:up:

Say you go skydiving and your friend asks you "what was it like to go skydiving?" Now, you have said that there are no "what it is like to do/feel/be statements" (e.g. "What it is like to see red"). What exactly do you mean by that? Are you claiming you can't understand questions like, "what is it like to do/feel/be x?"?

I don’t think so, but it’s fine if you do. Hell.....I don’t even know what a mental state actually is. — Mww

So we'll state simple. You know what the experience of a toothache is, right?

How would I know it, such that it couldn’t be anything else?

You know the experience of a toothache is different than the experience of listening to your favorite song, so then the experience of a toothache can't be the experience of listening to your favorite song.

I never said anything like that. Never mentioned a mental state. That’s a knowledge claim, and I’m showing that particular knowledge is not available to us. — Mww

The knowledge of mental states is not available to us?

Well, I know this is a big ask but how about giving the opposing argument an airing rather than just claiming it to be true, calling others crazy, and doubting their motives and prospects. — Kenosha Kid

I'm not calling you crazy, I'm saying your claim is crazy. I didn't mean any offense. Idealism is completely out there, so I know about making crazy-seeming claims.

I've given a pretty comprehensive explanation as to why there is no "what it's like to see red" and you're not presenting any specific problems with anything I've said. Park that, and make a compelling case for:

there IS "what is it like to see red/be in pain/lose a loved one"
— RogueAI

Look at a red thing, stub a toe, lose a loved one (though hopefully not). I'm looking at a red object in my room. I'm having the experience of seeing red. There is something that is it like for me to see this red object: me seeing this red object. That is a mental state I can access through introspection. I assume all this is true for you as well, so when you say "There is no "what it is like to see red," and I also know that you, like me, can have the experience of seeing red, I honestly have no idea what to say. We're at first principles here. I can't wrap my head around denying the existence of "what is it like" statements.

There is no "what it is like to see red", that's idealism." — Kenosha Kid

I think it is trivially true that there IS "what is it like to see red/be in pain/lose a loved one" and denying the reality of that is crazy, but we're at the axiomatic level here, and your claim is similar to the move some materialists make when they try to deny consciousness (or claim it's an illusion). I think it's just totally obvious that such moves are not persuasive and are doomed to failure.

You agree then that experience is necessary to answer "what is it like?" questions? For example, you would agree that Mary needs to experience seeing red in order to know what it is like to see red?

Well let's see... Is that what I said? — Kenosha Kid

I wasn't clear on what you were saying, hence my question. Can you answer it? Is Mary's Room meaningful?

we are permitted to say we have no idea how the brain causes experience — Mww

Three points to make:

Your claim is dualistic. You're saying that brains cause experience, which is to say that for any mental state, there's a causal brain state. Brain states and mental states aren't the same thing; one causes the other. So, if brain states and mental states are different, how are they different?

We're permitted to say "we have no idea how the brain causes experience" because it corresponds to reality (i.e., is true): we have no idea how matter can cause experience.

Suppose we're still in the dark about the Hard Problem 100 years from now. How damaging would that be to physicalism? What about 1,000 years from now? Or do you think physicalism can survive an infinitely long explanatory gap?

Again, the dualist will admonish against claims regarding insight into ourselves, for which there is a plethora of justifiable speculation, in juxtaposition to claims about the mechanistic origin of ourselves, for which there is barely any insight at all. In short, we have been given what’s necessary for insight into ourselves (brains/matter), but not yet what is sufficient (causality). — Mww

What is the causality you're talking about? How matter causes experience?

Nonetheless, many (most?) people insist without compelling justification that there is an additional thing: the so-called hard problem of consciousness, such that if all of the physical barriers to knowing what it is like to be a bat were overcome, we would still not know what it is like to be a bat. This is just proof that sentences can be valid without conveying understanding or meaning imo. — Kenosha Kid

Are you claiming Mary's Room is meaningless/devoid of meaning?

I agree with you that good looks grease the skids and make life easier, but it doesn't make a person any happier. Also, if you are beautiful and are emotionally invested in your beauty, aging is going to be a bitch. And you're also going to attract people that are only after you because of your looks. Those kinds of relationships aren't fulfilling.

No , all there is to life is looking beautiful, the rest will take care of itself. — Wittgenstein

Are you being serious?

Idealists cannot rule out supernatural explanations, whereas materialists can. — Pinprick

That's a good point, but simulation theory provides a foundation for modern day materialists to seriously consider some pretty improbable events. For example, thirty years ago, I don't think any materialists would have given much credence to the possibility of the stars in the night sky rearranging themselves to spell out a message, but if this is a simulation, and that's what the simulation creators want...

Although, even in that case, the explanation for the stars rearranging themselves would still not be supernatural. I agree that idealists should be much more receptive to supernaturalism.

:up:

Yeah, that made sense. Perhaps an objective math formula can bring about a state of synesthesia in a blind person so that their processing of the equation brings about a mental state that is similar enough to seeing so that they know what seeing is like. Although, in that case, some kind of experience is still necessary for knowing what seeing is like- the formula, if there is one, would simply act as a bridge allowing the blind person to make a "what is it like" realization about seeing without ever seeing. I don't know how much sense that made.

Yeah, I agree with a lot of that. I love Kastrup! My personal "journey" away from materialism is similar to his. I don't think he really has anything knew, and I don't think he's thought through the theological implications of the existence of a cosmic mind. I think if you explore the idea of just one mind existing, you're going to wind up with a god eventually. Kastrup is great at explaining, though. I would love to listen to Harris interview him. I also thought Rupert Spira was great on Harris's show:
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=sam+harris+debate+consciousness

The short answer (to your questions): I don't know.

The long answer: I'm working with the hypothesis that consciousness is some kind of pattern, to take a physicalist stance, in matter-energy. We already have a pretty good idea that matter-energy and mathematical patterns are connected in a very initmate way (physics, chemistry). I then just put two and two together and came to the conclusion that consciousness could one day be expressed as a formula. Speculation of course, nothing definitive. — TheMadFool

Personal incredulity aside, I think this runs into a Mary's Room problem. If an experience can be expressed mathematically, then if a blind person knew the right maths/numbers, they could deduce, from the math alone, what it's like to see (and also what it's like to be a bat, if they know the right math). Doesn't that seem wrong? I don't see someone blind can know what it's like to see without having the experience of seeing.

And then of course, there's the issue of what kind of substrate the pattern is being run on, and how would you go about verifying if it's substrate-dependent or not? How would you test that mathematical pattern X,Y,Z is a conscious moment? I can see how you can claim that a conscious moment has a mathematical correlate, because we can express the physical brain state assosciated with the conscious brain state mathematically, but then you're back to the causal problem.

But I will grant you that you can correlate mental states with numbers. That is significant.

keeping my fingers crossed that consciousness turns out to be a mathematical pattern — TheMadFool

How on Earth can mathematical patterns be consciousness? Why should someone take that as a serious possibility? Also, if that's the case, there should have been evidence of it by now. Consciousness and mathematical patterns have existed for a very long time. Why has there not been any proof the two are causally connected (or the same thing)? I don't think any proof will be forthcoming and this problem is just going to get more and more acute.

Sure, I agree we know mind exists. But it rests on matter - the brain. Without a brain we'd have no mind. — Manuel

There is correlation between brain states and mental states. Causation has not been established. I think the failure to come up with a causal explanation for how brain states lead to mental states, at this point in 2022, is catastrophic to materialism, which is evidenced by the recent popularity among materialists of panpsychism. You even have Mex Tagmark, out at MIT, claiming the universe is made of math.

My point is that the Explanatory Gap is evidence that we have a situation where brain states are correlated with mental states, but are not causing mental states- if brain states are causing mental states, we'd have at least some idea of how that happens, but it's still a complete mystery.

Unless someone would say something like "we don't know that mind depends on brain" or "the brain is mental stuff too". I think we can say that the first option here is too plausible. — Manuel

I think idealism is the most plausible (second option). It certainly is the most parsimonious. Positing the existence of mindless external stuff creates problems, solves nothing, and is unverifiable.

On the other hand, if you say brains are a construction of mind, then yes this makes sense. What doesn't would be to say that brains aren't matter. — Manuel

Under idealism, brains aren't matter, they're ideas, just like when we dream of physical objects- they only exist as ideas. Idealism simply posits that what happens in our dreams is also happening right now. I have no evidence of that, of course, but at least it's a case of going from the known to the known: dreaming. Materialism goes from the unknown (mindless stuff) to the known (mind) via an unknown (and possibly unknowable) mechanism. That's not parsimonious.

I know you have not been suggesting this at all, I'm just pointing our some options that would follow from the argument. — Manuel

I'm an idealist, although I don't know if I've suggested it in this particular thread.

When I talk to idealists I don't say "You can't prove mind exists so you can't say anything". — khaled

"Mind exists" does not need to be proven. We know for a certainty that at least one mind exists. That is not the case with matter.

Come on now. Matter existing is a given. Or else you're not talking to a materialist. — khaled

Matter existing is not a "given" when I'm talking to a materialist any more than Christ rose from the dead is a "given" when I'm talking to a Christian. I didn't find your other answers compelling, either. Sorry.

I'm excluding those 2. When I say materialist or idealist I mean a purist, IE not a dualist in either case. — khaled

You think mysterianism is the same thing as dualism?

Yes he can. Because consciousness to a materialist is a certain pattern of matter. You can easily tell when things follow said pattern. — khaled

It depends on the materialist. Some believe that mental states are identical to physical states. Some are property dualists. Some are mysterianists (materialists who think we'll never figure out consciousness).

A materialist cannot say anything about consciousness* with confidence because A), there's no way to prove that matter exists in the first place, and B) even if matter does exist, if consciousness is patterns of matter, why does pattern A give rise to the feeling of stubbing a toe, while pattern B gives rise to the beauty of a sunset, while pattern C gives rise to no experience at all? How does that work? Why are we conscious in the first place? If pattern of matter XYZ gives rise to (or is the same as) experience ABC, and that machine over there looks like it's an instance of pattern of matter XYZ, how do we verify it's having experience ABC?

Since the answers to those questions are all unknown, any claims materialists make about what consciousness is and how it arises from matter cannot be made with confidence, at least at the moment. Agreed?

You seem to already have in mind a particular effect called "consciousness" that we cannot detect that arises from matter. — khaled

I think we can detect it, but only in ourselves. I cannot be wrong I'm conscious, but I ultimately have no idea whether you are or aren't and if you are if your consciousness is anything like mine. If you disagree, then explain how a scientist would go about detecting consciousness in a machine.

That's not how a materialist would put it. To a materialist, again, consciousness is a pattern, not a seperate "secret sauce" added to things that have matter (usually). That's dualistic.

Again, it depends on the materialist. Let's take you. Do you believe that mental states are identical to brain states? If so, how is it that I can have a song playing in my head, but there's no music in my skull? If mental states are identical to brain states, then my mind weighs a couple pounds and is about the size of both of my fists. Do you really think your mind weighs anything? Isn't the idea that your mind is double-fist sized pretty absurd? And if you don't believe that mental states are identical to brain states, then how are they different?

Consciousness is to a brain what a program is to a PC for a materialist. The program is not a seperate entity that acts on the PC, it's a specific configuration of the PC. — khaled

This assumes there is a material thing called a brain that exists outside our minds. You need to prove that first before you start talking about what kinds of programs this hypothetical brain can run.

*I think IIT has some interesting things to say, but only at a trivial level.

What’s something a materialist cannot say about the world that requires they be an idealist. Or vice versa — khaled

A materialist cannot say about the world (with confidence) that consciousness can arise from non-conscious stuff. They can assume and believe it's true, but there is (currently) no explanation for how that can happen, why we evolved to be conscious, or indeed why we should even assume mind arising from mindless stuff is possible in principle. The materialist, again, simply assumes there's not a category error going on.

The materialist also cannot say (again, with confidence) that non-conscious stuff exists at all. There is no way to verify it. It's simply a belief.

For an idealist there is two different kinds of things, "mental stuff" and "physical stuff" — khaled

That's dualism. Idealists believe only mental stuff exists.

:up:

All you are doing is moving the goal posts. Now we need to define pain. What if I defined pain as being informed that you are damaged. — Harry Hindu

That would not be a good definition of pain. The salient feature of pain is not information about damage to the system. You can have pain without any damage to the system (e.g., phantom limb pain). The main thing about pain is that it hurts, and any definition that doesn't mention this phenomenal aspect of pain is severely lacking. Wouldn't you agree? The main thing about pain is it feels bad?

Also, I don't think there's any goalpost moving going on. I might grant you that "is x conscious?" might get bogged down in definitions, but "is x in pain?", won't. Everyone knows what that means. Either a machine can feel pain or it can't. No fancy definition is required. Do you believe that machines will ever be able to feel pain?

Imo, the only people who can be indifferent about an instance of consciousness, are people who can meditate to a depth of ineffability, where they cannot say / recall anything about their experience. So in a sense they obliterate consciousness. — Pop

I would agree that people in such states are probably not doing any kind of memory creation.

I agree. I didn't know what you meant by "emotion" at first.

I tend to agree. If emotions create consciousness, wouldn't strong emotions create a strong sense of consciousness? Not necessarily, but the implication is there. I'm pretty emotionally neutral at the moment, but I don't feel any less conscious than times I was really happy/sad/scared/etc.

And the Hard Problem is about how consciousness arises from non-conscious matter and why we are conscious.

But there are still people who believe mental states are identical to brain states. For them, a mental state isn't emergent, it just is a physical brain state.

— bert1

(the mental just is a physical function)

"A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been satisfactorily resolved, concerns various non-intensional properties of mental states (on the one hand), and physical states (on the other). After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple."
https://iep.utm.edu/identity/

Also: having a song stuck in your head, but no music playing inside your skull. This is one of those cases where materialism goes down a rabbit hole into absurdity.

Well said.

NM

I have an idea what someone might mean, but then that idea falls apart when subjected to logic and reason. The same goes for the word, "god". People use the word without a clear understanding of what it is that they are talking about. We need a definition in order to understand what each other are talking about so that we are not talking past each other. — Harry Hindu

I don't think we even need to use the word consciousness to poke some serious holes in materialism. For example, if scientists come up with a theory of consciousness and claim that some machine is conscious, instead of worrying about what consciousness means, we can just ask the scientists, "Is it capable of feeling anything, like pain or pleasure?" If the scientists say "yes", then they are still on the hook for proving that that machine can feel pain, and then we're back to the verification problem. People can throw up language barriers to questions like "Are you conscious?", but if they try to do so for something like "are you in pain?" it's not going to work. We all know what is meant by "are you in pain?"

For example, Kenosha Kid thinks it's possible for consciousness to arise from different substrates, like rocks or ice cream cones (I think he used that example). So, instead of getting bogged down in questions like, "How could a collection of x produce consciousness?", we can ask "how could a collection of x feel pain?" The same absurdity arises (e.g., a collection of rocks feeling pain), there's the same explanatory gap and hard problem (e.g., how could a bunch of rocks feel pain? How does that work?) and we don't even have to mention consciousness.

Only because we've learned to associate consciousness with behaviors and haven't come up with an explanation of consciousness that allows us to detect consciousness more directly.

How would you detect consciousness in a machine, even in principle? How would you go about determining that a substrate other than neurons can generate the sensation of pain? I think this is, in principle, impossible to verify.

I don't know what "physical" means, much less a physical fact. How about just facts, or information? I think it would be easier to figure out what consciousness is without the false dichotomy of "physical" and "mental".

I'm sympathetic, and I think things are easier if we ditch physicalism altogether, but physicalism's central claim is that there is this non-conscious stuff that exists external to us and that it either causes consciousness or is consciousness. I don't think there's a problem understanding what physicalists mean when they say that. It's a pretty straightforward theory: mindless stuff exists and everything is made of it and it causes all phenomena. That's easy to understand. I happen to to think it's wrong, but I don't think there's a meaning problem there.

I'm not so sure. Are you saying that my feet are conscious like my brain? Are you saying that molecules, as well as the atoms they are composed of, and then the quarks that the atoms are composed of, have points of view? What is a point of view, if not a structure of information?

In monistic idealism, there is only one cosmic mind, and we are dissociated aspects of it (think dissosciative identity disorder, which used to be multiple personality disorder). So, would my feet be conscious? There's an assumption there that there are these things separate from us called "feet", and that they might be conscious. I don't think anything is separate. I think that separation is an illusion. There's only one thing that is conscious: the one mind. Our own focuses of awareness are, as I said, dissociated aspects of this one cosmic mind.

Are you fibberfab? Is your significant other fibberfab? How can you answer those questions without knowing what fibberfab is or is not? — Harry Hindu

Do you really have no idea what someone is talking about when they ask "are you conscious"? You're not able to grok that sentence?

You can say that you are conscious, but what makes you conscious?

Nothing. Consciousness, mind, and ideas are all there is. Idealism makes everything so much easier.

How can you tell if others are conscious when you can't observe their consciousness, only their actions? Are actions conscious? If not then what is conscious and how can you tell?

You can't tell, you can only assume. Since we're all built the same way, there's been no problem assuming we're all conscious, but when computers get more sophisticated, and people start claiming things other than brains are conscious, the impossibility of verifying external consciousnesses is going to become a big problem.

Maybe. Maybe not. Either way, the scientific definition can't contradict other definitions, or else scientists and laymen would be talking about different things. — Harry Hindu

Well said.

Can we do the same thing with consciousness? Can you talk about how consciousness appears from consciousness and as it appears from a view from nowhere? — Harry Hindu

Can you unpack "view from nowhere"? Do you mean a god's eye view of your internal mental states?

Your consciousness appears as a physical brain that drives various actions from my conscious perspective, which is not how my consciousness appears to me so how do I know if you or I are actually conscious or not? What is concsciousness like from a view from nowhere?

Suppose we have an unconscious machine that knows all the physical facts about our universe. From that information, could it figure out that this thing called "consciousness" exists?

Bob is just going to be a lot older than Frank. They'll be able to consult with a physicist to understand why. — frank

I think there's more to it than that. At time t to whatever, Bob and Frank report the same "speed" of consciousness. But if Frank accelerates enough, then at T+whatever, Bob and Frank will differ on how much conscious experience they report has happened to them, and they will both be correct. But that entails that for one (or both of them) their consciousness did not "flow at the speed it flows, neither faster nor slower".

Doesn't IIT entail that our consciousness should fluctuate with the amount of information integration going on? For example, sitting in a dark silent room that's neither hot nor cold should result in a severely diminished conscious state compared to doing a stairmaster at a gym, but of course that's not the case.

Axioms can't be proven and I think there's a lot of relativism in our choice of axioms we follow. For instance, it's possible that there's a literal hell that you go to if you displease some god (or simulation programmer), but I find the notion so implausible that I don't entertain it seriously. But maybe I should...