Or, would the experience of the thought itself mean that you could not doubt the content of the thought itself?

E.g. There appears to be a conscious thought of "I believe I am watching a sunset". Why would that thought be free from any form of doubt about its existence as a thought? — Kranky

Come to think of it, you might(?) be here referring not to the though/belief itself but the very experience of the thought/belief. If so:

While we can come to doubt the content of what we experience (be this an experienced perception or an experienced thought/belief) that we so experience at the given present time will likewise so be "a strongest form of fallible certainty'.

For example: you are seeing a pink elephant. You can come to doubt whether or not you are in fact so seeing a pink elephant in the external world or else are hallucinating a pink elephant in the external world. But the fact that you so experience visually at time X remains a fact regardless.

Does anyone know what he means here? Why does "immediate" contradict "certainty"? — J

I can only presume that what he intended by "immediate certainty" was something like "a certainty that is prior to any reasoning or empirical, else experiential, evidence". In this manner thereby being what can then be termed "infallible certainty".

I'm in agreement with all your comments, btw. Maybe FN's key objection to the cogito was to a possible reification of what the term "I" references that might have been typical in his day; here specifically thinking of the Cartesian "res cogitans" and "res extensa" distinction (such that FN might have disagreed with this dichotomy?). My best guess, at any rate.

It is more likely that "I" is the thought rather than it is the "I" that is having the thought. — RussellA

Doesn't this entail that with each change in thought thunk there will then necessarily be an ontological change in the "I" addressed? If so, how can the same "I" be privy to different thoughts?

I have some questions about certainty.

I understand that our senses can be doubted. E.g. Everything I 'see' could be an hallucination or an illusion etc.

But I have read lots about the certainty of thoughts.

If I have a conscious thought/belief that I am seeing something, could that thought/belief be doubted? — Kranky

My own two cents:

If the certainty you’re in search for is that of infallible certainty – a certainty that cannot be wrong in principle as well as in practice under any circumstance whatsoever – I will fallibly affirm that no such thing can occur.

As to thoughts being doubtable, I’m preferential to the bumper-sticker affirmation of, “Don’t believe everything you think”. After all, via judgments, such as those regarding what is and is not real, one will tend to select one of the multiple thoughts and discard all other options as false thoughts regarding the matter. Example 1: is my laptop real? One option available to you will be endorsed and all others rejected upon arriving at a conscious decision regarding the matter. Example 2: I think Earth is both necessarily solid and approximately spherical. And I can of course come to doubt this by consciously asking myself for what justifications I in fact have to think this. (Troubles tend to start when one, for example, thinks the Earth is flat, or else hollow on the inside, and in no way doubts this thought irrespective of the evidence to the contrary.)

As to, not infallible certainty, but “the strongest form of fallible certainty that can be had”:

Given that one can come to doubt both one’s own perceptions and one’s own entertained thoughts, can you then come to in any way rationally doubt the following proposition here placed in quotes?

You – here strictly entailing “a first-person source of awareness (i.e., an aware being, else an occurrence of first-person awareness)” – will be, i.e. occur, for as long as you are in any way aware of anything whatsoever (to include being aware of doubts regarding your perceptions or else the thoughts which you are momentarily aware of).

I could try to rationally evidence why this proposition cannot be an infallible certainty - even if it’s not possible for you to in any way cogently doubt - but so doing would take a considerable amount of reasoning to express. Notwithstanding, I do find this quoted proposition to be an example of “the strongest form of fallible certainty that can be had”.

(BTW, in case this might be in any way pertinent, this specific “strongest fallible certainty” just specified will in no way then provide either rational or empirical evidence to the effect of there not occurring similar aware beings in existence at large other than yourself.)

Well, for starters. nature itself as can be witnessed today is a pretty brutal if not outright savage environment. One could assume, if we slowly became set apart from this environment, and were once immersed in it knowing nothing but the sort, for how could our lesser evolved predecessors possibly have, things were quite, as they say, savage. Makes sense, no? — Outlander

Seems to me that, in order for this to make any kind of sense whatsoever, one would need to presume that the hunter-gatherers who live in “nature itself as it is witnessed today” are significantly unlike the prehistoric hunter-gatherers who lived in “nature itself” as it was in prehistoric times.

What evidence, rational or empirical, do you have for this?

I’m running on the presumption that we are strictly addressing Homo Sapiens. Wouldn’t make much sense to call a female chimp or a female bonobo a "woman”, for example. Still, for the record, all current indications point to hunter-gatherer societies being around for far longer:

Hunting and gathering was presumably the subsistence strategy employed by human societies beginning some 1.8 million years ago, by Homo erectus, and from its appearance some 200,000 years ago by Homo sapiens. Prehistoric hunter-gatherers lived in groups that consisted of several families resulting in a size of a few dozen people.[10] It remained the only mode of subsistence until the end of the Mesolithic period some 10,000 years ago, and after this was replaced only gradually with the spread of the Neolithic Revolution. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-gatherer#Archaeological_evidence

emphasis mine

------

Your former kumbaya-like sarcasm aside, I so far don't find any reason to affirm that my initial assertion was not, generally speaking, spot on. Again, this from what I know regarding what is known at large.

Perhaps you simply forgot and omitted the oh-so-forgettable "I imagine" preface in front of your ideal description of the world. — Outlander

Any particular reason you hold to presume things were any different prior to written history commencing? To be clear, this in hunter-gatherer tribes.

Really? I mean. Okay. Based on what information? Were you there or something? :lol: — Outlander

The first paragraph in the subsection "Social and economic structure":

Hunter-gatherers tend to have an egalitarian social ethos,[26][27] although settled hunter-gatherers (for example, those inhabiting the Northwest Coast of North America and the Calusa in Florida) are an exception to this rule.[28][29][30] For example, the San people or "Bushmen" of southern Africa have social customs that strongly discourage hoarding and displays of authority, and encourage economic equality via sharing of food and material goods.[31] Karl Marx defined this socio-economic system as primitive communism.[32] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-gatherer#Social_and_economic_structure

There's a lot more to read to the same effect, with most of it being well-enough referenced.

do you think this was something that during prehistoric or ancient times was also commonplace among our ancestors? — Shawn

If by "the distant past" you're willing to go all the way back to when everyone was of a hunter and gatherer tribe, all indications seem to suggest otherwise. As far as I know regarding what is known at large, not barring exceptions to the rule, these tribes tended to be (and tend to be) very democratic in their leadership by our modern standards.

The caveman with club in hand knocking over the dame on the head so as to take her back to his cave ... its one of those stories that is more a reflection of the tellers than it is of what actually occurred in prehistoric times.

[...] but I don't see much awareness of the fact that [...] some of the 'crisis' of masculinity can be perceived as a preference for 'female' values, by females, in feminized spaces. — Jeremy Murray

The present move away from cooperative leadership is... regrettable. — Banno

I’ll add that both global and national percentage differences between male and female populations, though not perfectly equal, are so negligible as to pretty much round out to equal standing in most, if not all, cases. (reference)

If we in fact honor power of leadership by representation in our culture, leadership ought then be just about equally divided between males and females at all levels of governance, without any glaring exceptions.

So, given the yet occurring disparity in this leadership by representation, and in acknowledging that women have made some progress over the years toward this just mentioned ideal:

Can anyone explain to me how the fear of (else the roundabout concern that) “women are taking over and are destroying the core of masculinity” is in fact not a communal projection of personally held aspirations by a certain male faction in society, one composed of individuals that themselves desire to be domineering over all others - women very much here included as those whom they deem themselves entitled to subjugate? Entitled by Nature, by God, it doesn't much here matter.

(I don't mean for this question to be insulting. It's quite sincerely asked. To maybe make this more clear: Such that this one male faction of society might typically hold a belief in something along the lines of, “the weaker sex needs to be barefoot and pregnant with mouths closed in obedience to whatever 'the man' says”. While this might in no way depict you, it is a paraphrased sentiment I’ve, again, unfortunately often enough encountered. The majority of rapes in the world, after all, are perpetrated by men on women; men who often enough hold this or a similar enough mindset in respect to women at large.)

It doesn't much matter for the purposes of the discussion if masculinity and femininity match biological gender. — Banno

:smile: OK, you, I'll take you're word for it. All the same, I can't escape the hunch that many, if not most, tend to disagree with this. "Power" being often strictly equated to control and dominance over other, and in this way with the capacity to domineer, with this capacity tending to be seen as what ought to be a strictly male characteristic, which most term "masculinity".

That said, I'll endorse your statement: yes, plenty of women are domineering and in this sense alone masculine. Moreover, though, plenty more feminine women and masculine men are, despite their gender differences, alike in being neither submissive to domineering factions nor attempt to domineeringly subjugate others. But this regards a type of power utterly different from that just specified.

So here we are. Sounding off topic.

Edit: Having read a couple pages now, I see nothing reasonable was going to come out of this. Sigh. — AmadeusD

OK, going back to the OP in addressing the problem of masculinity:

Is the occurrence of "masculinity" of itself contingent on there existing "a weaker sex"?

(Examples such those I linked to in my previous post indicate otherwise. Nevertheless, this seems to be the implicit assumption of most - at least most I've been acquainted with either directly or via media.)

-------

To be upfront about my own stance, as a heterosexual male who values my own masculinity, I'm an egalitarian at heart, and thereby view the power (ability to accomplish) of both sexes/genders to be both of equal ability and of equal value in at least principle - though not always in practice, modern culture playing a large part in this. I also uphold that "if there will be a war between the sexes, there'll be no people left". This pretty much summing up my own view.

Not something which homophobic attitudes will much enjoy, but all the same:

This seems to conflate happiness and eudemonia with pleasure. — Hanover

It doesn't. Pleasure has as it's opposite pain. Happiness has as it's opposite suffering.

My response here is just a push back on the comment regarding the ubiquity of happiness seeking by all life forms. — Hanover

OK. Still, that wasn't the pivotal issue addressed.

Gesundheit. Need a hanky?

Dudes and Dudettes, were gender to be fully biologically determined, empirically verifiable examples such as these would never occur:

Some of the most compelling evidence against a strong biological determination of gender roles comes from anthropologists, whose work on preindustrial societies demonstrates some striking gender variation from one culture to another. This variation underscores the impact of culture on how females and males think and behave.

Margaret Mead (1935) was one of the first anthropologists to study cultural differences in gender. In New Guinea she found three tribes—the Arapesh, the Mundugumor, and the Tchambuli—whose gender roles differed dramatically. In the Arapesh both sexes were gentle and nurturing. Both women and men spent much time with their children in a loving way and exhibited what we would normally call maternal behavior. In the Arapesh, then, different gender roles did not exist, and in fact, both sexes conformed to what Americans would normally call the female gender role.

The situation was the reverse among the Mundugumor. Here both men and women were fierce, competitive, and violent. Both sexes seemed to almost dislike children and often physically punished them. In the Mundugumor society, then, different gender roles also did not exist, as both sexes conformed to what we Americans would normally call the male gender role.

In the Tchambuli, Mead finally found a tribe where different gender roles did exist. One sex was the dominant, efficient, assertive one and showed leadership in tribal affairs, while the other sex liked to dress up in frilly clothes, wear makeup, and even giggle a lot. Here, then, Mead found a society with gender roles similar to those found in the United States, but with a surprising twist. In the Tchambuli, women were the dominant, assertive sex that showed leadership in tribal affairs, while men were the ones wearing frilly clothes and makeup. — https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Courses/HACC_Central_Pennsylvania%27s_Community_College/ANTH_205%3A_Cultures_of_the_World_-_Perspectives_on_Culture_(Scheib)/12%3A_Gender_and_Sexuality/12.04%3A_Gender_Variability_and_Third_Gender

I saw a documentary of the Tchambuli back in university days. Quite telling to so see first hand. And there are many, many other examples as well. In the west, there are stories of the Amazonian women who, for example, were stated to partake in the battle at Troy in the Illiad (Troy no longer being a mere "myth"). With burial mounds of Scythian woman worriers quite possibly aligning to the purported tales of Amazonian women having traveled north.

Culture plays a heavy role in what genders are expected to be. For better or most likely worse, with the "weaker sex" motif being quite central to today's typical western culture.

I’ll be away for a while, but in case this comes up:

Though I can imagine how what I mentioned in my previous post might sound uncouth to some, so interpreting - as per Genesis I - the creation of humankind on day six (this rather than on day seven) to me is the only way I can find of making sense of the age old question of how Cain got around to having children: Here, Cain did not have children via some form of immaculate conception nor did he have his children with Eve, his mother, but instead coupled with a women created on the sixth day when humankind at large was created. This union thereby giving rise the Jewish peoples.

This being a philosophy forum, thought I’d mention this perspective. This, again, just in case what I previously mentioned might have sounded cross to some. (Hard to tell how others interpret it.)

There's a lot to unpack here. And rules go back all the way to Eden. — BitconnectCarlos

Would you then agree that, from within an Abrahamic perspective, the same “rules” of ethics would minimally go back to Gensis 1’s so-called “sixth day” (which I so far interpret to represent “the sixth cycle of events” given that there were "days" prior to a solid earth's occurrence)?

The sixth day being the day in which the “we” therein addressed – which I interpret as being Elohim (this rather than G-d, this due to G-d's entailed divine simplicity, which thereby could not be a plurality in any sense of the word) – created both man and woman, woman and man, in Elohim’s very own image likeness. This, then, necessarily before Eve was created from Adam’s rib; and so long before the Cain and Abel event ever took place.

I ask (in my previous post) because to my way of understanding, this so called "pivotal intent" of maximizing eudemonia (which can be translated as "well-being" just as much as "happiness"; and to which suffering is the opposite) is of itself ubiquitous to absolutely all lifeforms and, hence, all sentient (aka, subjective) beings.

So the question regarding ethics at large is then not "whether or not so doing is of itself good" - it can't help but so be, and is in a way the missing link to all ethical considerations bar none - but, instead, it's the question of "what is the best approach to so doing".

It's consequentialism. If happiness is not the consequence you wish to achieve, what is? — Hanover

Ok, so maximal eudemonia is the goal or else consequence pursued. The pivotal intent, so to speak. Doesn't the exact same apply to all theistic peoples out there?

In case you did not know, if you want to reply to a specific post, go to the bottom of the post and you'll see an arrow pop up. Press on that arrow and the post will be mentioned in your post. If you want to make reply to a specific statement in another post, highlight that statement with a mouse and then press on the "quote" button with pops up.

Basically, power is within the law and the usage of law. — Ludovico Lalli

Not one iota. Power is strictly in the enforcement of the law. Human laws are in effect nothing more than dictums, statements - which as statements can be used in any number of ways (such as lawyers and judges make use of these statements). But without any power of enforcing such human law, the law of itself becomes or else is powerless and so impotent.

Me, too. So we agree on that... If we disagreed, there would be more to say.

Does that make our agreement subjective? Is our agreement relative? Or is this talk of subjective/objective relative/(...absolute?) just fluff? — Banno

The answer to this question is contingent on how these words get defined and thereby understood.

Suppose that among its other attributes “subjective” necessarily entails that that specified is a) partial to only some aspects of all that is real and b) is subjected to aspects of all that is real toward which it is not partial to.

Further suppose that among its other possible attributes “objective” necessarily entails that that specified is a) not partial to some aspects of all that is real and b) not in any way subjected to aspects of all that is real toward which it is not partial to.

These two attributes then being necessary but insufficient definitions of each term.

Then, if there is an objective Good, all subjective beings will necessarily be subjected to it – irrespective of whether they are partial to it or not. Here, one need not have an affinity toward the Good to be subjected to it. More extremely, if all subjective beings were to have a repulsion toward the Good and thereby be in full agreement that the Good is in fact bad, sooner or later the Good would end up biting them in the ass – not because the Good is a ego-endowed selfhood which judges them but, instead, because here the Good is an objective aspect of reality at large to which all subjective being are thereby inevitably subjected to. Like gravity, given that it likewise in fact is objective, one might detest being so constrained and might want to fly off a tall building by flapping one’s hands, but gravity will have its (metaphorical) final say in the matter all the same. Agreement on what is good is here agreement on what in fact is an objective aspect of reality at large.

If there is no objective Good, then goodness is fully subjective: If enough people agree that murdering is good, murdering thereby here becomes good for the people in question. And there is no objective realty by which to measure this goodness of murdering. In parallel, using gravity as example again, if enough people were to agree that gravity is not a universal law and further agree that it is then possible to fly by the flapping of hands – given that there is nothing objective about gravity – then within these cohorts people would then begin flying by the flapping of their hands.

Other definitions of subjectivity and objective might well yield different results. But the question still gets answered based on how the terms specified get to be understood.

I'm very glad we agree.

The International System of Human Rights is redundant and pleonastic. — Ludovico Lalli

Right. So is the truth that the planet ain't flat (and quite a few other affirmations out there). Your point being ...

lol what world have you been living in where this already isn't the case? — DifferentiatingEgg

It goes by the name, "planet Earth".

Power relegated to voting and fiat money. — DifferentiatingEgg

Yup. Power relegated to the people. Not just some at expense of others, but all.

I'm here guestimating you disagree. In which case what in your view ought power be relegated to?

I'm assuming that whatever your answer is, it will include power to you at the expense of others. But I'm open to being wrong.

That's true. But unless you realize that you are included in the common good, you will mistake your taxea for some kind of charity or protection money. But if one has some money, it is the result of the social structures that you live by. So your taxes give you the opportunity to make money. (And money itself is the result of the social structures you live by.) — Ludwig V

:100:

You seem to confuse science with scientist. There are plenty of theists in the science world, but science itself, since around the renaissance has operated under methodological naturalism, which is indeed the presumption of no magic. So science operates as if there is no god, true, but it makes no demand on the beliefs of the people doing the science. — noAxioms

I don't think I'm "confusing science with scientist". Isn't it only via science that we can affirm things such as that ESP has no objective bearing? I'll maintain that it is. In which case science and the scientists it consist of is free to scientifically study such things as ESP. And this irrespective of whether the beliefs of the scientists' involved are pro or contra things such as ESP's validity.

BTW, in relation to this boogieman word "magic": even for a naturalistic pantheist who most can't hardly distinguish from a diehard atheistic physicalist, the whole of reality can only of itself be, in one word, magic. To disprove this affirmation one would need to find a cogent reason for being's so being. It's been tried plenty of times. No results so far.

Or maybe we could just call it the nature of reality. — BitconnectCarlos

Too many criminals getting away with their crimes in this world for me to consider it the nature of reality. But perhaps you've addressed "reality" as something which goes beyond the physical and the lives lived in it ...

I had in mind the idea that the "moral" or "good" thing to do is to maximize the pleasure/utility of the masses and to give no special regard for e.g. one's own family. — BitconnectCarlos

Which would be a perversion of goodness to be sure. But then isn't this a scarecrow to the commonplace decency that all adults need to give something of their own well-being for the benefit of the community they pertain to? I for one example know of many that detest jury duty when selected for it - even though there can be no such thing as jury-of-one's-peers in its absence. As far as I can tell, the sense of community has be lacking, or else slowly degrading, for some time. This, at least, in my neck of the woods.

Those who stray generally pay a price and bad deeds can carry a nasty ripple effect. — BitconnectCarlos

It here sounds like you're referring to something like karma, rather than a deity's judgments.

like sacrificing one's own happiness for the multitude. — BitconnectCarlos

That's what taxes are all about, right? One's giving of one's own profits for the common good, this at least within genuine democracies. Here, I tend to agree with Mr. Franklin when he said:

Our new Constitution is now established, and has an appearance that promises permanency; but in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.

I could have called those 'science-determinism' but there are several kinds of that. — noAxioms

Given what you've previously said - namely, that the opposite of "philosophical determinism" is not randomness but supernaturalism - this term of "science-determinism" would be akin to calling all scientists atheists (uniformly disbelieving in all that atheists consider to be supernatural and hence unreal). Which, to be blunt, is quite contrary to facts. It's not science (which is the sum of all that scientists do and present) which you here are implicitly referring to but scientism, a term that often enough gets used on this forum, and which need not be pejorative if it honestly reflects one's views.

As to the adjective "philosophical", determinism, being of itself a purely metaphysical stance regarding what ontically is, can only be philosophical. (That in itself threw me off a bit.)

All the same, determinism remains determinism, regardless of subspecies. This as per 's comment.

I've never seen it used that way, but it's still a form of the 'inevitability' meaning.
Izzat so? : — noAxioms

Yup.

I stand corrected. — noAxioms

Don't currently know of a better way to say this, so I'll just say - in as honest and humble way as I can - very cool of you to so express. Can only hope I can return the phrase to you some day.

Indeed, I'm not rigid on the details. — bert1

:grin: :up: Neither am I.

Still, the declarations are worthwhile, if only they are put into effect. — BC

In general agreement with 's observations, I personally think that the OP might (?) be emotively taking a long, roundabout, and maybe scapegoat way of saying that, because the declarations of international human rights are not uniformly enforceable globally, they then are worthless.

To which one reply, the only one that currently makes any sense to me, will be this:

I'd like to see the world being a single democratic state. — bert1

Or else a global democratic nation with a multitude of states, each state with its own ethnicity, culture, sub-laws, etc., such that each state votes for what the global nation’s laws should ubiquitously be. Here, then, there would be a global enforcement of the two declarations you link to, this as would be decided upon by the states' citizens.

Not essential to the issue, but I'll add this to my former post just in case it might eventually come up:

Yes, the naturalistic pantheism of someone like Spinoza is a non-dualistic naturalism wherein God pretty much equates to the sum of all natural laws and their effects. It is nevertheless a theism due to a stringent affirmation of God's being, a theism which upholds theological determinism. Ought one then consider it to be a form of “theistic physicalism”?

While I couldn’t give a hoot either way, this or any other possible to conceive of exception - such as the “naturalism” of the ancient Stoics - do not nullify today’s commonly held stance that theological determinism is fully resultant from a supposed omni-creator deity - one who thereby has reputedly created both the natural laws and the causal processes that are, this so as to result in … a reality of determinism. One which can be said to preclude libertarian free will to boot.

Nor, for that matter, would any possible exception nullify the use of the term “determinism” within such contexts as that of theological determinism. Which, again - I’ll here say “typically” - is taken to be at direct odds with physicalism, or else with non-dualistic naturalism when thus understood.

In trying to presume the best here: your usage of the term does not equate to the usage of the term. If it did, then theological determinism would equate to naturalism and thereby be a physicalist stance. This conclusion then being in tune with the slithering roses motif I previously mentioned.

Ah, I don't think javra was assuming you're just making the term and the meaning of it up. — flannel jesus

Quite true. I wasn't.

In fact, you said it's basically just not-dualism, and that already has a name: monism. Physicalism or materialism also seem to cover it, if I'm understanding it correctly — flannel jesus

Since monism too comes in different flavors - to include both neutral monism and idealism - it can only be a naturalism in the form of physicalism/materialism.

So, because one thus upholds, “philosophical determinism” then is “physicalism” … and since the latter, lo and behold, allows for, but does not necessitate, randomness, so too then does the former.

The style of reasoning will in some ways parallel that of roses being dogs, of dogs having three wings, and of wings being things which slither, ergo that roses can by definition slither (in part if not in whole) … or something to the like.

Not my idea of what philosophy is about. Wish I hadn't squandered so much time on this. But, hey, lesson learned.

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism

Determinism and randomness are ontological opposites only under D2 and D3. The opposite of D1 is supernaturalism, which makes the physical universe not a closed system, open to external causes from outside. Those causes are presumably not random but rather conveying intent. — noAxioms

D1, as specified by you, is "philosophical determinism". Not "naturalism". And you yourself provided the SEP link to reference D1 as such. From the link to the other forum post which you provided:

1) Philosophical determinism.
I googled 'determinism' and got this: "all events in the universe are caused by prior events or natural laws ". This is probably the primary definition used when asserting a dichotomy between determinism vs free will, the latter being defined as choices made by supernatural causes.
This sort of free will is required to be held responsible by any entity not part of the natural universe (God). It is in no way required for internal responsibility (to say society).

I think this equivocation on your part between "philosophical determinism" and "naturalism" is where our disagreement might likely primarily reside. If so, and if you want to insist that they are the same thing such that they then each "allow of ontic randomness", there then is a lot more befuddlement going on than I currently care to address in regards to determinism. In which case, I'll just call it quits.

The second question, and the one I touched on above, what dictates the objective? [...] What are you ultimately referencing to prove something is good. With law, you point to the law. With morality, what to you point to? — Hanover

It seems to me one can here only point to the Good, of a platonic / neoplatonic repute. It by entailment would be a) a completely fixed aspect of all being and b) completely impartial relative to the whims of individual egos or cohorts of these, this in all respects (be these egos deities or not), thereby being (non-physically) perfectly objective.

Oh wait, it's mysticalish of me to so say. Never mind, then.

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it. — noAxioms

OK, thanks of the replies. Want to point out that this example is not good, though. Given a metaphysics of determinism, though epistemically unpredictable in it's outcome, a rolling of the dice can only be ontically determinate. Else we get into issues of omniscience, which we've already agreed upon is a dud.

"To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic?" - javra

What, randomness? By definition of 'not random', it cannot be, but that's not to say that a completely different definition of determinism allowing randomness.

" If [randomness is] not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld." - javra

I don't think that in such cases the determinism is otherwise upheld, at least not by definition D2 or D3. — noAxioms

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism" - this instead of now validly being termed an "indeterminism"?

This issue will only validly apply in reference to D1, due to the reasons given bellow:

----

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing? — javra

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience — noAxioms

In having had further time to think about your initial reply, and with the definitions you provide here for D1 - D6: We already agree that D6 is a dud, so D6 does not validly count. D2 - D5, however, are all models of physics which are construed to be different types of determinism only in so far as they can each be deemed a subcategory of D1.

Because of this, the only one of the six categories listed which validly counts toward a "philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing" will strictly be that of D1.

To this effect, I for example found this article in relation to "D2":

Why Bohm was never a determinist

Marij van Strien

Forthcoming in Guiding Waves In Quantum Mechanics: 100 Years of de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave
Theory (ed. Andrea Oldofredi). Oxford University Press, 2024.

Abstract
Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has generally been received as an attempt to restore
the determinism of classical physics. However, although this interpretation, as Bohm initially
proposed it in 1952, does indeed have the feature of being deterministic, for Bohm this was never
the main point. In fact, in other publications and in correspondence from this period, he argued that
the assumption that nature is deterministic is unjustified and should be abandoned. Whereas it has
been argued before that Bohm’s commitment to determinism was connected to his interest in
Marxism, I argue for the opposite: Bohm found resources in Marxist philosophy for developing a non-
deterministic notion of causality, which is based on the idea of infinite complexity and an infinite
number of levels of nature. From ca. 1954 onwards, Bohm’s conception of causality further
weakened, as he developed the idea of a dialectical relation between causality and chance. — https://philarchive.org/archive/VANWBW

Point being, whether or not in this case D2 is a determinism is measured against D1. This as I just specified above.

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"One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1." - javra

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it. — noAxioms

Your answer is unjustified. And, unless you can answer the question posed at the beginning of this post in a manner that makes cogent sense, it further seems to me unjustifiable in principle.

First, I take it that we then agree that by randomness we are not addressing mere unpredictability but, instead, some ontic attribute of reality.

You did nitpick but then agreed with the definition of randomness I provided. It is here that I'm not understanding your premises. What, to you, then is ontic randomness?

To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic? Or is it not deterministic?

If deterministic, in what way is the ontic randomness not an intrinsic attribute of the ontic determinism specified per se (to which it is otherwise contrasted as something other than)?

If not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld.

Examples of physics will be of no help here, for their metaphysical interpretation can vary considerably in this matter.

This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)? — javra

I've encountered plenty of people that use definition 1, the one in the dictionary, which yes, doesn't seem like determinism at all to me. That D1 allows it does not in any way imply that the others do. D1 just says naturalism: no magic going on. No interfering miracles or anything like that. — noAxioms

You'll notice the SEP article on D1 nowhere mentions that the determinism therein addressed allows for ontic randomness (when understood as not deterministic). Randomness is not address until section "3.3 Determinism and Chaos" which, upon first reading, only presents what might be potential problems for determinism as described by the article. The section, for example, ends with this sentence:

Nevertheless, the mathematical exploration of chaos in dynamical systems helps us to understand some of the pitfalls that may attend our efforts to know whether our world is genuinely deterministic or not.

One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1.

At any rate, rather than writing considerably more, I'm hoping you can clarify things by answer the question(s) posed at the beginning of this post. Just so you know, though I'm currently confident in my position, I'm of course open to the possibility of being wrong.

All this by way of suggesting that it might be our intent that is important in ethical situations rather than our emotional response. — Banno

To this effect:

If one intends to save a life (and has good enough reason to believe oneself capable of so doing) but accidentally kills it (say in the process of giving CPR or first aid), ought the person be deemed good or bad? Most of us would say "good", and the law generally agrees. (e.g., in California there's the so-called "Good Samaritan law" which applies to just this kind of thing. It's in large part based on intent.)

Conversely:

If one intends to murder another but accidentally benefits the other in the process of so trying to murder but failing (say by alleviating them of a malignant tumor, for example), ought the person who intended to murder be deemed good or bad? Most would say "bad".

This offered in the context of intents vs. doings.

And, of course, one can always actively intention X while emotively disliking so doing. Here I figure things could get relatively complex. But we still judge ethical standing on the intentioning and not on the emotive state of being. If one intentions the saving of a life by giving mouth to mouth resuscitation while being disgusted by the vomit, for example, the actively engaged in intentioning is nevertheless what counts.

I ask because, as far as I can see, if necessitarianism is entailed by determinism

OK, let's compare it to my list of 6. 1 is out since it allows randomness — noAxioms

This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)?

If so, then one gets randomness only in the sense of notions such as chaos theory, of the butterfly effect repute, which is itself deterministic ontologically... and so here the resulting randomness is only so epistemologically (to any non-omniscient being) but not so ontologically. Ontologically, there is no randomness. And so everything ontologically remains causally inevitable. Edit: And so completely necessary in every respect; thereby completely fixed; and thus fully equivalent to eternalism in its ontic being.

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Maybe we should better define what "randomness" is intended to here specify. I'll start by defining it as an event within the cosmos (with the cosmos here understood to be the totality of all that is, to include multiple worlds or universes where such to occur) that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring. This then to me generally conforms to this definition of randomness:

3. A measure of the lack of purpose, logic or objectivity of an event

Only that instead of being "a measure of" which holds degrees, it's taken to be a complete lack of that specified.

Do you mean something different by the word such that randomness would be something not deterministic in terms of ontology (rather than in terms of mere epistemology as just previously addressed)?