I would appreciate particularly the sceptical response to Episode 5: Methodologies for the Study of Magic. — unenlightened

Only read the cover page to the linked to episode but, in case it’s of interest: From my multicultural studies I’ve so far gathered that “magick” is commonly understood amongst modern practitioners (e.g., self-labeled neopagans, witches) as simply being the ability to conform reality (more properly, aspects of it) to one’s will. Hence, if one’s will is to blow one’s nose, one’s being capable of so doing and then so enacting would be a proper, and quite technical, instantiation of magick. Obviously by this, it's deemed commonplace, if not utterly pivotal, to the ordinary occurrence of will-endowed-beings and, by the extension of such interpretation, the world itself can be deemed to be magical (shit and all). From this pov it’s esoteric only in that most people don’t consciously realize they engage in it 24/7. And then it’s considered both “a science and an art” whose details haven’t yet been adequately figured out with any semblance of precision.

TMK, it’s taboo typically applies to monotheistic folk who deem that everything should be done via God’s will: hence magic only via prayer to God who is then the agent that does the deed—this rather than via a spellcasting wherein the spellcaster proclaims “so mote/may it be (this in accordance to one’s own will as agent who does the deed)”. As with most anything in life, those who deem themselves to practice magick affirm that it too can be intended for either good or bad, this depending on the practitioner’s intents. But I reckon the same can be said for prayers as well—which tmk can sometimes take the form of curses upon others.

As to the skepticism, well, causal determinism and physicalism tend to contradict any ontic ability to conform aspects of reality to one’s will, either because everything is deemed to be predetermined in full or because no such thing as the will is deemed to hold ontic reality (instead being deemed illusory).

Mentioning this in attempts to demystify the notion of magic as it is held by modern folk who don’t use the term as a derision - as per magical thinking and such.

(P.s. Me? I too will sometimes blow a runny nose but I don’t make much of it.)

Again: belief-that-X ... hence, belief - that - event/situation. Where X is event/situation.

I'm going to withdraw from this conversation for the time being.

No, its in fact what I'm point out.

Consider the simplistic case of perception, for example. One's perception of X can either be true or false. Same with a lesser animal's. When a lesser animal innately trusts what it perceives, it un-reflexively believes what it perceives to so be; and, in so doing, it holds the implicit (un-contemplated) attitude that what it perceives is true. Same as we do on most all occasions. "Is that a real tree that I see?" hardly ever enters into the equation of our believing that the tree we see in fact is, i.e. we hold an implicit attitude that our perceptions are true most always. And, arguably as with at least more intelligent lesser animals (like great apes for one example), we are only uncertain about what we perceive when it conflicts - of fails to fit into - the coherent / consistent body of all associated perceptions and their assumed relations: the "I can't believe my eyes" attitude.

Granting that we believe what we see, do we not then necessarily assume what we see to be true - this even when we do not contemplate our former and present perceptions in terms of propositional beliefs? After all, it's only after the fact that we analyze via analysis of propositional beliefs.

While I don't want to drag this into the mire:

Perhaps, but is it of any consequence? — creativesoul

Yes, the difference between attitude and fact is of significant consequence.

X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not? — creativesoul

Yes, and in so equating, how does belief-that-X not entail an upheld implicit attitude that X corresponds to what is - thereby, the implicit attitude that X is? An attitude what leads to some form of surprise or bewilderment when and if it turns out that the mouse is not behind the tree.

My own appraisal is that you’ve misread what I’ve said: entails the attitude that X is true; not the fact that X is true.

But OK.

Do you see humans as "the measure of all things", that humans are the ones who decide what is and could be, and humans get to decide this for all other beings? — baker

No. Definitely not.

As just one measly example: A bee can and will decide for itself whether it will or will not sting a human.

And again:

lesser animals' abilities of awareness pale in comparison to our own


On what do you base this claim? — baker

Well, on the best, though imperfect, knowledge that we currently have. Technology aside, human awareness is able to understand and analyze its own meta-cognition, issues of meta-ethics, the ontological nature of the cosmos, advanced probability theory, and so forth. No other living being currently known to us exhibits any indication of holding an awareness that is so capable.

Why do you ask?

To be clear, you're referring to this post. On first reading, I agree with what is said in it. But I gather that it only addresses proportional formats for beliefs in relation to the issue of truth. This as stated here:

Some say, and rightly so, that when we believe some proposition or another, that we have a particular sort of attitude towards that proposition, and that that belief has propositional content. I would readily agree. When a competent user believes the following proposition...

"The mouse ran behind the tree."

...they believe that that proposition is true. The proposition is sometimes said to 'sit well' with the individual's other beliefs whenever there is no readily apparent disagreement between the proposition and the individual's worldview. I've no argument against that much.

What I'm asking is how can a belief-that-X (be it in propositional format or not; so phrased to contrast to belief-in-A) not entail the attitude that X is true?

I ask because I so far disagree with the notion that a belief-that-X (be it in propositional format or not) can be held without entailing the attitude that X is true - i.e., corresponds to what was, is, or will be. So, if a lesser animal believes-that-X (without this belief being in propositional format), this to me so far entails that it believes-that-X-is-true (or: that X corresponds to what is) - despite there being no linguistic proposition to contemplate.

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. — creativesoul

Can you exemplify a belief-that-X wherein X is not upheld to be true?

E.g.: If one believes that Santa Clause is fictional, doesn’t that entail one upholds that “Santa Clause is fictional” corresponds to what is?

Or, more in-tune with the thread, if a cat believes that “it will soon have food” doesn’t that entail that it expects its emotive attitude of “I will soon have food” to correspond to what will be - being in some way surprised or dismayed if it turns out otherwise?

This going on the presumption that truth is understood as “that which corresponds to what is (to include what was and what will be)”.

If you have a lot of political power, you can hide your tracks to a degree, control the narrative. And then your bad deeds become invisible. — Olivier5

I can see it both ways. But then power/ability can be subcategorized into power/ability-over-other and power/ability-with-other: power-over and power-with for short.

Societal power-with tends to remain so over time when all factions that constitute the power-with are in roughly equal balance of power-over ability relative to each other, each checking the other factions so that no one faction gains the upper hand in their power-over all other factions. The US government was once upon a time founded upon this principle. (Today its dynamics have changed in significant part due to the unchecked power-over of financial institutions – including the one-percent-ers - in relation to government; a different story though.)

My point being, in our society men typically - on average - hold power-over relations with women, this rather than power-with relations. On a different front, same can be said of society’s typical (average) relation with nature: it’s one where we want power-over nature rather than power-with the natural world - so instead of wanting to live in balance with nature we tend to plunder it at will … leading to things like global warming.

At any rate, if one qualifies power as power-over (and neglects power-with) then I find the infamous phrase you reference tends to make sense: “Power-over-others tends to corrupt, and absolute power-over-others corrupts absolutely.” Caveat: this where corruption is deemed to be the valuing of one’s own ego’s interests as superlative at the expense of all other’s interests. This would be of weak or degenerate morals, i.e. corrupt. It would also make etymological sense in a way: it would be the rupture, or the breaking apart, of all power-with structures when absolute (as in "togetherness breaking").

But then, the only way to combat a corrupt faction with increased power-over will itself be via some form of power. So power in and of itself cannot be the culprit, i.e. cannot be viewed as a perpetual bad regardless of context.

You'll perhaps be aware that I've a generally anti-philosophical approach. — Banno

Very candidly stated. I can find admiration for that. Maybe akin to the moto of not fixing what isn’t broken? Just as candidly, I remain curious … and dissatisfied with not knowing what is right and what is wrong in that oh so philosophical sense. So, from where I stand, we’re at a friendly enough impasse.

But to be clear on my part:

So I think that there's a fundamental methodological error in starting by deciding what is good. — Banno

Not deciding, but discovering.

Virtue ethics lacks the hubris of deontology and utilitarianism.

Sure, being fair, being consistent, and being happy are worthy; but there's more to it.

Hence, goals — Banno

Other than what I previously mentioned here, I don't have anything against virtue ethics.

The plurality of goals you mention to me misses the point. Of course there are a plurality of goals in practice within an individual, to not address a culture. As to their ethical standing, what is it that makes all these deemed to be good goals commonly defined - or better yet understood - as good? Herein lies the meta-ethics of good, or goodness. All concrete instantiations of good - regardless of perspective from culture or person - share in common the property of being good. And this property that defines all concrete instantiations is singular. Liken it to a universal and its instantiations: the universal is singular, the instantiations of it are plural.

While I can understand that it's a non-concern for some, it is yet a valid, if not very important, philosophical question: What is this ideal good that defines the innumerable, often enough times conflicting, instantiations of good relative to different cultures and to the different individuals within?

And again, the point is to act. — Banno

This reminds of a somewhat tasteless analogy: that of a headless chicken (which is set on the ground rather than held upside-down by the legs to hurry up the rush of blood - yes, as the high school joke goes, I sometimes eat dead animals too … and they have to be killed in order for this to be … this great news flash aside). A headless chicken will act in all sorts of ways - can even be said to interact with others when other chickens are around - but this without a coherent goal. Ethics on the other hand, in order to so be, requires action governed by a coherent goal.

Deontology: that good is best approached when all one does can become a universal law were all others to find themselves in an identical situation. Utilitarianism: that good is best approached when dolor is optimally minimized among one and all within the cohort(s) considered. Virtue ethics: that good is best approached when virtue is optimally enacted in oneself and in the populace. At the very least when so expressed, all systems of ethics are founded upon an optimal approach toward a good - a good that is never fully, perfectly obtained and maintained in its pure form within practice; an ideal good, in other words. Action not governed by this ideal good is thereby not ethical regardless of the ethical system implemented - so too does this ideal good define the unethical as action that stands in opposition to the very same ideal good addressed. The headless chickens’ actions, however, stand outside both the ethical and unethical, this as best as we can tell.

What, then, is this ideal good that all ethical systems address implicitly, if not explicitly?

As previously mentioned, and in accord with @Joshs, I strongly sympathize with the notion that its discovery resides in reflection upon the nature of the self, which naturally incorporates not only oneself but what all other selves desire by shear fact of being (when philosophically addressed, even when they are deemed mortal enemies). And, in accord with @Astrophel, I can’t see how it can be discovered without discovering truths in respect to the affective beings we are - some universally applicable affective truth(s) which reason serves to guide and benefit but which is not reasoning in and of itself.

[My own answer, BTW, will be quickly disregarded as mysticism, pomo, or some such, for it in part pivots around an ultimate state of nondual awareness wherein all dolors can only be rationally inferred to vanish while awareness remains - a state of awareness that awaits to be obtained for as long as it might existentially take - in this sense akin to cosmological notions of Nirvana, Brahman, the One, etc. So, because of this derision from others, I’m not going to be offering my own answer as a contender for argument. But the philosophical question regarding ethics remains even when such “mystical” answer is at best shunned:]

What is the ideal good aspired toward that all ethical systems address - this implicitly, if not explicitly - without whose governance actions become at best amoral (i.e., neither moral nor immoral), this as per the actions of a headless chicken?

Else, how can ethics obtain in the absence of any ideal good?

Thanks. :grin: And a noteworthy aside! :up:

I see more of a love of wisdom in modern psychology than in modern (especially analytical) philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:grin: I second that. Then again, there is the philosophy of mind to take notice of psychology, at least in principle.

Interesting as all of this belief talk is, it doesn't seem very important. More important to my mind (in the Facebook age) is the psychology of belief. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yup. Hmm. Tentatively addressed, I figure it this way. Can there be belief without trust? I can't discern it if there is. Belief that = trust that. Belief in = trust in. Trust is a funny concept. It's essential to who we are and yet, philosophically, more or less a mystery. Trust can be betrayed. Including by one own very self; like when one trusts that one has set the alarm-clock but has not. One wakes up and might feel self-sabotaged. We humans gain most of our instantiations of trust. Many lesser animals have their instantiations of trust inherited genotypically: e.g. a duckling innately trusting that the silluete of a bird of prey indicates danger wheres that of a goose does not; else its innate trust on what it imprints on.
It gets even more intense in terms of innate trust when it comes to insects. We, on the other hand, are birthed with little preset, innate trust - but yet exhibit it in (for example) trust that caregivers will caregive as needed, this from the moment we first emerge into the world. Most all the rest we build up over time. A lot of what we trust is habitual to us. But to form these habits of trust, we typically initially consciously ponder, deliberate, the issue with some momentary degree of uncertainty: choosing what to trust and what not to trust.

A small hint of background to the following idea: belief is trust (at least for the most part: belief is a thing; trust is a process). Belief/trust can then be a) inborn, phenotypically obtained via genetic inheritance, b) inherent in what we do (like a habit) and formerly learned in part via inborn beliefs/trust, or c) enactively made via conscious deliberation and choice founded on (b), and thereby becoming (b) after the fact.

Might be unclear, but I'm throwing this out there for the sake of sharing. Not currently looking to argue for it. But if its of interest as a possible alternative to other perspectives, there you have it. Belief is a concrete instantiation derived from the general process of trust. Or so I currently believe. :smile:

Yeah, I get it. I suppose it's just a matter of opinion whether we should call certain attitudes of languageless creatures "propositional." — ZzzoneiroCosm

At the end of the day, though, I agree. And it's not high up on my list of priorities regarding beliefs/opinions that need to be maintained and justified. So it's known.

It sounds weird to me. Sounds like a stretch possibly deployed to serve some philosophical agenda.

It also commits one to the view that propositions or at the very least propositional attitudes can exist in the absence of language. That sounds weird too and (in my mind) points to an agenda. — ZzzoneiroCosm

If I do have an agenda, here it is: I uphold an evolutionary cline in the abilities of life. That's it. I don't uphold a miraculous metaphysical division between such abilities.

As to language, animals don't have (the human) language (wherein, for example, signs can be freely created to reference relatively advanced concepts). But mammals for example readily communicate via things such as body language all the time, not only within species but also between species.

It seems ancient Egyptian women fared better than current day ones, with a report of 87% of women there undergoing female genital mutilation currently. — Hanover

There was a drastic change in religion between ancient and modern Egypt, wasn't there.

I'm hesitant to invoke tales of what early human society must have been like and how that embedded itself in our DNA and that can then be used to explain our current behavior. Such tales are highly speculative and really not based on scientific evidence. I take them as "just so stories." — Hanover

In case this is of interest:

Setting aside tribal societies the world over, both ancient and modern - a fair enough portion of which are best inferred to either be matriarchal or, more commonly, of equivalent social power between male and female roles and abilities - there’s the longest standing society known to humankind: ancient Egypt. Its dynastic period lasted roughly three millennia; and one can deem that ancient Egypt society at large lasted six millennia if one includes ancient Egypt’s predynastic era. This early human society is certainly not an insignificant blimp on the screen of human history, nor is it a mere anomaly in terms of what our innate, genetically inherited human nature is capable of.

Though the number is disputed, it’s factually known that the ancient Egypt empire had several female pharaohs. This fact should be considered in concurrence with the following:

Women in ancient Egypt were accorded almost equal status with men in keeping with an ancient tale that, after the dawn of creation when Osiris and Isis reigned over the world, Isis made the sexes equal in power. — Love, Sex, and Marriage in Ancient Egypt - Joshua J. Mark

It wasn’t an idealized total equality between men and women in an advanced society, true. But meanwhile Anglo-Saxon cultures still have sometimes grave issues with electing female presidents. Then again, our primary religion(s) tends to place the value of maleness way above that of femaleness via the religion’s creation mythologies. God being a “he”; Eve being just a rib from Adam’s body and not (at least directly) endowed with the “breath of the Lord”; so forth. Then again, the acceptability of incest in ancient Egypt can also be traced back to its creation myths: Osiris and Isis where after all both lovers and siblings.

BTW, if the quality of references is wanting, couldn't find better ones for this post on a whim. But may I be fact-checked if needed.

That's what I mean by an actual human putting the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude. You just did it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

OK, yea. I can't express my beliefs regarding the cat without doing so. I was however aiming at the notion that the cat expresses its propositional attitude to the dog, sometimes quite successfully - this with both being languageless creatures.

But, yea, I know: in order to so express I need to put both the cat's and dog's beliefs into the form of a propositional attitude. If only the circularity of it all could be somehow done away with ...

As I have argued, a priori intuitions or any such introspection will not survive contact.

Everyone has a plan 'till they get punched in the mouth.
— Mike Tyson

Hence virtue ethics - but that's a longer story — Banno

:smirk: — 180 Proof

As Evander Holyfield can attest to, many do have a plan for when they are punched in the mouth – and can cope ethically enough even when their ears are unexpectedly bitten off by dumbass assholes. But we’re championing the dumbass’s affirmation as sound by placing it in boldface?

Question: What is “virtue”?
Answer: You know it when you see it.
Second Question: How so? For example: Why is Tyson’s boldfaced statement deemed virtuous, if it is?

[...] it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put things into the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Rascal that I sometimes am, I’ll question the weirdness of so doing. As a commonly known example: a snarling dog with hairs on end and bared fangs seems to me to be holding a propositional attitude in so manifesting: basically expressing to its interlocuter the following proposition “I am capable of inflicting gravely unwanted pain upon you” - which can either be true or false - and furthermore holding the conviction that what it is conveying is true. It’s the dog’s momentarily held belief that it can inflict injury, a belief which the dog furthermore conveys to interlocutors. Same then can be said of the cat cornered by a dog, with the cat hissing and spitting again with hairs on end and exposed teeth.

To my mind, then, here are quite plausible examples of languageless creatures actually holding propositional attitudes which they convey, communicate, to other(s).

These examples can be made all the more complex belief wise were we to entertain the possibility that the lesser animal is bluffing: here believing that they will make the other believe the languageless proposition they are conveying though they themselves are at best uncertain of it’s truth.

Was just doing online research on the topic and, as you can guess, Wikipedia has an entry on it. Here's what it says:

In some societies, cannibalism is a cultural norm. Consumption of a person from within the same community is called endocannibalism; ritual cannibalism of the recently deceased can be part of the grieving process[19] or be seen as a way of guiding the souls of the dead into the bodies of living descendants.[20] Exocannibalism is the consumption of a person from outside the community, usually as a celebration of victory against a rival tribe.[20] Both types of cannibalism can also be fueled by the belief that eating a person's flesh or internal organs will endow the cannibal with some of the characteristics of the deceased.[21] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_cannibalism#Reasons

Neither endocannibalism nor exocannibalism can be classified as murder per se: the first is a sign of respect/love for the already deceased; the latter usually follows warfare, and homicide during warfare is not considered to be murder (deliberate homicide without justification). There might be other examples that you could use, but, tmk, cannibalism as an accepted form of murder among some cultures is not it. "Female circumcision" however does come to mind.

Example: Murder. In cannibalistic societies the available meat protein is scanty. You capture and kill members of OTHER tribes and eat their flesh. — god must be atheist

From my former studies, the rarity of protein doesn't play a major role. Their spirituality however does. It bears heavy on the notion of consuming - both in the sense of devouring and annihilating - one's enemies: this both in terms of body and soul. But I grant, it's been a while since I've read up on the issue.

Abolition is a dreadful idea. Folk need to drink. :wink: — Banno

:razz: For the record, I was addressing it in terms of slavery.

Hence virtue ethics - but that's a longer story. — Banno

Doesn't that beg the question, though: how does anyone discern virtue from vice, kind of thing.

But OK.

One might know oneself best by looking in at one's reflection on the eyes of another. — Banno

:grin: Yes. I find a deeper truth in this then might many others. Needless to add, if one takes it metaphorically rather than physically. Something to do with self in other and other in self: value in that which is universal to all.

Introspection is fine, but it will not tell you how to treat the homeless, or what abortion laws should be in place, or how much to donate to charity.

Ethics is inherently concerned with action, not introspection. Indeed self-reflection is so often an excuse for not acting. — Banno

Issue being asked is what makes ethics existent in the philosophical sense wherein we contemplate and infer a rational answer to the question. Theory regarding the idea/ideal rather than practice wherein this idea/ideal is imperfectly implemented. Or at least so I take the OP to ask.

What, for example, makes abolition ethical even when most, if not all, those who surround you despise you for your intents?

My own hunch is that in order to know how one ought to act one must first know - intuitively if not at a level of conscious understanding - the ideal one is in pursuit of by so acting. To me at least such can only be discovered via reflection regrading what the self (as in both oneself and others) is.

Is contempt for death (or maybe bravery in the face of death) a virtue? — Ciceronianus

Nicely worded. I find it hard to envision how it would not be. From patients with terminal cancer, to risks incurred in sports/activities such as rock-climbing, to the expected professional altruism of firefighters, and the like. Looking the prospect of death in the face and not being afraid come what may seems to be a virtue universal to all cultures and times. I find that it was certainly present as a virtue to be admired in respect to gladiatorial sports.

The "most accessible possible examination" is your interaction with others, which is there for all to see.

An attempt to base ethics on private self-reflection will lead to nonsense. And does.

Ethics isn't an armchair self-examination. It's about getting out in the world, being amongst others, interacting. — Banno

Take away the reality of emotive, consciousness endowed subjects that interact. What remains of ethics? Nothing. Ethics is thus contingent upon this reality. What of this reality brings about the occurrence of ethics? The only possible answer - were one in search for it - can only be found in that which is universal to such subjects: something like "hinge rules" by which all subjects play regardless of their wants and choices. And this cannot be ascertained by looking at what is perceivable in the external world - but only via self-reflection into the universal properties applicable to the cohort of all such subjects, a cohort which one oneself is a constituent of.

Same for the occurrence of aesthetics, or of value in general.

Were interacting with others to of itself be that which defines the ethical, mass murders would then qualify without reserve, for such are known by their interaction with others. Humans, however, don’t typically deem mass murders to be ethical.

I'm not here to try to provide answers to the OP, but I disagree that self-reflection - the notion of knowing oneself - can only be a wrong-minded approach to the matter.

I've embarked on Wittgenstein discussions before. While what you say makes sense, it to me runs counter to Wittgenstein's own words which I'll re-post, boldface mine:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein

... not redundant, but irrelevant. To generalize from the one case of one's own being to other people is to be irresponsible. And so forth.

Phenomenologists like Husserl doesn’t think such questions are irrelevant , but his method of answering of them I think has much in common with Wittgenstein’s. That is, consciousness would not be an object but a relational, synthetic activity organized by pragmatic use. — Joshs

Yes to Husserl and cohort not finding such questions irrelevant.

In this context, “object” can have numerous equivocations. One’s own consciousness can be deemed an object of one’s own awareness (not to be confused with “object” in the sense of a physical entity), for it can be that of which one is aware of; i.e., that which one’s awareness is about. Yet, in so being the object of one’s awareness, it likewise need not be deemed to ontically be an object (here, “object” in the sense of an existent entity) - but, this object of one’s awareness (what one’s awareness is about) can well be appraised to be a process: a be-ing. If it needs saying, I of course reject the notion that consciousness is an entity rather than a process. Either way, however, it remains a beetle in a box in terms of Witt’s philosophy.

Edit: In case one is unfamiliar with the terminology, please check out definition #2 in the APA dictionary for "object of consciousness". Namely: "2. anything of which the mind is conscious, including perceptions, mental images, emotions, and so forth, as well as the observing ego, or “I,” of subjective experience. Compare subject of consciousness."

Mistaking the pleasure of watching well played-out combat sports for the pleasure of bloodlust — javra

Why else would one watch combat sports, if not for the pleasure of bloodlust? — baker

For the admiration of skill and stamina within a context that safeguards against what would occur in real life combat where nothing is barred. For example, when someone falls to the ground in a boxing match they're left alone and helped out after a few seconds - rather than having their skull pounded into the hard ground by the opponent (which, for example, happened to a friend of mine in high school when I wasn't there; fortunately resulted in nothing worse than a broken nose). Wanting to see the latter would be bloodlust. Not wanting to see it occur would be an absence of bloodlust.

lesser animals' abilities of awareness pale in comparison to our own — javra

Why do you consider this a matter of awareness, and not of something else? — baker

I take it that greater intelligence, for example, endows an animal with greater awareness regarding what is and could be. Conversely, in the absence of any awareness, no degree or type of intelligence could manifest.

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic. — javra

If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to
refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense. — Joshs

While acknowledging other’s rather complex interpretations of Wittgenstein, here’s what the guy actually said in his own words:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein

Note that the most primordial beetle of all beetles, so to speak, is conscious awareness itself. The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”

As always before, I, personally, am not satisfied by Wittgenstein's answer to this and like issues. This when reading Witt verbatim. Felt like mentioning that.

How do you know that animals aren't aware? — baker

Hm. I fallibly know that unicelled organisms are aware, as are fungi and plants. Needless to then add, as are all lesser animals. Interesting issue for me is whether individual somatic cells, including neurons, are to some degree aware - and I find no reason to conclude they’re not. In fact, I’ve in my life wondered how far animals like dolphins would have gone technologically had they acquired appendages with opposable thumbs (something that’s not going to happen for sea-dwelling life); as intelligent as they might be, they’re however stuck with the body they have, as are all of us. So, in short, you’ve misread my comment.


Thanks for that.

By this he didn’t mean animals didnt think, but that their social behavior constituted language games we couldn’t relate to. — Joshs

And yet when a lion does its thing and roars with a certain tonality in a certain context, we non-lions get the gist of what its conveying well enough: the rough English translation being, “I’m the boss”. Going by their behaviors, so too do zebras and gazelles - or else competitors such as hyenas.

For background, what is your stance on the proposition that lesser animals do not convey propositions?

The beetle in a box argument isnt about verbal language, it’s about social behavior, and a rejection of the idea that any meaning can be intrinsic (like qualia). — Joshs

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic.

Shoot. Any time.

What makes us better? — TiredThinker

Degrees of awareness rather than divisions between. But these degrees relative to our surviving closest evolutionary kin are so astronomical in magnitude that lesser animals' abilities of awareness pale in comparison to our own.

Otherwise, tool making, conceptualization, conveying info via species-specific signs, and so forth, all these are found in a cline.

So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Seems to me to be the case, yes.

Do you take issue with this (to my mind non-controversial) position? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Not one bit. I rather take issue with the notion that the linguistic expression of "my pain" has no relevant referent (this as per the beetle in a box argument).

Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.

We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior.

I don't see why it needs to be more complicated than that. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:up: Fully agree.

I don't want to say this due to the can of worms that it is, but I will anyway: the problem is one of other minds; in this case where we linguistic ones refuse to grant nonlinguistic beings any relevance. There of course is the evolutionary conundrum to this and like telltales (e.g., shared central nervous system anatomy) to dispel such a view ... but it's not historically uncommon.

What's the controversy? — ZzzoneiroCosm

In absence of @Banno's reply:

I believe it nullifies the importance of the beetle in a box argument - for, in this argument, if it isn’t linguistic it is irrelevant. Whereas to claim that nonlinguistic beliefs can occur is to claim the relevance of nonlinguistic givens. The two appear to stand in direct contradiction.

Again?

So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diplodocus? — Banno

Can a languageless animal experience uncertainty? In my experience at least some of them can. When in any way uncertain - such as when there is hesitation in proceeding a certain way - what else could such animal be possibly uncertain of if not issues regarding what ought and ought not be done in relation to what is or is not?

No proposition is being made yet there occur conflicting beliefs in relation to what is and ought be done for as long as the uncertainty occurs. This proposition-devoid conflict of beliefs* occurring in the mind of the respective languagleless animal.

* Belief as minimally understood to comprise trust in what is or ought to be done.