That was my avatar on a politics forum!

Also, I saw a rainbow this morning for the first time since April (I live in the desert). I swear to god, there was an actual rainbow about an hour after they called it.

This is what it's like talking to these Dennet types:

Does it hurt when you stub your toe?
Qualia is incoher-
No, does it hurt when you stub your toe?
When we talk about reporting-
No, does it hurt when you stub your toe?
The neurological states invol-
No, does it hurt when you stub your toe?
Define-
No, does it hurt when you stub your toe?
....................yes.
How does the brain produce that feeling of pain when you stub your toe?
It doesn't hurt when I stub my toe.

Failed at what? Was the universe required to produce life?

No, by "failed" I mean the universe would not have been life-permitting had the constants been different. I should have been clearer.

If we assume those fundamental constants could have differed, then this universe (which happens to be life permitting) is low probability - but the exact same low probability as every alternative. Each of the n possible universes had a 1/n chance of winning, so it was a certainty that the winner would be that low 1/n probability.

Setting aside issues of infinity, the set of non life-permitting universes is vastly larger than the set of life-permitting universes, so if we were surveying the multiverse (and it contained universes where the constants were different), we would very very rarely see any universes with life. Therefore, the odds of a universe being life-permitting are not the same as the alternative, as you claim.

Every lottery winner is surprised when he wins, but it's not the sort of surprise that should lead anyone to think the lottery was rigged for that outcome.

It depends on the lottery. Suppose there was a brand-new lottery created, just for you. The odds of you winning are a quadrillion to one. You win on the first try. You're going to conclude it was rigged.

The problem with the firing squad analogy is that it treats life as a target.

In the firing-squad analogy, YOU are the target. Your continued existence is surprising because it is so implausible that so many people would miss you at point-blank range. The conclusion that your execution was rigged follows from Pr("marksmen miss by chance") <! Pr("marksmen miss on purpose").

So if you assume God wanted to create life, it implies he had to finely tune the constants to meet that goal. So as an argument for God's existence, it's circular.

The firing-squad analogy isn't an argument for God. It's argument that you can, in certain situations, be surprised by discovering you're alive.

"My tablet, since you didn't like the multivariate argument, could have tipped the scales in favor of life. "

Your tablet? I have no idea what you're saying here.

Well, first you need a definition of consciousness that is distinct from unconscious, otherwise you're not making a meaningful claim. Then you study the object of doubted consciousness for whether its behaviours, which correlate to its properties, are consistent with it being conscious or unconscious. If you cannot distinguish then, again, it's a meaningless claim.

I have no idea what you said here.

Right, there is no evidence that aliens exist. So we cannot rationally discuss aliens as if they do exist.

This is different from saying, "Maybe aliens exist," and then looking for evidence that they exist. The people I've been chatting with aren't saying, "It could be that all of physics is wrong and consciousness could exist as something separate from the brain,". I would have no disagreement with that. Having an idea of what could be and looking for it are great. We would never advance our understanding of the world otherwise.

The posters that I have been discussing with are claiming that consciousness IS separate from the brain. Not a maybe, but that it just can't be from the brain. I have asked for evidence that would show this to be true, and none has been provided but speculation. Asserting the existence of one thing, and the refutation of another thing without any evidence that can be shown in the real world is a fantasy world framework.

Nonsense. The statement: "aliens, if they exist, aren't made of chocolate and don't have candy cane brains" is not irrational. It's true.

How does empiricism tell you that non-conscious stuff exists? Is there a hidden anti-panpsychist proof in empiricism?

What is your justification for assuming physical non-conscious stuff exists?

For example, lets say I proposed that all sentience was non-physical, but consisted of a substance called sentisia. I could write a complex paper that details exactly how it works, and it would be incredibly logical and work within the framework. But if I can't find sentisia in reality, if I can't demonstrate its existence and use, all I made was a fantasy world framework.

The bolded doesn't follow. Just because you can't find something in reality doesn't mean you conclude it doesn't exist, or you conclude that everything you thought about it was a "fantasy world framework". It depends on how well you search and how competent you are at searching. That's the mistake you're making.

For example, there is no evidence that aliens exist. We haven't "found any aliens in reality". Are all the papers on exobiology a "fantasy world framework"? Are all the proposed solutions to the Fermi Paradox mental masturbation? Is SETI a big waste of time? Maybe. Maybe not. We're not justified in declaring the non-existence of X just because we can't find X in reality. String theorists would certainly agree with me on that one.

To my knowledge, this matter was settled a long time ago with the aid of the ubiquitous game of chance - lotteries.

The chance of winning the jackpot in an average game of lottery maybe arounf 1/10,000,000. You have a better chance of getting hit by lightning I guess. Anyway, the point is someone always wins.

It's shocking for the winner for the simple reason that the odds of winning are near-zero. However, given the number of players, a winner is assured.

Let's take the lottery example. Suppose someone wins the lottery. No big deal. Suppose that same person wins again next week. Big deal, but it happens sometimes. Suppose they win again. And again. Eventually, you're going to conclude they're cheating or the game is rigged.

Here's another interesting example: suppose a new lottery is rolled out. On the first draw, the lottery numbers spell out the first 10 digits of Pi. That lottery would immediately be shut down because it would be obvious someone rigged it, even though a Pi result in a lottery is perfectly within the realm of chance. The reason you would shut the lottery down in the Pi example is because
Probability("fair lottery") <! Probability("rigged lottery").

The point is, the longer the odds get, the more the "cheating" hypothesis becomes viable. Another example: suppose someone shows you (what they call) a "fair coin". And they proceed to get 20 heads in a row when they flip it. That outcome COULD be chance. But nobody would believe it.

Well, if we CAN be surprised by our existence, and a life-permitting universe (any kind of life) is highly highly improbable, then the fact that we find ourselves in a life-permitting universe is surprising and needs an explanation. So far, that explanation is multiverse theory, but it's interesting that some scientists have taken umbrage with multiverse theory, claiming it's not really a theory.

No, I don't think it's any gods. The point is that your own existence CAN be considered surprising, in the firing squad scenario. Agreed? Or would you NOT be surprised to find yourself alive in such a situation?

I don't see how. Are you suggesting that logging to working memory is not a 'mental activity'?

That is logically equivalent to: you are not conscious when you are not doing reporting activities. Is that the claim you're making?
— RogueAI

Yes. That's right. You have read my explaination of what I mean by 'reporting activities'?

Of course you have an explanation of reporting activities. Reporting activities can't possibly mean reporting activities. We're talking about "reporting activities". I'll pass on that rabbit hole.

I guess I'll take you both at your word that you're not prepared to discuss it seriously and leave it at that. I wish you would've saved us some time and not engaged.
— fdrake

In what field other than the whole consciousness/qualia field is this...

no matter what arguments they give or evidence they show, you're not going to conclude you're unconscious. That would be absurd. Do you agree? Or could you be persuaded into thinking you're a zombie? No, you couldn't! You know you're conscious. How can you not know that? This is why these discussions are frustrating. You know you're not a zombie. You know nothing anyone can say to you will convince you you're a zombie.
— RogueAI

...considered an argument?

There's something I find so odd about all this. The counter-arguments to any questioning of what's going on is "but we know X, you can't deny it", and yet it's apparently the 'hard' problem? We both unquestionably know it and simultaneously find it the hardest problem in philosophy. Is God messing with us?

Isaac, do you believe it's possible you're not really conscious right now, as you're reading this? Do you think you can be talked into the belief "I am not conscious right now"? If no, then I guess what I was saying about Searle makes sense, doesn't it? There's just no evidence or argument that can persuade someone they're unconscious, is there?

If yes, and you really think it might be possible you're a p-zombie, all I can do is say, wtf? And you wouldn't be the first (self-described) p-zombie I've run into in philosophical forums. The things some people talk themselves into believing...

I said 'reports of mental activity', not 'reports of consciousness'.

OK, you're conflating mental activity with reports of mental activity. The point is the same: consciousness/mental activity is different than reports of same. Agreed?

"Are you ever conscious when you're not doing any reporting activity?"

"No, it doesn't seem so."

That is logically equivalent to: you are not conscious when you are not doing reporting activities. Is that the claim you're making?

fdrake, referencing an authority like Searle IS taking the discussion seriously (I can't find the exact quote-I think it was a Ted Talk). The point is germane: no matter what anyone says to you, no matter what arguments they give or evidence they show, you're not going to conclude you're unconscious. That would be absurd. Do you agree? Or could you be persuaded into thinking you're a zombie? No, you couldn't! You know you're conscious. How can you not know that? This is why these discussions are frustrating. You know you're not a zombie. You know nothing anyone can say to you will convince you you're a zombie. That was my entire point in paraphrasing Searle.

And I also tried to discuss this with you seriously. I'll repost:

OK, let's start with this one. I said:

" You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely"

Do you think reports of consciousness are the same thing as consciousness itself? That's absurd. What more needs to be said against that? Obviously, you can be conscious without reporting about it. Do you disagree with this?

Would you care to comment on this? Are reports of consciousness the same thing as consciousness itself? Obviously not, so Isaac's claim:

Consciousness is just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity

is wrong, isn't it? There's more to consciousness than "just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity".

I was listening to a philosopher (I think it was Searle) who said (paraphrasing), "Imagine scientists come out with a report that says, "You know how you thought you were conscious? Turns out you're not. Here's the proof." You wouldn't believe it, no matter how good the evidence is".

That's where I'm at. There's no argument or evidence that is going to get me to think, 'Hmmm...maybe I don't have qualia after all..." Consciousness/qualia deniers are like flat-earthers. They even argue the same way, retreating into stuff like "well, I don't know what that means" when they get pressed into a corner. As I said, it's frustrating talking to such people. I probably shouldn't.

Yes. It is obviously true that reports of consciousness and consciousness itself are different things. In fact, this is so obviously true, I suspect that people who conflate the two aren't arguing in good faith, and it's frustrating.

OK, let's start with this one. I said:

You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely

Do you think reports of consciousness are the same thing as consciousness itself? That's absurd. What more needs to be said against that? Obviously, you can be conscious without reporting about it. Do you disagree with this?

You said:

Consciousness is just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity and it's caused by the neurons which produce language, movement and other awareness-mediated responses being stimulated by the neurons constituting the processing of sensory inputs to which that awareness relates.

That's a terrible definition of consciousness. Consciousness is more than "just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity". You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely.

You said "Reporting on mental activity isn't even a necessary condition for consciousness, let alone a sufficient one."

That claim is self-evident. Again, reporting consciousness is not the same thing as BEING conscious. Do you think it is??? What an absurdity.

To make such a claim requires (as far as I can tell) an empirical data-set which includes people being conscious but without any reporting activity going on.

Are you ever conscious when you're not doing any reporting activity? Are you ever in pain without telling anyone about it? Yes, you are.

In order to acquire that data-set you'd need a measure of consciousness so that you can tell the people with no reporting activity are nonetheless conscious. I just wanted to get clear what that measure is you're using, otherwise I can't have any real understanding of what you're saying.

You need a data-set to tell you that people are conscious even if they're not reporting it? No, you don't. That's silly.

I don't really know what 'first-person subjective experience' is in this context.

Lame.

Hundreds of years of lack of progress on something so fundamental as consciousness wouldn't be a problem for physicalism? Obviously, at some point (e.g., 10,000 years from now), lack of progress on the Hard Problem would be catastrophic for physicalism.

OK, when does the lack of progress become a problem, in your opinion? Suppose we still don't have an explanation for how brains produce consciousness 100 years from now. Is that a problem for physicalism?

I have absolutely no idea. All anyone can do, whether it's within physicalism or any alternative, is produce untestable hypotheses (guesses).

Shouldn't we have some idea, at this point? The mind-body problem has been around since Descartes' time. What progress has physicalism made in solving it?

What measure of consciousness are you using then?

We were talking about definitions, not measures. Any definition of consciousness is incomplete if it doesn't include first-person subjective experience (qualia). I'm not saying first-person subjective experience is a sufficient condition for a definition of consciousness, but it is a necessary condition. Agreed?

Consciousness is just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity and it's caused by the neurons which produce language, movement and other awareness-mediated responses being stimulated by the neurons constituting the processing of sensory inputs to which that awareness relates. I'm genuinely dumbfounded as to how or why anyone finds this in the least bit difficult to imagine.

That's an incomplete definition of consciousness. Reporting on mental activity isn't even a necessary condition for consciousness, let alone a sufficient one. Any definition of consciousness has to include first-person subjective experience.

This thread is a reading group? What do you mean?

I don't think even Dennett knows his position anymore. I go over this with my 6th graders. Kids like metaphysics and ethics. They're not good at it, but they like talking about it. I wrote it out:
1. Stuff exists that isn't conscious and can't feel anything: atoms, rocks, comets, dirt, etc.
2. When you take some of this stuff and make a brain out of it, and add a little electricity, the brain becomes conscious.
3. How does the brain become conscious?

And I ask them to give me an explanation. After we go over their explanations, they want to know the real answer. I don't blame them. I think materialism's inability to answer it is catastrophic to the theory, but that's just me.

The problem being that you're incredulous?

My incredulity is that you find it at all difficult to believe that 80 billion neurons firing at a rate of up to 1000 per second could produce something as relatively simple as experiencing a phenomena. How many neurons did you imagine it would take? Another few billion? Should I contract some philosophers to investigate that for me, do you think?

OK, what is your explanation for how non-conscious stuff, when assembled the right way, can produce consciousness? Because that seems like magic to me, and to date, materialists have utterly failed to explain the mind-body problem. As I said, they tried to brush it under the rug for awhile, but that's failed. Nobody takes Dennett seriously anymore.

"Qualia" names the set of all subjective experiences: my pain of stubbing my toe, your pain of stubbing your toe, Tom's pain of stubbing his toe, my experience of red, Mary's experience of red, etc.

As others have pointed out, the amazing thing is qualia exists at all. This three pound lump of meat in my skull produces a phenomenally rich inner mental life? How does that happen??? For awhile, the Hard Problem was swept under the rug by the likes of Dennett, but those guys are dying off. The energy is with the computationalists and panpsychics. I think they're wrong, but at least they're addressing the problem.

Can you fix your post?

N: "That's absurd! Rocks don't have minds! Only things that are functionally like humans can have that first-person, mental experience. Other things obviously don't have it. It must emerge somewhere in the development from rocks to humans."

M: "Only things that are like humans can have a first-person experience that is genuinely mental in the way we normally mean of humans, sure. But other more elementary things must have some kind of experience out of which that human-like experience can emerge. Otherwise it could only spring into being from nothing, like magic... which is supernatural, and not physical."

This is one of panpsychism's biggest problems: rocks don't have experiences. What is it like to be an electron? is a nonsensical question. If the claim is that things like rocks have experiences, you're so close to idealism, just go whole hog and ditch the physical.

So either:
- we're zombies ourselves,
- magic happens, or
- everything "has a mind" in the sense that these people are talking about.

That's pretty much where I've ended up.

I think you're misreading "access" as "active" here.

Yeah.

In any case, access consciousness is the topic of the easy problem. There is no mystery there. Access consciousness is just a kind of functionality. How does the function of my computer emerge from the function of the atoms it's built out of? Very carefully, but not philosophically mysteriously. Likewise, the function of brains emerges from the function of atoms in a similar fashion.

Whatever there is besides that function, whatever metaphysically special thing there also needs to be, that is phenomenal consciousness, which is the subject of the hard problem, and my solution to that is that everything has it, so nothing (phenomenally-)conscious emerges from anything non-(phenomenally-)conscious, because there is nothing non-(phenomenally-)conscious.

You sound like a panpsychist idealist. That's a contradiction, so, do you believe non-mental stuff exists? If no, then you're an idealist, if yes, what kind of stuff is it and how does consciousness emerge from it?

"If you mean access consciousness, then I think there are lots and lots of things (most things) that are not access conscious, and our access consciousness, "consciousness" in the sense that we ordinarily mean it, is built up out of that stuff."

You're back to the Hard Problem: how does "active consciousness" emerge from "non-active consciousness" stuff?

That's a long thread. I guess my salient point is: are you assuming some non-conscious stuff exists? If so, do you believe consciousness comes from this stuff?

"There are generally three possibilities when it comes to what kinds of beings have phenomenal consciousness in a physicalist ontology..."

Why are you assuming physicalism to be the case?

Do you really think you're mindless? No, you don't. So, why waste people's time on such idiocy?

To be specific, I don’t believe minds exist, only brains do. Until some sort of evidence can be presented that shows minds, of the metaphysical/immaterial variety, are even possible of existing, I see no reason to change my belief. I’m always open to the possibility that there is evidence that I’m not aware of, however.

Nonsense.

If brains are identical to minds, then talking about brains is the same as talking about minds. If X and Y are identical, then talking about X entails talking about Y, and vice versa. For example, talking about bachelors is, necessarily, talking about unmarried men.

Do you believe brains are identical to minds?

What do you want out of life?