Um, the points of a line may be put into one-to-one correspondence with the set of real numbers, which Cantor proved to be uncountably infinite in 1874. In fact, the points in a tiny line segment are uncountable. — Real Gone Cat

You seem to be asking me to explain a commonly established attribute. If you’d bother to check the link to “infinity” I posted you’d find the following:

1. (uncountable) endlessness, unlimitedness, absence of a beginning, end or limits to size.
2. (countable, mathematics) A number that has an infinite numerical value that cannot be counted. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/infinity

The definitions can of course be questioned, but they are commonly established, at the very least as best approximations of, as Banno would say, the term’s usage.

I’ll again try to explain. A metaphysical infinity has absolutely no limits or boundaries. Due to this, it cannot be discerned as a unit: it is immeasurable in all senses and respects and hence, when ontically addressed (rather than addressed in terms of being a concept) it is nonquantifiable. As a thought experiment, try to imagine two ontically occurring metaphysical infinities side by side; since neither holds any delimitations (be these spatial, temporal, or any other) how would you either empirically or rationally discern one from the other so as to establish that there are two metaphysical infinities? In wordplay games, we can of course state, “two metaphysical infinities side by side” but the statement is nonsensical. More concretely, ontic nothingness, i.e. indefinite nonoccurrence - were it to occur (but see the paradox in this very affirmation: the occurrence of nonoccurrence, else the being (is-ness) of nonbeing) - is one possible to conceive example of metaphysical infinity. Can one have 1, 2, 3, etc., ontic nothingnesses in any conceivable relation to each other? (My answer will be “no” for the reasons just provided regarding metaphysical infinity. However, if you believe this possible, please explain on what empirical or rational grounds.)

With that distinction hopefully out of the way, you can then have limitlessness or unboundedness that applies to a certain aspect of what nevertheless remains a unit. That which is limitless or unbounded about the unit cannot be measured of counted to completion - this as I've previously mentioned. The unit itself - which is a unit only because there are limits or boundaries which so delimit it - can however be counted. A geometric line does not have limiteless or unbounded width; its width holds a set limit or boundary, namely that of zero width. Because of this, one can quantify and thereby count geometric lines on a plane as individual units.

It bears note that I’m not arguing for a novel concept here. As I pointed out to jgill, these are established notions: you have dictionary definitions such as those provided by Wiktionary and SEP entries on infinity in reference to this.

I'm unsure why you're hung up on causal determinism. — Real Gone Cat

It was given as one possible concrete example of ontic determinacy, primarily on account of all-knowing people such as Banno not getting the context of the usage of the term "determinacy". But no, causal determinism does not hold the only conceivable type of determincay: there can be already established notions of non-causal determinacies, this as @Srap Tasmaner illustrated in this post.

You seem genuinely interested in the topic. — Real Gone Cat

Yea, I am. And as opposed to what? (a rhetorical question)

agreed
this is what I'm questioning.

In attempts to simplify the reason for this thread:

We have two well-established concepts: that of determinacy (such as can be found in the notion of causal determinism), on one hand, and that of “non-metaphysical" (aka, countable, mathematical) infinity (such as can be found in a geometric line of infinite length), on the other. On their own, both concepts are cogent (to most folks, at least). However, when attempting to define infinity (which describes a certain state of affairs) via determinacy (which describes how a certain state of affairs comes to be), inconsistencies emerge.

(Non-metaphysical) Infinity can thus either be:

a) determined, hence determinate
b) undetermined, hence indeterminate
c) neither (a) nor (b)

If determinate, then you run into problems such as given by

If indeterminate, then this directly contradicts the fact that, for example, a geometric line can be determined by geometric points … as well as having properties specified by once so determined

---------

Seeing how I’m having a hard time in even getting people to understand the problem, my only current conclusion regarding this problem is that it’s so dense that I needn’t concern myself with it when specifying metaphysical possibilities of determinacy.

Thanks for the input.

Is this what you're looking for? — Real Gone Cat

Thanks for the offer.

Unfortunately, not to my satisfaction as expressed, no.

Can not two points in a plane (with the plane itself determined by a multitude of points) determine a unique line, this as offered? In which case, the line here then has determinants and is thereby not indeterminate (i.e., undetermined). An indeterminate line so far makes little sense to me, as it would not be determined by determinants (here, namely, by points).

... as it is, been sitting on my own ass a little too long today. Going to take a break.

I don't know what you're talking about. — jgill

Nor I. — Banno

and ...

I don't have an opinion [on what determinacy is]. — Banno

I can only interpret this as implying that to you causal determinism is meaningless or nonsensical, as is its notion of determinacy.

But you're still butting in as the measure of all that can be understood.

OK, then.

It has a bunch of uses, which we might set out one by one, but which change and evolve over time - like all such words. — Banno

Aright. What use do you take it to presently hold in the notion of causal determinism in particular? If you find that it holds different uses in this context, I'm more than happy to listen.

If a line (not a line segment) is ontically determinate, I assume you can draw it in its entirety. No?

I can't. Can you? — Real Gone Cat

OK, I get that. Tis why I've started the thread. But then, would you say that it is instead indeterminate? Neither determinate nor indeterminate?

Should we go into it in more detail? — Banno

Please do. Answer this question:

What would you say "to be determined" is? This in the ontological sense rather than the psychological. — javra

...with the supposition that any of this makes sense. — Banno

OK Banno. What would you say "to be determined" is? This in the ontological sense rather than the psychological.

So width is length? — Real Gone Cat

no

And what is "uncurved" length? — Real Gone Cat

a straight extension in space

I would like a better definition of determinacy. — Real Gone Cat

see my latest post for the definition also mentioned in the OP

You seem to be implying that the line is determinate because the line exists in its entirety in the plane. Is this correct? — Real Gone Cat

no

Oh, Banno. You're ruining our fun. — Real Gone Cat

Let him play! As an self proclaimed anti-philosophy philosopher enamored with Witt, he's into games. :wink:

Just an example. Mathematics does sometimes directly address how determinate its objects are, at least in this sort of sense, whether there's a unique solution, finitely many, infinitely many, etc.

Is this sort of determinateness any use to you? — Srap Tasmaner

So far I don't find it being of use to alleviate the issue. Thanks for the input, though. What you say addresses determinacy in the sense of "that determined has its limits or boundaries set by one or more determinants". I'm so for robustly in favor of this definition.

Yet the same issue results: if a unique line is so determined by any two points on a plane (in the sense just provided above) how does one then commingle this same stipulation with the fact that that which is being so determined is - at the same time and in some respect - infinite and, hence, does not have some limits or boundaries in any way set by its determinants. Here, the two point on a plane do not set the limits or boundaries of the line's length - despite setting the limits or boundaries of the unique line's figure and orientation on the plane. Again, once the line is so determined by the two points on a plane, it is fully fixed or fully set; hence, fully determined in this sense. But going back to the offered definition above, this would imply that "the line, aka that determined, has it limits or boundaries fully set by one or more determinants" - which it does not on account of being of infinite length.

So, if I have a countable collection of lines, they are countable? I suppose that's a step in the right direction. — jgill

What makes them countable if they are completely devoid of any boundaries? So might staying on topic be another step in the right direction.

That's where I'm currently stuck. It feels like I'd equivocating between apples and oranges. Yet both determinacy/indeterminacy and finitude/infinitude are defined by the ontic presence or absence of limits/boundaries.

So, a geometric line for example, once its placed on a geometric plane it is - in one sense - fully determinate. Its direction and figure are fully fixed in place. No variance; no vagueness. It is not as though the geometric line is semi-fixed or semi-vague. Yet in a different sense, it is only semi-limited or semi-bounded: being infinite only in length (but not in figure or, as a one-dimensional object, in width).

Yet this doesn't make it semi-determinate in the sense of being only partially fixed, or set.

-------

BTW, not naval gazing. I'm trying to address three metaphysical possibilities in regard to determinacy - namely, that of being a) completely determinate, b) completely nondeterminate, or the possibility of c) being only partly determined by determinants (i.e., of being semi-determinate). And my stumbling block is that by defining determinacy as I did in the OP (i.e., having limits or boundaries set by one or more determinants), I run into this stubborn paradox of having to differentate semi-determinacy from what I've so far termed "mathematical infinities" ... which are, again, only partly infinite in some respect while yet being finite in others.

I'm assuming this is somewhat dense, but there's the background to the OP and an answer to your question.

Ah, I see, you meant countable as a unit, as a line. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, and its countable as a unit on account of having some limits or boundaries via which it can be so distinguished.

If we're in agreement on this, cool. :smile:

Set theorists and foundations people might be interested in such distinctions, but for me infinity simply means unbounded. — jgill

Is a geometric line - a maths concept - to you unbounded in all possible respects?

Besides, again, the issue is one of whether such unbounded things that we discern via definite demarcations are determinate, indeterminate, or neither.

and the length of a line is not countable in that sense. — Srap Tasmaner

I specifically said the length is immeasurable. If one can discern the quantity of lines specified, then lines as a whole are indeed countable. Or would you disagree with what I actually said?

Mea, in terms of what you've quoted, here's some reference: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinity/#InfiPhilSomeHistRema

OP's question is one of whether mathematical infinity - your field I take it - is determinate, indeterminate, or neither?

Yet the infinite length of a geometric line is definite, — javra

Can you elaborate? Do you mean that the line is measurable?

I know so little about math, but I'm always eager to learn. — Real Gone Cat

I'm in no way a mathematician; not my personal forte. Wanted to be forthright about that. But sure on elaboration of my philosophical reasoning regarding the matter:

As I tried to point out in the OP: a geometric line is defined by an uncurved infinite length of zero width. Its length's expansion in both directions is not limited or bounded, yes. Its length is then of itself immeasurable. But its width and shape is subject to fully set limits or boundaries, thereby endowing the geometric line with a definite uncurved length. Devoid of this definite state of being brought about by fully set limits or boundaries - namely, of having zero width and a straight length - we wouldn't be able to discern it as a geometric line. Hence, as with all other mathematical infinities I currently know of, a geometric line is not perfectly infinite in all respects but only infinite in some respects while being finite in others. Due to its finite aspects, we hold a definite idea of what a geometric line is (it then becomes measurable in this sense; else expressed, it becomes countable).

Maybe mathematical infinities only make sense in relation to the metaphysically infinite — Gregory

How so? As background: I've read a little on Cantor's "Absolute Infinity" and find it to be a nice poetic conception. But I don't see any relevant connection between, for example, a geometric line and the attributes which Cantor said of God - aka of Absolute Infinity - e.g., that of being "the supreme perfection".

More to the point: how would this in any way clarify whether mathematical infinities are determinate, indeterminate, or neither?

To be more explicit on this matter, metaphysical infinity, in being perfectly devoid of all possible limits and boundaries (as defined in the OP), would then be perfectly undetermined in all respects. As such, it would then be perfect indeterminate (aka, nondeterminate). Yet the infinite length of a geometric line is definite, and so I take it in at least some meaningful way determinate; but, then, if it is determinate this brings back the issue addressed in the OP of apparent contradiction in regard to limits (contradictions which don't occur for metaphysical infinity on account of it being perfectly indeterminate).

[BTW, to my way of thinking, one can conceptualize metaphysical infinity as perfect being (i.e., God) just as readily as perfect nonbeing (i.e., nothingness ... as in, "why is there something rather than nothing") - this though the two are polar opposites. And neither have been either empirically or rationally evidenced to be to the satisfaction of most. Whereas at least some mathematical infinities - like the irrational number pi (whose decimal expansion is infinite despite the sequence of its decimals being, by all apparent accounts, determinate) - do occur in nature, or at least can influence our reality as though they do. But discussion of metaphysical infinity to me appears to enter a whole different ballpark than what the OP is asking.]

It's very hard for me to sustain his though experiment, that once we stop perceiving an object, we don't have many good reasons (although something must be there, in the world) to suppose it continues to exist. For as he says (I know I'm re-quoting him, but, he articulates it so well): — Manuel

But it is very, very clear, that Hume was what is now called a "mysterian", which should be the common- sense view that we are natural creatures, and hence some things are beyond our capacities, as some things are beyond the capacities of dogs or birds. — Manuel

For whatever reason, his allusions to instincts always resonated with me and quenched the otherwise potential difficulty in not having conscious reasons for an external world. Myself, I can fall back to the notion of the moon being there when no one is looking precisely on grounds of causal reasoning (riptides and such), and believe this can be extended to all external objects. But yes, Hume presented more problems than he resolved.

As to the title of "mysterian," I agree. From what I recall, maybe most notably, he was a kind of mysterian compatibalist who upheld both metaphysical free will and causal determinacy co-occurring; a very different species of compatibalism than what we have today wherein the notion of "freedom" is modified in any number of ways so as to suit a fixed stance on causal determinism (determinism being a term that wasn't coined yet in his day).

like an instinct, a phrase he doesn't appear to use in this chapter. — Manuel

That's exactly right, or at least, that's how it looks like to me as well. — Manuel

I’ve found another supporting quote from within the chapter (Part IV Section II, page 214). This is in introduction to the notion of double existence: to roughly paraphrase, here he articulates the opinion that our instinctive awareness of resembling perceptions being continued, identical, and independent is indicative of the external existence of objects in the world whereas our reasoned awareness that our perceptions are all dependent, interrupted, and different is indicative of our minds’ internal existence. (Emphasis on the former external existence being inferred by us on account of what our instinctive awareness informs us of – this in contrast to our internal existence which is inferred from reasoning regarding our perceptions.)

“There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind. […] Thus tho’ we clearly perceive the dependence and interruption of our perceptions, we stop short in our career, and never upon that account reject the notion of an independent and continu’d existence. […]”

boldface mine.

This is somewhat paradoxical, given his reputation and thrust of his thought, an argument for innate faculties, — Manuel

Yes, maybe. Still, what I’ve read about Hume is often quite different than what I gathered from directly reading Hume. For one example, to me, Kant borrowed from Hume rather than debunking him. Hence, imo, Kant’s categories are a subset of Hume’s natural impulses (instincts) which Kant worked out to far greater extents - and to which Hume's epistemology of causation still applies. Likewise, Kant’s noumena are Hume’s objects of external existence which, again to paraphrase Hume, resemble internal perceptions due only to fancy but not due to any reason to so infer. (see page 216, for example). Had to throw this in. :smile:

The word might be in there somewhere, but there doesn't seem to be much use made of the idea; the whole flavor of the account is causal, mechanical. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. I think he has in mind something like mechanical, but also something like an instinct, a phrase he doesn't appear to use in this chapter. Perceiving is like breathing or seeing, we can't not have perceptions. — Manuel

we need principles that will relate certain perceptions to each other. — Srap Tasmaner

VERY perceptive. This is one of the reasons he gives in the Appendix for, essentially stating that his system fails, or as he puts it "my hopes vanish". This is one of the things he cannot account for, how perceptions relate to each other. The other being that we really do perceive continuity in the objects. In other words, he has used these two principles: the uniting principle and the continuity principle (my terminology, not his), without being able to justify them, but he isn't able to renounce either of them. — Manuel

I agree that he had instincts in mind. My interpretation of his thought: though to a far smaller (else, more generalized) extent than lesser animals, humans are nevertheless inescapably driven by instincts - including those of what you’ve termed the unifying principle and the continuity principle of perceptions, both to my mind being subsumed by reasoning in general.

To my reading he briefly addresses our faculties of reasoning being instinctive at the very end of a previous chapter, Part III Section XVI (Of the reason of animals), starting at the bottom of page 179 [boldface mine ... as well as any potential typos]:

“Nothing shews more the force of habit in reconciling us to any phenomenon, than this, that men are not astonish’d at the operations of their own reason, at the same time, that they admire the instinct of animals, and find a difficulty in explaining it, merely because it cannot be reduc’d to the very same principles. To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations. This instinct, ‘tis true, arises from past observation and experience; but can any one give the ultimate reason, why past experience and observation produces such an effect, any more than why nature alone shou’d produce it? Nature may certainly produce whatever can arise from habit: Nay, habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from that origin.”

Very many humans are very off-put today when told that we humans are to significant extents instinctively driven - and this is well after our knowledge of evolution. I can easily envision that Hume didn't greatly dwell on this notion in his writings due to the audience of his time.

To put it another way, I don't see it as having anything to do with "reality"; I think that term is altogether too overblown. "The most plausible" is just what seems to be the best explanation; the one that fits best within a general network of perspectives that I find explanatorily workable. — Janus

Best explanation for what if not for what is real or else what is really the case? But if you think the notion of reality is too overblown, even though I disagree, I won’t argue with you.

I guess the example is unclear because it lacks specificity. The unknown critter is referred to as both an experience-based prediction and also an inference. — praxis

There were two competing alternatives rather than the one scenario of an unknown critter. Then again, I don’t get how experience-based predictions can be anything other than inferences based on some experience.


Maybe it’s just me not being up to par. All the same, I’m going to likely call it a day.

Believing something is "holding it to be true". That is not what I'm talking about; I'm talking about entertaining the idea that seem most plausible, not holding ideas to be true. — Janus

“Most plausible” to me signifies “most likely to be real or conformant to reality”; to deem X most plausible is hence to provisionally accept X’s reality, thereby constituting a belief.

How can S deem X plausible without deeming X to be likely real or else likely conformant to what is real? Thereby in some way attributing reality to X, which would then be an act of believing.

For instance, to believe that extraterrestrial intelligence occurs and that humans therefore are not the only sapient species in the universe is neither a) to know that extraterrestrial intelligence occurs nor b) to be uncertain and fully agnostic about the matter but, rather, c) to deem its occurrence most plausible - hence most likely real.

In short, how else should I understand “plausible” in the contexts we’re using?

--------

To address a previous notion, a justified and true idea that one cognizes but does not hold to be true is not a personal instance of knowledge. As one example, a theist may hold the idea of atheism, may be aware of the justifications for it, and it might in fact be the case that atheism conforms to what is real; still, if this theist doesn’t hold the idea of atheism to be true, this justified and true idea of atheism which the theist holds awareness of will not be an instance of the theist’s knowledge. On second thought, if you deem that it is not possible to either know that there is no divinity or else that there is divinity, the same argument can be presented of numerous other propositions, such as that of “the house is over the hill”: the idea might be justified and true, but if one doesn’t hold it to be true then it cannot be something which one knows.

Tangentially, to clarify something on my part in case this does need clarifying:

Beliefs - at least as I’ve so far tentatively defined and understood them - which will never waiver irrespective of evidence or reasoning will presume an unwarranted infallibility. And I again fully agree with @Ken Edwards that such a species of belief is most often, if not always, detrimental to at the very least an accurate understanding of reality. But the observation of this species of belief sometimes occurring in others does not signify that all beliefs are thereby just such a species of belief. Hence my disagreements in this thread.

(To my fallibilist mind, the alternative is to hold all beliefs to at the end of the day be fallible, and thereby remain open to revising them if evidence or reasoning gives warrant to so doing.)

You asked: “If one then moves away from one’s position so as to avoid the possibility of contact with a small animal, how can this activity be accounted for in the absence of belief (to whatever extent conscious and/or subconscious) that the movement was likely produced by a small animal (rather than, for example, by wind-blown leaves)?”

If a mind accurately predicts the presence of a rat then moving away from it, assuming the rat is rabid or whatever, is a good and adaptive prediction. Otherwise it’s a prediction error. — praxis

While it may not have been the best example I could have offered, you’re still overlooking a key ingredient that was stipulated from the beginning: lack of knowledge. You do not know what caused the movement in the dark corner. You haven’t clearly seen anything but a movement; you haven’t seen a small animal, never mind seeing a rat. But you’re mind inferentially predicts that the movement might either have been caused by wind-blown leaves or by a small animal (but not both). Which one is real is to you not known, and hence not a psychological certainty.

-----

BTW, I’ll ask that you also comment on the working definitions I’ve provided of belief in my previous post – which culminate in stipulating that all forms of belief in one way or another consist of “the attribution of reality to”. This so as to arrive at a common understanding of terms.

Going by what was so far offered, if one attributes reality to the contents of a prediction, then the given prediction will by default be believed - thereby constituting one form of belief. Otherwise one deems the prediction fallacious and, by the same count, does not believe - i.e., does not attribute reality to - it.

Then, going back to the example of the two alternative predictions - that of either wind-blown leaves or of a small animal (to make this explicit, which are to be understood as mutually exclusive) - it's to be understood that they cannot both be real. And again, one does not know which one is real. If one acts accordant to one of the two predictions - thereby evidencing via action that one attributes reality to the prediction’s contents and, hence, believes the prediction’s contents - then one at the same time dispels the other prediction's validity (here, at least momentarily disbelieving the other prediction’s contents).

… I'm thinking this holds unless you find the offered definitions of belief to be fallacious. In which case, what do you instead recommend?

(Note: “X is held by S to be true” is equivalent to “X is held by S to be conformant to what is real” which to my mind in turn is equivalent to “S attributes reality to the contents of X" - this example being just one of many variant forms of belief.)

Prediction, to put it succinctly. This happens whether we like it or not. Our minds are constantly looking for patterns and making predictions. — praxis

In the example provided, the mind predicts two conflicting alternatives are possible: wind-blown leaves or a small animal. Also given is that you do not consciously know which alternative is real. To consciously act on either is not prediction: the predictions of if-then are already embedded in each alternative. So prediction as stipulated does not account for why one chooses to act on one alternative but not the other.



Prior to addressing what you’ve stated, I think it's best that we agree upon what terms signify. I’ll start by providing some working definitions of what I understand by “belief”:

-- a belief (a noun) is an instantiation of the activity of believing (a verb)
-- believing can occur in the form of “believing that [the given clause]” or “believing in [the given noun]” or else “believing [the given agent(s)]
-- to believe that [the given clause] is to trust (i.e., hold confidence) that [the given clause] is real and, hence, is to attribute reality to [the given clause] (e.g., I believe that tomorrow will be like today)
-- to believe in [the given noun] is to attribute reality to [the given noun] (e.g., he believes in UFOs), else to [the given noun]’s moral standing or preferability (e.g., she believes in not burning flags), or else to [the given noun]’s ability to accomplish (e.g., I believe in Bill (e.g., in Bill’s ability to finish the marathon)).
-- to believe [the given agent(s)] is to attribute truthfulness to [the given agent(s)]’s claims and, hence, to attribute reality to what [the given agent(s)] claim (e.g., he believed her).
-- hence, common to all three types of belief is some variant of “the attribution of reality to”.

Do you disagree with these definitions, and, if you do disagree, what do you instead recommend?

You say:" I do get the often grave problem of unjustified belief treated as incontrovertible knowledge. But I so far take it that such isn’t equivalent to belief per se.)

I think that beleif per se would also apply to Justified belief. — Ken Edwards

Sure. Belief, in and of itself, would also apply to "justified true belief", which is the commonly accepted definition of descriptive knowledge. Which in turn would make belief and indispensable aspect of, at the very least, descriptive knowledge.

This, however, for example does not make "knowledge" equivalent to "unjustified belief treated as incontrovertible knowledge" - even though both make use of belief.

Still, you might have a definition of knowledge in mind which does not make use of belief. In which case, the just mentioned wouldn't apply, granted.

Anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; no believing needed. — Janus

If it's not knowledge, such a frame of mind would result in at least two alternatives being tentatively entertained: at minimum, that of X being and that of X not being. How can acting out on any alternative not entail some type of belief that the alternative one acts out on is at least likely true?

As one concrete example, one sees movement in a very dark corner close to oneself outdoors. To one's momentary awareness the movement could at least either be produced by wind-blown debris, like leaves, or else by a small animal, like a rat. Both seem relatively reasonable to yourself and both can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; still, one does not know which alternative is true. If one then moves away from one’s position so as to avoid the possibility of contact with a small animal, how can this activity be accounted for in the absence of belief (to whatever extent conscious and/or subconscious) that the movement was likely produced by a small animal (rather than, for example, by wind-blown leaves)?

The same question would also apply to less time-sensitive instances of action in cases where knowledge is not held.

(BTW, I do get the often grave problem of unjustified belief treated as incontrovertible knowledge. But I so far take it that such isn’t equivalent to belief per se.)

I did give one.. one where preferences CAN NEVER be met, by default of things like the law of non-contradiction. But we can use other standards. For example, a world in which harm is entailed to survive can be considered morally disqualifying. — schopenhauer1

Hmm. I'll help you out with a truism: life needs to feed off life in order to survive. Still, as was the case with previous arguments, this does not preclude there being an objective, platonically real good in the world.

I don't see how it has to be "platonically real Good" for there to be some sort of morality. One can keep it at a level of "treat people with dignity" or "don't treat them as a means to an ends". — schopenhauer1

I see the issue as being somewhat deeper than that. On what grounds is treating people with dignity morally good? The bully that outperforms the nerd (unfortunately happens often enough in our world) could very well disagree with the statement. If there is no platonically real Good, then the bully could well be right in treating others as means to personally desired ends - and could well justify this by expressing something along the lines of "the proof is in the pudding".

Then again, I don't believe this existential issue of an objective moral good (singular) vs. relativistic moral goods (plural) can be resolved in a forum format.

I just don't find the conclusion of a morally disqualified world convincing for the reasons previously given.

But then here we have your preference for what is good winning out perhaps...thus starting the cycle. — schopenhauer1

Whomever presumes that what you’ve quoted in regard to an Absolute Good constitutes my personal preference is, to be blunt, mistaken. To be clear, if there is a platonically real, hence existentially occurring, good that thereby takes absolute/complete form, it’s occurrence and attributes would then necessarily be bias/preference-independent - irrespective of whether these biases/preferences are mine, yours, some deity’s, or some other agent's. This, for example, in parallel to the occurrence and attributes of a particular truth regarding the external world being bias/preference-independent. Despite their partial contingency on minds, truths too have nothing to do with what one might prefer to be.

So I think we have to parse out the structure of the system versus various attempts at morality within it. — schopenhauer1

I don't find this adequately addresses my question - it was structure in "if-then" format. Nevertheless, in reply, this is exactly what both Buddhism and Neo-Platonism - in their own disparate ways - attempt to do.

That is to say, within this system, it can certainly be said that there could be a case that one can do good or do "better" towards someone and one can do bad or "worse" towards someone. Perhaps good here is something like helping a friend when they are sick or visiting them in the hospital. Bad here would be picking on someone who is already down.. Just giving various examples. None of these "truths" of INTRA-WORLDLY ethics can justify or make up for the fact that perhaps the world where these intra-worldly ethics takes place is ITSELF a morally disqualified world for aforementioned reasons. — schopenhauer1

This still doesn’t address the by now repeatedly stipulated issue of “via what ethical standard would any such world be deemed morally disqualifying if no platonically real ethical standard is deemed to occur”. It seems to me that one needs to explicitly present this ethical standard for what is morally disqualifying if even the possibility of such a morally disqualified world is to be rationally entertained.

If this ethical standard in fact is platonically real, then a platonically real Good existentially occurs - resulting in some form of metaphysics wherein an absolute moral good is part of the overall world we dwell in (I gave examples of such in my previous post). If, on the other hand, some form of non-objective ethical standard that is rooted in one’s current emotive biases is maintained, all I currently have to say in reply is that neither the grunts, nor the verbally expressed emotions, of one or more agents could of themselves constitute a rationally coherent argument for the world being morally disqualified. And I so far don’t see a viable third option here.

The thought is phrased in terms of absolutes, namely, absolute good. I take there’s no controversy to our current existence not being absolutely good. Also likely noncontroversial is that we can closer approach that which we intuitively deem to be absolutely good or further distance ourselves from it.

But there are two implicit questions to this issue: “What is the absolute good in explicit terms?” and, “Does the absolute good in any way existentially occur?” I don’t find that a forum such as this can definitively answer either.

Cabrera presumes to adequately define absolute good in terms of conditions set upon interacting selves and further presumes that which is absolutely good to be an impossibility. If the premises are true, then so would appear to be Cabrera’s conclusion. Only that the same unanswered question presents itself: “Morally disqualifying” accordant to what moral standard if not that of a platonically real idea/form of the morally good? - for the occurrence of this platonically real moral good as standard for "morally disqualifying" contradicts the premise that no such thing occurs.

For me, the premises aren’t true. I again will lean on those typically unliked metaphysics of Buddhism and Neo-Platonism: both uphold the reality of a nondualistic absolute good – the first Nirvana and the second “the One” – wherein there is pure being devoid of selfhood (i.e., where no selves occur so as to interact) and, furthermore, both maintain the existential occurrence of this absolute good (such that the actualization of this absolute good is possible to accomplish). And, if these general premises are true, then Cabrera’s position would be unsupportable.

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As to some people’s preferences winning out, if there is a moral good, how can society progress toward it without those preferences aligned to it succeeding at the expense of those that aren’t? This by sheer necessity of their so being a moral good.

We still run into the same problems though. It's just a "dynamic" SOME rather than a static. — schopenhauer1

I'll try to come back to this later, but can you better explain your meaning? As I so far interpret it, the "some" preferences still gets filtered by that which is morally good.

OK, I see what you mean. But this in itself restricts one's otherwise freedoms of preferences to that which is deemed morally good. Thinking of those (too many for my tastes) who get their best pleasures from putting others down.

From the OP:

With the idea of only SOME people's preferences satisfied, and those preferences entailing the infringement of other people's preferences, this makes this existence morally disqualifying. — schopenhauer1

Here, reaching out toward often unpopular metaphysics, were Absolute Good to be actualized, it would then be equivalent to a universally actualized Nirvana as pure nondualistic being for the Buddhist - or to a universally actualized oneness with "the One" from the Neo-Platonism view.

That would make our existence in current form not absolutely good, but either moving toward this state of existential being or against it. And this would nevertheless be an aspect of the existence we're in. Such an outlook would then not make "this existence morally disqualifying".

My best appraisal, at any rate.

That's not quite what I'm talking about. [...]

So a world whereby we have to do X, Y, Z to survive may be thought as being "acceptable' to one group but "not acceptable" to the other. Just because the "acceptable" group conforms with current realities of what is needed to survive and have accepted harms like illness and disasters, does not mean that thus it is moral. It simply is what needs to happen if one does not want to die.. Either way, this still makes this "real world"/existence morally disqualifying because whilst some people don't mind/like the terms of this reality, THEY get to have their way above and lording over those who would not have wanted this reality. — schopenhauer1

In fairness, the reply you’ve quoted was strictly concerned with the purported strict existential dichotomy between victim or victimizer - which I find fallacious.

As to the larger picture addressed, to assume that a morally good world is one where all preferences get accommodated without any negative consequences (setting aside its apparent impossibility given interactions between sentient beings, each with their own preferences of interaction) is to stipulate that in a morally good world all conceivable evils get accommodated and realized as intended without any negative repercussions - and, thereby, that the realization of all such evils is of itself morally good.

This, however, contradicts there being such a thing as a moral good - via which one can discern the morally good from the morally bad such that, for example, the world can be labeled morally good, morally bad, or a mixture of the two.

I get that many aspects of the world are unjust, and therefore morally bad, in many a way. But for this to even make sense there needs to be implicitly given such a thing as the just, or justice, as a moral good via which lack of justice gets appraised. And the very occurrence of such a moral good then necessitates that not all conceivable preferences are to be deemed morally good.

As to conformity to the real world being to the liking of some but not others, more generally expressed, if “conformity to what is real” were to be itself deemed a moral good - compare this to the general appraisal of truth (i.e. conformity to what is real) being morally good and falsity being morally bad - then desire to act in discord to what is real would by default be morally bad in some existential way. It would then seem practical that, for example, those who are generally truthful (morally good) would want to safeguard against those are generally false (morally bad) via some form of restrictions so as to maintain a generally morally good society.

One can of course deem this perspective regarding conformity to the real speculative, but the notion of there in fact being such a thing as the morally good (via which addressed givens can be appraised as such) to me necessitates that the realization of all preferences cannot be morally good.

From where I stand, the world you mention in which all preferences get realized without any negative consequences cannot be a morally good world if such a thing as the morally good is deemed to occur. This for the aforementioned reasons as well as the following:

As I previously expressed, intent upon the morally good necessarily restricts one's freedoms to engage in that which is morally bad. Hence, the ability to act unimpeded with a unrestricted freedom in what one does thereby negates the existential occurrence of any moral good to begin with, rather than being any kind of moral good in itself.

In sum, the morally good (if at all premised) requires that one's fundamental wants be satisfied through some restricted way(s), rather than via any whim one might have.

"This square is not a square" is seen as a self-contradiction on its face, and its truth value is falsehood, and there is no contradiction in saying its truth value is falsehood.

"This sentence is false" also implies a self-contradiction, but it is not so easy to say its truth value is falsehood, since if its truth value is falsehood then its truth value is truth and if its truth value is truth then its truth value is falsehood. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I keep on overlooking the subtleties. You've pointed them out well.

Here's a better justification for why I find the liars paradox to be gibberish:

TMK, given the LNC, a contradiction between X and Y necessitates one of the following three: a) X is valid but Y is invalid, b) Y is valid but X is invalid, or else c) neither X nor Y are valid. But given the LNC, possibility d), that of both X and Y being valid, will be excluded as impossible.

I'm saying "valid" as shorthand for this applying not only to propositions but also to non-propositional criteria, such as percepts and memories. For example, if event E and event F are mutually exclusive, and if one recalls that one did E at time-interval T and also recalls doing F at T, one could then assume a) having a false memory of E at T but not of F, b) having a false memory of F at T but not of E, or else c) having a false memory of both E at T and of F at T. But one does not conclude that both E and F happened at T.

I'm hoping this makes good enough sense without me needing to engage in more in-depth explanations.

If so, applying this type of general rationale to the self-contradiction of the liar paradox, it can be a) true but not false, b) false but not true, or else c) neither true nor false - but, given the LNC, it cannot d) be both true and false at the same time and in the same way.

We know that if we claim (a) it will also be (b) and that if we claim (b) it will also be (a) - with amounts to (d).

This leaves us with possibility (c): neither true nor false.

If so, this amount to the liar's paradox being syntactically coherent gibberish: a statement devoid of any possible truth value.

I might be somehow wrong in this general perspective - and if you have the time to point out how, that would be appreciated - but it's how I've so far appraised the liar paradox: as being syntactically correct gibberish.

A square is a circle — javra

That's not paradoxical. — TonesInDeepFreeze

True. Maybe, more in keeping with "this sentence is false", might be "this square is not a square". But I get the the former has a more of self-referential aspect then the latter.

Still, I'd be grateful to hear of any notion regarding why it should be taken seriously as a proposition. This when something like "this square is not a square" is not. For example, can the proposition be deemed a necessary valid deduction from a grouping of incontestably true premises?

No arithmetically adequate and consistent theory can define a truth predicate by which to then formulate a predicate 'is a liar'.

Keep in mind that Tarski's theorem is a claim only about certain kinds of theories (arithmetically adequate and consistent) formulated in classical logic. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Thanks for the reply!

Rather than get bogged down in whatever vagaries there might be in the Epimenides paradox, I would suggest the clearer, simpler, mathematically "translatable" simpler and more starkly problematic "This sentence is false". — TonesInDeepFreeze

I know. But to me this derivative of the Epimenides paradox is as much pure gibberish as is the what might be called paradoxical proposition of, "A square is a circle". To each their own, maybe.

In the sense you mention a 'truth predicate' we actually say a 'truth function'. Meanwhile, (Tarksi) for an adequately arithmetic theory, there is no truth predicate definable in the theory.

For a language, per a model for that language, in a meta-theory (not in any object theory in the language) a function is induced that maps sentences to truth values. It's a function, so it maps a statement to only one truth value, and the domain of the function is the set of sentences, so any sentence is mapped to a truth value.

And, (same Tarksi result said another way) for a semantic paradox such as the liar paradox, the statement can't be asserted in any arithmetically adequate consistent theory, so it is not mapped to any truth value. — TonesInDeepFreeze

As someone largely ignorant of formalized logics:

The less technical format of the liar paradox (contrasted to "this sentence is false") is that of “someone who is a member of X claims that all Xs are liars”.

-- This can be true in the sense that all members of X have at some point in their lives told lies, thereby being definable as liars. Non-paradox.

-- It can also be true in the sense that all members of X have a larger than normal propensity to tell lies, thereby again being deemed liars. Also non-paradoxical.

-- The claim can only become paradoxical when interpreting that all members of X can only strictly communicate via lies, without any exception. Yet this interpretation is contradictory to the real-life occurrence of liars.

While I don’t know how to translate the aforementioned into formal logic, I do find that the claim “I am a member of humankind, and all humans I know of (including myself) are liars (on account of having lied at some point in their lives)” to hold a truth value.

Again, as someone ignorant in the formalities of the matter, cannot this latter sentence as expressed be mapped to a truth value in formal logics?

Or would one argue that the sentence as expressed (a variant of “someone who is a member of X claims that all Xs are liars”) does not present a valid format of the liar paradox?

If a train of logical reasoning ends on a contradiction (paradox), the following possibilities must be considered

1. Fallacies (mistakes in applying the rules of natural deduction)

and/or

2. One/more false premises (axioms/postulates)

If not 1 and/or 2 then and only then

3. The LNC needs to be scrapped + a version of paraconsistent logic needs to be adopted — Agent Smith

While I don’t purport to be an expert in applied formal logics, this seems worthwhile to mention:

All apparent paradoxes not accounted for via (1) or (2) might also be accounted for in principle by multi-valued logics, with fuzzy logic as one variant. MVLs can, for example, take into consideration things such as partial truths, or else partial falsehoods (e.g., on which a great deal of spin and misinformation is for example dependent, this in real-life applications of truth-values).

Multi-valued logic does not reject the LNC.

Hey, it was good debating with you.