienced by what else than awareness (be this awareness either consciousness or not)?

This then will speak to the following:

I think that is the Mind/mind that perceives the state of pure awareness and Maya. — MoK

Do you feel safe? Do you care about justice and freedom of speech? — Athena

Wanted to say thumbs up to the OP. To the first question, for now yes; issue though is about the soon-to-become-present future. And here I am very concerned. To the second question: yes.

Seems to me that those who don't feel safe will not speak up against authoritarianism and fascism because of this very concern or else fear. Whereas those who don't see any problems with authoritarianism and fascism - maybe due to believing these to work in their favor - will not have any reason to speak up against them.

To my understanding, Maya and pure awareness are different modes of experience, so essence dualism refers to a duality—maya versus pure awareness—whereas substance dualism is the fundamental model of reality. — MoK

Again, no problem if the use of essence rather than that of substance doesn't work for you. But to address this quote: pure awareness would here be non-illusory essence which is that via which maya (illusory essence) is experienced. All that is not pure awareness - to include both mind (thoughts, ideas, percepts, etc.) and matter (rocks, atoms, etc.) - is thereby different aspects of the same maya as illusory essence - a sort of property dualism of maya.

So yes, there is a duality of essences here, but it is not a duality between "different modes of experience": all experience of maya being contingent on and originating from the non-illusory essence of pure awareness (also termed "witness consciousness").

Are you then maintaining that "consciousness in its most fundamental sense" can well be fully devoid of all understanding/comprehension - irrespective of how minuscule - regarding that of which it might be aware/conscious of?

Depending on definitions, many or all species are intelligent, though none with our abilities. So there can be consciousness without our intelligence on par with ours.

I think intelligence and consciousness are different things. I think all conscious things are conscious of whatever intelligence they possess. — Patterner

Although its been a few days now, you might want to reread my post: I said nothing to the contrary of this.

I did not address intelligence but the faculty of understanding innate to consciousness - which can be of greater or lesser magnitudes when comparing one being or species of such to another. And, in a breaking away from traditional conceptualizations going all the way back to Aristotle, I stated that this faculty of understanding (e.g., an ameba understands, however minusculely, differences between predator and prey when faced with another ameba in its environment) goes by the synonym of the intellect, i.e., that to which things are intelligible. To then be explicit, thereby granting an ameba a minuscule degree of intellect (which is not a synonym for intelligence - ameba don't understand and then apply principles, for example - although, in lifeforms, intelligence will itself be contingent on the degree or magnitude of this faculty of understanding which, again, is intrinsic to all consciousness)

As to intelligence and consciousness being different things as exemplified by AI, I've already mentioned the same in my initial post in this thread:

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc. — javra

Finite essence is a constraint in being, the being of things a particular constrained act of being. Fr. Norris Clarke refers to the "limiting essences" of things. God meanwhile, is not a thing, but being itself, and God alone is subsistent being (ipsum esse subsitens). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for this. I greatly like the terminology of "limiting essences" or else "finite essence" - this in contrast to what would then be pure ousia as "limitless, boundless, else infinite essence". Although I personally don't univocally associate the latter - this tmk being the quintessence of priority monism - to "God" for various reasons: one of these being that God is often construed to be a deity which, as a psyche, would itself then necessarily be in dualistic standing to all other occurring psyches (and hence not be limitless, etc.). But, yes, it's fully contingent on how the term "God" gets to be understood. To each their own. :smile:

My views changed as I contemplated the idea of higher consciousness, as it relates to various fantasy/sci-fi beings. Like Star Trek's Organians, Metrons, Q, Prophets of Bajor, etc. Such beings are often said to be of higher consciousness. I wondered what that might mean. Greater intelligence doesn't seem to equal greater consciousness. Nor do more extensive sensory capabilities, abilities to mentally manipulate reality, or an awareness that might be said to encompass a larger area.

I came to think there's no such thing as higher consciousness, and I don't think I have higher consciousness than anything else. I am just conscious of things, capabilities, I possess that other things do not. — Patterner

Wanted to address this notion of higher consciousness.

An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect, can at least metaphorically be stated to have its non-quantitative contents – non-quantitative because in truth all such contents which could be individually addressed are unified in a non-manifold manner.

As an example of such content, one which typically remains tacit within our consciousness but is nevertheless understood or else known: we all understand, else know, ourselves to be human Earthlings, rather than Martians or some other type of extraterrestrial alien. (This again, is typically not declarative knowledge but, instead, an understanding intrinsic to us as conscious beings.) Likewise can be said of our not being brains in vats, or our being of this or that ethnicity, of this or that gender, etc. Most of the time all these are tacitly understood without being declaratively, else explicitly, known.

A frog, too, will have this faculty of understanding – such as might regard what is food and what is not.

And, when contrasting a frog’s faculty of understanding and a typical human’s – both of which are intrinsic to the consciousness of each – the human’s consciousness will be far greater in a) its capacity of such understanding and b) its contents of such understanding.

In so being, a human will then have what goes by the name of “a higher (more technically, greater) consciousness” than will a frog. And this notwithstanding that a frog might have intelligences of its own that humans might not be aware of, might have capacities of sensory experiences that exceed those of humans, and so forth.

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc.

Or, as another example, a good Jeopardy player might be of far greater encyclopedic intelligence than a bad Jeopardy player, while it is at least conceivable that the bad Jeopardy player might yet be endowed with a far greater capacity of understanding than that of the good Jeopardy player – here, then, denoting the bad player to be of a (at least somewhat) higher consciousness than the good player.

And this same faculty of understanding can fluctuate in magnitude within any single human. Contrast the difference in acuteness of understanding when one is “healthy, full of vitality, and in the zone experiencing cognitive flow” and when one is bedridden with migraines and stomach aches (or such) from a flu virus. Most always, one will be of higher consciousness in the first scenario but not in the second.

For reasons such as these, I don’t think the notion of “higher consciousness” – when understood as the non-quantitative content and capacity of understanding, which can hence be of greater magnitude in one being by comparison to some other – can be easily ruled out.

And, of course, unless one views humans as the end all and be all of this very faculty of understanding, more evolved species of life can well then be postulated to potentially hold far greater magnitudes of consciousness than any human has ever been endowed with. Just as a frog from the distant past could not fathom its future evolution into a human, so too can a human not fathom his/her future evolution into a being of significantly greater consciousness (forethought will always have its limits).

Glad to know. Thanks.

I wouldn't rule it out, but intuitively it seems like monism or dualism isn't even the right way to talk about it, because substances are an afterthought of being, — ChatteringMonkey

I think this gets back to the OP. In the case of priority monism - such as can be found in "the One" of Neoplatonism - there is no substance involved in the definition of the monism addressed. Rather it is being itself - as being beyond both existence and nonexistence. The Ancient Greek "ousia". Which both "substance" and "essence" are Latin translations of, but with only the latter nowadays yet holding some clear semblance to what the Ancient Greek "ousia" most typically signified in philosophical discourse.

All this to say that in priority monism, the monism addressed does not specify any type of substance whatsoever but, instead, essence itself: the One in Neoplatonism being quite literally quintessential - the ultimate essence of all that is. If Heraclitus had in mind a priority monism prior to there being words for the concept, the only substance he would have specified would have been the logos/fire - this being "stuff" - but by "Zeus / wisdom which is one" he would have intended and done his best to express in this own time "a nondualistic being/ousia - such as the Neoplatonic "the One" - upon which all existence and hence substance is dependent". Or at least something to the like. Hence making sense of fragments such as this (as previously addressed):

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R. P. 49 a. — Heraclitus

Just checked. Couldn't find any fragments to the effect of light equating to the "only one" - wanted to say my bad for this - but there are fragments and interpretations such as this:

(74-76) The dry soul is the wisest and best.[31] R. P. 42. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_118

with the following footnote:

31. This fragment is interesting because of the antiquity of the corruptions it has suffered. According to Stephanus, who is followed by Bywater, we should read: Αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, ξηρή being a mere gloss upon αὔη. When once ξηρή got into the text; αὔη became αὐγή, and we get the sentence, "the dry light is the wisest soul," whence the siccum lumen of Bacon. Now this reading is as old as Plutarch, who, in his Life of Romulus (c. 28), takes αὐγή to mean lightning, as it sometimes does, and supposes the idea to be that the wise soul bursts through the prison of the body like dry lightning (whatever that may be) through a cloud. (It should be added that Diels now holds that a αὐγή ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ αρίστη is the genuine reading.) Lastly, though Plutarch must have written αὐγή, the MSS. vary between αὕτη and αὐτή (cf. De def. or. 432 f. αὕτη γὰρ ξηρὰ ψυχὴ in the MSS.). The next stage is the corruption of the αὐγή into οὗ γῆ. This yields the sentiment that "where the earth is dry, the soul is wisest," and is as old as Philo (see Bywater's notes).

Which may or may not speak to the same thing? Don't know.

Upon further reading I think he may be using Zeus as a symbol for daylight, the other thing he commonly stands for. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't see how it could be physical daylight since this is of itself an aspect of logos/fire, of the universe in total - with night/darkness as its dyadic opposite. I instead interpret his references to light (and dryness) to be metaphors for wisdom ... which is in keeping with a) traditional western metaphors of light being wisdom and b) with the fragments I've previously referenced. Again:

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_32

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_41

It then seems plausible enough to infer from his total known fragments that for Heraclitus becoming has at its ultimate end this addressed "wisdom" which is "one only" and can go by the name of "Zeus" (although imperfectly). — javra

This sole nondualistic one - addressed at different times as Zeus/God/wisdom/light - then being the source of (what I so far find to be) a plausible priority monism, thereby being that "one only" from which the universe in oppositional total as fire/logos takes its form and attributes and which, as wisdom which is one, "knows the thought/logos by which all things are steered through all things" (with knowledge here, to my mind, clearly not being declarative knowledge - which requires changes via argumentation/justification, to not mention declaration - but more in keeping with notions of a complete understanding).

becoming does not logically entail a completely permanent relativism wherein there is nothing for all of this becoming to eventually become. — javra


This universe, which is the same for all, has not been made by any god or man, but it always has been is, and will be -- an ever-living fire, kindling itself by regular measures and going out by regular measures. — Heraclitus


It doesn't logically entail it no, but Heraclitus seems to have thought otherwise. — ChatteringMonkey

In all references I so far know of (e.g. 1; and e.g. 2), the Heraclitus fragment you've mentioned is devoid of the hyphenation between "be" and "an". This can change tthe meaning of the fragment significantly - so that the fragment can indeed be aligned to a notion of priority monism: All that is is therefore not made by any man or god - both being aspects of the logos/fire - such that for as long as the universe/existence is "it always has been is and will be an ever-living fire (etc.)". This with the "one" previously mentioned yet referencing its ultimate origin in a priority monism fashion.

But please do reference the fragment with the given hyphenation inserted if you believe the hyphenation is original, or else essential, to Heraclitus's fragment.

I haven't read Heraclitus's fragments in full for some time, BTW, but I don't remember reading anything that would contradict this plausibility of him being a priority monist. That said, I might of course be wrong.

Does the personification mean anything, in the sense of having agency or will? Or is it rather a naturalistic/pantheistic god?

"unwilling and yet willing"? — ChatteringMonkey

It's again speculative inference - a best conjecture based on his fragments - but if Heraclitus in fact did have in mind a priority monism, then this "God / Zeus' he addresses would not be any deity whatsoever but, instead, would be in general keeping with what the Neoplatonists addressed as the One as the source of all things.

Zeus is the totality of becoming, the one thing that is, the thing that cannot be named, the logos etc. I think he was using common used terminology of the time to convey to his contempories what he was getting at. — ChatteringMonkey

While I agree with the second sentence, I don't think Heraclitus can be pinned down to what you say in the first.

There are passages such as this:

(1) It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things are one.[18] R.P. 40. — Heraclitus

... but, then, the "all things are one" motif is readily open to interpretation - it can be found in multiple traditions and can at least in some such be easily interpreted to stipulate a priority monism {... which thereby connects all otherwise disparate existent things - this so as to result in statements such as "everything is one" or else "we are all one"}.

Whereas fragments such as these following are harder to assimilate into this notion of "Zeus is the cosmic totality of becoming as the only thing that is one":

(97) Man is called a baby by God, even as a child by a man. R. P. 45.

(98, 99) The wisest man is an ape compared to God, just as the most beautiful ape is ugly compared to man.

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R. P. 49 a. — Heraclitus

Especially when analyzing the last given fragment - and in assuming that Heraclitus was not an ignoramus in his aphorisms - in which way can one make sense of "and it is law, too, to obey the council of [the cosmic totality of all that is]"?

The totality of all that exists is itself fire, perpetual transformations of constant strife between opposites. It so far to me makes no sense to then affirm that it too is law/logos (itself here appearing unchanging) to obey the counsel of "dyadic opposites in strife in their cosmic totality" (in contrast to obeying some aspects of the total at expense of others - or, what still seems to me more likely, obeying "Zeus" / God (per the quotes above) as that only given which is nondualistic and hence one)

Can you then make sense of how one goes about obeying the council of "the cosmic totality of dyadic opposites in perpetual strife (of which one oneself is an aspect of)"?

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At any rate, I don't see how my previously offered inference can be ruled out via Heraclitus's own fragments. Again, so far finding the inference offered plausible, albeit not the only one possible.

If being is becoming, then being is a fiction because being implies something that does not become but stays the same. — ChatteringMonkey

"Being" is however a verb, a process, that is treated as a noun conceptually, the same as "becoming" is in philosophical circles.

This cultural reification of being into something that is fixed and hence not process, I'll argue, may have something to do with the metaphysical notion of an ultimate goal or telos of being (as verb) which could, for one example, be equated with the Neoplatonic notion of the "the One" - which ceases to be a striving toward but instead is the ultimate and final actualization of all strivings.

One can note that the term "becoming" can also easily raise the question "becoming what?" And, unlike many a modern interpretation of the process theory of becoming - which, to my mind, again seems to in some way reify becoming at large into a static thing, or else "something that always stays the same" - becoming does not logically entail a completely permanent relativism wherein there is nothing for all of this becoming to eventually become.

Heraclitus, or at least his known fragments, are not very explicit about the philosophical working which Heraclitus espoused. Nevertheless, one will find in Heraclitus in quite explicit manners the notion of something which is - i.e., some being per se - which is not in duality with its opposite and hence is not in a state of perpetually changing:

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_32

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_41

It then seems plausible enough to infer from his total known fragments that for Heraclitus becoming has at its ultimate end this addressed "wisdom" which is "one only" and can go by the name of "Zeus" (although imperfectly).

A very good - and might I add substantial :wink: - OP!

How do you think it affects how we talk about mind, matter, or metaphysics more generally? — Wayfarer

Personally, given its modern connotations, in my own writings I tend to reserve the term "substance" for "stuff" - be it mental (e.g., ideas, thoughts, paradigms, etc.) or else material. Whereas ouisia - being - I instead address via the term "essence".

I find that so doing allows me to specify awareness as being (as essence) and all that is non-aware (be it an idea one entertains or else a rock one sees) as a different type of being (a different type of essence) - and this without importing the baggage of "stuff", else of "thingness" (ideas are things as well), nowadays too often associated with the term "substance" into the concept of awareness's being.

That's why I'm questioning whether -- or admitting my ignorance about -- how bringing in choice-worthiness helps matters. — J

In truth, I'm not intimately familiar with the philosophical use of "choice-worthiness" ... but I take it to specify that which makes one alternative among the two or more we're faced with worthy of being chosen.

So understood, choice-worthiness would then be an intrinsic aspect of ethics - for it is that which we presume to make a given alternative worthy of being chosen which determines our ethical standing in so choosing. Hence, we always chose what we assume to be beneficial/good to us. But only if our reasons for the choice made (to include teleological reasons) are correct, hence right, will our choice then be ethical.

For instance, the murderer chooses to murder in the pursuit of that happiness which accompanies so successfully murdering. Here, to successfully murder will be good relative to the murderer's character due to the murderer deeming this beneficial to him/herself (maybe on account of the euphoric thrill thereby obtained in so doing and getting away with it). But we sane people deem this to be an unethical choice due to knowing full well that it leads, sooner or later, to everyone's reduced eudemonia/wellbeing (including the murderer's). We sane people thereby know this choice to murder to be a blatant wrong - rather than being a right / correct choice to make - and this in almost all conceivable scenarios imaginable we might care to hypothesize. To this extent making murder objectively wrong (although I could play devils advocate to this and provide examples where murder might be the lesser of the available wrongs and, in this manner, not be the unethical choice to make).

This then can be contrasted to choosing chocolate vs. vanilla ice-cream. Unless there's allergies or other outstanding factors involved, choosing one one or another will make virtually no difference whatsoever to the telos of optimal eudemonia. Here, though we yet choose based on what we deem to be most beneficial for us, our choice will not readily fall into the category of "ethics".

All the same, devoid of the criteria of choice-worthiness (as previously defined), I don't yet understand how any comportment or deed can be appraised as being either ethical/virtuous or not. Conversely, the activity of entities we deem devoid of any ability to choose - rocks as one clear example, such as when they result in an avalanche - we neither appraise as ethical or unethical. Such that it (at least so seems to me) is only via what we deem "worthy of being chosen" that any determination can be made as to the ethics concerned or the ethos we adopt.

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This seems like a good window onto virtue ethics, and the way you go on to elaborate it also makes sense. — J

BTW, I neglected to say this initially, but thanks for these comments. They’re appreciated!

I think you will like it. — Wayfarer

A fellow "mystic"? Sure! I think I'd like it as well. :wink:

I also noticed your explication of substance/essence above. I tried to introduce the topic of what substance means in philosophy as distinct from everyday use earlier in the thread. I think I'll write an OP on it. — Wayfarer

If you do, substances aside, I'd be interested on any offerings regarding the notion of essence-dualism. Again, this for example as per the Hindu distinction between maya and pure-consciousness/atman.

If I choose to read an interesting book, that book is, arguably, choice-worthy. But why? I honestly don't see how calling out its choice-worthiness gets us anywhere. You can't mean that being chosen is any sort of moral criterion. So how does "good" get brought in here? What is it about the book that would make my choice a worthy one? — J

While I hope I’m not intruding on the discussion, I thought at least parts of this might be of use to the issue (these being some personal perspectives interjected with what I take to be staple aspects of the philosophy of ethics at large):

A synonym of “good” is “beneficial”. We always select what we select to do deeming it beneficial to us. This is quite arguably a universal to all choices made and all those with an ability to so chose. Going to the dentist because it is beneficial, even if deemed unpleasant. Etc.

Ethics come into play in the context of whether or not that which we deem to be beneficial to us in fact actually is so or not. If it in fact is beneficial, then it is the correct - aka the right - thing to do. If it in fact is not beneficial to us (either in the short or long term when considered in terms of overall outcome), then it is the incorrect - aka the wrong - thing to do.

There’s of course much which could then be considered in this calculus of what is the right vs. the wrong thing to do. Including taking into account other’s actions and reactions to what one does (or does not) do.

This calculus then ultimately ending in the possible metaphysical notion of there being an ontically real but yet to be actualized, ultimate beneficiality to aim toward – one that is of itself validly obtainable in principle (this, again, at some future time rather than in the here and now), hence being correct or true, hence being right – and this irrespective of people’s perspectives pro or contra – which could be worded as “a complete and perfect eudemonia or else wellbeing”.

This, whatever it might be in its details, then being what would be termed “the (objective) Good” – which would then hold ontic presence, hence be real, as a telos (teloi, final causes, always being givens that await to be actualized in the future that, at such, are likewise always concurrent with that which they teleologically effect - in this case the very sentience which innately seeks optimal wellbeing).

As to why the Good is not yet actualized, simplistically, this can be explained via our ignorance and our capacity to choose wrongs (in the erroneous belief that they are beneficial when, in fact, they are not).

In any case, the whole thrust of the book is (as I understand it) the quantum nature of consciousness. He presents the idea of ‘seity’ - the individual, conscious subject as a unique center of experience that cannot be reduced to anything more fundamental. — Wayfarer

Yes, that's indeed up my alley, so to speak. Thanks for the reference. :up:

But there are multiple primary particles, right? Photons and electrons are not made of anything else. Protons and neutrons are made of quarks. Aren't neutrinos also primary? Can monism be the answer if we already have those? — Patterner

On a physical level of understanding, all quanta themselves emerge from the quantum vacuum state:

In quantum field theory, the quantum vacuum state (also called the quantum vacuum or vacuum state) is the quantum state with the lowest possible energy. Generally, it contains no physical particles. The term zero-point field is sometimes used as a synonym for the vacuum state of a quantized field which is completely individual.[clarification needed]

According to present-day[when?] understanding of what is called the vacuum state or the quantum vacuum, it is "by no means a simple empty space".[1][2] According to quantum mechanics, the vacuum state is not truly empty but instead contains fleeting electromagnetic waves and particles that pop into and out of the quantum field.[3][4][5] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_vacuum_state

... which is located neither here nor there but, quite literally, is physically everywhere - omnipresent.

In then interpreting the vacuum state to be physical, such that all physicality emerges from it in one way or another, physicalism can well be preserved despite the many different variants of quanta that are known to occur.

I'm not sure if anyone brought this up yet (haven't read the entire thread) but have you considered an "essence dualism" - this so as to avoid all the pitfalls of "substance dualism"?

Here is one possible example of an essence dualism; Here leaning on Hindu views as one example, one could then posit an essence of "maya (illusion or magic-trick in an ultimate sense of reality, which would in traditional views include both mater and mind)" and a separate essence of "pure awareness" (which is non-illusory actuality).

No worries if this doesn't make much sense or else work for you. But I thought I'd mention it just in case.

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BTW, the distinction between substance and essence can get easily complex and maybe at times convoluted, but for example:

Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.[1][2] Substances are particulars that are ontologically independent: they are able to exist all by themselves.[3][4] Another defining feature often attributed to substances is their ability to undergo changes. Changes involve something existing before, during and after the change. They can be described in terms of a persisting substance gaining or losing properties.[3] Attributes or properties, on the other hand, are entities that can be exemplified by substances.[5] Properties characterize their bearers; they express what their bearer is like.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

vs.:

The English word essence comes from Latin essentia, via French essence. The original Latin word was created purposefully, by Ancient Roman philosophers, in order to provide an adequate Latin translation for the Greek term ousia.

The concept originates as a precise technical term with Aristotle (although it can also be found in Plato),[1] who used the Greek expression to ti ên einai[2] literally meaning "the what it was to be." This also corresponds to the scholastic term quiddity or sometimes the shorter phrase to ti esti[3] literally meaning "the what it is" and corresponding to the scholastic term haecceity (thisness) for the same idea. This phrase presented such difficulties for its Latin translators that they coined the word essentia to represent the whole expression. For Aristotle and his scholastic followers, the notion of essence is closely linked to that of definition (horismos).[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence#Etymology

So roughly construed - to provide just one more example - the Neoplatonic "the One" could then not be a substance - but it might conceivably be referred to as essence (in at least certain interpretations of it, such as in addressing it as that which is "essential" to being itself - this in contrast to something like the aforementioned maya being essential only relative to existence (that which "stands out") at large ... but maybe all this is a bit off topic).

Again, though, no problems if this seems to hinder your position rather than help it.

interesting distinction, to call yourself a monist but not a physicalist. — flannel jesus

There are many different types of monism. These can include "priority monism" - of which Neoplatonism is a type - "dual-aspect monism" - in which both mind and matter as two aspects of the same underlying given - and the far more familiar "substance monism" - of which physicalism is only one particular type (with idealism being its often mentioned opposite). Quantitatively addressed, physicalism is just one of a far greater plurality of possible monisms - with some such monisms not being logically contradictory (e.g., one can uphold a priority monism while cogently also at the same time upholding, for one example, a monism of objective idealism - else, an objective variety of dual-aspect monism).

Dennett's particular flavor of physicalism is strongly epistemological.

[...]

Almost none of that is true, especially about the first-person stance, IMO, but I want to give Dennett a fair hearing so we can see what a sample version of physicalism is up against. — J

I acknowledge this. To me, however, it does raise the question: Can there be anything epistemic without there being something ontic* which the epistemic references?

I so far take philosophical relativism to implicitly, if not also explicitly, make just this claim. A different topic maybe, but I'll argue that upholding an affirmative answer to this question can only result in a logical contradiction: at the same time and in the same respect there both a) is an ontic actuality which the epistemic addresses (namely, the ontic actuality of there in fact not being any ontic actualities - this being a sort of meta-level ontic-actuality) and b) is not any ontic actuality which the epistemic addresses ... This might be better formulated, but the same logical contradictions seems to remain irrespective of adjustments.

The stance of physicalism does seem to presuposes that everything ontically actual, and hence real, is physical. Such that any epistemological account (regarding what is) seems to pivot upon this very bedrock assumption of what the ontic is, even if its kept utterly tacit in the arguments provided.

But on what would the necessary "wrongness of non-physicalism" be grounded? (My own take so far is that physicalism provides a maximal explanatory power to those who are physicalists - and that it's due to this teleological motivation alone (namely, the intent to best understand) that physicalism is so stringently upheld and maintained.)

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* "The ontic" being that which ontology studies (this via any of various epistemologies).

To begin with, can you provide references evidencing that modern hunter-gather societies - or at least some such - are of an authoritarian leadership which so 'oversees' all others in the tribe so as to preserve social cohesion? — javra

No, because I didn't claim this. — AmadeusD

Again, what you in fact claimed:

I think the idea that a pre-historic society was egalitarian is pretty much a DOA. Nothing to it. The less oversight society has, more abuse happens. — AmadeusD

My knowledge of several of those groups is that they are decidedly not egalitarian, even in principle. — AmadeusD

Rationally then, your affirmations entail that in the absence of a non-egalitarian, hence authoritarian leadership which "oversees", societies will have ample "abuse" ingroup.

I personally don't know of tribes which have ample abuse ingroup. So I assumed that you knew of tribes with authoritarian leadership.

Can you then, instead, reference tribes wherein abuse is rampant ingroup due to not having authoritarian leadersphip?

If not, your claims above are unjustified and, thereby, rather hollow.

I sense some bristling in this response, so forgive me for being pretty lack luster in mine. I don't care for bristles — AmadeusD

Might as well be calling me a porcupine. Name-calling, while it might have its political advantages amongst some, is not something that validates affirmations, though.

"In the Aka community, despite a sexual division of labor where women primarily serve as caregivers, male and female roles are highly flexible and interchangeable. Women hunt while men care for children, and vice versa, without stigma or loss of status. Women are not only as likely as men to hunt but can even be more proficient hunters."

If you're not seeing a problem, I can't say I care to explain it. — AmadeusD

As to examples like this one, no, I'm not seeing any problem whatsoever in terms of egalitarian governance of the tribe.

"The Bambuti tend to follow a patrilineal descent system, and their residences after marriage are patrilocal..... The only type of group seen amongst the Bambuti is the nuclear family."

"Sister exchange is the common form of marriage. Based on reciprocal exchange, men from other bands exchange sisters or other females to whom they have ties.[9]"

Clearly not egalitarian, despite the claim (not referenced) in the following paragraph, that they are. — AmadeusD

Because a patrilineal society cannot be egalitarian, or because the "exchange" of women cannot be consensual?

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You offered just one reference to one patriarchal society, the Ket. Which does not a generality make.

Furthermore, if the Ket were patriarchal, this is because we know via their oral tradition that these tribes were led by shaman (it's from these peoples that the term "shaman" gained its repute) which were men. This as is clearly stated in the article:

The Kets have a rich and varied culture, filled with an abundance of Siberian mythology, including shamanistic practices and oral traditions. Siberia, the area of Russia in which the Kets reside, has long been identified as the originating place of the Shaman or Shamanism. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ket_people#Culture

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I also spent about eight years looking in to and speaking with members of Amazonian tribes (for different reasons) and it was patently obvious all of those groups (Jivaro, Shipibo, Ashaninka etc..) are patriarchal through endless books, conversations and papers - I can't pull out some specific reference without carrying out some actual research, which this thread doesn't call for. — AmadeusD

Given your empirical expertise, you might then want to rewrite the Wikipedia page on hunter-gatherers, which directly contradicts your claims. Again, this as pertains to hunter-gatherers at large as they are known to be in various scientific fields. I say this quite earnestly, for truth is truth and facts matter.

Till then, I'll trust what the referenced scientists say.

Further, this concept of hte 'noble savage" or some weird idea that indigenous societies were more just than ours needs to stop. They were mostly brutal and unforgiving. — AmadeusD

First off, I made no such mention of a "noble savage" - and only claimed they were/are largely egalitarian, which in no way precludes their ability to be brutally violent for reasons such as that of self defense or warfare.

Secondly, the boldfaced affirmation seems to directly speak to the very same inference based on your previous posts made at the beginning of this one post: namely, that of there being a good sum of ingroup abuse.

To which, again, references are as of yet lacking to show how hunter-gatherer tribes are "mostly brutal and unforgiving" or else "abusive" when it comes to ingroup members. This even as pertains to the very few human-cannibalism-practicing tribes among them,.

"descriptions and predications" — J

Yes, it doesn't address what physicality per se is. But this theme brings to mind how water can be described via, and predicated on, the structure of two elements. It also brings to mind the fact that such description and predication neither changes a) the reality that water can be wet (a liquid) at room temperature whereas the two gases cannot nor b) the reality that there is no known explanation for why H2O ceases to be strictly gaseous at room temperature, this unlike compounds such as CO2 (predictable thought it is, this quality of H2O, and of other compounds in general, nevertheless being blatant hocus-pocus events that are often overlooked as so being, as though they’ve been in some way explained).

And this, to me, in some ways parallels to the mind-brain dichotomy. There still remains a difference between mind and brain (e.g., the second can be touched, smelled, seen, even tasted; the first can’t - to skip on a long list of maybe more pertinent examples), and there is still no viable explanation of how or why the two correlate. Save that, unlike chemical compounds, the mind holds properties that are commonly understood to be immaterial.

He was less circumspect in later talks and seemed to be pushing a notion that could possibly run afoul of Hemple's Dilemma (i.e. if something is real, it is, by definition, included in what is physical).

The difficulty is that "physical," like the "methodological naturalism" mentioned earlier in this thread, is that they can be pushed very far in different directions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, exactly so. Hence, were something like “the One” to in fact be real, it would then need to be deemed physical due to the necessity of anything real being strictly physical. And what an odd form of physicalism that would be.

How then to account for the general egalitarianism of the hunter-gatherer tribes which are present in the current day? — javra

Easy: The rest of the world are no longer in those situations. My knowledge of several of those groups is that they are decidedly not egalitarian, even in principle. — AmadeusD

You offer a lot of opinions and thoughts in your post, but I am interested in the potential facts of the matter.

To begin with, can you provide references evidencing that modern hunter-gather societies - or at least some such - are of an authoritarian leadership which so 'oversees' all others in the tribe so as to preserve social cohesion? (this rather than being societies of generally egalitarian governance).

But that subjection of women to their men, rife in pretty much every group on that list. — AmadeusD

Next, can you provide references to how "the subjection of women to their men is rife in pretty much every group on that list"?

I’m assuming these references will be easy for you to provide, given the knowledge you say you have regarding these matters. (I've previously given references to my affirmations. It'd be odd for you not to do likewise.)

I think the idea that a pre-historic society was egalitarian is pretty much a DOA. Nothing to it. The less oversight society has, more abuse happens. — AmadeusD

Is this to say that devoid of some authoritarian oversight humans - and, in particular, men - are naturally abusive?

Issues such as this then signifying that men will naturally rape as many women as they/we can were it not for such oversight (this not being an ethical characteristic by the standards of most) aside:

How then to account for the general egalitarianism of the hunter-gatherer tribes which are present in the current day? There's more than a handful of these.

I believe it comes down, once again, to an unshakable faith in physicalism. — J

By my counts, quite validly expressed!

And, in keeping with this thread's theme: yes, there is a distinct difference between "faith" at large and that particular type of faith which is "unshakable" - this irrespective of the rational or, in this case, experiential evidence to the contrary.

What Dennett means by "illusion" is "something that looks like it's non-physical." — J

Within this context which you mention, the notion of "illusion" almost begins to make sense. (Save for the "looks like" part :razz: , which, again, would logically entail an awareness which so sees.) In earnest, however, I admire your willingness to see things from others' perspectives.

Since I take it you've read Dennett first-hand, did Dennett ever get around to defining what "the physical" actually is in his philosophical writings? This so as to validly distinguish it from that which would then be "the illusion of non-physicality".

The issue brings to mind Thomas Huxley - with the nickname of "Darwin's bulldog", who first coined the term "agnostic", and who was a worthwhile philosopher in his own right - whose works I have read. A quote from him, here with emphasis on the subject of physicalism / materialism:

My fundamental axiom of speculative philosophy is that materialism and spiritualism are opposite poles of the same absurdity - the absurdity of imagining that we know anything about either spirit or matter.

Techne is in some sense the proof of episteme, and what "objectifies" it in the world (in the same way that Hegel says that institutions serve to objectify morality). — Count Timothy von Icarus

While still upholding the primacy of episteme over techne in their importance, I do agree with this. :up:

And in keeping with this, I often enough think that Francis Bacon would have been better off stating "understanding is power" - this rather than "knowledge is power". But then it gets to be contingent on how one understands and translates the term "scientia".

The only eliminativist I've really spent much time on is Daniel Dennett, [...] I believe he would say that consciousness and awareness are user illusions -- as is, indeed, the user him/herself! — J

Though I'm familiar with the argument, I haven't read Dennett's works first hand myself, so I'm not sure how he would argue this illusion might work when replied to thusly:

"Consciousness" is (I think we'd all agree) a very concept-laden term - such that what some might interpret by the term might in fact not be. I grant this. But there can be no notion of consciousness devoid of all awareness.

And, as to "awareness being an illusion", an illusion relative to what if not to awareness itself?

"Illusion" - if its to be at all cogent as term - can only mean "misapprehension, i.e. a mistaken understanding (else: a mistaken seeming)". So, I'd take it that for wrong-apprehension to occur there must then by entailment yet be an ontically occurring apprehension, an understanding, by ...

And here again I ask by what else if not by an ontically actual and hence real awareness (or, as @Count Timothy von Icarus might say, "by the intellect", which is awareness-endowed by the very fact of being that which understands).

Illusion devoid of an ontically real awareness to which the illusion applies is, I argue, at best nonsensical (and at worst, possibly willfully dishonest).

I think you're overestimating the power of the "give me a predictive hypothesis" request, but yes, we do want to be able to say more than "Tradition says so" or "it's empirical too." — J

Wanted to add that focus on “a hypothesis’ ability to predict” is, to my mind unfortunately, too often prioritized over “a hypothesis’ explanatory power” – this especially in philosophy.

The first strictly addresses techne (i.e., the making or doing something (namely, that of a valid prediction)), whereas the second is about episteme (i.e., the understanding of what is) – and to me it seems obvious that there can be no techne in the absence of episteme, such that episteme is of paramount importance, with techne being only secondary..

For example, in this context it can be asked, "Does the phenomenologist or the eliminativist provide more explanatory power as regards the totality of what is?" While I'm sure that argument galore as to this question's answer could ensue, to my best understanding it remains the case that the eliminativist will not be able to explain most anything as regards awareness per se. And without awareness, there cannot be any form of empiricism.

But anywho, what is the philosophical import of this sociological discussion? — Hanover

If most of the human species’ 200,000-year or so existence has been of a largely egalitarian nature at least within ingroups, this might illustrate that human males are not genetically hardwired to be misogynists as far as the human species (as it's biologically defined to this day) goes. It might also support the credence that men being innately superior relative to women - i.e. male chauvinism - is not supportable in strictly biological terms (but gains its support strictly form culture, e.g. “God said so, therefore so it is”; Edit: else via cultural understandings of 'evolution via natural selection" as conceptualized by those who do not know and don't give a hoot about what evolutionists of biological science actually say - the history of our human species being just one such example).

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Tim wood thinks perhaps 100% of women can tell a story of sexual assault. I think he's right. All the women I know have horror stories about men. — RogueAI

As in, the evolution of human societies takes a path, and along the route women fare better and worse depending upon the moment. From my vantage point today, it does seem at this moment substantial efforts at female protection and enforcing equality are being made. — Hanover

I see an incongruity in the propositional content of these two quotes.

These are just two of many possible ways of understanding the superordinate concept. — Joshs

OK, but - as per all that I have written in this thread - I reject both these "superordiante concepts" (in sum: that of biology and of culture) as being foundational to the masculinity / femininity dichotomy. Instead adopting the more metaphysical notions of yin and yang. For which, I personally cannot so far think of any possible "superordinate concept".

Suppose there's a parallel universe where everything else is the same, but men are weaker than women. Would we see the same rates of rape and abuse? — RogueAI

I'm here presuming you mean to say "men are weaker than women" in this parallel world physically and politically, rather than psychologically. It's been my experience (in the military) that most men are anxious if not fearful of injections, whereas most women are not - to not bring in the psychological strength required for human childbirth.

Granting similar inequity of physical and political power and a similar general want of respect for the other - this in an "us vs. them" state of mind as regards the sexes (e.g., what man likes being called "a pussy", as just one common enough example in the world we inhabit) - I can easily fathom the same general rates of abuse of the weaker sex (here, men) by the stronger (here, women). But not the same general rates of rape: this because a) men are the ones biologically endowed with penises by definition (right?) and b) - either via forms of love (minimally, consensuality, even if it occurs via S&M in which physical pain might be wanted and given) or, else, via willful cruelties (unconsensual almost by definition: this being "the willful causing of suffering in another") - it is only men who thereby gain sexual, physical pleasure via use of their penises to penetrate others (here taking into account homosexuality as well).

That said, I don't find women any more "innately benevolent" than I do men. It's just that (when addressed as a whole) each sex has its own biological and hence physical equipment and, maybe, its own general talents and other psychical abilities (though how much of the latter is strictly genetic vs. cultural I don't presume to know) - which, in either sex, could be used either constructively to promote harmony or not.

I doubt that I can provide references to this (other than the biological aspects of being a man :smile: ), but it is what I generally uphold.

BTW, if you're talking about awareness per se, though it can become a concept we as aware-beings become aware of and thereby think about, awareness of itself is nevertheless not a concept. This likely deviates from the thread's topic significantly, though

... unless one gets into the issue of whether awareness is of itself masculine or feminine ... to which I'd maintain something along the lines of it being neither but instead a perpetual hybrid of both: You can't have spatiotemporal awareness without any agency (yang), and spatiotemporal awareness is perpetually penetrated by information (yin) - both simultaneously. (I here specify "spatiotemproal" to allow for the metaphysical possibility of things such as the notion of Nirvana when construed as a non-spatiotermpral and nondualistic awareness - hence one which no longer wants/wills/etc. and no longer is penetrated by information.) But again, all this is awfully distant from the thread's intents.