• Nietzsche: How can the weak constrain the strong?
    Germs. Gravity. Children. Promises. Memory ... wtf, think! :sweat:
  • Commandment of the Agnostic
    ↪baker
    Judgment, not a ruler.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪NotAristotle
    Sorry but I don't understand the question?
  • Commandment of the Agnostic
    ↪baker
    If you say so ... :roll:

    ↪baker
    "Measure" what? I didn't propose to quantify anything.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    Addendum to:
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/768274

    Not this tired old 'idealist/antirealist' caricature again ... :roll:

    Why physicalism? [ ... ] This is where the problem of consciousness originates - — Wayfarer
    "The problem originates" with semantically reifying the abstraction, or concept, of "consciousness" and thereby reducing a self-reflexive activity to a discrete thing (i.e. reduce what human brains intermittenly do to the contents (outputs) themselves).

    – because by definition consciousness is excluded from this paradigm.
    Physicalism only excludes non-physical concepts from modeling (i.e. explaining) how observable states-of-affairs transform into one another. In this way "the paradigm" is epistemologically modest, or deflationary, limiting its inquiries to only that which can be publicly observed – accounted for – in order to minimize as much as possible the distorting biases (e.g. wishful / magical thinking, superstitions, prejudices, authority, etc) of folk psychology/semantics. We physicalists do not "exclude consciousness" (i.e. first-person experience) but rather conceive of it as a metacognitive function – e.g. phenomenal self-modeling – of organisms continuously interacting with and adapting to each other and their common environment.

    As far as I can discern it, Wayfarer, 'first-person subjectivity' is like one-dimensional information processing for which the higher dimensions (e.g. third-person objectivity) it is imbedded in are completely transparent to the one-dimension (like the circle in Flatland (E. Abbot, 1884)) sustaining the illusion of 'first-person subjectivity' as either (A) all-there-is, (B) the ontological basis of all-there-is or (C) a separate substance from whatever-else-there-is. Physicalism helps to philosophically dispel this (folk) illusion much in the way prescription lenses correct for acute myopia.

    I would have thought that the distinction between sentient beings and insentient objects is a fundamental not only in philosophy. — Wayfarer
    Again, unwarranted Cartesian-Heideggerian dualism. The fact is, Wayf, a very very tiny fraction of all "insentient objects" ever on Earth have also been "sentient beings", and we know this by observing that the latter are subject without exception to all of the same objective conditions and forces to which the former are subject. At most, functionally, "sentient" only predicates – is a way of describing – (some very rare) "objects" but is not itself a "fundamental distinction" any more than wings on butterflies are "fundamental distinctions" from wingless larvae or caterpillars.

    ↪NOS4A2
    :up:

    ↪Janus
    :100: Yes, maps =/= the terrority.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    God is God — Walter
    Yes and, regardless of Thomistic wordplay, a tautology is a tautology – vacuous.
  • Commandment of the Agnostic
    ↪mentos987
    I don't find any of your objections or commentary substantive so I won't respond any further to you on this topic. Good luck with your inquiry.

    One of the areas in which I have done insufficient thinking is that of the 'harmful'. — Tom Storm
    Maybe the following helps ...
    For me, harmful denotes causing or increasing harm and harm denotes (bodily / emotional) impairment-to-disability via deprivation, injury, terror, betrayal, bereavement, loss of agency, etc the vulnerabilities to which are usually specific to each natural species; and in this regard, we can know exactly what harms all h. sapiens – what all h. sapiens avoid by reflex (à la conatus ~Spinoza) – as moral facts, or reasons (to cultivate habits) to help¹ prevent or reduce harm to every harmless – not causing or threatening harm or has not caused harm – individual; therefore we (can) know what each one of us ought (i.e. conatus + moral reasons) to do¹ and we (can) observe, all things being equal, whether one does it or one does not do it.

    Thoughts?
  • Commandment of the Agnostic
    Are these sorts of maxims ultimately just variations on, 'Do not cause suffering?' — Tom Storm
    More or less – I'd put it: 'Prevent or relieve more suffering than you cause'.

    ... following it literally would be difficult... — mentos987
    As I've already pointed out ...
    Literalism is the death of reasoning and judgment. — 180 Proof
    To follow any rule, the context in which it is applied needs to be interpreted – adapted to – in order for the rule to be effective; therefore, "following it literally" is myopic and usually counter-productive.

    It probably doesn't handle animal cruelty very well. — mentos987
    Insofar as an animal is harmless – is not causing or threatening harm or has not caused harm – "cruelty" towards that animal is clearly proscribed.
  • Commandment of the Agnostic
    Do you think it is possible to formulate any general principles that can be used to assess actions? — Tom Storm
    A few days ago I offered this (ignored by @Joshs & @mentos987) ...

    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/864587

    Thoughts?
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    Proponents of the doctrine of Divine simplicity, and especially Thomists, maintain that God is a necessary, absolutely simple and immutable being who is identical to all of his properties. — Walter
    This Thomistic fetish doesn't make sense: "absolutely simple and immutable" excludes "properties" just as, for instance, a triangle excludes parallel lines. The only modal implication to this "doctrine" is that (à la L. Carroll or A. Meinong) it describes an impossible object.
  • US Election 2024 (All general discussion)
    ↪Wayfarer
    :100: :up:
  • US Election 2024 (All general discussion)
    ↪Relativist
    You're entitled to your opinon, so we disagree on a number of points. Let's resume this discussion ten and a half months from now, Relativist, and see who got it more right than wrong.

    Happy Holidays :sparkle:
  • Bob's Normative Ethical Theory
    P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross
    This is a vacuous definition, not an ostensible claim.

    P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.
    Demonstrate this entailment.

    C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself.
    Invalid inference from underdetermined "propositions". Ergo, "FET proof" (C6) fails.
  • US Election 2024 (All general discussion)
    ↪Relativist
    This far out from the 2024 election, polling only indicates relative name recognition and nothing more. What will "turn this around" is GOP primary voters deciding they want to beat Biden more than they want to loyally back a proven loser (neither SP-1 nor MAGA candidates have won a majority of voters in general, midterm & special elections, nationally or locally, since 2016 to 2023). Also, SCOTUS overturning Roe v Wade in 2022 was the final nail in SP-1's coffin as all of the "pro-life" (anti-woman) ballot measure defeats in "red states" such as Ohio & Kansas unequivocally demonstrate. IMO, there is nothing non-trivial to "turn around" (and hasn't been since the day Putin's Bitch pre-ejaculated that he's running again for the presidency (i.e. to stay out of prison)).
  • US Election 2024 (All general discussion)
    ↪Relativist
    If a majority of GOP primary voters want a chance at taking back the White House in 2024, then they will show SP-1 the door in the spring (or sooner). Of course, he'll continue to play the whiny victim and run as a 3rd party spoiler to keep the grift going in order to pay his legal bills. Otherwise, SP-1 will take what's left of the GOP down in flames (à la the Hindenburg) with him next fall. :mask:
  • Why be moral?
    That you think "moral" = "rational"; and "immoral" = "irrational" ... — Vaskane
    Another vapid strawman.

    :shade: Go troll someone else, kid.
  • What is the way to deal with inequalities?
    Inequality is the root cause of dishonesty. — YiRu Li
    I disagree. "Dishonesty" is caused by intelligence; it is often an effective social, business or political tactic.

    This world is not equal and we can’t change it externally.
    The world is not static, it is entropic and chaotic. Because we are inseparable from the world, we can only slow or accelerate, not stop, its changes.

    But there is a way to deal with the inequalities [changes] and be peaceful & honest.
    What is the way?
    My guess: scientific understanding × nonzero sum practices.
  • TPF Quote Cabinet
    Art never responds to the wish to make it democratic; it is not for everybody; it is only for those who are willing to undergo the effort to understand it. — Flannery O'Connor
  • There is No Such Thing as Freedom
    ↪Manuel
    :up: :up:

    Only an idiot can't tell – won't admit – the difference between a territorial concentration camp and a self-governing, cosmopolitan city.
  • Why be moral?
    ↪Banno
    :up:

    If ethical non-naturalism is true then... — Michael
    :roll:

    ↪Vaskane
    Besides misquoting me, rationality =/= "to rationalize", lil troll.
  • Why be moral?
    Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno
    :up:
  • Why be moral?
    Assuming ethical non-naturalism — Michael
    Ah, okay, I assume ethical naturalism (as suggested by my reference to 'eusociality' and 'culture' in my old post linked above).
  • Why be moral?
    Here are two possible worlds:

    1. It is immoral to harm others
    2. It is not immoral to harm others     — Michael
    It is unclear what you mean by "immoral" and therefore that these are "possible worlds".

    Are you saying that if I were to harm others in world (1) then I would be miserable but that if I were to harm others in world (2) then I wouldn't be miserable?
    No.

    How does that work?
    Your false dichotomy doesn't work.

    Also the OP is directed at categorical imperatives, not the kind of hypothetical/pragmatic imperatives that you’re describing.
    I see. My bad, I should have read the first page of this thread at least. A naturalistic hybrid of 'eudaimonism and disutilitarianism' is my position, not deontologism.
  • How wealthy would the wealthiest person be in your ideal society?
    ↪unenlightened
    If you say so ... :roll:
  • Commandment of the Agnostic
    ↪mentos987
    :death: :flower:

    A naturalistic, twenty-first century formulation of 'Hillel's principle':
    Whatever is harmful to your species, by action or inaction do not do to the harmless.

    :sparkle: Merry Solstice & Reason's Greetings :sparkle:
  • Why be moral?
    From an old thread "Why should I be moral? – Does the question even make sense?" ...
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/533345
  • There is No Such Thing as Freedom
    There is no such thing as freedom because everybody is enslaved to either ego or conscience. — Piers
    Homunculus fallacy – "ego" and "conscience" are constraints on, or conditions of, volition and not agents which can "enslave" (i.e. act as masters). "Freedom" – minimally restricted state-of-affairs or phase-space – is not unconditional and to that degree, at minimum, 'agents are free'. See compatibilism¹.

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism ¹
  • How wealthy would the wealthiest person be in your ideal society?
    When are the robots going to start making more land? — unenlightened
    Silly question. Besides generational migration to space habitats, thinning the human herd is much easier and more efficient. :smirk:
  • How wealthy would the wealthiest person be in your ideal society?
    a scarcity of services provided by humans — RogueAI
    Ubiquitous AI-automation would eliminate that "scarcity" (as it's already incrementally doing now).
  • About definitions and the use of dictionaries in Philosophy
    No. IME, "dictionaries and definitions" are sometimes useful, at best, but not significant for doing philosophy.
  • How wealthy would the wealthiest person be in your ideal society?
    ↪RogueAI
    So what's your point?
  • Meaning of Life
    Suppose (the only) "meaning of life" is to live meaningfully¹ in order to die meaningfully ... :death: :flower:

    (creatively & thoughtfully)¹
  • How wealthy would the wealthiest person be in your ideal society?
    ↪Tom Storm
    :cool:
  • How wealthy would the wealthiest person be in your ideal society?
    How wealthy would the wealthiest person be in your ideal society? — Captain Homicide
    Given that my "ideal society" consists in post-scarcity economic democracy, "wealth" would be measured only as personal reputation acquired by positively contributing to (A) excellence (i.e. singular performances, innovations, inventions, discoveries) in culture and/or (B) positivesum conflict resolutions, such that "the wealthiest person" at any time would be the one who is most esteemed (trusted?), or among a cohort of the most esteemed, by her society for service to the overall well-being (i.e. flourishing, sustainability) of her society.
  • Fascista-Nazista creep?
    ↪Vera Mont
    :up: :up:
  • Are some languages better than others?
    Are some natural languages more logical than others though? — I like sushi
    If some are, then trivially so.

    As I said with German do you think that is more logical?
    I don't find it so (though I've never been fluent). As far as I can tell, Goethe's verse isn't "more logical" than Shakespeare's and Hegel's metaphysics is far more opague than C.S. Peirce's.
  • A Normative Ethical Dilemma: The One's Who Walk Away from Omelas
    ↪hypericin
    Yes, which is why I think "moral judgment is more a matter of habit" and not only or always a matter of habit.
  • Are some languages better than others?
    ↪I like sushi
    Formal languages (i.e. systems of substitution-rules) are "more logical" in structure than natural languages (i.e. conventions of ambiguity-constraints) which, IMO, are more semantic kluges than "logical structures".
  • What are you listening to right now?
    "Reason's Greetings, y'all. And Happy Solstice. :sparkle:

    Men I've been seein'
    Got their soul up on a shelf
    Though they can never love me
    Can't even love himself
    I wanna man to love
    I wanna man
    that can finally understand

    [ ... ]

    They all want me to rock 'em
    Like my back ain't got no bone
    Go ahead & rock me one time, big stuff
    Like my backbone was your own
    (Baby, I'm not foolin' around this time)

    "Love Me Like a Man" (3:56)
    live, 1989
    writer Chris Smither, 1970
    performer Bonnie Raitt
  • Metaphysically impossible but logically possible?
    ↪javra
    'A child older than her parents' is metaphysically impossible and logically possible insofar as there is not a contradiction in terms but an inconsistency in temporal composition, or relation.

    addendum to:
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/862580
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