It depends on tastes, but for someone who doesn’t like the superficial stuff, I’m in agreement that as an overall appraisal, that which now makes it out into culture at large tends to be lacking in the deeper truths—lyrically and instrumentally (here, emotive resonance with what feels true to oneself)—heard in the music of yesterday.

In comparing modern pop with pop songs such as Cyndi Lauper’s Time After Time or Kate Bush’s Running Up that Hill—both of which had plenty of radio play in their day—the more modern pop music that gets radio play is not up to par … this in terms of depth, for lack of a better word.

As to not selling out, you have singers such as Lenard Cohen. Even his last album, released about the time of his death, was superbly intense.

Thinking of downward tendencies, NIN’s Downward Spiral—as with everything that preceded and most of what followed—was good as well … OK, more than great for some of us. Sepultura too has persisted without any indication of selling out.

I can think of other examples of bands that keep things honest for the long hall, Collide as one such band that has never been and likely never will be mainstream (it’s not like every band I listen to has a large following).

But, since this seems to me to be a matter of voting on whether or not music is still staying strong, I too will vote with, “no; as an overall human endeavor and industry, it’s not as good as it used to be”.

Then again, having everyone now exposed to lyrics such as “war, what is it good for?” or “you say you want a revolution”—lyrics that tend to say something meaningful in relation to the lives most people are living (other than simple sex and violence)—might not be in the financial interests of the large corporations which have bought up most of the music industry in the last couple of decades … or so my presumptions go.

A bit of historical pedantry on my part, but I feel it important to note just cuz -- Cicero was a Stoic, and not a Skeptic. — Moliere

Hey, no problem. Didn’t find anything specific in my quick reading of his Wikipedia page but did find this on the Wikipedia page De Natura Deorum:

Gaius Velleius represents the Epicurean school, Quintus Lucilius Balbus argues for the Stoics, and Gaius Cotta speaks for Cicero's own Academic skepticism.

Having read this particular work and a little background—and as is confirmed in the quote above—we was an Academic (i.e., philosophical) skeptic who favored Stoicism in this very addressed work.

I mentioned the guy because he was anything but an ascetic.

There’s Truth, there’s truth(s), there’s a multitude of sometimes inconsistent connotations to each, and there doubtless is an unlimited amount of both individual and communal imagination as to what these signs could be established to mean.

Nietzsche is a fun guy in his expressions of there not being any truth(s).

Yet there’s an underlying problem to any such wondering when addressed at a strictly rational plane of thought.

Is what one believes—and then furthermore claims—a falsity, i.e. an either consciously willed or unconsciously constructed deception regarding ontic facticity? We cannot even begin to cognize this question in manners devoid of a Kantian-like, a priori conviction that there is such thing as truth, i.e. non-falsity. The truth that there are no truths is itself either a truth worthy of being upheld or a falsity which, we all aprioristically intuit, ought not be believed princely because it is not true.

Upholding anything with a negation of truth’s presence or value rationally results in a catch-22, and in a logical contradiction: both X and not-X are at the same time and in the same way (this were X signifies “the presence of truth, i.e. non-falsity”).

For example, suppose one proposes a post-truth world as beneficial. This proposition will either correspond with the reality of what is beneficial—and then be true, i.e. a truth, in at least this one sense of “correspondence to what was, is, or will be factual”—or else it won’t so correspond … in which case the given proposition will at the very best only be a partial truth and, at worst, a complete falsity.

As to Nietzsche, given the total body of his works, I strongly feel that Nietzsche was implicitly equivocating in his assertions about there being no truth(s). Equivocations being something he was fond of doing, such as when addressing the issue of virtue.

All that stated, our knowledge may not ever be demonstrably absolute about anything, but this is no valid reason to then deny the presence of knowledge—maybe formally demarcated as “beliefs fully consistent with the non-contradictory reasoning by which they’re substantiated which we, furthermore, hold no valid reason to suspect being false”… or something along these lines. I, then, can’t find any valid reason to uphold that we do not hold knowledge of truths.

For instance, though I cannot demonstrate this to be absolute/infallible knowledge, I nevertheless know it to be true that this thread has an opening post. Also: though I might not be able to demonstrate my knowledge of this truth to be absolute under intense philosophical interrogation, this by no means contradicts, nor nullifies, the viable possibility that what I here know is, in fact, absolutely true and, in this sense, an absolute truth regarding what is ontic.

Then, how would our philosophical investigations be oriented at anything other than the discovery of deeper truths respective to those we are already knowledgeable of?

Otherwise expressed, to me it seems like when we hold curiosity we likewise hold a desire to know truth--something we more often than not obtain when we act upon our curiosity.

Which aspect? The "value beyond value", or something else? — Noble Dust

Yes, the value beyond conceptualizations of value. I'm working with the presumption that we're on a close enough page with what this signifies--but, to the extent this is wrong, I'd like to find out more about your opinions.

For my part, to use more Eastern slang, to me it is the Akasha—some term it void, or sky, or emptiness—that serves as the non-physical core of the first-person point-of-view—of all first-person points of view. Slightly comically and slightly seriously, in western cultures (as in many of the East) it sometimes was/is termed the fifth element … from what I seem to remember at any rate. The element that binds all other elements together. Here, to be clear, I'm addressing the five ethereal elements of fire, water, air, earth, and this fifth. Oddly, The Fifth Element comes to mind now, but that’s not quite what the potential metaphysics of Akasha would be about. Anyway, my blabbing away aside, please feel free to offer your own takes on what you interpret to be the metaphysical component of being.

I'm not familiar with a nihilistic "meaningless meaning". What is that? — Noble Dust

Oh, my late night sense of humor. Nihilists believe that there is no basic meaning to life or existence, yet they mean things when they speak, so at least their speech is meaningful. Yet because there’s no basic meaning to life, this meaning is basically meaningless. Thus: "meaningless meaning". Or something along those lines.

So do you tend to ascribe this metaphysical aspect of being outside individual selves? Inside? Both?

Now, zoom back in to every day life, and our every day human concept of value, the one which you rightly described as "a human construct that is not the core referent it tries to conceptualize", suddenly seems meaningless without a metaphysical referent. So, if someone were to insist that it doesn't require a metaphysical referent (which I think is implicit in economics, politics, capitalism, etc), then their view, would, necessarily, regardless of whether they are conscious of it, be a materialistic, and thus a nihilistic view. — Noble Dust

This rings true to me. Yes, I too take it that there needs to be a metaphysical component to being in order for value-systems to not be nihilistic. Although, I’ve yet to come to terms with the notion of “meaningless meaning”, a notion which I take to be common staple within nihilisms … which, because of this, so far don’t make sense to me.

That last post of ten hours ago baffled me a bit ... and I reinterpreted the previous ones in light of it. I read "Buddhism, Hinduism, and other spiritual worldviews are inherently materialistic and thus nihilistic". Still hoping this was a bad interpretation on my part. Eah, it likely was.

I don't understand how you can agree here if 1) you consider the gist of my argument to be laconic and 2) your counter-argument is to emphasize the fppov, which is a given in my metaphysical argument for "value beyond value". — Noble Dust

I’d like to remind that laconic, as I so far understand it, is also Spartan (such as in the movie 300): i.e. courageously to the point.

That should answer #1. As to #2, in my current outlook, it is the metaphysically ontic aspects of the first-person point-of-view within which the “value beyond [human conceptualization of] value” resides. My emphasis of the first-person point of view wasn't a counter argument but an intent to make the argument no simpler than as simple as it ought to be ... considering. At any rate, it wasn't an argument against what the OP concludes.

Thanks for the kind reply.

I was thinking this sums up the core aspect of your argument:

For life to have value, it has to be metaphysically predicated on some valuation that is beyond the human concept of value. — Noble Dust

And given your latest reply, I’m now taking it that you hold disagreements with the human concept of value … maybe due to the human concept of value itself being a human construct that is not the core referent it tries to conceptualize? Am I in the general ball park?

I’ve reread your posts, and now find myself having a hard time following. For instance, I in no way understand your last post:

But a system of value that is self-contained is inherently materialistic, thus nihilistic. — Noble Dust

What would a system of value that is not self-contained be? Even when one invokes an Abrahamic Creator Deity the system of value itself as a whole would be self-contained. This self-containment, then, to you makes all forms of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—as only three examples of possible systems of value—inherently nihilistic and materialistic. (?) On account of my own limitations, I don’t know how to reply to this—presuming that this is an accurate interpretation of your own position.

If I’ve misinterpreted, can you better explain this conclusion which you state as fact.

But the issue I'm trying to highlight in regards to measuring the value of human life is that it's always self-contained if we can never truly get beyond the fppov; and if value is always self-contained in this way, then nihilism follows, because all attempts to qualify a measurement of value in regards to life will always be based on something else within life itself; — Noble Dust

I’m short on time now, but:

Unless one wants to uphold materialism and its cherished assumption that death of the flesh is identical to an eternal death of the self … slightly more accurately and metaphysically, an eternal death of the primordial awareness on which awareness-of (hence, selfhood as we know it) is contingent … then nihilism is by no means an entailed conclusion. Nihilism is a product of materialism.

Buddhism upholds Nirvana as this end. Hinduism Moksha (though many variants of Hinduism also occur). I won’t get into other worldviews. Yet there tends to most always be found the concept of a metaphysical end as one of absolute, selfless, and superlative being: an eventual (… who knowns how many physically measured eons from now …) ending in which being/awareness holds presence in manners devoid of other-ness. And as typical of any such worldview, until then the self itself evolves into, ideally, closer proximity toward such “state of bliss”. As some say, for every rebirth there must first be a death (which obviously doesn’t hold materialistically—but is quite often addressed of the self in many religions the world over).

I’ll try to better reply latter on. Though I have to say that, even here, I feel weary of getting into what most would consider to be spiritual worldviews—even when they don’t necessarily contain the presence of deity.

It's ambiguous, what "life" actually means. — darthbarracuda

This is a good point. So, from where I stand, I currently think of life as necessarily consisting—on an individual plane—of a first-person point-of-view regarding anything that is other relative to the same first-person point-of-view; the presence of this ontic state of affairs is then in no way contingent on what we typically understand by self-awareness—on any degree of meta-awareness regarding one’s own awareness; and to be clear, I take this first-person point-of-view to be in perpetual transformations.



I believe that I get what you are saying and that it holds validity at certain plains of thought regarding reality—this when addressed more metaphysically. Yet, soberly and without any intent to disparage, I in my lexicon would term this overall argument “laconic” (both in the sense of “Spartan” and in the sense of “simpleton”). Einstein was good for quotes, including something like this, “make things as simple as possible, but no simpler”. To make it simpler relative to the requirements of a given context, then, to me is to be laconic—something I’m guilty of often enough.

I say this because, in my view, the moment you address life you address a set of first-person point-of-views aware of other. Thus, self as inescapable reference point (a technical self-centeredness) for actions becomes simultaneously established. With any such self, there are then basic value judgments of what is good and what is bad for the respective self—these ranging from the genetically innate to the most abstract concepts that humans are capable of either conjuring or discovering.

I’ll here use to “fppov” to specify “first-person point of view” for the sake of brevity.

Value will always be relative to, minimally, one such fppov. For instance, if one deems one’s own life to have no value, the question then is “no value relative to whom”? One’s self (as a fppov that holds one’s own total life as the object of one’s momentary awareness), others one is surrounded by, the species at large, etc.? Different people are likely to provide different honest answers despite these people affirming the same proposition. Same can be said of egotistic evaluations of one’s own value.

To me, there is no getting beyond self—and thereby beyond value of, firstly, individual lives one encounters (including one’s own) and, secondly, the abstraction of life in general (when it comes to us humans)—for as long as there is an ontic presence of fppovs.

So, in what I take to be states of overall health, it makes sense to me that one values one’s own total being (of body and mind) more when one does virtuous deeds than when one engages in vice (one might think of something extreme to make this general truism stand out better). And, furthermore, likewise does it make sense to me that one then finds value in a similar fashion for the individual lives of others—as unique persons or as individual cohorts—this, again, in respect to one’s own fppov.

Nevertheless, as concerns the abstraction of life in general and its ontic value, I fully agree that it is predicated on the very being of life, more particularly on the presence of human life from which values regarding this abstraction emerge, and not the other way around. As you say, “value must be predicated on (human) life, not life predicated on value.”

I have read somewhere that the Dalai Lama has acknowledged that some of the tenets of Buddhism might need to be revised if they do not accord with modern science, and particularly, neuroscience. If that report is accurate it leaves me wondering if he was genuine about that. — Janus

Without any modesty intended or implied, why is there a logical contradiction between neuroscience and reincarnations. Would one hold a naïve physicalist mindset in which solid atoms are supposed to disassemble and the reassemble back into the same object/body? Such assumption, if at all held, would be specious.

Without claiming this to be a fail-proof argument: you neurologically are more similar—in innate and context-relevant-acquisition of affinities, interests, aptitudes, etc.—to one human in the history of all mankind than to any other. Same self, but dwelling at a different time (especially if we entertain Buddhist “neither is there or is there not a self”). Project this into the future and you obtain the same results, that of reincarnation of the self.

Yes, there’s a bunch of additional things that could be here inquired into and debated. Still, here you have both neurological presence and the concept of reincarnation in manners that are not logically contradictory.

Fair enough. Can we agree on this, though: You hold a trust/faith/belief that things such as the true nature of experienced/enactive aesthetics will be answered via investigation of objects while I hold the trust/faith/belief that such things can never so be discovered?

(I say "trust/faith/belief" because they in at least one sense all signify the same thing.)

Just pointing out that there are plenty of things that we do not doubt until some philosopher asks us to.

Folk take it as read that we ought not believe unless we have a justification.

Ought we doubt the obvious without justification? — Banno

Well, personally, I’m here only speaking on behalf of some of the more traditional forms of philosophical skepticism, such as that upheld by Cicero (insert: “global/radical/etc.” in place of “philosophical” if one pleases; this so as to definitively contrast it to philosophical dogmatists who finds “skepticism” for that which they are fully certain not be the case from the very get go … like the hardcore materialist who’s “skeptical” of ghosts):

There is never a good reason to doubt when no contradictions are present to one’s awareness. So, unless one gets to a situation that indicates both Q and not-Q both at the same time and in the same way, not an inkling of doubt is justifiable … but there’s always space for inquiry into anything one wants (from God almighty to … pick your poison) during the leisurely parts of the day. As life has it though, the more one inquires the more apparent contradictions one encounters, and, so, justifications are required to resolve the inconsistencies. But this basic, aforementioned principle is as steadfast as anything.

Not sure how the non-philosophical-skeptics would address this issue, though. A different recent thread on this form now comes to mind.

Edit: Speaking on behalf of the same perspective, I should add that when these contradictions become available to one’s awareness—though one’s life moves on with its hierarchies of priority—these contradictions are nevertheless accepted as givens that need to be addressed so as to be resolved. Whether they’re all remembered becomes a different issue. But rejecting their presence on account of one’s emotive dislike for their presence would, I believe, here be termed dogmatic prejudice regarding what is … and hence not the path of a philosophical skeptic.

I take it then that you’re for the alternative position of English-ism for those here involved, no?

Does it come down to either Dogma or Existentialism or Relativism?

[...]

Are there other possibilities? — anonymous66

Wouldn’t all conceivable stances yet be addressing that which is true (of the ontic)? In which case, there would then be a ubiquitously present meta-position: that of philalethia (the love of truth). … One could add an “-ism” to this term if one likes.

IF "physical" is defined as what science has explained.

THEN what is "non-physical" is what science hasn't explained.

Then how can there be "physical" stuff that science hasn't yet explained? How is it that the mind, and it's relationship with the world, isn't just one of those "physical" things that science hasn't yet explained? — Harry Hindu

You’re concluding rhetorical question relies on a circular argument, as far as I can currently see.

Just as can be the case with any other stance regarding, basically, philosophy of mind—idealisms (in plural since these can take many forms), Cartesian substance dualism, pluralism, and (my now personal favorite) dual-aspect neutral monism—so too can physicalism be a circular argument in search of some justification for not merely being a “because I say/believe/will so” argument.

Hence: P1) because I/we/they so assert, everything discoverable by science is physical (even though science might have no clue as to what it is; e.g. dark matter and dark energy (maybe over 90% of the known universe and of what we ourselves consist of as physical beings, this in the colloquial sense of physical); P2) because I/we/they so assert, everything shall be discovered by science at some future point in time (including all aspects of being and its becoming involved in consciousness); C) therefore, everything is physical (this due to the cause of me/us/them so saying it is—as explicitly affirmed in the two former premises).

This, as presented, is then a circular argument (where the conclusion is implicitly upheld in the premises) that does not demonstrate any stance to be true at expense of any other stance being erroneous.

But you are reducing nature to just an ejaculatory reflex, when I've made clear, had you read the whole of my post that violence and power-over is also closely linked to the male sex drive.
Wanking is not enough it's what chimps have to do when in captivity. — charleton

While you’re focusing on the power-over tendency in human males, I hold a different—what is to me, sad—reality to be true: it is the majority of women who select for these overly testosterone infused, power-over maniacal, human males to begin with. You’re forgetting that in Darwinian evolution, it is very often the female of the species that selects which males it copulates and reproduces with.

An unbiased look at other species reveals a wide array of more or less genetically hardwired heuristics of behavior. Them evil wolves (unlike the regal, good lions) are monogamous for life, else they—typically as immediate family members—serve the monogamous alpha mates of the pack. There is no power-over structure to this and like species’ relations between sexual partners. But I aim to keep this short.

Chimps are a notoriously aggressive species. Clincher is we’ve descended not from chimps but from a common ancestor to a) us, b) chimps, and c) bonobos. To those who give a rats’ behind (because they understand the deep neuro-psychological ramifications of this), unlike chimps, bonobos—as one measly but factual example—inherently smile like we do for all of the same reasons. Quite a commonality--which we do not share with chimps. So, via genetic resemblance, it seems we humans parted ways with something that then parted ways to result in chimps and bonobos in a manner that links us slightly closer to chimps than to bonobos. Nevertheless, the quantity of analogous evolution we share to bonobos by comparison to chimps is, for me at least, impressive—e.g., bonobos are known to walk for short distances, especially females with children on their backs while they carry stuff in their hands (this as another tell-tale indicator of our partial resemblance to bonobos … chimps don’t do this). But OK, keeping this short, bonobos are a wet dream for orgy-mongers. They do it anytime, anywhere, for pleasure, for comfort, for a banana they’d like but the other has—in heterosexuality and both male and female homosexuality … it doesn’t much matter to them. And none of it has to do with power-over: power-over being a typical chimp behavior, though not universal among chimps. (among my references are those of Frans de Waal’s published works … he’s both very esteemed and well known in the field).

For us humans, along with our massive cognitive abilities is also included an unprecedented amount of behavioral plasticity—including in our sexuality and in the cultural norms which affect our sexuality.

As to the gay thing: some of us have no choice because we're birthed 100% heterosexual or homosexual; most humans, however, are birthed (as I've learned at my university) with some degree of bisexual tendency ... which can adapt to whatever culture states ought to be (where the individual to so want).

Keeping this as artificially relevant to the nuts and bolts of basic sexual selection theory as it is known today: both males and females would like to successfully reproduce. The male has a basic choice between shooting out seeds like Rambo into whatever it can and, on the other side, doing everything he can to ensure that one or a very few seeds will out-compete all rivals when turned adult. First translates into promiscuity, for lack of a better term, and is normally benefited by power-over strategies/heuristics. The second variant translates into a life-long carrying, nurturing, father that safeguards the lives and welfare of his few progeny. Now, rape is rape, and it sometimes leads to pregnancy--this always being a result of the first male-type's heuristics. But abortions are not a new modern invention. Yes—and I very much stress this—males hold responsibilities for how they/we act toward women (or other men, when it comes to homosexuals). But then so too do women hold responsibility for the genotypes and phenotypes they select for in our species each time they chose a mate.

So long story short, no, it’s not in our genes—it’s not our “biologically” determined fate--to be power-over-other fanatics when it comes to sexuality. It’s in our upbringing, our culture, and in our individual choices as adult members of a collective regarding what the next-generation’s culture will look like … and when I assert "our", I’m asserting both males and females equally.

Pimping? Note how this slang affirms sexual power-over-other (namely, over the "bitch-hos") as good.

As a male addressing what I believe to be another male, what’s stopping us from affirming our male tool to be our “magic wand … that dreams up the dark how it pleases”—or something like this (I won’t be more explicit in what it could be; force is a natural aspect of healthy sex … but not non-consensual harm/violence)—this rather than addressing it as our “gun”, “sword”, “hammer”, etc.? Nothing. Nothing but our own sense of deviating from the flock, of not being cool, or fear of being strange. I say to hell with it. I say, what women wouldn’t want to have a wizard in bed? I’ll stop short. Point being, we human beings are evolved … to add a spiritual slant: into closer proximity to the purely abstract than any other lifeform we know of … this to the extent we can explicitly make our own moral choices and take the responsibility that follows suit.

Man, our global society is proliferating in sex-slave ownership, and for those in the dark, this in Europe, the USA, and doubtless other developed nations/places. Not cool.

Would complete realization of the Sexual Revolution--complete liberation; complete openness --result in the end of sexual harassment? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

It seems obvious to me that the power-over-other structure of sexuality goes deep in our, and a few too many other, cultures. The penis as a gun that shoots off bullets, as a sword that penetrates, etc. All these “fun” metaphors are inextricable from notions of non-consensual violence/harm on those that are penetrated. Furthermore, modern science has evidenced ( :-} ) that women too enjoy sex—though, most don't enjoy being shot at with bullets as a bad/nauty/dirty things, or else repeatedly stabbed at with a knife/sword for the same reason. (Though, we all adapt to the culture we have no choice (or virtually no choice) but to live in, emotively and cognitively.) But, fuck, "fuck" is understood and used by both men and women. And to say “fuck you” is most often not used to express “let’s have loving, rambunctious, passionate sex that brings both of us into closer proximity to ecstatic being of mind, spirit, and flesh” but, basically, to express “may you be brutally raped”.

Fuckin’ hell.

So my impression is that this equality of value/worth/respect between the sexes and their sometime unique ability to accomplish (aka, their unique power) is gonna take some time in actually manifesting, and this only at a progressive, step by step rate.

Still, in terms of the 70s-like notion of love = sex within the slogan of “free love”, I don’t believe that were (consensual) orgies to be the norm everywhere and at all times within the workforce, that, then, sexual harassment would miraculously begin to vanish. OK, me, I’m not an orgy guy. But even so, you can’t have orgies all the time while working. What about during the hours when orgies don’t occur. Would sexual harassment then be reduced? I think not.

How come ataraxia? — charleton

Personally, I liken it to making both emotive and cognitive peace with the epistemic truth that “we have not yet demonstrated any proposition to be perfectly secure from all possible error—not even this one”.

O:)

... but then this can go in as many directions as there are directions to go in.

Edit:

I saw a man pursuing the horizon;
Round and round they sped.
I was disturbed at this;
I accosted the man.
“It is futile,” I said,
“You can never —”

“You lie,” he cried,
And ran on. — Stephen Crane

Notice that in the deeper truths of this poem, the horizon nevertheless does hold ontic presence.

… to try to add some perspective to the issue of ataraxia, at least as I so far understand it.

To anyone who is in any way interested with the topics of this thread:

Having read through a good portion of this thread, I’m starting to lose my aesthetic for the terms “skeptic” and “skepticism”. Common modern notions—as easily pinpointed in dictionaries—associate these terms as antithetical to something real being, and to belief in reality. OK, nothing new to me about common modern notions … but on a philosophy form? I’m starting to question my use of this term …

So, my question: is there a viable, alternative, philosophical terminology—other than that of a newly invented word that no one else know of—for what most take to be this rather simple, commonsensical, epistemological stance: that of, “we as of yet have not demonstrated any proposition to be perfectly secure from all possible error”.

Note: this stance is one of unabashed certainty, not of doubt; it is also one of logical inference, and not one of supposition; lastly, it is one that implicitly affirms that truth—and, by extension, the ontic—does hold presence regardless of what people may claim or feel … with this specific, just underlined conclusion regarding human epistemology being itself upheld as an instantiation of such truths. Oh, and all this fully upheld, and entwined, with the commonsensical, self-evident truth that all the certainties we live by, aka subjective certainties (from the weakest to the strongest), are never contingent on some absolute certainty being first demonstrated by the intellect.

Whatever ready existent term for the aforementioned, underlined stance is in fact proper, it certainly is not that of “skepticism” as it has been used by at least half of the (philosophically learned) people of this thread. Uphold the stance previously underlined, and questions regarding things such as “how does one know (i.e., gain absolute certainty) that laptops don’t turn into seven headed evil demons that mock you behind your back every time you blink your eyes?” become exceedingly illogical … especially given all the justification for the contrary that has been so far provided.

Maybe this post comes off as off-putting. It’s not intended to be.

The underlined proposition above is logically valid, if not sound, given the arguments for it. To my knowledge so far, this commonsense position can only be termed one of skepticism. Hence, since so many people quite erroneously assert that global/philosophical “skepticism” entails lack of justified belief in reality, realism, etc. (nothing in the underlined stance justifies this) either a) there’s something quite wrong about the authoritarian biases of those who purport this entailment or b) there’s got to be a different philosophical term for the commonsensical, and quite ancient, philosophical position underlined above.

… eha, OK, maybe I’m not currently in the best of moods. Still, I find that the contents still hold.

got plenty of those myself

Yea, I see your point. And then it would be hatched into the wetness. Still, wouldn’t it as embryo still be wet given the fluid it’s surrounded by? (Same with the sperm and egg prior to the embryo being developed.)



... but I'm OK with either way, to be honest

I wasn’t expecting a serious reply. Maybe I should have been more serious myself, and likely should have first replied directly to Baden. To go back to what Baden’s reply to me was:

To soak something is to immerse it in water or to make it extremely wet. The fish is literally soaking in water when it is in the water. — Baden

I get what Baden is here saying; that “immersion in water”, or “being made extremely wet”, signifies that something is soaked--that something is soaking wet. Yet, by what Baden expresses verbatim, this entails that the thing addressed was immersed in the given liquid from a former state of not being so immersed, and was made wet--this in comparison to a state of non-wetness prior to being so made wet.

So, being serious about the matter: that a natural, living fish in some lake or ocean (etc.), which was birthed there and died there without any alteration to its context of water, was "soaking wet" to me strongly implies that at some point it was not. But this conclusion would be erroneous. It always was in the same state of being surrounded by water.

Were such a fish, however, to be taken out of its natural context, say by fishing, and then immersed into some other liquid, because this this other liquid would be a novel and impermanent context, the fish would then be “immersed” or “made wet” with this novel liquid. So, the fish now could be said to be soaking wet in the liquid because it was so made to be from a former state of not being so. E.g.:

“All fish are soaking wet in water”, doesn’t sound right to me (though I grant that English is my second language, I've never quite heard this term outside of this philosophy form, and I'm guessing the same applies for most).

“That living fish over there is soaking wet in ketchup”, though a bit sadistic, does to me seem cogent as a statement.

… but this is not an overall argument I have big stakes in.

Suppose one has a bottle of 100% isopropyl alcohol. It looks like water, behaves like water, but it isn't water. — Bitter Crank

Now, by my argument, a fish immersed in rubbing alcohol (or beer) would then be soaking wet in whatever you’ve immersed it in. Cuz, then it would be surrounded by something different than what in normal circumstances remains a permanent context. No?

So we might have moist liberals... — Banno

OK, with this part, unless we’re talking about sexuality in code and are refereeing to the female sex, I don’t yet know what you here mean. (maybe not important)

Presumably then it is possible that a fish in water is soaking, while one in the hand is merely moist? — Banno

Well, what I’m upholding is that the fish isn’t soaking unless it then steps out of the water somehow—this so as to compare soaking wet with being merely moist (maybe due to perspiration after drying off).

Oops. Moistness, yes, that's what I was getting at.

Well, with a tad more seriousness, “wet” can only hold meaning via “not-wet/dry”. So I agree with what Wayfarer said. Since fish live and die in water without ever (typically) being not-wet (not all fish jump out of water), it wouldn’t make sense to say that a fish in water is wet … unless you conceptualize the fish out of water as well.

Isn’t moisture a type of wetness? I say "yes", so yes.

If a fish is in water, is it wet, — Posty McPostface

Yes, but only on the inside.
-------
Now that I’ve read Wayfarer’s post, come to think of it, you could have a dry fish in water … I’m thinking along the lines of smoked salmon. Which only further substantiates my position.

We take our most fundamental criterion in a blindly passionate sort of way. Because what's so great about being logical? We can't use logic to justify this, since the authority of logic as a criterion is what's at stake. On the other hand, something like being logical is experienced as a self-justifying value. It's 'aesthetic' in some sense.

[...]

I understand the charm of fine-tuning arguments. Still, I think the most revolutionizing speech often involves a strong new metaphor --an analogically shifted paradigm, etc. — ff0

Hesitantly—and kind’a encouraged by the last quoted statement—I’ll be a bit creative in this post’s expressions so as to condense an otherwise hard to communicate concept:

I sometimes liken logic (logos as it was addressed in Ancient Greek) to itself be a universal metaphor—in the sense here intended, a metaphor for pure being as it is and as it, in all its existentially divided parts, operates via process of becoming. This can probably become a multifaceted stance—and maybe you’ll agree that poetic speech might be both helpful for conveyance of meaning between some while simultaneously being a hindrance as regards meaning-conveyance among others. Still, relying on the Ancient Greek concept of Logos: logic, reasoning, ratios and rationing (or, partitioning this from that; appropriating relations between; proportionality; etc.), rationalizing, and language itself—among other concepts—were all interlinked in the concept of Logos. Are all interlinked, I’d say. Our inability to get behind language—which you’ve previously mentioned—is then, from certain vantages, one and the same with our inability to get behind the logos within which we dwell and of which we are in large part composed … and—like the fish’s lack of awareness of the water within which it swims, which you’ve addressed—quite often of which we can’t help but be utterly unaware of. IMO, due to our inability to get behind all the logos that is, we in some ways then cannot ever get to the pure, non-linguistic, being that is—for which we as beings use logos to address.

That perspective briefly mentioned, logic—in the form of the principles of thought being consistently applied—then serves as our common, human, universal language—or common meta-language if one prefers. (For my part, the particulars of formal logic then follow suit, but are not as universal as the principles of thought themselves.)

To cut to the chase, what I’m here trying to make the case for is this: imo, the optimal metaphor would be one that consists of a logical expression readily accessible to all—such that the meaning holds the potential to become commonly understood by (as extremely overreaching an ideal as this is) all people. Since all people share the aesthetic for consistency in what is and what is deemed to be—otherwise said, all are subjects to the principle of noncontradiction—all could then in principle come to understand such logos-bound expressions.

… or so I’m currently thinking. And waxing a bit too poetic at that, I imagine. (Heck, not all poetic verse is good even from the vantage of its author.) But I trust that some of this can come across in a comprehensible manner—though maybe not to everyone.

If God exists, does God have a purpose for existing? — Qurious

I’m assuming that this will not be a novel idea. The referent to the term “God” is not singular among those who use the term—irrespective to these being theists or atheistic, and most especially across different cultures and different times.

If God is deemed to be a deity (something endowed with any form of psyche), then its/his/her drive toward some outcome will logically hold presence, and, hence, God will be purpose-driven. If, however, God is deemed to not be a deity, then there is no logical requirement that God, in and of itself, be purpose-driven.

One can find the same roundabout conundrum in the question of “if God is omnipotent can he create a rock too heavy for him to lift?” If one presumes the referent to “God” to be a psyche, the answer becomes irrational regardless of what it might be—this though the question remains cogent. However, if—as one example—one presumes a pantheistic God—such as that of Spinoza’s—the very question itself becomes an irrational strawman—hence, one for which, naturally, no answer could ever be derived.

Current mentality commonly associates, first-ness, to that which is an ultimate precedent. In this contemplation, first cause has—to my current understanding—nothing to do with Aristotle’s final cause (final telos) as the unmoved mover. If, however, one associates first-ness with preeminence, then Aristotle’s final cause can be consistent with also being termed the first cause.

So, to my best current understanding, were one to assume an Aristotelian final cause as the first cause in the sense of preeminence, and further equate this notion with the label of “God”, then God is that which endows purpose without itself being purpose-driven. As to why some might ascribe the term God to this Aristotelian final cause, a) it would be present/real in manners that evade the principle of sufficient reason, b) it would be the final state of being (the Omega), and c) it would be a prerequisite for all that manifests (the Alpha). Notice how there would then logically be no imperative for worship or prayer, no “talking to God who talks back to chosen ones” … well, it’s a long list, I’m thinking.

Nowadays, any such view of God—much as was the case for Spinoza and his conceptualization (though his was a different system than that of Aristotle’s)—will in all likelihood be deemed theism by atheists and atheism by theists. So I’m thinking it would be a bit of no man’s land.

I don’t have anything to prove here. But this is my current understanding of the main issue which the OP addresses: It’s not only an issue of if God is real, but of what one is referencing by the term, specifically either a psyche as other relative to all of us or, to be less theistic in terminology, an ultimate limit on everything which can be which pervades everything, including ourselves.

Interesting questions on causation, btw. I’ve here only wanted to address the issue of God being or not being purpose-driven, hopefully from the vantage of a relatively non-dogmatic logic.

In my view, we work with a persuasive speech that is both logical and feeling-tinged. For instance, I might ask you what it is for logos to convince logos. What is this being convinced? Is this not something like a feeling about the way that sentences hang together? A good feeling that approves? (I realize that this stress on feeling drags along the specter of irrationalism. ) — ff0

Yea, you’re of course correct that there is no such thing as emotion-devoid logic. Logic is, I very strongly believe, strictly a tool via which our cherished emotions (e.g., sense of well-being) are safeguarded, embellished, and so forth. Hence, our emotive experience of being is primary and our logic (or even wisdom) secondary—thought the first is strongly dependent upon the second. Yet, even in this, merely so saying will not be enough to convince someone who deems logic to be the superlative faculty of intellect to which, ideally, all emotions (including those of desire and sense of satisfaction/comfort) then become subservient slaves of. So, while I agree with you, I still personally find the fine-tuning of logical arguments to be very worthwhile. Then again, there’s wisdom in how one best goes about conveying what one intends to convey, this again addressing the emotive aspects of what is expressed … and I’ve so far found myself direly lacking in this department. But I’m aiming to fail better next time around. :)

So, "nonsubjective reality" is your term that could include both the Tao and objective reality, as a way to avoid pointless argument about terminology. Is that correct? Off the top of my head, have no problem with that, although I'll think about it some more. Wherever I finally come down, I appreciate the effort and understand the impulse. The problem for me is that the really interesting issues are found between the two concepts. This is a fight between the Tao and OR, not one where they join together like a Power Ranger to create a mighty Nonsubjective Reality to fight for truth and justice. Wow, that's some metaphor. I'm really proud of that. — T Clark

Very cool. To my mind, if it could be agreed upon (else, logically demonstrated) that nonsubjective reality holds presence, this would then simplify a great deal of ongoing arguments—mostly dealing with at least some issues of what can be labeled subjectivism. Then the concerns become solely focused on what in fact is nonsubjectively real. A lot of disagreements would yet occur, but at least we’d all agree that there is something real which underlies all that we otherwise imagine to be—maybe even including a strictly subjective opinion that there is a logical contradiction to the Tao and OR co-occurring. (Maybe.)

OK then, so my resolute stance is then one of nonsubjective realism. (Just trying to get used to expressing this phrase … still weird to me, but I’ll be using it.)

The philosophy with respect to which I am 'anti-' is just the bloodless stuff that wants to be a depersonalized armchair science. — ff0

As to philosophic justifications, while I hold deep empathy for pathos given outlooks that provide wisdom, I’ve come to believe that only logos can convince logos. This, then, does lead toward one of those dry, analytic forms of argumentation … at least this—I guess unfortunately—is the formal approach I’m taking in putting together whatever philosophy I’ve got.

There's a world outside of me that contains me and I share it with others who are also in this world. I was just at the memorial of someone I've known for twenty years. I have their dog now. The world survived their passing. — ff0

Condolences, and may things work out for the best.

It's up there with love not as a duty but as a self-justifying higher pleasure. — ff0

I’d use the word “happiness” for, to me, this concept encompasses that of pleasure. All the same, I like the way you’ve stated this. Hence, then, the supposed pinnacle of love—that of absolute, selfless love—is not an issue of duty but one of attraction toward a self-justifying highest (or deepest) happiness of personal being (by which I take for granted the love of other; interpreting one’s proximity to this pinnacle to be proportional to the degree—dwelling at least within individual moments—to which distinction between self and other fizzles away … be this relation one of romance or otherwise). Anyways, nicely worded.

I do like non-subjective actuality. — ff0

:) Thanks for so saying. I’ll begin to make use of it, then.

Of course we know how to do things, but there's something like a massive ignorance that (in my view) we mostly ignore. Yet this same ignorance when experienced is wonder itself. — ff0

See, it is this very aesthetic that makes philosophical skepticism so wonderful a stance for me. Somehow always feel the strain in saying this from those who are Cartesian or else interpret skepticism from a Cartesian stance of “doubt”—now common fare culturally. Nevertheless, this (occasionally felt) experience of beauty in there being unending wonder and unending discoveries is to me part and parcel of what philosophical skepticism is all about.

Hello, and thanks for a reply.

I’ve got nothing against direct experience. Most who’ve begrudgingly come to know a little of my philosophical stances would likely claim that I give way too much importance to experience. And yes, to me flow is good. Philosophy, then, to me, is about the theories and discoveries which facilitate better experience of flow—at least in the long term, if not in the short.

As an apropos, when you say “anti-philosophical” I intuitively hear “anti-interest/love for wisdom (Sophia as she’s been called)”. While I do uphold that wisdom concerning life is not the truth of experience/life itself, that it is the map and not the terrain, I nevertheless deem wisdom of great value. At any rate, I take it you have something else in mind when you use the term(?).

But, in relation to my previous posts on this thread, here’s my sole, hopefully cordial-ish, rebuttal:

Trying to say what it is to be there and being sensitive and open to poetic failure is what, in my opinion, leads to statements that the true way cannot be spoken. — ff0

In the statement “the true way”, either “true” is referencing a path that is regardless of what anybody might say or believe or, else, it is not. If it is, then the Tao that can’t be spoken which is inextricable from life and experience is—ahum—a “non-subjective actuality” (just made this term up, but I’m hoping it’s understood given my recent posts on this thread). If it is not, then the Tao is as subjective a reality as is one’s preference for ice-cream, no more metaphysically significant than the clothes one chooses to wear on any particular day.

Same would apply for the Tao being the source of all that is: either it would be the non-subjectively actual source of all that is or, else, it would strictly be so believed to be by some without any real bearing on what the source of all things is.

So far, I very strongly presume Taoism to be addressing the former and not the latter.

So it’s known, I too am no expert on Taoism, but I hold affinities to the outlines of it that I pick up on.

Also, I’m not trying to make the case for what in fact is “non-subjectively actual”; I’ve only been trying to make the case that something “non-subjectively actual” is—whatever it might in fact be. The affirmation of the Tao then being an example of a concept specifying its referent to be non-subjectively actual.

X-) No problems. Thanks for the reply.

Right.

Still, any advice on how I/anyone who’s interested in philosophical issues (even at the expense of current cultural norms) should then specify that which I’ve intend in my previous posts?

“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”.

So, if either of you feel like offering your opinions on this, could “nonsubjective actuality” be cogently understood to express this stated meaning? Such as in the proposition: “that the first person point of view holds presence while it is in any way aware is a nonsubjective actuality”. (this being the first example that comes to my mind)

Transcendentals may be thought of as 'real but not objective', as they are prior to the division of subject and object. — Wayfarer

Yet this depends on how one uses language. For example: Transcendentals are themselves the objects of awareness of any subject which is so aware of them--thereby here constituting objects within the subject-object divide. But yes, of course current cultural norms would have it otherwise, even though the linguistic use of "objects" or "object-hood" I've just engaged in to me currently seems philosophically valid.

Edit: on second thought, please overlook this second remark to you. Just realized that I’ve here addressed the idea of transcendentals and not transcendentals themselves. While the idea is an object of awareness, the transcendental itself—like the a priori understanding of causation, I presume—is not. My bad.

When you say "this statement" do you mean my statement about the Tao? — T Clark

yes

If so, in my understanding, it has nothing to do with objective reality. In a sense, the Tao is the opposite of objective reality. It's an idea, an experience, that I find much more useful then the idea of objective reality. It's much more in line with how I see reality. — T Clark

Hmm, as I previously tried to specify it from the perspective of metaphysical realism: “objective” in the sense of “impartial to, or independent of” personal preferences; “real”, I’ll now add, in the sense of what is “actual” and not fictitious, etc. So this definition of “objective reality” does not strictly relate to the physical world; although, by definition, it can well relate to the physical world. (and, for the materialist, strictly to the physical world)

Think, for example, of Platonic realism: it is not materialist naturalism (personally find the natural world an exceedingly important component to what is objectively real, but not the only component; I do also hold belief in an Aristotelian-like final cause as itself being objectively real); yet, despite not being materialism/naturalism/scientism, it yet upholds an idealistic type of reality to be in manners independent of personal preferences. Hence, it is yet a worldview that upholds the presence of an objective reality—this as I’ve just expressed it.

So, in the sense I’ve previously denoted, “the Tao which cannot be expressed” is, then, a reference to what is here taken to be objective reality. (It is not a mere whim of fancy or a fleeting emotion—though, I take it affirmed by Taoism that it can nevertheless be experienced and, in this sense, simultaneously both felt and cognized)

If you do find fault with my way of interpreting what objective reality signifies, can you explain why? I can’t now think of an alternative terminology for what I’ve herein referred to as “objective reality”.

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. — T Clark

To get back to the question of objective (bias-impartial) reality (be it physical or not, or both and co-related):

This statement to me is one that attempts to specify to the intellect an objective reality. It is not what may be termed a subjective reality—such as which flavor of ice-cream tastes better—but, if the statement indeed corresponds to what is objectively real, a statement conveying an otherwise purely noumenal objective truth.

For instance, one can say the same of the neo-Platonist “the One”: “the One” is a phenomenal item (a word written and read, or a sound, or a tactile structure) that is not itself that which is addressed: a purely noumenal, unified/part-less, non-quantity, superlative state of being that, hence, is perfectly devoid of all phenomena, for phenomena ratios. … Something like this at least.

BTW, I discovered a way of embellishing my former logical argument for objective reality, but I’ll save it for some other time (given contingents).