At the most basic level, Yang ('masculine') represents action, and Yin ('feminine') represents rest.

Even in the most masculine man or most feminine woman the Yin and Yang principles must be in balance. There is always Yin in the Yang, and Yang in the Yin (as represented by the dots in the famous Yinyang symbol). Unbalanced Yang exhausts itself, while unbalanced Yin grows stagnant. — Tzeentch

I wasn't expecting something so unapologetically mystical, thanks. — fdrake

While it might come as no surprise, ‘s account makes sense to me. Our agency, often enough symbolized via our tongue or speech, is in all cases an aspect of yang, action, the masculine; whereas our listening is in all cases an aspect of yin, the passive, the feminine. Etc.

But your reply does make me curious: What would a so-called “non-mystical” account of masculinity then be? This question asked with examples previously addressed within this thread in mind - such as the example of female masculinity (Margret Thatcher as one previously given example of this ... and to better balance off the conservative-progressive spectrum, with US judge RBG and US representative AOC as additional examples of the same).

Of course, such states of pure consciousness are exceedingly difficult to realise in practice, but in Eastern lore, they are amply documented. The difficulty being, from a philosophical perspective, that they're all well outside the bounds of discursive reason. — Wayfarer

I started to write "Yes" but then I asked myself, "Well, why exactly?" What's so exceptional about such a claim that puts it outside anything we can reason about? Is the experience itself seen as so esoteric as to defy description, and perhaps credulity? This may be a Western bias. — J

Nirvana can readily be described via discursive reason, and can well align in most such interpretations to "a completely nondualistic awareness* ". And, although it might not be airtight, and although it utilizes discursive reasons / reasoning atypical of most Western thought, the learned Buddhist can discursively justify via reasoning the ontic reality of Nirvana just fine. This such as via discursive reasoning regarding the underpinnings of the Noble Eightfold Path.

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* as one referenced example of this:

In archaic Buddhism, Nirvana may have been a kind of transformed and transcendent consciousness or discernment (viññana) that has "stopped" (nirodhena).[136][137][138] According to Harvey this nirvanic consciousness is said to be "objectless", "infinite" (anantam), "unsupported" (appatiṭṭhita) and "non-manifestive" (anidassana) as well as "beyond time and spatial location".[136][137] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nondualism#Buddhism

The understanding of all this being contingent on discursive reasoning.

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Similarly, reports about ego-loss or enlightenment states are hard to understand, but we can say something about them -- for instance, that the experience is usually described as blissful and beneficial, as opposed to painful and destructive. Notice here that language has moved from discursive rationality to descriptions of emotion and value -- that may be a clue. — J

:up:

And then, what evidence is there that emotion and value cannot themselves possibly be subject to some measure of the discursive rationality which we consciously engage in? But it is a different playing field, so to speak, to that of formal western logics all the same.

“The sun will rise tomorrow” is contingent, dependent on temporal and physical conditions. In contrast, real knowledge — as Plato describes it — must be based on eternal, immutable truths. — DasGegenmittel

So are you endorsing Plato's definition of knowledge? — Ludwig V

And, as per my first post in this thread, perhaps so affirming that "real knowledge — as Plato describes it — must be based on eternal, immutable truths" is of itself a gross misattribution of what of what Plato, an Ancient Skeptic, in fact described. Here granting that epistemic truths - prone to the possibility of being wrong as they all ultimately are - nevertheless do occur in the world. From the last paragraph of the SEP entry (boldface and underlining mine):

The official conclusion of the Theaetetus is that we still do not know how to define knowledge. Even on the most sceptical reading, this is not to say that we have not learned anything about what knowledge is like. As Theaetetus says (210b6), he has given birth to far more than he had in him. And as many interpreters have seen, there may be much more to the ending than that. It may even be that, in the last two pages of the Theaetetus, we have seen hints of Plato’s own answer to the puzzle. Perhaps understanding has emerged from the last discussion, as wisdom did from 145d–e, as the key ingredient without which no true beliefs alone can even begin to look like they might count as knowledge. Perhaps it is only when we, the readers, understand this point—that epistemological success in the last resort depends on having epistemological virtue—that we begin not only to have true beliefs about what knowledge is, but to understand knowledge. [...] Perhaps this is the somewhat positive conclusion Plato reaches in the Theaetetus, suggesting that absolute knowledge requires a metaphysical framework that even the best and truest logoi can only approximate. [...] — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-theaetetus/#Con

... here, with "absolute knowledge" being synonymous to the more modern expression of "infallible knowledge" ... this rather than to knowledge which is real. And with the second of the two boldface portions of the quote only reemphasizing the first.

Going by at the very least this one SEP entry, Plato then in fact did not describe real knowledge as based on eternal, immutable truths. (See, for example, the first of the two boldfaced portions of the quote in which Plato's conclusion is quite blatantly expressed as: "we still do not know how to define knowledge".) Nor to the best of my knowledge did he at any point specify absolute knowledge to be real knowledge such that all non-absolute forms of knowledge then equate to non-real knowledge. The latter formulation, instead, being a rather Cartesian interpretation of Ancient Skeptic perspectives ... the latter of which philosophers such as Cicero very much exemplify.

I don't know what you're getting at here. — flannel jesus

Never mind, then.

Knowledge requires infallibility, on your terms. — AmadeusD

We cannot know that the sun will rise tomorrow — even if it seems rational to believe so. The first major reason is the classic problem of induction, as formulated by David Hume. There is no logically necessary connection between past experiences and future events. The fact that the sun has risen every day in the past only gives us a strong expectation — not certainty — that it will rise again tomorrow. Our belief is inductively justified, but not logically or metaphysically guaranteed. — DasGegenmittel

You both hold knowledge to be an epistemically infallible given. I'll just re-post this and call it a day:

Man, I'm a diehard fallibilist. To me the cogito is fallible as well. And I fallibly maintain that we can never be infallibly certain of anything, period - not even that we exist. That said, yes I'm (fallibilistically) certain of this. And a whole lot more. Including that we're now communicating in the English language. To not even mention things such as that the sun will once again rise tomorrow.

The type of "truth" you're here implicitly addressing would be an intrinsic aspect of what the OP terms 'static knowledge". But, while epistemic truths can only be fallible to different degrees and extents, this in no way takes away form the fallible certainty that there does occur such a thing as ontic reality. To which all epistemic truths need to conform. — javra

In other words, there can be no infallible justification, no infallible truth, and no infallible belief. This just as much as one cannot grasp the horizon were one to run fast enough toward it. Ergo, there can be no infallible "guaranteed" knowledge as JTB. All the same, I very much know that this conversation has so far been in the English language just as much as I know that the sun will rise again tomorrow. This knowledge that I do hold then being "fallible beliefs which are fallibly justified and thereby fallibly true". To say that this is then not "real" knowledge is to then insist that "real knowledge" equates to "infallible knowledge" Good luck with that then.

Every so-called “well-grounded claim” in non-static environments rests on credence and is therefore never absolutely certain. JTB can't handle this truth.

Present a counterexample: — DasGegenmittel

So I don't, and can't, fallibly know as JTB that the sun will rise once again tomorrow? This where (fallible) JTB: signifies: non-complete and hence fallible justification for a belief being conformant to that which is, was, or will be ontically real.

My position is that the way you are using 'truth' results in this state of affairs. — AmadeusD

I don't yet follow: I don't think you are here saying that the use of epistemic truth of itself results in the ontic state of affairs which the given truth references. This would be the quite literal position that "It is so because I/you/we/they so say it is", i.e. that one's affirmation of itself causes that affirmed to be or else become real. (This very much like the omni-creator deity concept and his supposed "word".)

Nevertheless, this is how your statement so far reads to me.

I agree. But we can never know if such is the case. — AmadeusD

We always (fallibly) know if such is the case. It's just that, being fallible, our knowledge is subject to the possibility of being wrong - but, until our justifications for it being right fail, there is no reason whatsoever to presume that our fallible knowledge is not in fact right. In other words, not in fact conformant to the ontic reality it references - and, hence, true.

We can never infallibly know if such is the case. Yes. But this plays no part in fallible knowledge of any kind - this as just addressed.

We can never be certain any particular thing is true except that, perhaps, we exist. — T Clark

Man, I'm a diehard fallibilist. To me the cogito is fallible as well. And I fallibly maintain that we can never be infallibly certain of anything, period - not even that we exist. That said, yes I'm (fallibilistically) certain of this. And a whole lot more. Including that we're now communicating in the English language. To not even mention things such as that the sun will once again rise tomorrow.

The type of "truth" you're here implicitly addressing would be an intrinsic aspect of what the OP terms 'static knowledge". But, while epistemic truths can only be fallible to different degrees and extents, this in no way takes away form the fallible certainty that there does occur such a thing as ontic reality. To which all epistemic truths need to conform.

Nothing meets the criteria you're using, without plain supposition. Therefore, for what the word truth is mean to entail, it is useless as a criteria for belief in these terms, imo. I understand the distinction you're making, but the description is what Truth would be, if ascertainable. — AmadeusD

Ok, thanks for you answer. I disagree. I guess I could ask for justification of what you affirm in fact conforming to the actual state of affairs regarded, i.e. justification for it in fact being true. But that would nullify your system of thought.

Would it then be fair to suppose that you live in a world, an umwelt, devoid of truth?

It means really, actually, for real true, which, of course, nothing ever is. That's why JTB is such a bonehead definition. — T Clark

Replace "true" with "conforming to that which is real". Is nothing ever conformant to what is real?

As to the traditional JTB interpretation, I agree that the interpretations could use adjustments.

So, I return to comments about hte uselessness of 'Truth' in that conception. — AmadeusD

You'll notice I did not write nor specify "Truth" with a capital "T" - which I think we both interpret to be some sort of absolute or complete truth. I did define truth as conformity to what is real.

Are you then maintaining that "conformity to what is real" is useless?

While I get what you’re saying, here fully utilizing the definitions of “belief” and “justification” you’ve provided, I yet believe that the truth component to declarative knowledge will in one way or another still be an important component. This for reasons such as the following (here trying my best to present a good and easy to understand example):

A blatantly given lie – say, that one is currently at the North Pole - will be a declared belief a) which the liar in question knows full well to be false and b) which the liar in question will nevertheless attempt to justify to the best of his/her ability so as to convince others of its truth.

Here, then, one has a rather commonplace example of what can be termed a Justified False Belief.

Is the known to be false belief which the liar upholds via justification then of itself the liar’s declarative knowledge of what in fact is the case? It will, after all, be a Justified Belief – but it will not be a belief that is both justified and true.

It seems obvious to me that, while the liar in question can well declaratively know that it is a JFB, the JB in question will nevertheless not be what the liar in question in fact knows to be the case.

Yes, one might start questioning the interpretation of the words "belief" and "justification" in the above example, yet lies do occur among humans often enough - and, imo, ought to be both taken into account and properly accounted for. In this case, as they pertain to knowledge.

All the same, why justify any belief whatsoever if not to best evidence that the belief is in fact true (i.e., that the belief in fact does conform to that which is real)?

If no cogent answer can be here given, then, while in no way being infallible, declarative knowledge can only be "a belief which one can justify as being in fact true". Hence, JTB in the sense just mentioned.

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p.s.: Tacit knowledge, by its very properties, doesn't get justified by us, not until it becomes declared (if it can so be to begin with), at which juncture it becomes declarative knowledge as per the above - but this only if we are then able to so justify it as being true. For example, we all tacitly know ourselves to be human Earthlings (rather than Martians or some other extraterrestrial) - such as, for example, when reading a sci-fi novel about extraterrestrials - but we will not consciously find any need to provide justification for this tacit knowledge-that (which is different from tacit know-how; e.g. knowing how to riding a bicycle) until the moment it gets brought up into explicit conscious awareness as a concept and becomes in any way affirmed or upheld (i.e., declared) by us as conscious beings. That said, other forms of tacit knowledge - such as, as one universal example, our tacit knowledge of the wisdom, or it's degree, with which we are endowed - will not so easily become declarative knowledge on account of our inability to properly justify the position - this even when made explicit in consciousness. For, in the latter case, we do not commonly hold declarative knowledge of what wisdom is to begin with - this other than its rather vague dictionary definitions. .

Though different in some ways to my previous post, I’m very curious to see if there’ll be any disagreements on this perspective (forewarning: it likely won't be intuitively valid upon first reading to many):

-- The masculine is interpreted, be it psychologically or physically, as being “that which penetrates (alternatively expressed, as that which inseminates via information)”.

-- Whereas the feminine is interpreted, again either psychologically or physically, as “that which is penetrated (alternatively, as that which is inseminated by information)”.

On a strictly physical level of being (here ignoring all variations in-between the two sexes, this both in humans and other species of life), men will always penetrate women so as to bring about reproduction. Being physically masculine by the definition just offered.

We all, men and women, are however psychological beings in addition to being physical. Here, when a woman advises a man in what to do, for example, she will be psychologically masculine in so doing. And when a man so complies, he will in turn be psychologically feminine by the definitions just offered.

Yet again, in a typical (harmonious) conversation between a man and a women, since both will penetrate the other with information and be penetrated by the other will information, psychologically both will be of roughly equal standing in the masculinity/femininity dichotomy - being psychologically hermaphroditic - this despite yet remaining completely divided in their masculinity or else femininity on a purely physical level of being.

Even more abstractly, irrespective of our physiological makeup as humans, all humans cannot help but be perpetually penetrated psychologically by reality at large via its information. With perception of all types as one self-evident example of this. And, on this plane of contemplation then, all humans, irrespective of type, will necessarily be then psychologically feminine in respect to reality at large as the masculine – the latter, again, perpetually penetrating all lifeforms with information.

This overall take on masculinity / femininity to me easily enough converges with the yin-yang or else the star of David motifs - which can get rather in-depth philosophically - with both systems symbolically holding the masculine and the feminine in equal importance to existence at large.

All the same, I’m curious to find out what considerations to the contrary of this just expressed outlook regarding the masculine / feminine dichotomy could be offered?

Since this thread is about issues and concerns regarding masculinity, I’m thinking that a discussion regarding what masculinity ought to be understood to be in the first place is rather pertinent the thread's theme.

Beowulf seems to embody the physical aspect of it - a protector against external threats. — Tzeentch

Musings: Brings to mind the etymology to "lord" and "lady". Their current connotations and denotations aside, etymologically:

lord = "bread-guardian" (rather self-explanatory, I think)
lady = "bread-kneader" (which could be construed as bread-maker)

With bread often enough symbolizing material existence, this as per the likely "pan / pane" symbolic connection. But here with material existence being deemed the feminine aspect of existence at large. This as per the notion of Gaia. ... mater as mother or else womb (matrix). Same general motif can be found in the triangle pointing up, the masculine (akin to yang in some ways), and the triangle pointing down, the feminine (akin to yin in some ways), converged into a symbol of existence at large.

Tentatively here granting this, both then will be - though in different ways - of roughly equal importance to existence, and living, at large.

:smile: Very cool.

And hey, since as of late I've been on a role with links from this one webpage, for what it's worth, here's a quick reference to the effect that authoritarian domination is in fact not biologically hardwired into our human nature (the second paragraph in the subsection):

The egalitarianism typical of human hunters and gatherers is never total but is striking when viewed in an evolutionary context. One of humanity's two closest primate relatives, chimpanzees, are anything but egalitarian, forming themselves into hierarchies that are often dominated by an alpha male. So great is the contrast with human hunter-gatherers that it is widely argued by paleoanthropologists that resistance to being dominated was a key factor driving the evolutionary emergence of human consciousness, language, kinship and social organization.[33][34][35][36] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-gatherer#Social_and_economic_structure

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To be clear: If so, then authoritarian domination of others is a byproduct of culture and not of (genetically inherited) biology. With sexual selection doing it's thing all the same. (As Homo sapiens, we are the same genetically-hardwired species we've always been.)

Can anyone explain to me how the male desire to dominate is other than a performance intended to attract a mate? — unenlightened

I could explain my views on why it’s not completely a product of Darwinian sexual selection. But sexual selection of course plays a very large role. I did just say “of course”, right?

We as a western society at large – men and women alike – by in large worship authoritarian violence. If we didn’t about half or so of the movies and songs that get our attention nowadays wouldn’t exist, ‘cuz they wouldn’t have an audience and so wouldn’t make any money. Think of movies the glorify criminals and their behavior; songs with push the norm of pimps and their bitches; etc. And with authoritarian power comes control of money. And with control of money comes improved stability of physical being, including bread to put on the table. Which comes in handy for raising one’s young – this being in addition to the perceived ability of the authoritarian other to better defend the nest, so to speak. Plus, the demise of any authoritarian order brings with it tentative instability, and who wants instability to occur? So then authoritarian order is what ought to be preserved! So yes, not all, but a good sum of women will choose, and find attractive, the more authoritarian asshole as a mate (I’m guessing: and will at such moment of choice believe this authoritarian partner to be so to others but not to her).

Of course, if all women worldwide were to miraculously stop finding authoritarian assholes attractive and mating with such, this characteristic would stop proliferating in humanity soon enough. How many women consider males who un-consensually “grab women by their pussies” to be, at worst, OK people to have in society? Haven’t counted but women too elected just such an individual into power.

I could go on. But, at the end of the day, I’m no more about “it's all the women’s fault” as I am about “it's all the men’s fault”. If there’s problems with society, then there will be some faction(s) of society at fault for it, no doubt. I’ll suggest that the fault here lies with both the male and the female assholes of the world, this in part, and in other part with all the male and female non-assholes of the world for not speaking up.

Complex issue, but yea, sexual selection hasn’t stopped operating in our human species of animal.

I'm not sure why you're asking me that? — frank

I then misread what you intended to say, presuming there was such as "one diagnosis" which had been previously offered.

Spent enough time today online, but I'll sum up my position as being this:

Given that femininity does not equate to subservient obedience to they who are not feminine, there then is no reason for why femininity cannot increase in society to hold equal cooperative power in leadership and governance with masculinity - and this without in any way diminishing masculinity per se.

Just trying to give one diagnosis to a bunch of people who have different ailments? — frank

What one diagnosis would that be?

That may be because of inappropriate generalization. — frank

What do you here have in mind?

they had to be careful to avoid seeming powerful, because they would come across as bitchy. — frank

More specific to this one example: is a so-called "bitch" an independent women who doesn't accept being subjugated despite being of female sex (which of course means she gets penetrated during sex by some male, here assuming heterosexuality) or is a so-called "bitch" the subjugated property of some pimp (this literally or figuratively)?

Then: which of the two is the more morally correct way for a women to be in society? Then: which of the two is however the more ethically correct way for a women to be in society?

This only so as to better illustrate what I claimed in my previous post regarding femininity.

But I'll add that while some understandings of "femininity" will be at odds with what goes by the term "masculinity", yet other understandings of "femininity" will readily accommodate a cooperation of power and leadership between the feminine and the masculine.

I agree with what you say in regard to femininity. There for example is this virgin or whore theme to femininity. A damned if you do and damned if you don't proposition where women are the ones giving birth to the next generation. As points out though, its a very murky terrain.

To me it in large part pivots on what "power" is supposed to be and who it's supposed to be carried out by. Culturally speaking, that is. And, in turn, all this ties into both morals (the mores - i.e., norms or customs - of the land) and ethics (as in, for one example, what constitutes a virtuous use of power and what doesn't). BTW, to differentiate between the two - morality and ethics - one can well uphold that female circumcision is perfectly moral in such and such culture, while nevertheless upholding that it is all the same utterly unethical.

And all this to me gets exceedingly complex when philosophically enquired into.

... man oh man, back to the "burning times" theme of witch hunts, devil's mark and all. Gotta hate that (mother) nature and those who deem it in any way divine. Spinoza then being here included. :roll:

What would this consciousness be conscious of, if not the "I" or object of thought? — RussellA

The "I" here ceases to be entwined with thought, emotion, or perception - but instead is said to become, or else transcend into, pure awareness devoid of any duality. Here accepting that one is not any thought one thinks of - these thoughts and emotions and possible percepts instead being likened to ripples on a pond which should be fully calmed till no disturbance of awareness occurs. This, at least, as I've heard the experience of such meditation described.

Heck yeah. What else is self-reflection but self-knowledge? — J

:grin: :up:

Later in the same essay, Ricoeur puts it even more clearly:

The cogito is at once the indubitable certainty that I am and an open question as to what I am. — 244 — J

The more mysticalish parts of me then associates this very issue with the well known dictum from the Oracle at Delphi: "know thyself". Or at least endeavor to best understand? :grin:

Among women? Never heard that one. I was under the impression that honest cooperation is entirely feasible among both sexes. — BitconnectCarlos

Given the context of what I expressed, this is precisely what I intended: among both sexes.

It's interesting that serious meditation practice, especially in Hinduism and Buddhism, makes this point vivid. My understanding is that an experienced meditator would agree that there is indeed no "I" remaining -- but this does not show that consciousness requires an object. For pure consciousness is said to remain, even in the absence of the "I" and its objects. Of course we're free to raise an eyebrow at that, but there's a lot of testimony to the validity of this experience. — J

Again, nicely expressed. As to the raised eyebrow, without the meditater's active awareness of this transient ego-death which can reputedly occur during meditation - which, as active awareness, is clearly not that of an I that can only occur in relation to something not-I, i.e. which is not a duality-bound ego - the person would have no way of experiencing, much less recalling, the occurrence. Often enough as something associated with a moment of bliss. I believe it's this non-dualistic ego of active awareness that remains at such junctures of transient ego-death which then gets addressed as "pure consciousness". Without it, one might just as well be entering and then emerging from out of a state of coma.

I am, but what am I who am? That is what I no longer know. — in The Conflict of Interpretations, 241-2

I love that! Yes indeed.

We each have our own experiences in life, not all of them good. As to men and women, as I previously said of my views, both (though obviously in different way) are capable of equal ability to accomplish, of equal power. As such both can be assholes of equal degree, just as much as both can be non-assholes of equal degree. Honest cooperation tends to only occur among the latter, though.

I'm not claiming that abuse of women was in those days non-existent. But then neither am I claiming that abuse of men also did not on occasion happen. Tribal societies only began changing with the advent of animal domestication and their herding. Till then, there of course were occasions of inter-tribal warfare, in which one can well presume the "abuse" of others from different tribes. Still, overall, there is no indication pointing to hunter-gatherer tribes not being of a largely egalitarian ethos.

I don't know a single person who could take this as anything other than an insult to their morality (restrict this to males I know). — AmadeusD

Sorry to hear you so say. I, for one example, am in no way insulted by the question,

no direct evidence — flannel jesus

I take it by this that you weren't there yourself. OK. Neither was I or any other living person. But then the same applies to all history a century old or longer.

Can you then reference any academic paper as "indirect" evidence for what you've affirmed?

I do think it's pretty likely that violence in general, and sexual violence against women in particular, was more common the further back from "societies" we go. — flannel jesus

Hunter-gatherer tribes are "societies". Otherwise you are by no means alone in this perspective, but where is the actual evidence for this perspective when it comes to the hunter-gatherer societies of the past? Other than what @Outlander has addressed as being pure imaginings.

then what were preventing these tendencies in the past (prehistoric times) if there were no police, law enforcement, or laws protecting their livelihoods? — Shawn

The egalitarianism-oriented social cohesion of the tribal societies, this in regard to hunter-gatherer tribes of the past - just as much as it pertains to, and based on what we know of, the hunter-gatherer tribes of today.

What gives me the right to say that the "I" causes thoughts, as if the "I" is separate to the thoughts it has? — RussellA

Long story short, most typically, the "I" decides upon which thoughts to uphold and then upholds these, with such options of possible thoughts to uphold being "caused" (which I find to be an ill-suited term, but all the same) by the unconscious mind rather than by the "I".

I agree that the "I" is not separate to either its perceptions or thoughts. But what are the implications of this? The implication is that perceptions and thoughts are an intrinsic part of the "I". — RussellA

I did not claim that the "I" is not separate from its perceptions or thoughts, I only asked you to clarify what you mean by "separate". This, to be honest, because so far it seems as though you are reifying the mind and its components (e.g. individual thoughts and percepts) into having similar characteristics to physical things in the external world, which can indeed be separated givens.

Here's one example: if the "I" is not (in some non-physical way) separate from either its thoughts or percepts, then how can thoughts in any way of themselves be separate from percepts? Yet to see a house (a percept) is indeed utterly separate from contemplating the concept/thought of "house". And one does not need to see a house when so contemplating the concept, nor contemplate the concept when seeing a house.

But, I would still question your assumption that — Outlander

Man, I offered you two links which, I so far find, directly evidence my affirmation. Do you question the verity of the references linked to? On what grounds if so? (each has references of its own to academic articles and the like)

Otherwise, again - other than what you yourself "imagine to have once been" - what rational or empirical evidence do you have to support that the hunter-gatherers of today - which tend to be egalitarian in their ethos - are any different from the hunter-gatherers of prehistoric times?

If the "I" is separate to its thoughts, the question is, how can the "I" be privy to any thoughts at all? — RussellA

I'm no sure what you mean by "separate". The "I" for example is not separate from its perceptions in so far as these perceptions are only so because they are perceived by the "I" - being in fact contingent on the "I"s awareness. Same with all thoughts. And we seem to agree on perceptions, at least, being doubtable all the same.

As to the question you ask, the answer I offer is: via its faculties of awareness.

Or, would the experience of the thought itself mean that you could not doubt the content of the thought itself?

E.g. There appears to be a conscious thought of "I believe I am watching a sunset". Why would that thought be free from any form of doubt about its existence as a thought? — Kranky

Come to think of it, you might(?) be here referring not to the though/belief itself but the very experience of the thought/belief. If so:

While we can come to doubt the content of what we experience (be this an experienced perception or an experienced thought/belief) that we so experience at the given present time will likewise so be "a strongest form of fallible certainty'.

For example: you are seeing a pink elephant. You can come to doubt whether or not you are in fact so seeing a pink elephant in the external world or else are hallucinating a pink elephant in the external world. But the fact that you so experience visually at time X remains a fact regardless.

Does anyone know what he means here? Why does "immediate" contradict "certainty"? — J

I can only presume that what he intended by "immediate certainty" was something like "a certainty that is prior to any reasoning or empirical, else experiential, evidence". In this manner thereby being what can then be termed "infallible certainty".

I'm in agreement with all your comments, btw. Maybe FN's key objection to the cogito was to a possible reification of what the term "I" references that might have been typical in his day; here specifically thinking of the Cartesian "res cogitans" and "res extensa" distinction (such that FN might have disagreed with this dichotomy?). My best guess, at any rate.

It is more likely that "I" is the thought rather than it is the "I" that is having the thought. — RussellA

Doesn't this entail that with each change in thought thunk there will then necessarily be an ontological change in the "I" addressed? If so, how can the same "I" be privy to different thoughts?