It is clear from the OP that I am referring to substance dualism.

I don't know what energy is. If it is not a stuff, then I do not know what is being spoken of by it. But my point remains that the transfer of energy principle is not violated by dualism. If the transfer of energy principle is nonsense anyway, then dualism isn't challenged for that reason either.

I am not sure I follow. It sounds as if you're reifying 'potential energy'. B is a mental event. Any transfer of energy between A and C would have been 'through' the involvement of B, but B would not be taking away, or contributing any energy to the picture, just as, by analogy, a person who is at a points intersection and redirects an oncoming train down one path rather than the other is not adding any energy to the train. That's only an analogy of course.

But either way, I'm agreeing with you. The only point I'm trying to make here is that you're highly unlikely to find anyone out here on TPF who will spend much time defending Christian beliefs. — EricH

Well, in my view and experience Christians are often among the ablest philosophers and some of the very best philosophers have been Christians. And this is a philosphical issue. You don't think it is, but that's neither here nor there. I am interested - as I keep saying - in 'justificatory' reasons (aka epistemic reasons) not motivational reasons or explanatory reasons.

If I ask "why do you believe X" the question is ambiguous, as I could be inquiring about your motives or a literal explanation of how you came to believe it. Or I could be asking you to provide justifying reasons. If that question is asked in the context of a philosophy forum, then it should be taken as read that it is justificatory reasons that are being inquired after.

It's not owed. I was merely curious if you had an alternate explanation — EricH

no. Whatever explanation the atheist gives, the Christian can give too if they wish. If there is no need to suppose that God created this place, then all options are open

Here I suggest that you go to a Christian forum to get a more definitive answer to how actual religious Christians resolve this apparent discrepancy. — EricH

I am arguing that they are mistaken. I keep saying: I am not asking for an account of why Christians typically believe what they believe. I am asking for a defence of it.

So,

1. If Genesis is an account of the creation of this place, then this place is approx. 6,000 years old
2. This place is approximately 5.54 billion years old
3. Therefore, Genesis is not an account of the creation of this place

And so on.

Not only did I read it, but I'm basically agreeing with you on one of your main points. — EricH

I asked because you quoted Genesis. And yet in the OP I explained why nothing in Genesis commits the Christian to the view that the account is an account of the creation of here. On the contrary, it seems quite obviously to be an account of the creation of somewhere else.

So, why did you quote Genesis at me when I had explained at length in the OP why Genesis is not evidence that God created the world?

Re: how the world got here. Why is any explanation owed?

Have you read the OP?

Nothing you have said is correct.

That's false. Christians have always believed that reason will confirm God's existence.

None of you seem capable of focusing on the issue. It's like trying to have a discussion with little children.

There's an OP. To challenge what I argued there you need either to show that it is essential to being an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person that one would create a world such as this one, or you need to argue that something in the bible commits the Christian to the view that this place - not 'a place', but this place specifically - was created by God. And don't just quote a passage without having read the OP.

and I told him that and eternal being is, by definition, a necessary being — TheGreatArcanum

Er, it isn't. So, I present you with an argument that demonstrates your view to be false (and the example I employed is based on one by Kant so, you know, not some dumbo). And your reply is simply to reiterate your conviction that if something exists eternally, then it exists of necessity.

Once more: if something exists of necessity, it exists eternally.

It does not follow that if something exists eternally, then it exists of necessity.

Now, try and address my argument. The mug in front of me exists contingently (or those who believe in contingency and necessity will all agree it does). And it exists now. Nothing in principle stops something tah exists at one moment in time from existing at all of them. There aren't weird 'no entry' signs around some moments of time and not others.

So, it can exist at every moment in time. But it wouldn't thereby magically become a necessary existent. See yet?

YOur view is demonstrably false. There is nothing in the notion of necessity that requires that a necessary existent must exist 'prior' to the existence of any contingent thing, for there is nothing in the notion of a contingent thing that is incompatible with a contingent thing existing eternally.

All you are saying in reply is to reiterate over and over your conviction that to exist eternally is to exist of necessity.

I don't think you do. Again: what on earth do you mean by saying consciousness is a 'function'. It literally makes no sense.

It goes like this "dur...doing things to brain does things in mind....hit head, causes ow, ow is in mind. Therefore mind is brain. Neurscience. Sam Harris. Mind is brain. Dennett. Mind is brain. Take away bit of brain, person go dumb dumb. Therefore mind is brain."
— Bartricks

While I wouldn't put this is quite such an annoying and dismissive way, I do agree with the substantive point, namely that too much is made of the relationship with brain function and what we experience. Not as much follows from this as people often immediately think. The close relationship between brain function in humans and what we experience is compatible with any theory of consciousness, even extreme forms of dualism. — bert1

Why would you not put it so dismissively? That really is the only argument I have ever been given for thinking that the mind is the brain (or anything else material).

Doing things to the brain affects what goes on in the mind......therefore brain is mind. That's it.

The slightly more sophisticated might throw in the dogmatic claim that two fundamentally different sorts of thing can't causally interact, but it's the same argument just with added dogmatism (and it backfires anyway, as the conclusion to be drawn is not that the mind is the brain, but that the sensible world is immaterial).

It's not, then, that 'too much' is made of the relationship. It is that the entire case - the whole of it - for the materiality of the mind is based on the fallacious inference from 'A causes B' to 'therefore A is B'.

There are loads and loads of arguments for the immateriality of the mind. I just want one for the materiality of the mind that isn't reducible to those appalling ones just mentioned above.

However, I do think that if something is eternal, that it is absolutely necessary and not relatively necessary, — TheGreatArcanum

Yes, but you just think that and I refuted the idea. So this is tedious. I can just keep refuting it if you want, and then you can just keep insisting that if something exists eternally then it exists of necessity, even though that's demonstrably not true.

For example, presumably you do not believe all things exist of necessity. So, some contingent things exist alongside some necessary existences. Now simply imagine that at the beginning .

So, to be clear, you think your consciousness is the state of what - an atom?
— Bartricks

No, not my consciousness, because I'm not an atom. — bert1

But you think atoms are conscious, yes?

You think you're an atom, do you?
— Bartricks

I don't. No sir! Not me. — bert1

What are you then? What else has consciouness aside from atoms?

Possibly, depending on definitions. — bert1

How would it depend on the definition? Do atoms have mental states?

And to be clear some more: you think the way to solve the problem of how consciousness - which is clearly not a property of matter - could be a property of matter, is to make all matter have it?
— Bartricks

It makes it easier, yes. — bert1

Really? Er, no it doesn't. So, you flood the bathroom. Your solution is to flood the rest of the house?

How do you 'solve' the problem of consciousness by simply supposing tiny things rae conscious and there are lots of them. How does that solve a thing?

If you're happy enough with atoms being conscious, why not be happy with lumps of meat being conscious? That is, why do you think there is a problem with lumps of meat being conscious until or unless you can show that the little atoms composing it are? The same leap - the same leap in defiance of reason is made either way, you're just making it a gazillon times for some reason.

It avoids the problem of explaining why only some things are conscious and not others. — bert1

"why the F is lounge sopping wet?"

You: "The bathroom and hallway are wet, as are the bedrooms and every other room in the house"

"Oh, okay. I am happy with that explanation.".

Only that's nor reality. In reality the question would be "and why the F are they wet!!! Why is the entire house sopping wet?"

And that's the same question you should be asked. How are brains conscious?
"The atoms composing them are."

Er, and how are they conscious? (and, you know, they're not and that doesn't do anything at all to explain how the brain is conscious).

You're not explaining anything at all. No problem has been solved.

The problem, note, is that extended things do not appear to have conscious states and anything that has a conscious state does not appear to be extended.

You don't do anything whatsoever to address that problem by supposing all extended things have conscious states. So, the problem is how any extended thing can be conscious, not how is it that some are and some aren't.

Note, if you think the problem is 'why are some material things bearing conscious states and not others, then you've already solved the problem of how any material thing can be conscious.

It's a state. Conscious state. Consciousness is a state of mind.

You have said it is a 'function'. That makes no sense. Explain what you mean. My mug has a function - it's function is to contain water. What sense is there in saying that consciousness 'is' a function. Functions are functions.

It's like me saying consciousness is a number.

Minds are things. They have states. We call them mental states. They include conscious states. That's why we call them conscious states.

Yeah, okaaay.

You know as well as I do that you meant by imply, imply - that is, suggest. And that's what everyone else means when they say 'correlation does not imply causation'. And they're wrong. It does imply it.

I think you are stating a preference rather than discovering as morality. In some countries they are adamant homosexuality is wrong and should be punishable by death. Having a strong reaction to something doesn't mean you have made an accurate judgement. — Andrew4Handel

And that's most likely a mistake. Among those who are so good at thinking clearly about moral matters that they make a living doing it - so, among professional moral philosophers - you find virtually no one who thinks homosexuality is immoral. Why isn't that excellent indirect evidence it is not immoral?

When we make moral judgements, we are not expressing our attitudes. Our moral judgements may often reflect our attitudes - we may prefer it if certain acts are wrong because and only becasue we personally disapprove of them - but that discovery, if made, then discredits the judgement in question, which just shows that moral judgements are not expressions of attitude.

What do you mean by wrong? — Andrew4Handel

By 'wrong' I mean it is 'not to be done'. That is, there is a norm of reason enjoining us not to do it.

The judgement that an act is wrong is, then, a judgement about a norm.

And we make such judgements because there appear to be such norms.

They are not seen, touched, smelt or tasted. They are intuited. That is to say, our reason represents there to be such norms.

Those possessed of reason have recognized and argued about such norms for millennia. So there is no point in denying that such rational appearances exist. The history of ethics is a history of philosophers arguing over the content of such norms. Well, that confirms that there appear to be some.

And no nihilist worth their salt would deny them.

THe nihilist would deny that such appearances are accurate. That is, they would maintain that such rational impressions constitute normative hallucinations.

The problem, however, is that if you think there is a case - an argument - for thinking that such appearances are normative hallucinations, then you must presuppose that at least some rational impressions are not hallucinations (or concede that you have no case).

And once you concede that some of what our reason represents to us is true, it seems arbitrary to decide that when our reason starts telling us about norms enjoining us not to harm others, etc, that now it is lying.

No, you really don't understand at all.

You have a thesis that is false, but you're so convinced it is true no argument will sway you, as any argument that contradicts your confused thesis is, as you see it, faulty for that very reason.

You think that existing eternally and existing of necessity are the same. That is already profoundly confused. They're not the same. Something that exists of necessity will always exist - so it will exist eternally - but it does not follow that if something exists eternally it will exist of necessity.

Now, I showed you this. Anything that exists contingently right now, can - in principle - exist at every moment in time. And then it would exist eternally. But it wouldn't thereby exist of necessity - it remains a contingent existence.

If you can understand that, then you will also be able to see how there is nothing in the notion of necessity that requires a necessary existent to exist 'before' a contingent one. They can exist concurrently.

That's better: some manners.

This is my polite way of telling you to go f**k yourself. — GLEN willows

That wasn't polite at all and so now you deserve to be spoken to with outright contempt - do you see that?

You also do not know what an ad hominem attack is.

So, you know, this wouldn't have been a profitable debate. Snowflake.

Is torturing a child for fun wrong?

Yes, obviously.

So, some things are wrong. That is, it is manifest to reason that some ways of behaving are wrong.

Then there are some acts whose moral status is less clear.

But that doesn't imply nihilism. It just reflects the fact that our reason is not infallible and that it is especially exposed to corruption where morality is concerned

If Mr X denies premise 1, then how the bloody hell is he a proponent of the problem of evil?

Do you know what a proponent of the problem of evil is? Do you actually know what you're talking about?

I am entailing that you don't know what words mean.

Tell me, Neomac, when someone says "correlation does not imply causation" what do you think they mean? Do you think they mean that it does not entail it, or that it does not imply it?

Psst: it's the latter. And it is false. Yes? It's false. It DOES imply it.

It doesn't ENTAIL it.

It does IMPLY it.

What are you entailing?

Are you entailing that invizzy was wrong or that I was wrong? Which one - which one are you entailing?

Some panpsychists (like myself) might say that consciousness is a basic property of matter, like charge, spin or mass. That way it's inside your brain without being a function. — bert1

Be honest, you're a panpsychist because you like the word and want to belong to a gang.

So, to be clear, you think your consciousness is the state of what - an atom? You think you're an atom, do you? And presumably you think that your body contains billions upon billions of other persons? And that everything around you is teeming with billions of persons.....why are you not in a straightjacket?

And to be clear some more: you think the way to solve the problem of how consciousness - which is clearly not a property of matter - could be a property of matter, is to make all matter have it? How does that work? How does that explain anything? You think if you multiply the problem enough times, it goes away?

Why not just say that some things are conscious - such as complex arrangements of meat - and some things, such as sandwiches, are not? That'd still be false and not solve anything, but at least it wouldn't be totally mental.

The problem with thinking anything material is conscious is that consciousness is not a property of material things and everything our reason says confirms this. That's why there is a 'problem ' confronting those who choose to ignore what our reason says and insist that material can be conscious.

But you do not solve that 'problem' by attributing consciousnes to everything or to little things rather than big things. You solve it by listening to reason and concluding that the mind is not a material thing. Jesus. You people.

I'm still struggling with the issues involved with consciousness. The most pressing for me is how - if consciousness isn't entirely a function of the brain, and is somehow outside the brain - that wouldn't invoke the mind-body problem? — GLEN willows

There is no mind body problem.

Consciousness is a state. It's not a thing. It's a state of a thing. It's a state minds - and minds alone - can be in.

That is, if something is in a state of consciousness, then it is a mind. For that is a defining feature of a mind: a mind is an object that has consciousness as a state it can be in (some would say that it is always in it).

So, first, let's not make category errors: consciousness is something minds 'have'.

Brains do not have it. Or at least, there is no evidence they have it and plenty that they do not.

Therefore, minds are not brains and brains are not minds.

If anyone thinks that there is evidence that brains are minds - that is, that brains have consciousness - then all they will do (for to date, this is all they have ever done when I have asked for evidence) is point out something that no one seriously denies. Namely, that brain states seems to be causally responsible for our mental states.

But only someone incredibly thick would think one can go from A causes B to A 'is' B. Yet that is how thick these people are. For that is precisely how they get to the conclusion that the mind is the brain.

It goes like this "dur...doing things to brain does things in mind....hit head, causes ow, ow is in mind. Therefore mind is brain. Neurscience. Sam Harris. Mind is brain. Dennett. Mind is brain. Take away bit of brain, person go dumb dumb. Therefore mind is brain."

Consciousness is a state of mind. And minds are not brains. They - some of them, namely our ones - are in causal relations with them.

Is there a mind body problem? No. What would it be? What problem?

The only people who think there is a mind body problem are those who are unable to accept that minds are not brains and so then wonder 'but how can a brain be conscious?'.

It's like supposing cheese has consciousness and so is a mind, and then wondering how that could be and calling such wonderings 'the cheese/mind problem'.

There's a sparrow outside. Let's imagine it isn't outside, but is in fact inside my locked cupboard. And now I have something to wonder about - how on earth did a sparrow get inside my locked cupboard? It could not have opened the doors and shut them behind it. So how did it get in there? That is contemporary philosophy of mind. It's a bunch of people who have decided that something is the case that clearly isn't the case, and now they're wondering how it could be the case. A truly spectacular waste of time.

Like I say, you seem to have problems focussing.

For example, you've just asked if I am a Christian. Now, I said I wasn't, didn't I?

So that means the answer to that question is 'no'. See?

And this thread is not - not - a request for historical or psychological explanations of why most Christians believe that God created the world.

This is a philosophy thread.

So, clearly what I am wondering is if there is any philosophical reason why a Christian should believe such a thing.

And then I explained why I think there is no philosophical reason why a Christian should beleive such a thing and good philosophical reason why they should not.

And then you said something irrelevant, namely that the concept of God is incoherent. That's not true, but it is also not relevant. It's like blurting that England is bigger than France. That's not true and it is also not relevant.

Look, this isn't hard. Ought an omnipotent, omniscient person do X?

if the answer is 'no'. then that means that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person wouldn't do it.

See?

Now, this is so basic - so simple - that I think you are just willfully misunderstanding as you find it amusing or something.

This is a valid argument form:

1. Either p or q
2. Not p
3. Therefore q

1. Either change the world so that it does not visit horrendous evils on innocents, or do not introduce innocent life into it.

Do you see how that says 'either p or q'?

do you also see how a proponent (that means defender) of the problem of evil must endorse it?

And do you see how this premise is true in respect of us:

2. We are not going to change the world so that it does not visit horrendous evils on innocents?

And do you see how it now follows that

3. Therefore, do not introduce innocent life into it?

3 is antinatalism.

So, to deny 3 you need to deny 2 or 1.

2 is obviously undeniable

So you have to deny 1.

If you deny 1, then there's no problem of evil. For there would be nothing wrong in introducing life into the world as it is. There would be no obligation on God to change it.

So, if - if - there is a problem of evil for belief in God, then there is also a problem of evil for the belief that procreation is morally persmissible.

On the other hand, if procreation is morally permissible, then there is no problem of evil for GOd.

Now, if at this point you still do not understand me - if the above just sounds like gibberish - then I'm afraid you need to work with your hands for a living and stop trying to do this thinking business: it's not for you.

No, you stumbled right at the first hurdle.

Why do you think I asked about an omnipotent and omniscient person and left off omnibenevolent?

Do you think it was a mistake? It wasn't.

Do you think you can understand me by deciding to change what I said rather than trying to understand why I said it?

If you want to understand someone, do not assume they don't know what they are saying. I mean, you'll never understand anyone if you do that.

I am not you. I do not think like you do. So try and understand why I left off omnibenevolent. Don't assume it was a mistake. Assume I knew exactly what I was doing

I have found logic for dummies. It's written by @god must be atheist and it's utterly incoherent. It says if tree, teapot, wizzzzz, then Sally peanuts brain chutney. And so on. Page after page of it

No, I think most people - including you and including this cat person - mean by 'imply' 'suggests'.
Imply does not mean entail. It means suggests. Whereas if something is entailed there is no suggestion at all - it occurs or follows. And that is how you use it. Yes?

And when someone says correlation does not imply causation that is how they are using it.

And that is also how you used it, because you are continuing to thing that statistical correlations do not imply causal links, even though they do. They just don't entail them, that's all.

Correlation DOES imply causation.
Correlation does not ENTAIL causation

The latter is not worth saying. By contrast, if correlation doesn't imply causation that would certainly be worth saying as if true as then we would have to deny the presence of all causation apart from that which we directly experience in the form of our own willings.

A logic for dummies? What are you entailing?

So, tell me,when someone says 'imply' do you think they mean 'entail'?
Have you ever said "what are you entailing?" When someone says something that implies you are full of something?
Now, when someone says 'correlation does not imply causation'what do you think they mean?
Do tell.

And do you agree that the claim that correlation doesn't entail causation is so mindnumbingly banal that no one in their right mind would make it?

Now, shall we get back to the topic? Correlation DOES imply causation.

It does not entail it. But it does imply it.

If, when you say "correlation does not imply causation' you mean 'correlation does not entail causation' then you are a) misusing the language and b) saying something incredibly banal that isn't worth saying.

Like I said, Bartricks is illogical — god must be atheist

Er, no. Just to be clear - you're someone who thinks this -

1. God is not evil.
2. God did not create evility.
3. Humans have free will and they created evility with their moral displestitude.
4. The devil exists.

is an argument! Presumably you think shopping lists are arguments. And windows. And tuesday.

So you use imply and entail as synonyms do you?
What do you say when you want to express the idea that something is suggested, but not entailed? What word?