Check out the link I gave in that post, where I answer this sort of question. — Leontiskos

I read it. It does not address the question I posed. Which I would still like answered.

But even when assuming that 100% of the human population is in fact bisexual — javra

But I have not assumed such a thing. — Leontiskos

And so your argument then had nothing to do with homosexuality, but, instead, with strict bisexuality. Two utterly distinct sexual preferences. First off, I was addressing homosexuality, not bisexuality. Secondly, arguments regarding how swayable bisexuals might be in terms of their sexual preferences are utterly disconnected from those regarding homosexuals (and heterosexuals).

Because I don't think such a thing should be done. Why would you assume that I think such a thing should be done? Nothing in my post says anything to that effect. Isn't it strange and uncharitable to simply assume that your interlocutor wants to exterminate an entire class of people? — Leontiskos

Hmm. Maybe it is because the very quote from me you chose to reply to stated the following:

So why then "try to eliminate" these expressions of being human? And then, if an alternative rational reason is provided, "eliminate" them how? — javra


Consider X and Y. If they are equal, then neither one is preferable. If X is better than Y, then X is preferable. If X is better according to some criterion, then X is preferable according to that criterion. If the proportion of X-outcomes and Y-outcomes is beyond our control, then it is pointless to prefer one to another even if it is better.

[Etc. ...] — Leontiskos

You actually seem to have managed to ignore almost the entirety of my post, — Leontiskos

You mean your arguments that strictly regarded bisexuality? You seem have completely missed the significance of my reply to it. In a nutshell, homosexuality is not bisexuality.

Specifically, I explicitly asked you four questions. You only answered one or two of them, namely the preliminary ones. — Leontiskos

Yes, specifically the ones I found pertinent following my reply to your post. Which two questions do you still deem pertinent and unanswered?

(This is why I don't tend to argue these topics on TPF. Over the years it has become a place where one cannot present an argument and have that argument addressed without being imputed with all sorts of strange, uncharitable, and extraneous positions.) — Leontiskos

On one hand, welcome to life. On the other, I find nothing in my reply that was "strange, uncharitable, and/or extraneous". Your verbiage here presented you as victimized and me as victimizer. Let's see, this then being "ordinary, charitable, and pertinent"?

And not all life uses cellular respiration. — Patterner

A bold statement. Can you please reference any known lifeform that can live in the complete absence of both aerobic or anaerobic respiration? Fermentation, a form of metabolism that is neither, to my knowledge is not sufficient for life in the complete lifelong absence of respiration - an example of this being the fermentation in yeast, which cannot life in a complete lifelong absence of respiration. (At least, from everything I so far know.)

My overriding question is:. Can there be life without chemical reactions? — Patterner

You more specifically mean certain reactions of organic chemicals, namely those which result in metabolism - or at least I so assume. This will fully depend on the metaphysics one subscribes to. In some such metaphysical systems, being "dead inside" or else being "fully alive" are more than mere poetics, but can point to an interpretation of "life" which, though non-physical, nevertheless required for physical life to occur. That mentioned, there is no non-metaphorical life (as in, "the life of an idea" or else "the lifespan of a car") known to science which is not grounded in the physicality of "chemical reactions". None that I know of at least.

Consider Christian theology, for example. Or any of a number of recent threads. — Banno

Considered and acknowledged.

Dogma basically means, "You aren't allowed to argue about this position."

If TPF wants to take a non-dogmatic approach to the topic then I think that would be wonderful. — Leontiskos

Would you affirm the same of positions such as that of Holocaust denial, the somewhat different belief that the white race is superior to all others due to divine commandment from God and thereby has an inherent right to subjugate or else exterminate all other races on Earth, how about the belief that there is rational justifications for the goodness of an adult having consensual sex with preadolescents? And far more taboo positions could be additionally proposed.

If you do, then is there no limit to this bottomless pit of deprivation? Or does deprivation, which in this context can only be harmful to the eudemonia of both individuals and society at large, not exist?

If you don’t, then on what grounds separate justifications for ever-expanding homophobia (which this thread’s theme maybe only too unintentionally seeks to provide and solidify) from, say, justifications for there not having ever been any intentional executions of homosexuals in the gas-chambers of WWII?

(I ask this as someone who respects the dignity of life, and sees no reason to deprive others who are for most part fully ethical humans of this very dignity.)

For something that's included that we think is booty living, she cites Carl Sagan' Definitions of Life:

For many years a physiological definition of life was
popular. Life was defined as any system capable of
performing a number of such functions as eating,
metabolizing, excreting, breathing, moving, growing, reproducing, and being responsive to external stimuli. But many such properties are either present in machines that nobody is willing to call alive, or absent from organisms that everybody is willing to call alive. An automobile, for example, can be said to eat, metabolize, excrete, breathe, move, and be responsive to external stimuli. And a visitor from another planet, judging from the enormous numbers of automobiles on the Earth and the way in which cities and landscapes have been designed for the special benefit of motorcars, might wellbelieve that automobiles are not only alive but are the dominant life form on the planet. — Carl Sagan — Patterner

Good post, but if we start playing footloose with the term metabolism - which in part necessitates cellular respiration - then fire is certainly alive: "it metabolizes energy to sustain its own being, it's birthed and it perishes, and it reproduces". And something's quire off about so affirming, unless one wants to assume an animistic cosmos wherein absolutely everything is animated with agency and, hence, with will.

The motive is rather something like pride or vanity, the desire to be right or to be seen as right (or intelligent, or powerful, or virtuous). So to oversimplify, we all desire to be esteemed and we all desire truth, but oftentimes a devotion to truth requires that we humble ourselves and abandon our desire for esteem. The question then becomes: do you care about truth more than being esteemed? — Leontiskos

:up: On this we very much agree. Because it deviates from the intent of the OP, I was trying to keep things short in my last post. But yes. Its what in my own terminology I'd sum up as the choice between preferring egoistic interests, what you term "pride or vanity", or else the more egoless interest of uncovering, of being aligned to, and of ultimately conforming to ever deeper truths. Apropos, the Ancient Greek term for truth, aletheia, gets variously translated as "unconcealedness", "disclosure", "revealing", or "unhiddenness".[2] It also means "reality".[3] A different contextual vantage on what truth signifies. As to vanity:

Upon the road of my life,
Passed me many fair creatures,
Clothed all in white, and radiant.
To one, finally, I made speech:
"Who art thou?"
But she, like the others,
Kept cowled her face,
And answered in haste, anxiously,
"I am good deed, forsooth;
You have often seen me."
"Not uncowled," I made reply.
And with rash and strong hand,
Though she resisted,
I drew away the veil
And gazed at the features of vanity.
She, shamefaced, went on;
And after I had mused a time,
I said of myself,
"Fool!" — Stephen Crane

So, when it comes to the pointing fingers at other's vanity, as another dictum from the Oracle at Delphi goes: "Everything in moderation". We're all, after all, in our own ways and degrees, vain.

Do they know what exactly implements this valence? Is it a chemical difference? — noAxioms

Not to my knowledge. But I do assume it's constituted from organic chemistry. Still, as with the metabolism that likewise unfolds, there is an autopoiesis involved that is other than the individual molecules and their chemicals. Feel free to use the pejorative of vitalism. Lumping together some lipids, proteins, and nucleic acids does not a living organism make. Or: metabolism = respiration = breath = anima = life. (e.g., a virus, viroid, or prion does not have a metaboism and is hence not living, even though composed of organic molecules) And this entails that extra oomph, relative to the purely terrestrial and inanimate, of autopoiesis.

Here your biases show through. Possession seems to be required for the cell to do this. The bacterium is possessed. The car is asserted not to be, despite some cars these days being endowed with an awareness that meaningfully responds to stimuli. I've always likened substance dualism with being demon possessed, yielding one's free will to that of the demon, apparently because the demon makes better choices?
If a cell can be possessed, why not a toaster? What prevents that? — noAxioms

Again, I'll just assume that you are biased against the notion that life is ontologically different to nonlife (be it either inanimate or else organically dead). And so I'll skip ahead to the term "vitalism". Vitalism is quite different from the hocus-pocus spiritual notions of "possessions". So framing the issue in term of possession is a non-starter for me. Now, as far as jokes go, supposedly anything can be possessed. From lifeforms to children's toys (e.g., Chucky), and I don't see why not toasters as well (this in purely speculative theory but not in practice, akin to BIVs, solipsism, and such) And this possession supposedly occurs via what is most often taken to be a malevolent anima (a ghost orthe like), which, as anima, is itself endowed with the vitality that vitalism in one way or another specifies. But again, I've no interest in the hocus-pocus spirituality of possessions. The issue of vitalism, on the other hand, seems important enough to me as regards the current topics.

Side note: It's Christine, not Carrie. — noAxioms

:grin: Haven't read the book nor seen the movie. Thanks for the correction.

I agree that not being rigorously defined, consciousness can be thus loosely applied to what is simple cause and effect. — noAxioms

Again, intents, and the intentioning they entail, are teleological, and not cause and effect. There's a massive difference between the two (e.g., the intent is always contemporaneous to the effects produced in attempting to fulfill it - whereas a cause is always prior to its effect).

This seems a biased definition. It would mean that even if I manufacture a human from non-living parts, it would not be conscious. Why does the intent need to be innate? Is a slave not conscious because his intent is that of his master? — noAxioms

What you do you mean "manufacture a human from non-living parts"? In whole? How then would it in any way be human? Or are you thinking along the lines of fictions such as of the bionic man or robocop? In which case, the human life remains intact while its constituent parts of its body are modified with non-living parts.

As to why innate: because it is, in fact, natural, rather than human-derived and thereby artificial. A human slave has innate intents, which thereby allow in certain cases the slave to obey the non-innate but acquired intent of the slave-master. (a slave's intent is never logically identical to the slave-master' intent - this, of itself, would be hocus-pocus possession)

And, from everything I so far understand, teleological processes can only hold veritable presence within non-physicalist ontologies: -- javra

Surely the car (and a toaster) has this. It's doing what it's designed to do. That's a teleological process in operation. — noAxioms

Even so, a) these teleological process you here address are artificial rather than natural and b) it doesn't in any way change what was stated regarding ontologies.

If I think about what could be lost should anti-modernism be turned into political action, it may turn out to be the most dangerous form of egoism we’ve ever seen. — NOS4A2

In many ways I agree. But to be clear, at least personally, I'm not "anit-modernism" nor do I hold a desire to return to the days of old. There's no looking back (other than to understand where the present has come from historically). There's only looking forward.

There's plenty more going on, including no small amount of self-deception. But not with you and I of course, only with them. — Banno

Seems like you're trying to insinuate something here.

Of course everyone, me and you included, is engaged in self-deceptions. That’s not the issue. For instance, philosophically speaking, it just as false to believe that “I am” as it is false to believe that “I am not”—though each falsity occurs from a different vantage. (This being, for example, basic Buddhist teachings 101.) Point being, issue is not if we are engaged in any self-deceptions (we’d be perfected being devoid of these, and all humans are imperfect) but, rather, what to do about it. One either prefers truth over falsity and so values the cathartic sting of bubbles getting burst whenever they so do or, else, one doesn’t, preferring instead the eternal preservation of falsehoods. In some ways it’s akin to becoming an alcoholic: it’s only when one loses all concern of becoming an alcoholic while drinking that one runs the risk of so becoming. Long story short, we all engage in doublethink, just that some of us dislike it while others do like it, with only the latter claiming that they are perfectly devoid of it.

Consider X and Y. If they are equal, then neither one is preferable. If X is better than Y, then X is preferable. If X is better according to some criterion, then X is preferable according to that criterion. If the proportion of X-outcomes and Y-outcomes is beyond our control, then it is pointless to prefer one to another even if it is better.

Is any of that objectionable? — Leontiskos

No, so long as it’s taken to be an oversimplification of real-world applications, where the criteria that determines better or worse is context-dependent and often multidimensional: Take intelligence for example. Einstein’s intelligence is not Darwin’s intelligence, such that each is far better than the other’s in the relevant context addressed. Neither are these two intelligences equal nor is one intelligence better than the other in any objective sense. Then there’s the artistic intelligence of, say, Michelangelo. The architectural intelligence of Gaudi. That of Kafka’s. And so forth.

At this point, if we accept that there are bisexual people who can choose, and that social norms have a strong effect on how much sexual orientation identification occurs within the society, doesn't it follow that we would be interested in objectively assessing the relative value of homosexual and heterosexual arrangements? If we are interested in the health and happiness of the society itself, would we not be interested in such a thing? — Leontiskos

There are, lets say, pure heterosexuals and pure homosexuals that are in no way bisexual. As I’ve previously expressed in a previous post, from what I learned in human sexuality courses while at the university: with each likely constituting roughly 1/5th of the population. This such that only 3/5ths of the population are in some means bisexual, and with only 1/5th of the population being true bisexuals, such that they in deed hold no preference whatsoever when it comes to sexual orientation.

But even when assuming that 100% of the human population is in fact bisexual and can thereby be swayed into either heterosexual or homosexual relations (which, I hope, is readily understood to be utterly false), given that homosexuality is neither a disability nor a mental insanity, your post neither addresses why homosexuality ought to be exterminated from the population nor the how this ought to then be done.

As to relative values, they again can well be context-dependent and multidimensional.

As to the health and happiness of society at large, by what criteria is the typical Ancient Greek citizen concluded to be less healthy and happy that the typical modern citizen? … and this not due to improved medicine or technology but strictly on account of the Ancient Greek most likely having engaged in homosexual activities.

Alexander of Macedonia comes to mind as one well-known example, and he appears to have been a pure homosexual: quite healthy and happy for span of his life, despite his homosexual activities.

and that this will shed light on truth and knowledge (by shedding light on falsity). — Leontiskos

As a song by "The Doors" has it: "you know the day (in this context, light and thereby truth) destroys the night (falsity), night (falsity) divides the day (truth) ..." Poetic but substantial enough to me, this when it comes to the ontology of truth and falsity.

In truth, your account is somewhat overly simplistic for me, but, that said, by and large I agree. In real world cases, the successful self-deceived will sometimes form a confirmation bias whereby they attempt via all means possible to justify the (believed) truth of what in fact is a self-deception. I take this to go hand in hand with the human ego’s often valued impetus to be right rather than undergo the suffering of being wrong. A kind of self-preservation of one’s identity as righteous, and the comfort (or else, satisfaction and peace of mind) that accompanies it. And, in cases such as this, the self-deception can well persist despite the surrounding community expressing otherwise via all sorts of evidence. (Don’t know how common this is, but I’ve encountered this in the course of my life.) Still, again, by and by, I’m in general agreement with you: if we're honest with ourselves ... then what you say follows.

The one I find most unexpected as a philosophical issue is "What the mechanisms are of self-deception and of wishful and fearful thinking?" If anyone, reading this, happens to know where Haack might have written on this topic, I'd like to know. — J

I don’t know if Haack wrote about it to any significant extent (it wasn’t present in what I’ve so far read of her writings), but the issue of self-deception is a very complex and problematic topic in philosophy. For example, one form of self-deception occurs when one lies to oneself and maybe others (e.g., “I didn’t do it”) while being momentarily aware that this is a lie (e.g., knowing full well that one did do it) only to at a future juncture come to believe this very lie as being a full-blown truth. I’d label the issue as one regarding the philosophy of mind. The SEP has a dedicated entry to the issue of self-deception here.

I intuitively believe the issues of wishful and fearful thinking can become easily resolvable philosophically once the issue of self-deception becomes satisfactorily accounted for.

OK, I’ll bite and reply.

Aristotle? The guy gave us the understanding of the unmoved mover as ultimate telos. No, I don’t read Aristotle as a man of materialistic values.

Here’s my synopsis on the issue:

-- Nonmaterialistic values: Beauty, justice, truths, understandings, kindness, love, among other aspects to be found in humanity’s being, are all intrinsically valuable to one’s own being. Why? Because they all, of themselves, serve to lead one toward the desirable ultimate telos of one’s own being’s optimal eudemonia, optimal bliss—an ultimate telos which is in fact obtainable despite the difficulties and, due to this alone, is impartially, aka objectively, Right (aka, the correct ultimate end). No hocus pocus spirituality is required for this mindset to hold, much less a belief in deities, angels, fairies, etc. (Which, however, isn’t to nullify their possibility.)

-- Materialistic values: All there is is matter, hence: here today, gone tomorrow. So you might as well horde as much cash as possible to best establish power over others, all this at the expense of others, while here, this via any means conceivable. It’s after all the optimal way of obtaining any semblance of real happiness in this life: that of being top-dog in a dog-eat-dog world. Hence no decrying of corruption if it happens to make one rich and powerful. This since there is no such thing as a governing, existential Right and Wrong that is independent of opinion. There is only Might, of body and of mind. Were you to obtain sufficient might, then, by gosh, all others would readily consent to your decree that 2 and 2 could in fact equal 5. And what a blissful life such would be for you. Besides, in the end, who cares anyway: the incontrovertible fact is that all that there’ll be is nihility of being for everyone currently living. So to hell with the notion of an intrinsic worth to beauty, justice, truths, and the like; they’re all worthless unless one can capitalize on them via cash and overbearing power, in short: via a despotic authority over others.

Yes, nonmaterialistic values and materialistic values have always competed: within societies and within individuals world over. But once one accepts materialism as fact it gets rather difficult, if at all yet rationally possible, to substantiate the worth of nonmaterialistic values—much less their both short and long-term benefits, especially by comparison to materialistic values.

So nonmaterialistic values get eroded from societies and their constituent individuals. Such as via the pressures of the marketplace under a system of global capitalism founded on the delusion of infinite growth from infinite resources. And one does have to put bread on the table so as to eat. So voila, welcome to modernity. And the kickback toward authoritarian fundamentalist perspectives, many of which happen to be religious, all claiming to be “a”, if not “the”, solution to what many humans sense to be problematic about today’s state of affairs, most of which are replete with materialistic values.

Now, no, this isn’t supposed to be anywhere near a formal thesis on the matter. That said, I do find it informally presents my own generalized understanding of the issue concisely enough.

Yea, I sharply disagree. (Reminds me of discussions on different thread where philosophy itself can be viewed as being a cash-making endeavor: Socrates the idiotic imbecile on account of not cashing in.) But I'll for now leave it for other to debate.

modernity is not the result of a success of this-or-that way of thinking or ideology, — NOS4A2

Because the prevailing philosophical outlook of materialism has nothing to do with the adopting of materialistic values which is so endemic to modernity?

------------

While I'm at it: Children would typically dream of becoming ballerinas and astronauts and the like not too long ago. Ask the typical child what they want to be when they grow up in today's world and what you typically hear is, "a rich tycoon". Materialistic values to the max.

Sure. They could have been high on hallucinogens. Religions might have been founded on the ideas of insane or high people. — Harry Hindu

Or, there might indeed be spiritual dimensions to reality. Take your pick. But don't presume to have definitively evidenced it. That is, not unless you can, philosophically speaking.

Define functional here. Sure intersexed people, homosexuals and trans are functional as human beings - they can live their own lives without the help of others, but what they cannot do is have children without the help of others. That is my point. — Harry Hindu

So ascetics world over, who cannot have children due to their own hardcore physiological imperatives, are to then to be deemed in terms of functionality/adaptiveness ... what exactly? Notice that such an ascetic has zero fitness biologically speaking. All due to "mental" reasons and choices.

As to definitions, this link gives what I intend by "functional". You'll note that is can well be a rough synonym for "adaptive"

Oh, come on. Don't start conflating my points as fascist. I am not saying that people with schizophrenia, or who are born with disabilities deserve less than anyone else. I am fine with supporting a safety net for the disabled, but at the same time would agree with society's goal with trying to eliminate these disabilities from occurring in the future. When we tell an anorexic that their body image is not true, we are not attempting to single them out for a "shower". We are merely trying to get them the help they need. — Harry Hindu

I am not conflating your points as fascist. It's the notion of X, Y, and Z, not fitting a human-envisioned "ideal human nature" that we ought to actualize which gives me the heebie-jeebies. This for reasons aforementioned. As to the rest of this paragraph, I'm glad to hear - but, again, I don't find rational grounds for the intersexed, or homosexuality, or the transgendered to be "disabled" or else mentally insane. So why then "try to eliminate" these expressions of being human? And then, if an alternative rational reason is provided, "eliminate" them how?

To cut to the chase: Do we then agree that the issues at hand have nothing to do with either “normality” or with “naturalness”?

If so, as currently appears to be the case, I’ll then assume that what’s instead being implicitly addressed is the issue of dysfunctionality.

This issue of dysfunctionality, of itself, is an extremely complex issue. For one example: You at some point mentioned schizophrenia as a mental illness and compare it to sex and gender issues. Not only are the causes to schizophrenia still unknown, but, as I previously mentioned, there would be no reason to presume that the Biblical Moses and modern-day psychics, as just two readily known examples, are not all cases of schizophrenia (they all claim to see/hear/etc. things that normal people don’t) were it not for the fact that they all are/were fully functional human beings. With some being far more mentally healthy than the average Joe. The point to this being that the seeing/hearing of things that are not physically there is an extremely complex issue, one that is in no way cut and dry, and it does not of itself signify mental insanity (as per the examples just provided).

That said, when it comes to being intersexed, intersexed people, as a general rule, are fully functional. As is the case for homosexuals. As is also the case for transgender people. This save for the pushback against their very being in society which many a “normal person” engages in. Again, these diverse expressions of the human, though functional, are nevertheless all different from the norm … with many in society treating that which deviates from the norm as “unnatural”—with this very proclamation being that which many of my posts in this thread have been ridiculing.

I get that they might not be “perfectly” functional, but then who the hell is?

And yes, things such as mental insanity is indeed dysfunctional. To not get into the more extreme cases of conjoined twins and such.

But I don’t here want to start on the issue of “what ought to be done about the dysfunctional folk” in society … were there to be significant debate on this matter, it would too easily bring to mind the extermination camps of the Nazis who, after all, were in pursuit of a future heaven on earth (this, obviously, via quite authoritarian means—and there’s plenty right about the dictum, “the means do not justify the ends”) where all human souls get birthed into a human-envisioned “ideal human nature” … reputedly, to include the ideal human nature of everyone being blue-eyed blonds world over.

You said earlier:

"The sophistic BS part was a separate issue to me: pivoting on the issue of ego and its desires for fame, fortune, power, etc. by mimicking (but not emulating) what good faith philosophers do"

I'm not sure what you mean here.
What do good faith philosophers do in regard to the ego and its desires for fame, fortune, etc.? — baker

From where I stand, good faith philosophers pursue philosophy for its intrinsic worth and mostly if not wholly shun its potential instrumental values for the ego, such as those of becoming famous, becoming financially wealthy, or gaining greater powers over others within society. Socrates, the homeless bum wanderer, certainly fits this description. Although not as humbly, many others do as well. Nietzsche as just one example of the latter.

In what way do you think that Buddhism is sophistic here? — baker

I don't. As for the book on dating I've mentioned, you seemed to have overlooked the beginning part of the paragraph from which you pulled out your quote:

Well, to start off, what I was saying is that there is philosophical fluff that drowns out the good quality non-fluff philosophy in today's connected world. Fluff, then, is not sophistic BS but merely superficial and in due degree inconsequential. — javra

Nor do I understand the entailment between the book "If the Buddha Dated" and Buddhism per se as philosophy. The first is relative fluff, the second ain't.

Here is a scriptural reference to the eight worldy conditions: https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an08/an08.006.than.html

I really want to understand this; I want to know how an outsider sees this Buddhist teaching. — baker

In short, the eight worldly conditions are aspects of samsara and hence of inevitable dissatisfaction given time. And btw, as an outsider, I find great value in a great portion of Buddhist teaching.

Conflict is the way of the world, a given, the natural state (also see agonism). — baker

As is harmony and happiness. Or are these somehow unnatural? And who ever even once mentioned "overcoming", to not even mention "banishing", conflict per se in general??? This would be projecting things into what I've said that were never there. Here, to put it in Buddhist terms, not until Nirvana is actualized on a global scale for one and all--in other words, not till the literal end of cosmic time--will there ever be a time when we're not knee-deep in existential conflicts. And the end of time is nowhere on the horizon. One swims/navigates the waters of life; one doesn't overcome them.

But, that said, I would like to presume that, when it comes to "conflict", you too would rather that those conflicts which occur as aspects of rapes and murders don't proliferate but, instead, cease occurring sooner rather than later. Notice, this has nothing to do with a cessation of wars and such; it wouldn't be world peace. It would only entail a cessation of wars where rapes and murders occur, rampantly so, and are in no way punished. I mention this because I've talked to some who view rapes and murders, such as in times of war, as innately ordained into our human nature (either by genes, by God, or by both). And I'm now curious to know your own stance on the matter. (And, no, a solder killing an adversary solder in a time of war is not of itself murder, this since all stated parties acknowledge and partake in the conflict of war.)

I wasn't satisfied with your comment implying that i'm only a "would be" philosopher. — ProtagoranSocratist

I can get that, but, on the other hand, none of us here have yet passed the test of time in terms of being a substantial philosopher … this generally happens well after one’s passing away from this world. :grin: As for myself, I'm not holding my breath.

The sophistic BS part was a separate issue to me: pivoting on the issue of ego and its desires for fame, fortune, power, etc. by mimicking (but not emulating) what good faith philosophers do — javra

Actually, those are references to standard Buddhist doctrine.
See the Index at Access To Insight, under "desire", for example. — baker

OK, why not, as well as references to common sense decency where some semblance of humility holds. (You wann'a go all Western religion/tradition about it, it's also what JC seems to have meant by "meekness" ... as in "the meek shall inherit the earth"... kind of like those small, warmblooded and furry rodent-like creatures did after the last great extinction of them oversized, pompous dinosaurs :grin: :wink: )

Lotuses that get drowned out in filth on account of the filth having far more connections. — javra

Lotuses grow in the filth, and they kill everything else in the bodies of water where they grow. — baker

Well, as far as poetic metaphors go, add some Hindu context to the expression and, yea, that's kind of part of the main point. Wouldn't it be swell if a nice lotus were to emerge from the swamps of filth so as to benefit all of humanity without exception, hence each human within their own perfectly individual contexts of existence (such that their own individual wants and needs get optimally satisfied), this rather than having humans suffer the swamps of filth (wherein nothing pleasing to anyone ever takes place) ad nauseam?

Put differently, is philosophy writ large about every ego perpetually being at odds with all other egos such that only filth results from the endeavor and interactions, as per in a mad house where everybody whats out? ... Or is it about best arriving at a communally-endorsed understanding of the world, of being itself even, which is accordant to all known facts while assisting all sapient beings in actualizing their individual purposes? This such that the filth no longer occurs due to this new understanding's growth. Yes, yes, the latter can all to easily be misinterpreted as endorsing and requiring authoritarianism; but, then, this would not only be contradictory to what was just explicitly stated in this paragraph but also to the aforementioned notion of common sense decency in the face of the first quote within this post. And yes, we all at times have our cockish authoritarian turns (some a hell of a lot more than others), but this too speaks to the same ideal of philosophy to me.

Of course, feel free to disagree. But, if so, I am curious to learn on what grounds.

Not true. There are plenty of machines whose functioning is not at all understood. That I think is the distinction between real AI and just complex code. Admittedly, a self driving car is probably mostly complex code with little AI to it. It's a good example of consciousness (unconscious things cannot drive safely), but it's a crappy example of intelligence or creativity. — noAxioms


Ok, but in the case of the machines we can reasonably expect that all their actions can be explained by algorithms. And I'm not sure that a self-driving car is conscious, in the sense there is 'something like being a self-driving machine'. — boundless

In conjunction with what I’ve just expressed in my previous post, I’ll maintain that for something to be conscious, the following must minimally apply, or else everything from alarm clocks to individual rocks can be deemed to be conscious as well (e.g., “a rock experiences the hit of a sledgehammer as stimuli and reacts to it by breaking into pieces, all this in manners that are not yet perfectly understood"):

To be conscious, it must a) at minimum hold intents innate to its very being (and due to these intents, thereby hold, at minimum, innate intentions) which then bring about b) an active hedonic tone to everything that it is stimulated by (be this tone positive, negative, or neutral).

An AI self-driving car holds neither (a) nor (b) (as per the joke I mentioned in my last post, not unless it’s possessed by ghosts such as Stephen King’s “Carrie” was stated to be). As @boundless points to, its “behaviors” all stem from human created algorithms that logically reduce to an “if A then B” type of efficient causation—even if these algorithms are exceedingly complex, evolve over time, and aren’t fully understood by us humans—and this devoid of both a) any intent(s) innate to its being upon which all of its “behaviors” pivot (and intents, innate or otherwise, can only be teleological rather than efficiently causal, with algorithms strictly being the latter) and, likewise, b) the affective valence which these same innate intents bring about. Example: a stationary self-driving car will not react if you open up the hood so as to dismantle the engine (much less fend for itself), nor will it feel any dolor if you do. Therefore, the self-driving car cannot be conscious.

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Please notice that I'm not in all this upholding the metaphysical impossibility of any AI program ever becoming conscious at any future point in time. But, if such were to ever occur, the given AI will then minimally need to be in some significant way governed by teleological interests, i.e. by intents innate to its being, that then bring about its affective valance relative to the stimuli it encounters (stimuli both external and internal to its own being).

And, from everything I so far understand, teleological processes can only hold veritable presence within non-physicalist ontologies: the variety of which extends far beyond the Cartesian notion of substance dualism as regards mind and body.

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EDIT: Additionally, to better clarify my aforementioned stances as regards AI, it should come as no surprise that the evolutions of AI are all governed by human-devised goals, relative to which variations of AI programs in a large sense compete to best accomplish—such that what best accomplishes these human-devised goals then replicates into a diversity of various programs which further so attempt to better accomplish the given human-devised goal. These goals that govern AI-program evolutions (rather than the AI programs themselves) have however all been devised by humans and are in this sense fully artificial (rather than being perfectly natural). In sharp enough contrast, all life, from archeobacteria to humans, is governed by fully natural and perfectly innate goals, i.e. intents; innate intents passed down from generation to generation via genotypic inheritance. So, while it is not impossible that AI might some day evolve to itself have innate intents to its very being, replete with pleasures and dolors (that are all relative to these very same innate intents with which they’re brought into being by previous generations), till AI programs so accomplish they will persist in being non-conscious programs: devoid of innate intents and so devoid of the affective valence to stimuli the former entail.

[Concerning] a Urbilaterian (a brainless ancestor of you, and also a starfish). Is it a being? Does it experience [pain say] and have intent? — noAxioms

If yes, is it also yes for bacteria?
The almost unilateral response to this question by non-physicalists is evasion. What does that suggest about their confidence in their view? — noAxioms

I’ll stick to the more extreme case of prokaryotic unicellular organisms termed “bacteria”.

Can bacteria act and react in relation to novel stimuli so as to not only preserve but improve their homeostatic metabolism (loosely, their physiological life)?

The answer is a resounding yes. For one example:

Abstract

As has been stated, bacteria are able to sense a wide range of environmental stimuli through a variety of receptors and to integrate the different signals to produce a balanced response that maintains them or directs them to an optimum environment for growth. In addition, these simple, neuron-less organisms can adapt to the current concentration or strength of stimuli, i.e. they have a memory of the past. Although different species show responses to different chemicals or stimuli, depending on their niche, a consistent pattern is starting to emerge that links environmental sensing and transcriptional control to the chemosensing system, either directly, as in R. sphaeroides and the PTS system, or indirectly, as in the MCP-dependent system. This suggests a common evolutionary pathway from transcriptional activators to dedicated sensory systems. Currently the majority of detailed investigations into bacterial behavior have been carried out on single stimuli under laboratory conditions using well-fed cells. Only limited analysis, using a range of rhizosphere and pathogenic species, has been carried out on the role of behavioral responses in the wild. While laboratory studies are needed to provide the backbone for eventual in vivo investigations, we should remember the responses of whole cells to changes in their environment under laboratory conditions are essentially artificial compared to the natural environment of most species. Once the basic system is understood, it will be possible to investigate the role of these responses in vivo, under competitive, growth-limiting conditions with multiple gradients. — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/1562188/

(though I much prefer this title: "Bacteria have feelings, too")

Their so doing then logically entails that, just like humans, the stimuli they are exposed to will have affective valence (aka hedonic tone), such that it is either positive and thereby pleasing to the bacterium or else negative and thereby displeasing. In considering that what humans label as pain is a synonym for dolor—which need not be physically produced via pain receptors and their related sensory neurons, but can well be psychological—there then is no rational means of denying that at least a bacterium’s extreme negative valence will equate to the bacterium’s dolor and, hence, pain.

Their observable, goal-oriented responsiveness to stimuli likewise entails that they too are endowed with instinctive, else innate, intents—such as that of optimally maximizing the quality and longevity of their homeostatic metabolism. Devoid of these intents, there would then be no organized means of responding to stimuli. Example: the bacterium senses a predator (danger of being eaten) and, instead of doing what it can to evade being eaten on account of its innate intents of not being so eaten, does things randomly, such as maybe approaching the predator as quickly as possible.

As to consciousness, this is a term loaded with most often implicit connotations, such as that of a recursive self-awareness. In certain contexts, though, consciousness can simply be a synonym for awareness that is not unconscious. A bacterium is no doubt devoid of an unconscious mind—this while nevertheless being endowed with a very primitive awareness that yet meaningfully responds to stimuli. Cars aren’t (not unless they’re possessed by ghosts and named “Carrie” (a joke)). In so having an awareness of stimuli, a bacterium is then also innately aware of what is its own selfhood and what is other (relative to its own selfhood), although this form of primitive self-awareness can in no way be deemed to consist of recursive thoughts.

So yes, given the best of all empirical information and rational discernment, bacteria are conscious (here strictly meaning: hold a non-unconscious, very primitive awareness) of stimuli to which they meaningfully respond via the directionality of innate intents and, furthermore, can experience negative valence, hence dolor, and, hence, some very primitive form of pain.

As to an absolute proof of this, none can be provided as is summed up in the philosophical problem of other minds. But if one can justify via empirical information and rational discernment that one’s close friend has an awareness-pivoted mind, and can hopefully do the same for lesser-animals, then there is no reason to not so likewise do for bacteria.

Shoot, the same can be argued for reproductive haploid cells called gametes, both eggs and sperm/pollen. The easiest to address example: a sperm devoid of any awareness of stimuli to which it meaningfully responds due to innate intents that thereby determine the hedonic tone of the given stimuli would be no functional sperm whatsoever (this if in any way living).

Taken together, these statements form a pattern:

• It is basically a “Religion of the Self.”
• By the Self, for the Self and in terms of the Self.

Please understand I am criticizing the underlying presuppositions of such a claim, not any persons who make this claim. I’ll qualify my criticism…

• By the self: The path is self-initiated and self-designed. It is separate from a lineage, a tradition, or a community of practice that carries epistemic or existential weight.

• For the self: The orientation is primarily inward (personal healing, empowerment, self-actualization). Others may benefit, but they are not the axis of concern.

• In terms of the self: The criteria for what is meaningful, true, or sacred are internal (intuition, resonance, felt-sense). There is nothing that contradicts, challenges, or exceeds the framework.

It is a religion reorganized around “me”.

So when someone identifies as "spiritual but not religious," they are often (though not always) enacting a spirituality that lacks any real other(s).

It bottoms out as being an isolated self attempting to be its own source of authority, value, and transformation.

This might be deviating from the OP, but there's something quite off about all this to me.

Why do many Easterners put their hands together (as Westerners do in prayer) and bow to one another to convey reverence? Is it not because they understand “the divine truth”, for lack of better concise terms, to dwell both within themselves just as much as it dwells within the other—this understanding being at least cultural?

Do we Westerners not see ourselves (the sacredness of our own being) in others as well? After all, this is key to sympathy, compassion, and the like. And is the mysticism-produced dictum from the Oracle of Delfi (the mouthpiece of Apollo, the giver of light and its related attributes), “know thyself”, to be interpreted as some type of egotism-reinforcing doctrine?

All this asked in more or less rhetorical fashion so as to express the view that of course the sacred dwells within us, in me just as much as in you and all others (in purely spiritual, incorporeal beings too, were such to exist). The so-called “divine truth” doesn’t ultimately reside spatially somewhere out there but, instead, within the very awareness upon which our total selfhood pivots. Not just mine or yours but everyone’s. Everything else is just representations, this in some ways akin to what Schopenhauer wrote about. Granted, some representations are deemed more pivotal than others in respect to the sacred, this relative to each culture (such as per Eliade’s take on a belief-structure’s axis mundi: the tree of life (be it depicted as an oak, a palm, or an evergreen) and Mount Olympus (where the Hellenistic deities gather) as well-enough known examples), but they are representations all the same. For one example of this, to deem a wooden cross hanging on the wall as the sacred rather than as a representation of the sacred (this from within a Christian frame of mind) is to be idolatrous, mistaking the symbol for its referent.

As to “spiritual but not religious”, all it seems to indicate is spirituality minus any of the associated rituals that pertain to any given religion. Maybe more to the point, those who so self-label tend to hold reverence for the divine without either beseeching or brownnosing greater spiritual powers to satisfy egotistic wants. (Example: praying one’s lungs out for that luxury car that will put all of one’s neighbors to shame, or some such.) An earnest naturalistic pantheist would therefore qualify as one possible example of “spiritual but not religious”: holding earnest reverence for the divinity of Nature—its reason and rhyme, so to speak—without engaging in any religious practice. And before anyone starts on this theism not being real, it can go hand in hand with the Stoic notions of Logos. And other examples can well be found.

And, as far as I can so far comprehend, none of the aforementioned in any way pivots on egotistic notions of the individual self, this as though any man is an island divorced from the cosmic and universal, to not mention other beings. Am I missing something in Vervaeke's perspectives on the matter?

BTW, in attempts to better clean up the issue of “more normal for Nature” not being equivalent to “more natural for Nature”:

Language can at times have a way of befuddling philosophic issues via metaphor and the like.

“Normal” stems from “according to rules”. Nature, the natural world, has its rules (natural laws as prime examples). The supernatural can be in certain perspectives deemed to not adhere to the rules of the natural world (or, at the very least, certainly not to the rules of the physical natural world); such that the paranatural (synonym for the supernatural) thereby gains the synonym of “the paranormal”. Example: Marian apparitions (here assuming that they might in fact occur for some, rather than all of them being outright lies) are outside the sphere of the natural world, the natural world then being the normal state of affairs as regards human experiences (this only where one allows for the possibility of veritable, extra-natural experiences)

In such means alone, an association is then made between what is natural and what is normal, namely: the natural state of the world/cosmos is the then the normal state of the world/cosmos, this in terms of human experiences.

Then, there’s a a slippery slope that gets slipped on whereby the two terms “the normal” and “the natural” become interpreted by some to have one and the same semantics: because the natural world is the normal state of affairs, this as previously outlined, that which is normal (i.e., ordinary, common, etc.) gets interpreted to therefore be that which is natural.

And it is exactly in this that the irrational bias of equating “normality” to “naturalness” becomes established in far too many. Redheads do not have the normal hair color of our human species, nor do gray eye-colored humans have normal eye-colors (one of my grandfathers had gray eyes), nor do AB negative blood type humans (1% of the human populous) have normal human blood types (most normal being O positive and A positive) … but all this has absolutely nothing to do with the naturalness of being a red-haired human, or gray eyed, or AB negative, and so forth.

I'm a little disappointed as I was hoping that you would maybe come up with something you regard as shallow and sophistic in formal, modern day philosophy. — ProtagoranSocratist

Ever heard of the book "Biocentrism: How Life and Consciousness are the Keys to Understanding the Universe"? (Wikipedia reference). This I've read. It's got some interesting points, with empirical evidence and all, but, philosophically, it is very shallow and at least borders on utilizing sophistic rhetorical strategies. This is a prime example, to me at least, of modern day philosophy that ain't all that philosophically astute.

Another good example of the same is: "A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing" by Lawrence M. Krauss

I'm thinking about how to tell the difference between the sophistic BS and the "deeper truth" philosophers, I'd appreciate if you elaborated because I don't know what you mean entirely. I think some deeper truths tend to get brushed aside either because people don't want to hear them or don't understand their importance. What makes a truth more important than another truth? — ProtagoranSocratist

Well, to start off, what I was saying is that there is philosophical fluff that drowns out the good quality non-fluff philosophy in today's connected world. Fluff, then, is not sophistic BS but merely superficial and in due degree inconsequential. Examples of fluff can be readily found in the self-help department, such as in, for example, "How the Buddha would Date" (from best recollections): utterly superficial and forgettable philosophy that nevertheless sells. But not necessarily sophistic BS. The sophistic BS part was a separate issue to me: pivoting on the issue of ego and its desires for fame, fortune, power, etc. by mimicking (but not emulating) what good faith philosophers do

As to what makes a truth more important than another: the more trivial the truth (e.g., the truth that up is not down), the less important its exhibiting to the public at large is. Conversely, the more exhibited truths light the way in places of darkness (i.e., bring understanding into places previously replete with unknowns and thus filled with displeasing uncertainties), the more important these truths become.

I can easily think of political writers who were only trying to make money, but what are recent examples of pop philosophers who are merely using rhetorical tricks to gain attention and make a quick profit? — ProtagoranSocratist

I now had to look up the darned book: If the Buddha Dated: A Handbook for Finding Love on a Spiritual Path In truth, never read it. Got it as a present from someone who did. It looks, sounds, and feels like fluff to me, so ... I presume it is. But it does have a lot of good reviews and plenty of sales. Will it be forgotten in a hundred years? Most likely.

It wasn't the just the same post. It was the same sentence "more normal for Nature". — Harry Hindu

Yes it was. There’s a very important aspect to language called “context”. Especially in the context of all my posts on this thread in which I’ve quoted you, I’ve made a point of evidencing via examples that “more normal for Nature” never equates to “more natural” or, more precisely, to “more natural for Nature”. This being something that you seem to disagree with, as is evidenced in your statement here:

Your argument can be used to assert that sexual reproduction is more natural than asexual reproduction or hermaphroditism. — Harry Hindu

Especially in the contexts addressed, there is no such thing as X being “more natural” than Y. Naturalness—i.e. the property of pertaining to Nature, i.e. to the natural world—does not come in degrees. Something either is natural or else it is not.

If you don't like the words you used, then would you prefer, "common", instead of "normal"? — Harry Hindu

I very much like the terms I’ve used. But ok, “common” is just one more possible synonym for “normal”. This changes nothing of the aforementioned.

To define any thing as belonging to a group you have to define the common characteristics of that group and that is what it means to be a "normal" example of that group. At what point does replacing the characteristics with other (opposing) characteristics make one not a normal example of that category and in a different category all together? — Harry Hindu

You're asking me to here resolve the Sorites Paradox, aka the paradox of the heap: at which point is a heap no longer a heap. This being a topic deserving its own thread in the metaphysics department of the forum. And certainly not easy to satisfactorily resolve, most especially on a forum's soundbite format.

this is really the only thing that matters in all of this, making the connections needed so that other people "carry your torch" so to speak. In some ways fame is pretty insignificant and not worth it, but those who come up with ideas they want to share usually want a little bit of recognition for it, even if it's just in the form of having some conversations with people who read their book. — ProtagoranSocratist

Are you saying this is the only thing that matters to you or to the subject at hand as laid out in the OP?

Plenty of fluff out there that gets far more fame than the meaningful stuff via our modern-day meme-transferring online networking. Which, to me, is a pretty big shame. Lotuses that get drowned out in filth on account of the filth having far more connections.

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For other people to “carry your torch”…

A proposal I don’t yet think is possible to debunk: philosophy either aims at exhibiting deeper truths or else it is utter sophistic BS purporting to do the same but with ulterior egotistic motives.

While the expressions of these deeper truths might be “yours”, this due to you being the creator of these expressions, the deeper truths themselves are as much yours as is the solid earth beneath our feet, which is to say they’re no more yours than anyone else’s. A philosopher might want for others to carry “the” torch of the deeper truths they desired exhibited to the world, but this wouldn’t be “their” torch, for deeper truths (which thereby apply to many if not all) are not something people fabricate and can thereby claim ownership of. (The latter, fabricated truths, commonly go by the term “lies”.)

I’m guesstimating, and maybe nitpicking, but maybe instead of “carry your torch” you intended that a philosopher would like for others to “carry the torch”? This just as the Olympic torch that gets carried from place to place doesn’t belong to any one originating person.

Which philosophers gain recognition without university assistance? Sometimes I conclude "none", but this is just an assumption. — ProtagoranSocratist

I’m here assuming that by “university assistance” you’re referring to holding a doctorate in philosophy, and the networking that then goes hand in hand with it.

While a higher education in philosophy certainty can help, there are examples of philosophers who “shook the world”, so to speak, that don’t fit this model. From a quick online search:

In ancient times, there was Diogenes (ancient cynicism), Epictetus (ancient stoicism), and Socrates (on whom the Academy was founded). In more recent times, there was Hume (never graduated from a university), Nietzsche (did not obtain a doctorate), Whitehead (had no advanced training in philosophy), and Wittgenstein (his higher education was not in philosophy). And Easterners have their own, such as Confucius.

In many a sense, it can be likened to being a good and successful artist: education in the arts certainly benefits but education of itself does not determine who the talented artists are, and some have no degrees in this field. Like him or not, Salvador Dali comes to mind (he was expelled twice from the academy and never completed his degree). Likewise can also be said with the good, historically important novelists.

All this to illustrate that the philosophical knowledge which higher education has to offer in no way equates to the philosophical understanding required to become a significant philosopher. But, again, this is not to then deny the importance of knowledge in the field.

Can you give an example of a religion in the pre-scientific era addressing existential dilemmas? — Janus

Most all religions not only address what the point of life is but also why one ought to live life ethically. I say it would be nice to address these same topics without all the religiosity traditionally implied. And to my tastes, the best philosophies do just this in manners devoid of dogma and the bs, such as in presuming to know how existence came about to begin with. And, while it is true that some adults couldn’t give a shoot about these issues—the point of life and how to best navigate an ethical life—most humans do, a group in which I include both non-voting adolescents and far younger children (who readily ask questions such as, “but then how was God created”).

Did religions really address the needs of the common folk or was it mostly the needs of the elites? — Janus

Though here posed as if mutually exclusive, they in fact are quite amiable to being readily converged: most anything out there can be warped for the sake of authoritarian purposes. A problematic and bad aspect of societal life, most definitely. As just one example, far too often righteous people are perjured and spun into being perceived as the exact opposite for the purposes of maintaining the stability of corrupt status quos, this, most always, for the benefits of some authoritarian elites. But in all of this is implied the very issues: what’s the point of it all and what is it that is in fact right (righteous)?

And in today’s world, save for traditional religions, what else speaks to these same issues with any sort of authority (not specific to “authoritarian authority” but also applicable to things such as the authority of reason)?

Decrying these two issues as being either in fact unresolvable or else as being utterly unimportant in either personal or communal endeavors, in many a way, only serves to lead most people into authoritarian religious dogmas wherein they at least are force-fed the belief that the resolution of these two issues is already satisfactorily obtained, this as per the religions' often authoritative dogmas. Which only drives societies into being more authoritarian in their governance due to the preferences of the governed, pivotally in relation to the two existential questions just specified: the purpose/meaning of life and the means of best living life well given the first.

With writing in general, I think the most popular principal is concision: you try to take something you write and remove as many words as possible, getting a similar message across. However, many would argue that such an approach doesn't always work, especially when describing something complex. — ProtagoranSocratist

There’s this aphorism given by Einstein which I think works wonders: “Make things as simple as possible, but no simpler.”

To make the question more direct and concrete, what philosophy writing will make your writing survive better through the ages, what philosophy writing will receive little in the way of fame, praise, or hostility? — ProtagoranSocratist

To put it in terms of a formula, first consider three variables: A) the quality of the content (it’s depth, breadth, etc.) which one seeks to express, B) the quality of its expression, and C) the ability of the intended audience to grasp A via B. Next assume that all three variables can hold values ranging between 0 and 10, and further assume their relation is multiplicative. Were either A, B, or C to be zilch, 0, there would be no quality whatsoever to speak of. Much less anything resounding. On the opposite extreme, 10x10x10 would be the absolute best. Maybe not ever obtainable, but reaching toward an optimal value of A and B given what one presumes about C would be bound to give improved results.

As to expression, I’d myself much rather that a philosophy be successfully expressed within the span of a single page, preferably via comic-book format (one that's really nicely colored). But this is bound to always be “far simpler than is possible” and would thereby result in a flunk.

L-O-Fucking-L!

YOU are the one that used the phrase "normal for Nature". I was merely using your own terminology. If normality has absolutely nothing to do with natural then what did you mean by "normal for Nature"? — Harry Hindu

Here’s some English definitions:

• Normal (adj): ordinary; usual, typical; conforming to a regular pattern. (e.g.: it is normal for a tossed coin to not land upright which, though not impossible, would be utterly abnormal)
• Natural (adj): existing in or caused by nature; not made or caused by humankind. (e.g.: evolution via artificial selection is not evolution via natural selection)

I made use of the two terms “normal” and “natural” in the same post so as to showcase their differences, knowing full well that too many hold irrational biases in which the two terms are opined to be synonymous.

And I made use of red-haired people - an abnormal case for humans which is nevertheless natural - to explicitly illustrate this. Many, many other examples can be provided.

To further spell things out: "normal (i.e., ordinary) for Nature" is in no way equivalent to "natural for Nature". Nature can have both ordinary and unordinary outcomes; that said, Nature cannot have unnatural outcomes, this by definition of "natural". But then, all this should go without saying.

Start by comprehending your own posts. — Harry Hindu

I get you’re trying to be insultive and all, but the hell have you been smoking?

So, about 1/3 of all non-insect animal species are hermaphroditic. That’s more normal for Nature than is being a red-haired human (less than 2% of humanity at large is. And please, please, let’s not start on the human-relative abnormal condition of red-haired-ness). — javra

Your argument can be used to assert that sexual reproduction is more natural than asexual reproduction or hermaphroditism. — Harry Hindu

Um ....

“normality” has absolutely nothing to do with “natural”. Otherwise, stuff like red-haired people would then, rationalistically and all, be unnatural abominations of nature. — javra

Is that your point? — Harry Hindu

I could only explain to those with better reading comprehension. Sorry, just not interested.

yeah, 2% is roughly the same percentage of people who identify as transgender, even though the two conditions are very different. We're talking very small minorities, but overall very large numbers of people... — ProtagoranSocratist

Yup. (It's also roughly the same percentage of people who are red-haired.)

But as you say: the two conditions of being intersexed and of being transgendered are very different. Being intersexed (and there's a whole story about how far too many are mutilated at birth so as to conform to societal expectations) is a strictly physiological, physical, condition of the human body (complexities of how this affects behavior aside). Whereas being transgendered is entirely mental, psychological: the body typically is perfectly male or female in appearance while the brain is configured to identify to the sex it is not bodily.

While we're discussing, all that said--and all of it blatantly enough evidencing the natural biological diversity within the human species as regards sex--I have yet to understand something about ancient cultures in which homosexuality was accepted and relatively wide spread (well known and documented examples include Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, and the less known in the west Ancient Japan, at least prior to Christian cultural "influences")):

Though homosexuality was by comparison rampant and readily accepted--and they no doubt had the same percentage of intersexed individuals--there is no historical record I can find of transgendered individuals in these cultures. Maybe I haven't looked deeply enough into the matter. Or maybe it might be the case that being transgendered is in some as of yet mysterious, at least to me, way intimately related with the culture(s) we ourselves are living in??? Then again, some of them Ancients wore togas most all the time, which kind'a look like skirts, so who knows? :grin:

"hermaphrodites" in human terms just mean that the person has both forms of genitalia, [...] — ProtagoranSocratist

...what i'm reading is that hermaphrodite humans cannot reproduce at all, even though there are some intersex people who can. — ProtagoranSocratist

To better clarify:

Yes, human cases of what is more correctly termed "true hermaphrodites" cannot reproduce at all.

In my previous post, what I stated about “ovotesticular disorder” in humans having only about 500 known cases ... this condition currently termed “ovotesticular disorder” is one and the same with what was traditionally termed "true hermaphrodism" in humans. You can verify this in the link provided to ovotesticular disorder in that post.

Now, technically,, ovotesticulral disorder / true hermaphrodism in humans is far more atypical than merely having a mixture of both forms of genitalia. It is having gonads (a technical term)--ovaries in women and testies in men (rather than the vulva or penis which are external genitalia, gonads being just one aspect of human internal genitalia (e.g. the male prostate and the female uterus are other aspects of internal genitalia))--that, as gonads in the one human, have both ovarian and testicular tissues, both together in the same gonad, which is then technically termed an "ovotestis". This is far more interesting than the issue of reproduction you bring up (and, again, yes, human "true hermaphrodites" cannot in any way reproduce) because the gonads control many an important hormone, both in adulthood and in development. (and ovaries deliver different enough hormones in women in comparison to testis in men, and the sex-specific hormones play a big enough role in how the two sexes differ physically).

All that stated, when it comes to genitalia per se (the whole entire shebang), in humans, cases where the two are combined to whatever extent are termed "intersexed" ... this rather than "(true) hermaphroditic"--the latter, again, only applies to gonads that are part male and part female. And, again, whereas "true hermaphroditism" is very rare (only about 500 reported cases in all of humanity past and present), cases of being intersexed are relatively quite common: up to nearly 2% of the global human populous might well be intersexed ... with a more or less absolute minimum of 0.018%, which is still quite a lot considering.

Yes, I'm in agreement.

Nature doesn't even conform to simple, binary ideas about sex. Hermaphrodites aren't just a mythological concept, but there have been real human heraphrodites. — ProtagoranSocratist

:roll:

Hermaphrodites don’t exist. That is an outdated term implying that a person is both fully male and fully female, which isn’t biologically possible. — Cleveland Clinic — Harry Hindu

I saw a documentary about a real hermaphrodite who had non-functional sex organs, it's extremely rare, but i was not imagining what i saw. Don't believe everything you read online. — ProtagoranSocratist

Was wondering if this had already come up ...

Hermaphroditism wherein the lifeform reproduces with another such that both impregnate each other and become impregnated by the other does not occur in humans—but is quite natural in relation to Nature at large:

A rough estimate of the number of hermaphroditic animal species is 65,000, about 5% of all animal species, or 33% excluding insects. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermaphrodite

So, about 1/3 of all non-insect animal species are hermaphroditic. That’s more normal for Nature than is being a red-haired human (less than 2% of humanity at large is. And please, please, let’s not start on the human-relative abnormal condition of red-haired-ness).

In humans, the condition of having both ovarian and testicular tissue is nowadays called, “ovotesticular disorder”, with only about 500 reported cases. It is certainly not a normal phenotype for humans but, wait for it, “normality” has absolutely nothing to do with “natural”. Otherwise, stuff like red-haired people would then, rationalistically and all, be unnatural abominations of nature. Besides which, it does occur in nature.

Far more interesting and telling is the proportion of intersexed humans in humanity at large:

Sex assignment at birth usually aligns with a child's external genitalia. The number of births with ambiguous genitals is in the range of 1:4,500–1:2,000 (0.02%–0.05%).[4] Other conditions involve the development of atypical chromosomes, gonads, or hormones.[5][2] The portion of the population that is intersex has been reported differently depending on which definition of intersex is used and which conditions are included. Estimates range from 0.018% (one in 5,500 births) to 1.7%.[5][6][7] The difference centers on whether conditions in which chromosomal sex matches a phenotypic sex which is clearly identifiable as male or female, such as late onset congenital adrenal hyperplasia (1.5 percentage points) and Klinefelter syndrome, should be counted as intersex.[5][8] Whether intersex or not, people may be assigned and raised as a girl or boy but then identify with another gender later in life, while most continue to identify with their assigned sex.[9][10][11] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersex

Boldface mine. So up to nearly 2% of humanity might be intersexed. Quite importantly: and all this is just regarding the physiology of the human body. Goddess only knows of the vast diversity of genotypic and phenotypic expressions as strictly pertains to the physiology of the human brain as regards sexual identity and preference. The brain being that which (either in large part or in full) constitutes the mind, rather than the body per se.

I’ll end this post with the number one news flash of all news flashes: Nature, ergo the natural, is all about diversity, intra-species very much included . (And not, by any means, conformity to any one man’s or cohort’s notion of an ideal essential nature of this and that lifeform. Such as how some humans have, at least historically, wanted all humans to reach their "ideal essential biological nature" of being blue-eyed blonds.)

As to homosexuality and such dying out in our species due to such people not being able to reproduce, over two millennia of documented history clearly demonstrates that, nope, this just ain't happening. ... This as though it is a naturally inherent aspect of our human species of lifeform. :gasp:

Faith gets a lot of contempt here on the forum as a synonym for unjustified belief. I’ve taken it upon myself to try to rehabilitate it as a valid epistemological method. — T Clark

:grin: Groovy. :up:

But seriously, for a moment, a 'mass delusion', is by definition not a mental illness but a social one - and that has profound implications. It becomes a great stretch to maintain the medical model at all. — unenlightened

For those who don’t know of it, there’s a parable/fable that speaks to this exact issue. In short, there’s a kingdom with a water well that, when drunk from, turns the individual crazy—this due to having had a spell cast on it by somebody or other. Everyone but the king and the nobility drinks from it (the king and nobility have their own water source). The king still wants to rule his kingdom but the general populous, now of the same mindset and in agreement with each other, comes to perceive the king and his associates as insanely crazy people, proceeding to rebel against them in all sorts of ways (with a give me liberty or give me death mindset). Eventually, out of fear for their own safety and in desperation, the king and nobility then come to decide that the only way out of the situation is for them to drink from the spell-cast well as well. At which point, the populace rejoices in the kings newly found sanity. And the king rules the kingdom happily ever after to everyone’s pleasure and benefit.

Multiple versions of this fable, some more philosophically poignant than others. Myself, I think I first heard of it as a child. And it does tend to illustrate well enough how certain notions of insanity and sanity are purely social constructs that have nothing to do with any solid grounding—other than that of an interpersonally created reality (with interpersonally created realities including those of languages, cash values, and most of what is cultural, culture-specific mores included).

Example: was Moses a man with mystical abilities and visions … or was he a full-blown schizophrenic who would have benefited from modern day anti-psychotics so as to not be bothered by things such as burning bushes that spoke to him? But as the stories go, at the end of the day, dude was functional. Hence sane (i.e., of a healthy enough—but never completely perfect—mind). From a different vantage, for those who believe in the possibility of such things, same can be said of all modern-day psychics world over (who happen to not be deceiving charlatans): they're sane rather than in need of psychiatric institutions.