Did 'the law of the excluded middle' - a basic logical principle - come into existence as a result of evolution? Or rather, did we evolve to the point of being able to grasp something that was always already so? — Wayfarer

If the first scenario, then: Before the evolution of life came around, there was no requisite identity to anything at the same time and in the same respect, so there was no such thing as logical contradictions not being possible—rocks all over the universe were at times both rocks and not rocks in the same respect simultaneously (to not start addressing atoms and fields, etc.)—and, so there were intermediate states of being between being either X or not-X (this at the same time and in the same respect) all over the cosmos. BUT: ever since the evolution of life came around, we literally can only conceive of the past as being accordant to the principle of identity, the principle of noncontradiction, and the principle of the excluded middle (for the first principle entails the other two)—thereby gravely misinterpreting all aspects of what the real ontic world was like before life came around (and possibly of what it continues to be with life present to it). Ergo, one then can only rationally conclude that, in this first scenario, what we contemplate as being the past is, and can only be, an idealization of what in fact was—necessitating that the world we know of is one of idealism in all respects. Thereby making physicalism an impossible stance to justify in any other means than via the idealizations of an idealistic, epistemically held onto reality … an idealism strictly concocted from the way life happened to evolve in its psychology.

On the other hand, if the second, then all I can presently affirm is that physicalism must be false.

Conclusion: regardless of scenario, physicalism is unjustifiable when logically appraised.
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Maybe I should say “my bad”: had a good private chuckle at this and I wanted to share. :razz:

Happy New Year’s irrespective of ontological stance all the same!

There are different ontological theories; there is one ontological subject and object of study, which is existence. Having different ontological hypotheses doesn't alter the nature of the real. — Pantagruel

Of course: one ontic reality (whatever it might in fact be) and many ontologies (each with its own proposed metaphysical laws) trying to accurately map it - often enough in manners that end up being contradictory to other ontologies.

I just finished Deacon's Incomplete Nature, which is an excellent framework for re-integrating the fundamental aspects of intentionality across the entire physical spectrum though morphodynamics and teleodynamics. — Pantagruel

I'll put it on my list of books to read. Thanks for mentioning.

If you have an alternative understanding, I'd be happy to hear about it. — Janus

My take was stated in this post in the thread, which is itself based on this SEP entry (you can quickly look at the SEP entry's section 1's two definitions of metaphysical possibility).

I'll say that, if by no other means, then via acquaintance with there so being different ontologies out there, all of which are metaphysical possibilities regarding what the actual world in fact is. These are all metaphysically possible rather than physically possible in the same way that a possible world is metaphysically possible rather than physically possible - only that in the case of ontologies, one of them might be a more accurate mapping of the actual than the others.

Why ask such a question?

We don't know what is metaphysically possible, — Janus

As a friendly reminder, we do know that different ontologies are metaphysically possible.

Although we also know logically that contradictory ontologies (e.g., that of physicalism vs. that of idealism vs. that of substance dualism) cannot all be accurate models of the physical, or better yet actual, world (needless to add, this at the same time and in the same respect).

Since the different gravitational forces would not make for much of a difference, — Janus

The example I just gave of GPS evidences the significant difference between the gravitational force that a satellite is in and the gravitational force that a Earth-bound human is in. But I guess considering what is a "significant difference in different gravitational forces" would embark us too far astray.

and hence significant differences in aging probably remain in the realm of fiction or fantasy. — Janus

... and in the realm of metaphysical possibility, which this thread is in part about.

And in general, when we talk about the age of anything, existing things which came into being earlier than other existing things are considered to be the older. On this criterion a daughter could never be older than her mother while they are both still alive, although of cause the daughter could live to a greater age. — Janus

I've already agreed to this, upheld it even before you mentioned it. But I don't see how this then contradicts the theory of relativity as regards a person potentially holding two actual ages in different respects - given the circumstances previously specified.

So that we're on the same page in terms of the theory of relativity's reality:

How does this connect with General Relativity and GPS? As predicted by Einstein’s theory, clocks under the force of gravity run at a slower rate than clocks viewed from a distant region experiencing weaker gravity. This means that clocks on Earth observed from orbiting satellites run at a slower rate. To have the high precision needed for GPS, this effect needs to be taken into account or there will be small differences in time that would add up quickly, calculating inaccurate positions. — https://www.nasa.gov/image-article/einsteins-theory-of-relativity-critical-gps-seen-distant-stars/

The theory of relativity does operate in terms of Earths own otherwise general time frame. So if travel even between different solar systems were to be possible, it would operate in these circumstances as well.

And yet the claim is that the Universe began around 14 billion years ago. — Janus

Unless I'm mistaken, there is no other way that estimate can be established other than via the theory of relativity - coupled, of course, with empirical evidence. So instead of contradicting the relativity of time, it will be one derivation from it.

This puts me in mind of some of Kant's CPR i've gone over in the alst couple of days.
The relation of time is individual in that an external impression of another person doesn't exist in their time, it exists in the perceiver's time. I would think that this means we can just see any subjective notion of time as legitimate. It only exists as a relation, so there's no other benchmark. — AmadeusD

It is commonly enough known that we perceive time in subjective manners (the linked Wikipedia article gives a nice presentation). This I think fits into part of what you are saying. But this can’t then be the only benchmark for time, otherwise there would be no way of discerning between time which is subjectively perceived (and which can vary by individual) and that time which is objectively occurring (and is equally applicable to all causally interacting, or else causally entwined, observers).

As concerns objective time, however, the same dichotomy between a relativistic time and cosmically absolute time will present itself. With all indications now pointing to time being relativistic rather than absolute. So, in extreme time dilation scenarios, for one example, an individual can still have two distinct ages that are both objective (and hence not subjective) by breaking away from a commonly shared time frame (for example, the time frame that Earth dwellers more or less all inhabit (though minor forms of time relativity still apply here on Earth)) and then subsequently rejoining it.

To illustrate the distinction between subjective and objective time via a simple example: In a given conversation, time might by going slow for one individual and might be going fast for the other (this due to each individual’s separate chronoception) but will nevertheless be commonly applicable (hence, impartially applicable and, in at least this sense, objective) to both individuals in terms of the back-and-forth dialogue of the conversation - e.g., both will know who said what prior to whose reply, etc., thereby facilitating the possibility of a conversation. And if there were a clock present to both during the conversation, both could potentially pinpoint at which commonly shared, objective time a certain statement was made in durational relation to some other - this despite the differences in chronoception between the two individuals.

Its a very complex topic, this metaphysics of time. But that's my best answer so far.

An addendum for improved clearness as regards my last post, just in case it might be needed:

In the fable presented, the protagonist’s age as measured by his own personally experienced duration of time will factually be that of twenty-some years. This though, in the fable, relative to the duration of time as would be measured by all those he departed from on his initial quest, he will factually be millennia old. In both cases his age is yet measured by duration, but this relative to the vantages of different actual or (being now dead) potential observers. (This as can be just as validly said of various scenarios concerning time dilation within the theory of relativity.)

Also noteworthy, physical changes occur in both of these duration-grounded appraisals of the protagonist’s age. So the division between age as measured by “duration of time” and by “physical changes” becomes largely spurious - although I do get what you intend by the dichotomy.

Secondly, and entwined with the just mentioned, there then will not be one objectively true vantage point of the protagonist’s age, this such that the other vantage point becomes falsity. The protagonist will hence factually be both ages at the same time, with each age being factual from a different vantage point.

As regards metaphysical possibilities, this then to me sets the fable apart from the Adeline movie scenario - as well as from vampire stories, etc. - in terms to the metaphysics of time. It basically seems to addresses the metaphysics behind the theory of relativity without the implied physicalism (and the block universe model) that is typically ascribed to the theory.

Which then directly ties in with this:

So, yes if that were possible then the main character would be biologically younger than his long dead daughter. On the other hand, since Earth time is really what counts for us, we would say he has been gone for a thousand years, and is thus one thousand plus years old, even though relatively unaged. — Janus

When impartially addressed, neither the character's vantage of his own age nor our own Earth-dwelling vantage of his age is privileged. Again culminating in the conclusion that both appraisals of his age are true, i.e. conform to what is factual - but this from different vantage points of observation.

All this stands in contrast to the notion that there is a universally applicable, objective, singular time frame.

But this is not to imply there is a discord between what I've said and what you've expressed.

Should we count age as being the time of duration or physical change? — Janus

There's a fable I was acquainted with as a kid in which the hero overcomes many an obstacle to at long last arrive in a kingdom where life occurs without death and without aging (though physical changes generally speaking do occur there: folks move about, talk, etc.). Being a magical place, he looses track of time. Nevertheless, after what by all accounts is a short stay there, he becomes nostalgic and wants to see his family again - not having seen them since the commencement of his journey a long time back. Though warned against leaving the kingdom, he leaves to return to his homeland. Once he arrives back from where he started his quest, he finds that eons had gone by since his departure, with everything he once knew and loved now gone.

At this juncture in the story, should we deem the protagonist to be millennia old or, conversely, twenty-some years old?

Long story short, I don't find this question to be answerable via any one of the two options presented alone. Rather, I find the issue of his age fully relative to the conceptual context addressed. Such that in the story both appraisals of his age are simultaneously actual but in different respects.

And, although I personally find this fable far more telling in terms of possible metaphysics of time (i.e., of duration), the same can be said of Highlander movies or of any vampire story: that the the character lives for hundreds of years or more while remaining of a constant age makes conceptual (else, metaphysical) sense. These stories would all be utterly unintelligible otherwise.

This to better illustrate the following stance: The answer to the question of whether "a child can be older than her parents" - this as a metaphysical possibility - will be relative to the semantics employed for the concept of age.

So, in durational terms she is always going to be older than her daughter, and since the very meanings of 'mother' and 'daughter' presuppose that the mother exists antecedently to the daughter, then to say that the child could be older than the mother would involve a logical contradiction. — Janus

As per my previous post, I agree with this in full.

A child older than her parents' is metaphysically impossible and logically possible insofar as there is not a contradiction in terms but an inconsistency in temporal composition, or relation. — 180 Proof

Though I appreciate the effort, the movie The Age of Adaline, for one example, directly contradicts it not being metaphysically possible (Adaline mysteriously stops aging due to an accident and her daughter grows older than her). Otherwise, were one to go by the typical understanding of "a child's parent" and "a parent's child" with all the ordinary presumptions intact, it's as logically possible as is a "married bachelor".

Yes, the bachelor could be married to his work, or some such, and hence not be married to a wife, but this is not in keeping with the logical contradiction that is commonly understood to be communicated by the phrasing. As can, for further example, be the case with a "circular triangle": a triangle with convex sides, which is logically possible, is not what is commonly understood by the terms - the latter understanding conveying what is logically impossible.

Oh fudge, I'll reply. And if Hitler happened to be a vegetarian, then it would be a worthwhile thing to keep in mind that all vegetarians worldwide share Hitler's mindset.

Again, I find a glaring logical flaw in this kind of association ... rewritten as some of your posts have so far been once replied to.

Going back into a non-sarcastic mood, it was good chatting with you.

All the same, if there isn't any further ado, I'll be bowing out of this discussion.

I duly agree with you're appraisal, and am strongly inclined toward the following conclusion in respect to the perspective I've previously outlined:

there is a glaring flaw — Lionino

... maybe more than one, actually.

Touche. Your logic as to fortune tellers and such is truly out-standing.

Me: What is an example of a person in which that [metaphysically impossible to be infinite but logically possible] applies? — Lionino

In an attempt to help out:

Since “a person” signifies a subject, and since dogs are subjects of awareness, an example of an infinite person would be an infinite dog.

Dogs are infinite because, just like every other physical object conceivable, when they are for example mapped mathematically via geometric points, they contain an infinite quantity of geometric points.

Infinite dogs are logically possible because they exist in possible worlds. But they are metaphysically impossible because these possible worlds don’t exist, ergo these worlds cannot contain metaphysics.

Such is my best roundabout understanding of the perspective so far.

From some perspectives, everything is connected or related to everything. — Corvus

This misses the entire point. Modal logic is founded upon metaphysics. These being two separate entities: modal logic as one specialized subset of metaphysics at large.

As to everything being interconnected in one way or another, I should think so. Even utterly disparate possible worlds will be interconnected by one's awareness of them, if nothing else. This doesn't prevent us from distinguishing rocks from their molecules and from their environment, though - as one example.

Going in circles. "Subject" is far more ambiguous then "person". But so be it.

So what does the term "person" signify to you?

Modal Logic is a branch of Logic, not Metaphysics. — Corvus

Here's a reference:

Modal metaphysics concerns the metaphysical underpinning of our modal statements.

There could be no formalized modal logic without an underlying modal metaphysics by which modal logic is established.

This gets back into what was saying.

Apropos, to Joshs:

if I were to draw up a diagram, metaphysics would be the circle encompassing the physical and the logical. — Joshs

I agree with your take in all respects but one. To me, the possibilities/impossibilities obtained directly from laws of thought, whatever they happen to be, will encapsulate and determine all possibilities/impossibilities obtained from metaphysics and from metaphysics-bound systems of formal logic (such as that of modal logic). This would then make the laws of thought existentially fixed - again, this irrespective of what they might happen to be.

BTW, dialetheism comes to mind as a conceivable break from the law of noncontradiction. But then again, to my knowledge, not even dialetheism questions the law of identity, which to my mind can validly be expressed as "A cannot be not-A when addressed at a singular time and in the same respect" hence equating to "A can only be A when addressed at the same time and in the same respect". But then this fits into the law of noncontradiction.

In Modal Logic it is possible to have a world that nothing exists. — Corvus

Thanks for the video posting, you. Cute. This Modal Logic, which can diverge into different forms, is itself rooted in metaphysical presuppositions regarding possibility and necessity. (This in addition to conforming to the laws of thought.) So to claim that a possibility emerging from modal logic is not, by its very origin, a metaphysical possibility is to me odd. But so be it, on my part at least.

Laws of thought which facilitate all logic exist as well. Do you then agree that the concept of "a possible world of nothingness" is not logically possible ... this in addition to not being metaphysically possible as well?

Agreed. I'll rephrase: why do you find the concept logically possible to begin with?

Yeah that is the exact part where the contradiction arises, which voids the metaphysical ground of "a world with nothingness". — Corvus

In honesty, I happen to uphold that nothingness is a logical impossibility due to unavoidable contradictions and reifications. But this is contrary to this affirmation:

A world with no existence is logically possible because logically there are possible worlds where nothing exists. — Corvus

So to further in my playing the devil's advocate here, were a world of no existence to be logically possible, then why would nothingness (i.e., a world of no existence) not be metaphysically possible? (As in the possibility of there being nothing rather than something.)

But because of the concept "a world" implying the ontological entity, "a world of nothingness" would be contradiction in metaphysics. — Corvus

Yea, I could see that use of semantics, and I for the record tend to agree with it. But I'm thinking of the question which many have philosophically asked of "why is there something rather than nothing". This question makes no sense without the metaphysical understanding of absolute nonexistence as a possibility regarding what might be the case of the world. Again, akin to an empty set ... that happens to be global. So the "ontological entity" here specified would be nothingness of itself.

A world with no existence is metaphysically impossible because metaphysics deals with existence. — Corvus

Isn't the idea of nothingness a purely metaphysical construct? Hence, a world of nothingness would then be a possible metaphysical construct - about which the only thing to be said is that nothing exists in the possible world. Akin to an empty set.

I think you might underestimate the inner monologue. After all, I am guessing that animals can think visually as well. Our ability to manipulate glyphs which represent arbitrary concepts, both aloud and internally, is part of what sets our cognitive ability apart. — hypericin

I mentioned something about how animals think without words in that thread. So I felt like commenting on this aspect here.

Although animals will have wordless thoughts in one way or another, the argument can well be made that thinking via words will set limitations on what can be thought by humans, this in manners that wordless thinking will not. This limiting of thought via words that grants thought relatively stringent structure would then be a hindrance in activities ranging from novel artistic expressions to novel ideas in both the sciences and in philosophies.

For humans, wordless thought can think outside of the box in which word-driven thought resides, so to speak. Sometimes in very abstract (and logically consistent) manners.

But as I said, I think this is only the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their [physical] referent(s). I don’t think this is the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their sense(s). — Michael

While I still find the notion of a posteriori necessity suspect for reasons aforementioned - for example, such as the issue of a term's sense(s) being precisely that which the term references - I do agree with what you here state.

In the context of this discussion the terms refer to an object in the solar system. — Michael

I get that, but then how does one obtain the necessity of equivalency between terms when they each in large part specify different things, such as in different contexts?

Rephrased, that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet speaks to the necessity of the physical item's identity being unitary irrespective of how it might be termed and, hence, referenced - but not to the necessarily equivalency of terms that can be used to address said item.

Back to a posteriori necessity, then, it is not necessary (logically, metaphysically, or physically) that the term "Venus" equates to the term "Lucifer". It is only necessary that were each separate term (each laden with its own many connotations and denotations) to happen to be used to address the same physical referent, that then and only then both terms be usable as means of referencing the same physical given. But that's a tautology: if it is true that both X and Y can be used to reference Z, then it is true that X and Y are interchangeable - and in this sense alone equivalent - only in so far as both can be used to reference Z. This tautology doesn't seem to me to then support any a posteriori necessity.

What am I not comprehending here?

The sense/reference distinction. By sense it’s metaphysically possible that they’re different but by reference it’s metaphysically necessary that they’re the same. — Michael

Can you clarify the attempted distinction. Venus references love as well as a planet X. Lucifer references lucidity as well as the same planet X. The sense of each term is then obtained from the totality of what each term references - or so it so far seems to me.

It currently feels like materialism is creeping in: as though only physical referents can be deemed the actual referents of terms. This in contrast to senses being immaterial, which, in then possibly referencing immaterial attributes (such as that of love or of lucidity), aren't deemed to reference any actual givens.

180 Proof is right in a way. When formalised, "an infinite person" does not entail a contradiction. There is an X that is both i and p. No problem logically.

However if we think of the concept of a person, and then the concept of infinity, can they both be properties of the same subject? Well, inevitably it depends on what our concepts are. If we start with a concept of a person as a a thing with spatial limits, and infinity as without spatial limits, then an infinite person would be a conceptual impossibility. Is this what is meant by metaphysical possibility? — bert1

The issue is what that X innately entails. Here, X = person. That X is both A (infinite) and not-A (finite) at the same time and in the same respect will be what the very definition of what a logical contradiction is.

The only conceivable exception I can think of would be that of the Trinity consisting of the Father, the Son, and the Holly Ghost as three different persons in one omni-this-and-that-being. Some of us strongly deem this to be logically contradictory (even if some subset of such might revere Jesus Christ's being/character/etc):

Jesus Christ's body was limited to a human body, as all accounts of him attest to, for example. Jesus Christ's mind was limited to, for example, what he as a subject of awareness perceived - rather than him perceiving what all subjects of awareness perceive in a simultaneously manner, for example - this, again, as all accounts of him attest to.

The Father in Genesis II onward was limited to his walking the garden of Eden, hence was bodily limited. He was also limited in in his forethought of what the serpent, Eve, and Adam would choose to do, hence was not omniscient.

As to the holy ghost being a person, I challenge anyone to cogently explain what this could possibly mean.

All that aside, a person is commonly understood to be a human being, no?

Without warrant ou ascribe the property of being "finite" to "person" which is not intrinsic to the concept. — 180 Proof

Please justify this so far unsupported affirmation to someone who can't comprehend it. Is any person, for one example, omnipresent bodily or omniscient mentally?

Also, circles (or spheres) are both infinite and finite simultaneously ... — 180 Proof

Sure, but in different respects. Hence, they are not logically contradictory.

Yes, metaphysiically, not logically. — 180 Proof

How do you figure not logically? To rephrase: an infinite person is at the same time and in the same sense both a) a person that does not have end or limit to mind and body (this on account of being infinite) and b) a person that does have end or limit to mind and body (this on account of being a person). This is a logical contradiction: A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect.

"Infinite person" is one person that is infinite in extent, — 180 Proof

Try it this way: "infinite" in all cases means "not finite", where "finite" means "having an end or limit". A person in all cases is finite in both mind and body. Hence, "infinite person" is contradictory.

The leading example I've seen of a posteriori necessity is that of "Venus = Lucifer". I so far find this fishy. Any bloke on the street will tell you that "Venus" does not equal "Lucifer". That they both in part reference the same physical planet is not the whole of the story.

Then again, who knows, maybe love does equal lucidity after all. :grin:

But I kept the doubt in mind: is it not a matter of semantics even then? Because in epiphenomenalism, the mental changing the material is impossible within that metaphysics. But in epiphenomenalism, isn't the inability to change the material part of the definition of what is mental? And thus the mental changing the material becomes a logical contradiction within that metaphysics? — Lionino

For what it’s worth, my current thought process on the matter is along these lines:

Logical possibility—all of it pivoting on laws of thought—pivots on what is (taken to be) ubiquitous to all subjects of awareness. This irrespective of whether subjects of awareness might hold a comprehension of what these laws of thought might be; e.g., a preadolescent child will think via the laws of thought (however imperfectly and, hence, at times, illogically) although not holding a comprehension of them.

Physical possibility—when divorced from any metaphysics regarding what the physical entails, e.g. materialism, idealism, or substance dualism, etc.—also pivots on what is (taken to be) ubiquitously applicable to all subjects of awareness. Here, though, without a metaphysics there cannot occur a comprehension by which to make sense of physicality.

So both the logically possible and the physically possible will at root address ubiquitous actualities, actualities that are thereby universal and, in this sense, singular.

Metaphysics, on the other hand, will always make use of the logical and of the physical—at least in part, to which experiences, i.e. subjective actualities, can be added as well—to arrive at understandings regarding that which is in any way actual (including, for example, that which is actually possible). There are multiple ways metaphysics could be derived via physicality-bound (as well as, at times, experience-bound) logic. Thus resulting in multiple, often enough contradicting, metaphysical models of what is.

Each metaphysical system will then galvanize its own semantics; most of the time the validity of these metaphysics-specific semantics will be evaluated by their individual explanatory power—this in explaining what is actual (be it laws of thought, be it the physical, or be it our sometimes discordant and sometimes commonly held experiences, which could then extend into things such as cultures, languages, etc.). And, by extension, these individual explanatory-power-endowed semantics that together form the given metaphysics then grants the given metaphysics as a whole its explanatory power.

So the individual understandings, or semantics, imbedded within a metaphysical system (such as that of epiphenomenalism’s impossibility of mind affecting matter) is tied into, and is justified via, a webbing of ideally fully self-consistent semantics—all minimally conforming to what is known of logic and of physicality—that work together to explain all that is actual. To deprive epiphenomenalism of the impossibility of mind affecting matter is to then nullify the entirety of the metaphysical webbing of understandings which epiphenomenalism is. This, were it to occur, would then leave a vacuum of explanatory power and, hence, of general understanding, for all those that previously upheld the metaphysics of epiphenomenalism.

This being a longer path toward saying that I fully agree metaphysical differences can be said to boil down to semantics. I’d only add that, for one example, the particular semantic of “mind” in the case of epiphenomenalism appears to me inextricably bound into the entire webbing of semantics—of logic- and physicality-bound understandings—which this one metaphysics in fact is, if not merely being a webbing of understandings from which this metaphysics is constituted.

[This, to my mind, could get deep into epistemological issues of justification: which, as per the above, I currently perceive to involve some variation of foundherentism. This being a crossbreed of foundationalism (in conforming to the laws of thought and to physicality, if not also to some aspects of experience) and coherentism (in relation to a particular metaphysics' ideal lack of self-contradiction in the understandings it holds). Likely a different issue, though.]

At any rate, this is only a rough sketch of a general idea. Still, while its likely incomplete, I nevertheless so far find it to, well … to hold a fair share of explanatory power—this in terms of the different types of modalities addressed in this thread.

Glad to hear it was of benefit. :up:

However, what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino

How do you understand “metaphysical possibility”? As 1) possible iff it is true in at least one logically possible world, as 2) possible iff it is logically consisted to the laws of some particular metaphysics, or 3) as a possibility not addressed by either (1) or (2) as just described?

If (1), and if all logical possibilities pivot on the laws of thought as I believe they do, then it so far seems to me that any possibility one can think of which conforms to the laws of thought will also be metaphysically possible. If so, then one cannot have a metaphysical impossibility that is however logically possible.

If (2), then this will depend on the laws of the particular metaphysics in question. For instance, in the metaphysics of epiphenomenalism it is impossible that consciousness could alter its constituency of brain via the choices consciousness makes, this despite such top-down process being logically possible all the same.

I'm quite open to learning about possibilities that would be encompassed by alternative (3), however.