If we do some rewind experiment, — flannel jesus

For the record, it has nothing to do with rewinding time. (It has to do which what is and is not possible at any juncture of choice-making. which as event always occurs in the present, and not in the past. If one can chose differently than what one ends up doing at any present juncture of choice making, then one could have chosen differently at any past juncture of choice-making.)

But I didn't call that "free will" at any point. — flannel jesus

I thought you implicitly did. But ok, you didn't. What then does this "free will" term signify to you?

I'm getting headaches again. So I'll stop.

I don't think so. Do you think so? — flannel jesus

Can you clarify what you're here addressing. As a reminder, what I was addressing is in relation to what you expressed here:

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. — flannel jesus

It doesn't Account for it. It's just there. It exists. — flannel jesus

Than why did you just specify the possibility of free will thus defined as being contingent on "genuine randomness"?

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. — flannel jesus

Unless one introduces some form of a hybrid event in one's metaphysics, I still don't get how randomness can account for any notion of free will. But thanks for the answer. :up:

De Broglie–Bohm interpretation can simply address this paradox as you can find it here. — MoK

Granted. Bohm does have a lot of interesting things to say.

It's an implementation detail that doesn't give us or deny us free will. — flannel jesus

As a reminder, do you believe that you could have chosen otherwise at an past juncture of choice-making (i.e., at any juncture in which you decided upon an option)?

So I don't necessarily think any *single event* is hybrid at that detailed level of description, no. Maybe it is, idk, I'm agnostic. — flannel jesus

Got it. I'm still curious though: What then would be your gut feeling regarding this in terms of free will?

The wave function does not collapse randomly. It just collapses when a measurement is done on the system. — MoK

If you're not yet familiar with this, the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment gets extremely interesting.

Nothing conclusive about it in this regard, but - from my last readings regarding it - it to me so far illustrates that the measurement by which collapse occurs might well be pivoted upon observers as conscious beings. But I grant that's debatable.

At any rate, its an interesting QM experiment that's been replicated many times.

The Schrödinger equation evolves the wave function deterministically, and then at some moment it collapses the wave function randomly. — flannel jesus

But here your saying that the first is 100% determined and the second is 100% random. Neither then are hybrid events. Where is the hybrid event at?

:up: I agree. Maybe I should have been clearer.

Conceptually, this way of interpreting quantum mechanics is a hybrid. — flannel jesus

OK. But how do you reason this hybrid metaphysics to work? This has direct baring on what you are wanting to claim for free will.

Its a hybrid. It is a process which is in part deterministic and in part random. — flannel jesus

It might come as no surprise that others disagree with this. So how do you rationally conclude this affirmation?

Not that any of this addresses the reasons I've given. But all the same.

-----

Just saw this:

Then why don't accept the De Broglie–Bohm interprertation which is paredox free and determinsitic? — MoK

If it's deterministic, it ain't partly random. :wink: :razz:

OK. Why not?

I really don't understand why "quantum randomness" isn't a solid example of the question at the end of your post. That, to me, would be a hybrid. — flannel jesus

I've already explained why. But (unless I need to give further replies) I'll stop.

No. And how does that address the question you've yet to answer?

i feel like what I said about quantum crap is a good example, no? — flannel jesus

No. First off because it addresses hypotheses regarding physics at a quantum level which have in no way been evidenced to directly influence, much less determine, the choices that we as conscious beings make. Secondly, this issue is one of sheer metaphysical possibilities rather than about physical data with nebulous explanations.

So, again, what to you would a hybrid between 1) a determined event and 2) a random event be?

When you come to a fork in a raging river, if you don't make a conscious (responsible) choice, the river will make it for you. :cool: — Gnomon

The question was about that conscious choice, and not about whether rivers make decisions. But I guess you're not taking this seriously. Oh well.

Because the options aren't 100% determinism and 100% randomness. — flannel jesus

To my surprise, I fully agree with this statement as written. (You might recall that in the other thread I used the term "semi-determined" or something to the like, which signifies just this.) But I doubt we agree on what the statement entails.

So what to you is hybrid between determined and random? Or are all events either 100% determined or 100% random when you get down into nitty gritty?

We can just ignore that edge case. — flannel jesus

OK. Then, a compatibilist will necessarily believe in the reality of some form or other of free will. If so, to reinforce 's comment, how can free will be stated to be real if the act of deciding is of itself random?

Absolute Determinism would be one-damn-thing-after-another. Randomness is non-linear, so there are forks in the path. Those forks are opportunities for Choice. If there is an option, you may be forced to choose by pressure from the past, but left vs right would be a "free" choice. :joke: — Gnomon

You've explained options via randomness, but not the choice between options which is taken. How can randomness account for the very act of deciding while yet accounting for one's responsibility in light of the decision made?

How is this not playing footloose with definitions derived from a word's common use? One can entertain compatibilism but cannot oneself be a compatibilist if one denies compatibilism's validity, as in the validity that free will occurs and is compatible with the likewise occurring reality that everything is in one way or another determined.

Can we at least agree that there can be no compatibilism if free will is denied regardless of how free will is defined?

I could probably be persuaded otherwise on some weird technicality — flannel jesus

What technicality could that possibly be?

Please read the op and see that I have written the same.
The democratic city-states fought well, but the were just too small in comparison with the huge Persian Empire. This is explained that before inventing the printing press, only small territories could have a democratic government. And again, this is the same thing as the on I mentioned in the op. — Linkey

I missed that in the OP.

My main point in addressing Ancient Athens was that a democracy can engage in war just fine. Athens as democracy did great in battles until the Peloponnesian war - in which Athens became largely outnumbered due to the Persian empire assisting Sparta against Athens. But this is a case of sheer numbers rather than ability to engage in war effectively, to my best understanding at least.

Maybe more importantly: Are you suggesting that dictatorships are necessarily more stable than democracies when it comes to large populaces?

Just to check: We do agree that compatibilism entails the reality of free will, right?

If the world has a little bit of randomness, that doesn't necessarily destroy the causality one needs to enact one's will. So that should be the answer to your first two questions, right? — flannel jesus

No. It's not an answer to the first question. The first question regarded what a "random free will" can possibly signify, and if the idea of such a random free will is at all viable. It did not address the workings of the world, but instead addressed what free will can and cannot possibly be.

Please re-read the first question again.

Can you explain what part of my answer feels like an ego-battle to you? — flannel jesus

Sure. Here were my two questions:

How can the stance of "compatibilism" be compatible with randomness? In other words, if one's actions of will are random, how then can one be stated to have free will?

If it can't, and if there is no other option than that of reality being "causally inevitable" or else random, doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable? — javra

Here was your reply which you insist answered the questions:

No.

Incompatibilists say "determinism destroys free will". Compatibilists simply say "determinism doesn't destroy free will". They're not (all) saying "and that means determinism is necessarily the case" or "indeterminism destroys free will".

Just one simple thing: determinism doesn't destroy free will.

Basically, imagine I have a snow globe in my left hand and a snow globe in my right hand - in each snow globe a little handheld universe. Suppose I know the one in my left hand is indeterministic, and the one in my right hand, while looking at a surface level pretty much just like the left one, is deterministic. An incompatibilist would say "free will may exist in the left globe but not the right", a compatibilist would say "free will may exist in both". — flannel jesus

For starters, my two questions are such that the second hinges on the answer to the first. You did not answer the first. You therefore neither answered the second.

you asked "doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable?" I explained why it doesn't. — flannel jesus

Okey dokey, then. (In the world I live in, however, context is quite important to individual words, such as the ones you've quoted. Apparently not so much in yours. Sounds more like an ego battle than an honest search for truths, in this case truths of a rational kind. But as you say, you've replied.)

None of which is a reply to what I asked. — javra


It's all explicitly a reply to what you said. — flannel jesus

OK. But neither question asked was in any way answered.

I think we first have to agree on how options could be real in a determinist world. Once that is established then we could understand that decision is not possible in a deterministic system. — MoK

Agreed.

Are you saying that in his opinion the decision is the result of randomness or else is determined? — MoK

Yes. With the caveat that "determined' here entails "causally inevitable".

I think we can simply exclude the latter because both options are real. The former also can be excluded as well because of the correlation between the time of decision and action. — MoK

I'd again agree.

None of which is a reply to what I asked.

Just one simple thing: determinism doesn't destroy free will. — flannel jesus

It does not destroy free will when free will is defined as:

"anything one wills to do that is not obstructed is thereby one's free will" — javra

If however does necessarily deny the very possibility of free will when free will is defined as:

"One could have chosen an option other than the one option one ends up choosing". Or, more simply, the ability to choose otherwise.

Common sense holds free will to be the latter. As it for example gets applied, however implicitly, in judicial systems.

Compatibilism isn't a hard commitment to determinism. — flannel jesus

How can the stance of "compatibilism" be compatible with randomness? In other words, if one's actions of will are random, how then can one be stated to have free will?

If it can't, and if there is no other option than that of reality being "causally inevitable" or else random, doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable?

Aren't you a compatibilist? — MoK

In trying to stave off potential headaches, he's a compatibilist in the sense of free will being defined as "anything one wills to do that is not obstructed is thereby one's free will" ... which would then be a free will notion that is perfectly compatible with realty being "causally inevitable".

@flannel jesus is of course free to correct or else modify this if wrong. But I've had my headaches in the past in trying to discuss with him the difference between libertarian compatibilism and deterministic compatibilism - which he seems to conflate into the same thing. He sticks to everything necessarily being either "causally inevitable" or else random. And hence to compatibilism only making sense within this framework.

Anyway, if this helps ...

Yes, and it might also be worth commenting that most of Ancient Greece was not democratic. The Spartans, with which the Athenians battled, for one example were oligarchical - with a duarchy (two kings with equal power) taking center stage.

Unfortunately, the one-man ruling is necessary for a war. At the same time, there is an opposite tendency: free countries support new ideas, including military innovations, better than unfree ones. — Linkey

What about the Greeks? They were the inventors of science... — Linkey

Which brings to mind: Ancient Athens was an exceedingly functional democracy (among male citizens) with excellent military prowess all in one bang. So this would directly speak against a non-democratic governance being necessary for war.

While I'm not claiming it's easy to obtain and sustain, it is nevertheless quite possible.

That sounds like the British "constitution". — Ludwig V

True that. But the British “constitutional monarchy” is such that the mon-arch (the sole ruler) is a figurehead which has no real power to rule anything. Sort of nullifying the “sole rulership” aspect of the political enterprise.

If you define democracy as non-ttyranical, then it must you're saying something about a term, not a political system. — Hanover

Your joking? My definition of democracy was this:

Democracy, instead, is any variant of a rather elaborate system which keeps the tyrannical drives of all participants and parties at bay via a non-hypocritical system of checks and balances of power. — javra

Which is very much a political system.

Suppose you have a non-tyranical monarchy, would it be a democracy? — Hanover

About as much as a triangular square would be. Which is to say, no.

2. If #2, then that person could will A for another intent, N, or intent some other action, B, with some other intent. — Bob Ross

Right. Only that what is quoted here is not mandatory for libertarian free will.

The physical causality could be the exact same and the intent pursued could be the exact same. Each option toward the given intent pursued is of itself, however, a more proximal possible intent toward the here distant intent one aims to actualize.

So A within the exact same physical context, with the exact same cognitive options available to A, can intend the exact same distant intent by choosing a different alternative. So construed, there will necessarily be ontically occurring reasons for any choice (between alternatives) taken, but reality, and so one's choice, is not "causally inevitable", and neither is the choice made of itself random (hence, devoid of any actual ontically occurring reason for its occurrence).

For example, a person wants to travel form A to B; the options cognitively available to the person for so doing are X, Y, and Z; if the person chooses option X as a means of getting to B, they at this moment of choice were metaphysically unconstrained in, and only in, their in fact choosing X rather than Y or Z. Hence, they could have chosen otherwise than they did. This very much assuming that the exact same physical context, the exact same intent to travel from A to B, and the exact same options of X, Y, and Z would occur.

Hey, I know we don't often agree on much, but damn that's a nice post. Wanted to so say. :grin:

So Chance, by definition, is not deterministic, it's non-compulsory. Change is inevitable, but Chance is optional. Where there are options, there is freedom. The door opens, but you can choose to walk through it, or not. — Gnomon

Sounds like you’re addressing “chance” in the sense of a random occurrence, this since its specified as not being deterministic. Two philosophically-minded questions:

1) How could randomness (“chance” so understood) allow for one’s responsibility (in the sense of culpability or praiseworthiness) for the options one decides upon?

2) How does any notion of free will when strictly understood as “I have free will whenever I’m not obstructed in that which I will” - be this act of willing chance-based or not - account for the sentiment of regret which most of us have and do on occasion experience, with this sentiment of regret basically translating into that of “I ought to have chosen a different course of events than the one I ended up choosing”? To be more explicit, how can regret be accounted for by free will when granting that “the ability to choose otherwise than what one ends up choosing” is fully illusory and thereby ontically non-occurrent (for the ontic occurrence of this very ability can only result in some form of libertarian free will, whose possibility is here denied)?