Will you explain each term, beauty and aesthetic? — Jackson

The aesthetic I did my best to define in this post. The beautiful, as I previously addressed, to me typically indicates in today's world a subcategory of the aesthetic that addresses its more feminine attributes. Ugliness can thereby be aesthetic, though not beautiful.

At least this is my current best understanding.

Though I think @T Clark does have a very good point in that the experiences of the aesthetic can always be deemed beautiful as experiences per se.

The more I look at it the more I like it. — Jackson

Yea, I like it too. (Though, again, I don't consider it a depiction of beauty, I find it aesthetic.)

Alright, but it's in the eye of the beholder. To me it's not grotesque - or else viscerally revolting - but simply ugly, in both technique and depiction of subject mater. To each their own, though.

I previously mentioned some of Goya's later works. Here's an example (if I can get the image to show):



(Two Old Men Eating Soup)

Edit: OK, that didn't work, but here's the link:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Viejos_comiendo_sopa.jpg#/media/File:Viejos_comiendo_sopa.jpg

It's not necessarily the picture that's beautiful, it's the experience. — T Clark

OK, but isn't the artwork nevertheless aesthetic to the beholder(s) even if not beautiful?

BTW, : I'll try my best to laconically define the aesthetic: that which draws one in, this conceptually and emotively, into a realm of truths/realities that intrigue but are not yet fully understood.

To me, this can be applied to biological beauty (what differentiates plain ol' sexual attraction to big boobs, as an example for some, from the aesthetic attraction toward another's appearance, even if they are over a hundred years old) just as much as to abstract art, or to a mathematical model, or to a particular soul/psyche, so to speak.

Debatable, I know, but I thought I'd give it a shot. Can't now think of anything I find aesthetic that doesn't. Don't know if its an over-generalization.

At any rate, though what is beautiful is always aesthetic, what is aesthetic is not always beautiful. — javra

I intend this as a serious comment. I don't think it's just a quibble.

Every definition of "aesthetic" I can find defines the word in relation to beauty, so if it's aesthetic, it's beautiful. I think that means we have to expand the definition of "beauty" beyond just what is pleasant to experience. — T Clark

I noticed that about the definitions. But, then, definitions can be imperfect, and the cultural significance of terms is malleable.

More to the point, in my neck of the woods, to call a heterosexual, good looking guy beautiful is most always to insult the guy, this by deeming him feminine - despite the guy having an aesthetically pleasing appearance, i.e. being handsome. (Be this semantic something that ought to be or not, it in practice is.) Which to me is one indication that the English term "beauty" is lopsided toward describing that which is of feminine attributes.

Then again, what of the ugly in art which is nevertheless attractive, captivating, and pleasing? Isn't it a contradiction in semantics to affirm that a painting is both beautiful and ugly?

One that comes to mind is "Painted Bird" by Jerzy Kosinski. — T Clark

Great book by the way.

Beauty can be a misleading word. It often connotes prettiness at the expense of numerous other attributes. At any rate, though what is beautiful is always aesthetic, what is aesthetic is not always beautiful. An aesthetic looking - i.e., handsome - man is not deemed beautiful by the typical woman, nor by the typical man for that matter. The grotesque, the morbid, and the horrid can be quite aesthetic for many (e.g., Salvador Dali as one well known example who often explores the grotesque), but rarely if ever can these attributes be deemed to depict beauty.

I’m currently no more inclined to try to define “the aesthetic” than I am to define either “beauty” or “art”. Doubt that I could. But, notwithstanding, my sense is that for art to in any way captivate an audience or even the artist him/herself it will need to be found aesthetic by the same - even if it is deemed ugly (e.g., some of Goya’s later works - I at least find them ugly but very aesthetic), nonsensical (e.g., many a Dadaist’s), or so forth. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be deemed of worth to the beholder.

So, from this I conclude that for art to be effective it needs to be aesthetic - though not necessarily beautiful.

That's one interpretation, sure. Do you see any relation between the quantum vacuum and wisdom? or virtue? or anything else that directly or indirectly governs all human behaviors? It is deemed to be an "absolute governing force" after all.

For Spir the principle of identity is not only the fundamental law of knowledge, it is also an ontological principle, expression of the unconditioned essence of reality (Realität=Identität mit sich), which is opposed to the empirical reality (Wirklichkeit), which in turn is evolution (Geschehen). The principle of identity displays the essence of reality: only that which is identical to itself is real, the empirical world is ever-changing, therefore it is not real. Thus the empirical world has an illusory character, because phenomena are ever-changing, and empirical reality is unknowable. — Afrikan Spir, Ontology

(I've found a well-formatted translation of his major work, which I'm going to try and get around to studying.) — Wayfarer

Interesting stuff. I do greatly like the boldfaced part of this quote from the same Wikipedia page:

[…] the principle of identity, which is the characteristic of the supreme being, of the absolute, of God. God is not the creator deity of the universe and mankind, but man's true nature and the norm of all things, in general. [...] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrikan_Spir#Religion_and_morality

While I don’t want to take away from the want to read him …

I myself differ in what I take the quote to be saying (further reinforced by the Wikipedia page) in that I don’t find identity to entail absolute permanence but, instead, relative permanence. This to me touches upon an old conundrum: Flux of what is (akin to a wave or a process) vs. permanency of what is (akin to a particle or an entity) - and, to my mind, taking into account that we and our mental faculties are intrinsic aspects of nature, this imo results in a kind of flux/permanency duality intrinsic to nature at large. To me, somewhat like what I take to be the more traditional version of the Buddhism mantra that neither is there a self (hence, a fixed personal identity) nor is there not a self (hence, lack of personal identity over time). Even if one adopts the more extreme view of process philosophies wherein nothing is absolute, one would still be untruthful if one where to state that one does not immediately apprehend the world in terms of entities - which I’d again say are relatively permanent - and the processes these engage in (like an immediate perceptual observation that the cat (entity) is running up a tree (process)). The identity of the Absolute, to my mind, would be divinely simple/partless and limitless in all ways … hence in my view not being that which we commonly associate with identity (I'm hoping that makes sense). But as “the principle of identity” … I’d need to read the guy to better understand.

On a somewhat related note, as you’ve yourself expressed over the years if I remember right, there can be deemed to be different types and gradations of reality - with “the Real” as their pinnacle, this being the only absolutely permanent reality that there is. The dream I had last night was real (unless I’m lying about having had one); as is the intersubjective culture(s) I pertain to; as is the empirical reality of a solid earth beneath our feet; as is - or so some of us maintain - the Real, i.e. the singular Absolute state of being (of which “the One”, Brahman, Nirvana, and so forth might be different visages of, understandings of the exact same given that emerge through different human and cultural perspectives). And the Absolute might well be neither entity nor process, yet still be being per se. So even in granting that the empirical world is Maya, illusion, this in an ultimate sense when contrasted with “the Real”, I’ll say that it nevertheless constitutes an important type of reality of which we do know a plethora of things about (to be clear, this in non-infallible ways).

I’ve probably rambled, and I get that all this might be overly opinionated. All the same.

A worthwhile mention while I’m at it: Heraclitus, despite his philosophy of cosmic flux - and despite his fragments being open to interpretation - held a belief in a singular, absolute governing force that stands apart from all else - what we could nowadays label a belief in “the Real” or the Absolute.

In the fragments, Heraclitus describes a single force that stands apart from all else and guides the universe according to a set purpose. Heraclitus calls this force 'the god', 'the wise', 'the one', Zeus, and the thunderbolt, and he explicitly connects these four words with each other in the fragments. Fragment 41 identifies this controlling force as 'the wise' and 'the one', showing that these two names stand for the same concept in Heraclitus' thought: — https://www.swarthmore.edu/classics/heraclitus-and-divine

Alright. Cool. thanks

I'm an electron! :wink: — Hillary

Alright you. Enough said.

Out of curiosity, what do you make of the particle-wave duality? Do you take electrons to be both particles and waves at the same time and in the same respect? (Just remembered that many organic molecules - which are big - exhibit the same particle-wave duality. But that aside.)

I'm not going to unpack everything, and I'm not here to debate the nature of QM, but this:

A vase can't change into a fork because then the vase is not the vase anymore, unless the fork is a vase in disguise. — Hillary

... is not what the law of identity states. See my previous post again. A vase can change into a fork ... maybe as can occur in a cartoon. But a vase cannot be a fork at the same time and in the same respect (... unless, of course, one considers the implausibility of a hybrid: something one can use as a vase at one time and as a fork at another. But, then, this hybrid's identity would itself be different from either that of a strict vase or that of a strict fork. The law of identity remains intact.)

One can postulate that QM operates beyond the laws of thought all one pleases, but this does not in any way evidence that we can ourselves think in manners that are not governed by the laws of thought.

Weieieird.... — Hillary

Trying out my luck at explaining the law of identity in a manner that might be understood.

That which is (A) is not and cannot be that which it is not (not-A). This being a more long-winded way of saying that “each given is identical with itself”, or “A = A”. Which is what the law of identity stipulates to be an innate and determinate aspect of our awareness and, derivatively, of how we think. Hence being deemed "a law of thought" - since it is deemed to govern all thought without exception.

This can be falsified by some given A being cognized as not-A at the same time and in the same respect.

So, if A = “two electrons in superposition” then A is and can only be “two electrons in superposition” - but not “four electrons in superposition” or else “strawberry cake” etc.

In agreement with what you wrote. Materialism is an ingrained aspect of our culture at large, with a lot of history to this.

I'm still thinking that it's, should I say "technically", distinct from the methodology and outcomes of the empirical sciences per se. In other words, I for example find that in a different possible world where the prevailing cultural view is that of idealism, the empirical sciences would still be indispensable for optimally appraising the truth of that which is universally observable by - and which universally affects - all in principle if not also in practice (hence, what we term the physical ... or what in Peircean philosophy of objective idealism is deemed effete mind).

Physicalism is a metaphysics. But they like to think it is not. — Jackson

Yes, agreed.

And science, or at any rate ‘modern’ science, operates from certain assumptions about what is real, what counts as evidence, and so on. It’s implicitly physicalist in outlook - ‘implicitly’ because physicalism may not be explicitly stated or defended as a philosophical tenet, but simply assumed. — Wayfarer

This got me thinking. According the Pew Research Center, about half of all scientists are neither atheists nor agnostics. This is much lower than the proportion of spirituality in the general population. And I haven't read the entire article. But still, to me this evidences that the empirical sciences do not require an assumption of physicalism in order to be successfully engaged in.

I rather see it as the empirical sciences tend to only hold efficacy regarding physicality - this excluding notable exceptions such as that of the cognitive sciences (which research cognition in empirical manners). So for the philosophical naturalist, if the only tool at one's disposal is a hammer ...

What I meant to say is that if we require science to require all theories to be empirically testable, then philosophical naturalism is not a scientific view, and further under the same arguments for why ID should be kept out of the classroom apply to naturalism as well.

Furthermore, the claim that all life came about by unguided evolution is therefore not scientific either, as it cannot be falsified. Assertions of teleology, and similarly, lack of teleology, would fall under this umbrella. — Paulm12

In a rational humanity devoid of hypocrisy, in a word, yes.

There are two typical understanding of "science": One is any branch of learning. Here mathematics can be construed a science, as can technology, archeology, etc. But then so too can mythology (it’s a branch of learning). Or, else, fartology as the branch of learning how and when to properly fart. The other understanding is that it is shorthand for the empirical sciences. Here, all conclusions are inductively obtained from empirical data that can be replicated by others - lest it be illusory or else outright deception - itself derived from falsifiable hypotheses which the data either evidences/verifies (but never conclusively proves) or else falsifies (thereby conclusively proving the one or more hypotheses false). Without this system/methodology that incorporates falsifiability, anything could go: including an in-depth theory/paradigm accounting for all aspects of the universe in terms of invisible unicorns with magical powers that surround.

Where there is confusion between the two understandings of science, the empirical sciences lose their efficacy and, in turn, their validity. At the very least in the public eye.

Since this is a philosophy forum, the methodology of the empirical sciences is itself founded upon philosophical principles. Nevertheless, in so far as these amount to the methodology of the empirical sciences, the empirical sciences will themselves be utterly distinct from the branch of learning termed philosophy at large. The empirical sciences are also greatly reliant upon non-empirical-science branches of learning, in particular that of mathematics (here first and foremost in terms of statistical analysis of data).

Because the empirical sciences are limited, in part, to data that can be replicated by any other, they by default cannot be applied to things such as the reality of anything spiritual - if there might be one - which by its very nature of so being (if it in fact to any extent occurs) is not ubiquitously profane and thereby equally observable by all in principle.

Gravity and natural selection are in and of themselves theories regarding broad spectrums of data obtained or else confirmed by the empirical sciences - but are not in and of themselves applied empirical sciences. Nonetheless, as theories they are falsifiable by potential empirical data (a replicable observation of apples that move upward into the skies or, else, a replicable observation of a lifeform in the fossil record devoid of any taxonomical lineage - like the discovery of a fossilized griffin), and as theories are furthermore evidenced/verified by all empirical data.

Not that this presents a complete picture, nevertheless:

Neither philosophical naturalism nor Intelligent Design can be empirically falsified via observable data that is necessarily replicable by all others. Neither are, nor can be, integral aspects of the empirical sciences proper. But both can be deemed sciences, by those who uphold them, in the generalized sense of “branches of learning”.

So no, Intelligent Design is not a valid scientific theory (if one is addressing the empirical sciences).

What are those? — Hillary

Never mind.

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot. — javra

A quantum particle hops non-locally between different position, within the bounds of the wavefunction. — Hillary

Seems like a bit of a non sequitur ... Can you either cite references of this being "the magical teleportation of quantum particles which they willfully enact" or else independently provide rational evidence for the same?

For instance, why would self-imposed/willed magical teleportation logically need to be bounded by anything physical, wave-functions included? Its magic, after all.

Secondly, your reply doesn't seem to address the logical necessities of identity, of noncontradiction, and of the excluded middle. Last I recall, QM is riddled with what appear to us to be logical inconsistencies. The delayed-choice quantum erasure as just one example which I'm personally astounded by.

Give me one example of a logical necessity. I can point to a natural process corresponding to it. — Hillary

A proposition containing logical necessities whose subject matter does not correspond to any natural processes or entities:

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot.

The principle of identity stipulates the following logical necessity: “A Chimera that can magically teleport itself” is equivalent to “a Chimera that can magically teleport itself”.

The principle of noncontradiction stipulates the following logical necessity: A Chimera cannot both be capable of magically teleporting itself and incapable of magically teleporting itself at the same time and in the same respect.

The principle of the excluded middle stipulates the following logical necessity: there cannot be a medial state of being in-between those of “can magically teleport itself” and “cannot magically teleport itself”.

------

I don't see the epistemic cut between physical causation and logical necessity in the aforementioned.

Then again, some such as myself will claim that these same three laws of thought are natural laws. Such that they govern not only all of thought (some of which has little to nothing to do with natural process and entities) but all of nature.

To be clearer:

evolution: natural selection upon mutations ... and further details related to this
biology: the study of life

If the argument is that the occurrence of life explains the occurrence of consciousness ... I'll be parting from the debate. My intuitive gut belief is that life and consciousness are correlated. But I can't provide you with a proof of this.

You can't talk about evolution without the biology. — L'éléphant

Hey, never claimed you can. But evolution is what happens to biological beings. They're not the same thing.

We can't say that computing is the same as thinking. — L'éléphant

I agree. As different examples, plants and even ameba exhibit intelligent behavior. Are they intelligent? They are alive; and some, such as myself, deem them to have awareness, hence some measure of consciousness.

At any rate, I still hold these questions to not be answerable via biological evolution per se.

Maybe we can agree to disagree ... this with gratitude for your answers.

I need to revisit those articles, as I'm not sure if they're adequate as sources of how intelligence (hence consciousness) developed. — L'éléphant

OK. Yet one can have intelligence in the absence of consciousness. Current AI as example. They're not the same.

So, we can proceed then to discuss how biology is the reason why consciousness exists -- as a start. — L'éléphant

This is a significant change in argument. The OP, to which I responded, addresses evolution as explanation for consciousness - not biology. There's a very distinct difference between the two.

What is lacking in our accepted definition/description of consciousness? Because I'm good with it. But if you're not, what's your definition of consciousness in humans, in animals? — L'éléphant

I've missed our agreed upon definition of consciousness. By common standard, it can be deemed equivelent to awareness, hence to a first person point of view, hence to firsthand experience.

Is this something we agree upon?

BTW, my personal take - which I find not possible to definitively prove - is that consciousness is a staple factor of all lifeforms.

They do. Let's cite some studies from the medical community. For example, the consciousness of babies is defined as that recognizing the mother's voice and face, then later awareness of body parts, etc. As adults we are aware of our own mortality and what is death. So, we are aware of the future and what happened in the past.

Tell me, what is it that's inadequate as explanation in your opinion? Let's start there. — L'éléphant

What you provide is not an explanation of how consciousness comes about via the mechanisms of biological evolution - in brief, natural selection acting upon mutations.

It is of course adequate as an explanation. But, again, it is not an explanation via biological evolution. Biological evolution does not address at which stage of an embryo does the species-specific consciousness takes hold. Nor does it address if gametes are themselves conscious But note that a sperm is well recorded as recognizing direction toward the egg and, furthermore, contact with the egg, at which point the sperm attempts to penetrate the egg. Whether or not this evidences some degree of consciousness on the part of sperm is again not something that biological evolution in any way addresses, much less explains.

Whether all life requires some degree of consciousness (firsthand experience) in order to function or else whether consciousness appears at some point in life's evolution is not something that evolution of itself explains.

Again the issue I'm addressing is biological evolution explaining the how of consciousness. Just that.

To be clear, my question was that of “how does biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about, this when biological evolution (as theory we employ for explanations and predictions) does not of itself provide us with an explanation of what is conscious and what is not conscious."

This has to do with the limitations of biological evolution as a system of explanation, and not with our firsthand experiential knowledge of so being conscious.

What does and does not have consciousness is an inter-disciplinary topic covered by biology, psychology, and specialized areas such as neurology. — L'éléphant

You're not mentioning philosophy, which I think is of greater importance than the disciplines you've mentioned. The cogito comes to mind on one side of the spectrum. Philosophies such as that of autopoiesis in respect to non-human minds on the other.

It's hard to have a discussion when one starts with "what does and does not have consciousness", because we know humans have consciousness. — L'éléphant

Sure, but we don't know this via our inferential knowledge of biological evolution, right?

Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc. — L'éléphant

Yep, I agree. — schopenhauer1

Maybe I'm misinterpreting or else missing something. So I'll ask: How can the mechanics of biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about when it cannot provide an explanation of what does and does not have consciousness?

Assuming that a dolphin has firsthand experience of its species-specific senses, what is it like for the dolphin to perceive its surroundings via echolocation? Or for the homing pigeon to perceive the skies via magnetoception? And so forth. It converges the experience of sense-dependent phenomena we ourselves do not experience with the experience of understanding these phenomena in manners that allow the organism to function. This as occurs in firsthand experience.

That’s my understanding of the phrase.

For instance, assuming that a homing pigeon has firsthand experiences of the world, I have no idea what a homing pigeon's awareness of the Earth's magnetic field is like. But I know it wouldn't be visual in the way that I visually perceive the world - for I don't have perceptual awareness of the Earth's magnetic field, be it visually or in any other manner.

How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? — schopenhauer1

As something different from the answers already provided, that biological evolution has taken place in no way specifies what does, and does not, have consciousness. First off, we know we have consciousness because we experientially know we are conscious (and not because biological evolution tells us so). Secondly, we infer that we acquired the specific forms of our consciousness via evolution. To which I say of course. But how can evolution explain if nematodes (which have a nervous system) have, or don’t have, consciousness? The same question can be asked of any other non-human lifeform, ameba included. Note: all I mean by “consciousness” here is “firsthand experience”.

The occurrence of evolution no more explains the occurrence of consciousness than does the occurrence of change: as in, consciousness occurs because change occurs. Which is to say, it holds no satisfactory explanations regarding the matter. Because it does not explain what does, and does not, have consciousness, it does not explain why consciousness is nor how consciousness comes to be wherever it does.

I don't want to bicker either. It was just what I hoped to be a helpful clarification. — Benkei

Thanks. :smile:

I'm not sure this is particular to current markets. All market transactions, even before capitalism, aim at that short term goal: profit.

[...]

So I think there's just more of it rather than that we've become more shortsighted than in the past. — Benkei

To my mind, there is such a thing as the delayed gratification of profiting more from long-term investments. Which requires more forethought. Short-term investments do not require the long-term sustainability of the business, or even of the business model for that matter. It's what populates the world with pyramid schemes - be these hidden or out in the open.

Then again, to me, an economic model axiomatically founded on infinite growth and resources which unfolds in a finite world is, simplistically addressed, itself a large scale kind of pyramid scheme.

I don't know enough about the subject to explore the nuances of how things have changed over the span of decades and centuries, but I do find this to be the current state of affairs. And, in so being, to be detrimental to our long-term benefit.

Hence my opinion that forethought, such as in the form of long-sighted interests in regard to profit, is not something which is selected for via optimal profits in our - at least - currently held, global economy.

As I initially commented, I'm all for a meritocratic economy of competition, but am opposed to the current, by now almost ingrained, outcome of those who are greedy being most deserving of the greatest profits (and along with these, of greatest financial power over others). Again, though - other than the vague, sophomoric, and overly idealistic notion of "raising human consciousness" or some such - I don't know how this problem could be corrected via the implementation of a different economic model in a democratic system.

The materialism-antimaterialism debate no longer holds much interest for me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Were it to be so for most. Who knows? Time will tell.

Materialism tells a good part of the story - but any kind of extremism is, to my view, ill-advised. — ZzzoneiroCosm

also

What I mean to say is there is some kind of relationship (link, connection) between mystical and schizophrenic phenomena and experience. It's a complex relationship (link, connection) and this thread is designed to increase my understanding of it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

To be clear, I acknowledge the often occurring commonalities between mysticism and madness so far presented. That said, do you have a working thesis on what distinguishes mysticism from madness that is more philosophically precise than the metaphor of how one deals with waters one is surrounded by?

To me, mystics (that are not madmen self-appraised as mystics) hold insights into (non-materialist) existential truths. At least, that's the best working thesis I have on a whim. At any rate, this to me signifies that materialism/physicalism as a doctrine (and not the presence of the material/physical) is in some way false.

Now you want to revise my phraseology. I said links and I meant links. — ZzzoneiroCosm

As in there can't be mysticism devoid of schizophrenia, bi-polarity, or the like? We may have different understandings of the term "link".

Alright. Got it. Thanks for the clarification.

Not only wrong for so assuming but wrong in methodology as apparently your approach is to make a wild, baseless assumption and then ask if it's wrong. I don't get that. Why do that? — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's a conclusion that materialists are likely to make ... if not the only logically necessitated conclusion which materialism allows. Oh, and materialists are prevalent on this forum.

ought the Dalai Lama be given medications till he holds no more belief in Nirvana and related and/or derivative Buddhist ideas - this on grounds that mysticism is linked to madness? — javra

I never said anything remotely like the above.

Keep reading the thread if you want to learn more about the link. I'll be posting more soon. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I’ve done my fair share of research into psychology and psychiatry. What you and express are nothing novel to me. I could probably further stoke this fire, so to speak, with other similar observations. So what conclusions do you draw from the links/connections correlations you’ve presented - and likely will further express - between the experiences of some mystics and the experiences of some madmen?

More concretely asked: Are all insights from the vast array of mystics to be considered the delusional insights of madmen - and, in so being delusional, thereby devoid of any existential truths? Taoism as just one example among many.

I know that the default answer of materialism is “yes”. Nothing novel in this either. Here, any and all spiritual/non-materialist experiences/insights and related reasoning are at best delusional. I’m so far assuming this is your stance - and, if so, so be it.

I’m asking you so as to find out if I’m wrong in so assuming.

Which also in no way answers the question.

BTW, https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/697780

To clarify my just asked question by example:

A Buddhist mystic with insight into Nirvana will neither talk to Nirvana nor have Nirvana talk back to him/her, yet will be a mystic nonetheless.

The Dalai Lama is likely a case of swimming. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which doesn't answer any of the questions posed.

So much for challenges being fun, I guess. OK, then.