All things are possible for God. There are lots of things I don't seem able to do. Therefore I appear not to be omnipotent, and thus appear not to be God.

I may be, of course. Because I do think that it is possible for God to be ignorant of all manner of things, and that he will in fact be ignorant of the fact he is God, and may have made himself so by making himself ignorant of his ability to do anything. So I am not ruling out categorically that I am God. I don't think any of us can. But I don't appear to be omnipotent, and so I don't appear to be God.

I think that if a proposition is true, then it is not also false.

So, just remove 'impossible' from Aristotle's description (well,you know, rewrite it without it - so rewrite it as, say, no thing that is, is also not, or whatever).

That's what I affirm: no true proposition is also false.

If you don't want to call that the law of non contradiction, that's fine. What's in a word? The point is that I think no true proposition is also false.

I don't understand the squiggles and squoggles (but Banno loves them - makes him feel clever).

I don't think there are any necessary truths. Truths, yes. But no necessary truths. I don't think necessity is a thing. However, I still think no true proposition is also false. It's just I don't think adding 'necessarily' to 'true' does anything, then. It's just a kind of underlining. So, 'necessary' functions expressively, not descriptively. That's how we tend to use the language of necessity in every day life. 'You must' means 'do it!'

You asked me to define change. That is a task for another day (it's a kind of thought). My point in the op was that change is more fundamental than time. For time exists when an event goes from - that is, changes - from being future or present to being past. Or changes from being past to being more so, etc.

So, one has not successfully analysed change if one says that change involves something having a property at one time that it lacks at another. For then one has invoked a change to explain a change, which gets us no closer to understanding change.

This - this conflation of time and change - is at the heart of McTaggart's confused reasoning about the matter. Or so I would argue. But Pue and others who know so much more about the nature of time will surely correct me on that.

God is a mind. And time consists of the properties of pastness, presentness and futurity. If time does not exist, then God's mind would not have any of those properties. But if time does exist, then God's mind will either exist in the present, or in the past, or in the future, or some combination. Thus, if time exists, God will be subject to time.

No, if all things are possible, then all things are possible. When you see 'push'do you reason 'push....therefore pull'? Yes. Yes you do. And that is why you are not allowed the metal cutlery. Plastic spoon only.

Erm, okay. But Jesus said that with God all things are possible. Not some things. All things. That's my view of omnipotence too. And Descartes'. And it is correct, for clearly a person who can do anything is more powerful than one who can only do a subset, yes?

Pray explain his rejection of my view.
Shall I do it for you?
Here: "hoity toity, far be it for me to hoity toity, but McTaggart was surely toity, hoity, hoity, toity toity. The great Descartes no less, held such a view, but hoity toity even the great among us make mistakes, indeed the very greatest of mistakes, so hoity toity. Anyway, I will not consider further this view of omnipotence, for it is plainly false and disreputable and only the greatest minds - who are apt, of course, to make the greatest mistakes, for there is surely no greater hindrance to understanding than to be extremely good at it - will have any truck with it and toity hoity. So let us now move on, 'hoitum toitum' as it were, to other views, having so roundly rejected this one without ever being so vulgar as to explain why."
Sound about right?

Yes, Jesus and I agree about omnipotence. Jesus said "with God, all things are possible". He did not say "God can do all that is possible". So yes, I am comparing myself to Jesus. And to Descartes as well, who defended the view. Note, that does not mean I think I am Jesus, or that I am Descartes, or that I think Descartes was Jesus. Though Banno, yourself, and just about everyone else on this site who isn't me, would think all of those things were implied by what I said, and then a whole load more besides. .

I don't know what you mean. Sounds a bit buddhist.

I don't accept any contradictions. Thinking a contradiction 'can' be true is not equivelent to thinking it is actually true. How do you ever figure out what to do? You must just hang around waiting for yourself to do stuff, like a kind of zombie. For were you ever to consider what actions you 'could' do, you would think you were actually doing them. When you look at a menu in a restaurant, do you think "blimey, I just ordered an awful lot of food"? I assume so. That is, to you the menu is just a description of everything you have ordered, not a list of things you could order. Must be incredibly confusing being you, and mind bending for those around you.

I do not follow you. First, I did not argue that the past (I will focus on that temporal property) is in our minds. I explicitly denied that thesis. It has nothing to be said for it and is evidently false.
But we are aware of time via sensations. There is a sensation of the past, then. That is, pastness feels a way.
In order for that to be the case, the past itself would be a sensation, else our sensations of pastness would not be able to tell us about it.
That, combined with the facts the past is unitary and that sensations are always the sensations of a mind, entails that the past is made of a single mind's sensations of pastness.
And this means that of course we can imagine the past being created. It's really no different, in terms of an imaginative exercise than,say, imagining being in pain.

I do not reject the law of non contradiction. I think it is true. I just don't think it has to be. But I am as sure of its actual truth as anyone. That's why I don't contradict myself - I am, if i do say so myself, the law's most diligent follower on this forum by far. Of course, I don't have to be - I am able to contradict myself whenever I want. But I don't. I am like God in that respect.
But back to time....

Yeah, that's the usual explanation, and it has this singular advantage over Bart's illogic: it is coherent. — Banno

Oh really. First, it is not the usual explanation - it is contemporary theist philosophers who tend to try and understand omnipotence in terms of being able to do all things logically possible, as opposed to just all things. It has not been 'usual'. Descartes believed as I do. So did Jesus. (With God all things are possible.....not God can do all possible things). So contemporary Christian philosophers at least, are being both dumb and heretical.

The idea that an omnipotent being can do only those things it is logically possible - and at that, logically possible for him - to do is patently absurd, as a moment's reflection reveals. For it makes God constrained - constrained by logic, this now strange forcefield that exists independently of God and limits what he can do. Clearly a god unconstrained by logic would be more powerful than an otherwise identical god who was constrained by it - or can you not even see that?

What do you suppose God creating time means? What does it look like? — TheMadFool

My second argument tells you: time is made of sensations and their absence. That is, pastness is a sensation, as is futurity, whereas presentness is the absence of either.

God creates time, then, by creating in himself those sensations about things. And in so doing, time is thereby created, for now all things God is thinking of will either be ones about which he is having the past sensation (and thereby they will be past), or the future sensation (and thereby they will be future) or neither (and thereby they will be present).

Re properties: temporal properties are properties, it's just they're not intrinsic properties. The same is true of spatial properties. My location is a property of my body. It is not an intrinsic property of my body, for my body would be the same body in a different location. But nevertheless, it is a property of my body that it is in the location that it is in. And temporal properties are the same, I think.

The claim that time 'flows' is a metaphor and, I think, a misleading one, as it invites us to think of time as a kind of liquid. Yet if my arguments are correct, that is quite the wrong way to conceive of time. Time is relevantly analogous to, say, pain or love. We might talk of the ebb and flow of pain or love, but we mean by this the manner in which they become more or less intense. That is how things are with time too. An event becomes more past, not by 'flowing' further down the river of time, but by the sensation of pastness becoming more intense in God.

Don't most people think in little maxims like these?

Each one is a generalization of some sort that is then promoted to the status of a universal truth. Whereas in fact, it seems that there are virtually no such truths. So the philosophical point, if it needs to be made explicit, is that generalism is false, and particularism true.

Take do as you would be done by.

Sometimes you ought to do as you would be done by. That is, sometimes it is right to do x, and right to do precisely because that's how you'd want others to treat you.

Yet sometimes it is wrong to do as you would be done by (and sometimes it is wrong precisely because it's how you'd want others to treat you).

Try and think of a quote or maxim that is true and insightful to which counterexamples cannot be found.

If you love the flowers in the garden, are you also in love with them? — Caldwell

Yes, I think so. Doesn't saying you're in love with something or someone or some appearance or whatever just mean the same as saying that you love that person, or thing, or appearance, or whatever?

If I say "I love x" then I am describing an attitude I have towards x. If I say "I am in love with x" then I am describing my situation in the attitudinal relation that i have towards x. That seems to be the only difference. Yet if I have a loving attitude towards x, then I am in the situation in the attitudinal relation that I have towards x that "I am in love with x" describes.

Clinton cards have yet to use any of my greeting card messages.

How? If you love something, you are in love with it, surely?

What?

But Peu, what about McTaggart? The A series and the B series and the C series - don't you want to tell me about them? Peu? I think I know what I am talking about when it comes to time, but you think I don't and so I am eager to hear what you know about it and to be put right in my thinking. So, Peu, what do you think about McTaggart's famous article? You know, the one everyone begins by reading when they start engaging with the philosophy of time - the one called the Unreality of Time? It's a good read, isn't it?

Rubbish! — Janus

Good point. Well made.

Show your bloody working.

Words mean what they mean 'contingently', not of necessity.

Omnipotence guarantees only all power that actually exists. God can still be all-powerful and not be able to perform the paradoxical. — theRiddler

No, that's false. If God is Reason, then God will not be bound by the laws of Reason, for they are his laws to make or unmake as he pleases.

Now, that God can do what our reason tells us is impossible, such as making square circles and such like.

Clearly a God who can make a square circle is more powerful than one who is otherwise identical but can't make a square circle, yes?

And thus if God is Reason, then God will be all powerful - for God will be able to do anything at all.

And as God is all powerful, then God is Reason. For a god who is not Reason will be bound by Reason and thus will be less powerful than a god who is Reason. A god who is less powerful than another has no business being called omnipotent. But a God who is Reason is all powerful, for there is no higher authority than Reason.

To say that God is by definition omnipotent just is to say that he must be omnipotent. — Janus

No it isn't. Show your working. How the hell did you get to that conclusion??

The definition of a term is a contingent truth about it.

Bachelor means 'unmarried man'. That's just contingent. It doesn't have to mean that. It just does.

And you certainly can't get from that, to the conclusion that bachelors lack the ability to have wives.

Likewise, God denotes an omnipotent person.

And by definition, an omnipotent person can do anything. That too is a contingent truth about the meaning of the word omnipotent.

But you can't get from the fact Mike is omnipotent to the conclusion that Mike is incapable of being anything other than omnipotent. That would be of a piece with stupidly thinking that if Mike is a bachelor, then he is incapable of being anything other than a bachelor.

The OP contains two arguments. You have addressed neither.

Why are you so sure I don't know what I am talking about?

I take it you've read McTaggart? Maybe you'd like to say something about McTaggart's view, as I know you're keen to teach me things.

Anyway, I can't think of an equivalent for quasi-eternity. There is no beginning and there is no end. — James Riley

Nonsense. Time has a beginning - see OP for details.

Some things have no beginning, for some things exist with aseity. Unless this were so, we would have to posit infinite events, and there are no actual infinities. Thus, some things exist without ever having begun to exist. And of course, there is also no beginning to your talent for philosophy.

But time has a beginning.

And everything can end, even though nothing has to. For God exists and is all powerful and thus can end anything and everything whenever he wants.

What the F do I care about a debate going on? — GraveItty

Oh, I am sure you don't care. It's just that I don't care that you don't care. I just care to point out that what you said was false and ignorant. There is a big debate about the nature of eternity. And I know about it and have read some of the literature on it - though no doubt not as much as I should - and you have not.

God can do both. That is, God has the ability to make a stone he cannot lift, and be unable to lift it. And God has the ability to make a stone he cannot lift, and lift it.

So, God has the power to give up his omnipotence. And God also has the power to make it true that he has given up his omnipotence and retained it at the same time. The former would just be consistent with what our reason tells us is possible, whereas the latter would not be. But what our reason tells us is possible is no restriction on God, for God is the author of our reason.

Gentle reader, apply the argument to yourself. Have you not been potent with respect to all that you do and have done, thus omnipotent? And of all the things that would make you impotent, have you not necessarily not done them - and thus your omnipotence preserved? It would seem that Bartricks' argument makes you God! — tim wood

What on earth are you on about? You think you can do anything? No you can't. You are extraordinarily limited in your powers.

An omnipotent being can do anything. That's what being omnipotent involves.

Everyone can do what they do. (Well, actually that's not strictly true - sometimes we do things we are not able to do, such as when we achieve something by luck).

But being able to do what one is able to do is not at all what being omnipotent involves.

I can do what I can do. But that does not make me omnipotent, for what I can do is very little.

God can do what God can do. But what God can do is, well, anything, as he's omnipotent.

Can God give up his omnipotence? Yes.

Can God give up his omnipotence and make it true at the same time that he has not given up his omnipotence? That is, can God make it true that he is omnipotent and that he is not omnipotent at once? Yep. Hard to make sense of that ability, admittedly - indeed, by its very nature we're not able to do so, for the tool we use to make sense of things is our reason, and our reason tells us in no uncertain terms that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. But that's just God telling us that. And God doesn't have to tell us it. He could tell us that if a proposition is true, then it is also false. And upon doing so, it would make sense to us that this is the case, for our sense-making mechanism would tell us it made sense. Or at least, it would if it worked, as it does in my case, but probably wouldn't in yours, as your reason is not tracking Reason herself at all well.

No, it is not clear what it means. There's a big debate about it. One could interpret it to mean that God exists 'outside' of time - and that this is what existing 'eternally' means. Or one could interpret to mean that God exists in time and at all times. That's a temporalist understanding of the term. And nothing stops one mixing both - indeed, that is what I am doing. Nothing makes God exist in time, for God could have chosen not to create time, in which case he would have existed and time would not. Thus, the idea of God existing outside of time is a perfectly coherent one.
But time exists, for God thinks. And so God is in time, but does not have to be.

One can create something and then be in it. If I knit a jersey, I created the jersey. And if I then envelope myself in it, I am in what I created.

So, God is in time, for God created time and his creating it placed himself in it, for about his own thoughts he is either having the past sensation, the future sensation, or neither (in which case his own thoughts are either past, future, or present respectively). But God does not have to be in time.

God being omniscient is the opposite of us being limited in knowledge. — SpaceDweller

I don't see this. Being 'omniscient' means being in possession of all knowledge - that is, to have beliefs in the truth of all justified true propositions. We - most of us - are in possession of some justified true beliefs. So we are not unknowing, we just do not have all knowledge.

If we are limited in knowledge (compare to God's knowledge) we can conclude the knowledge of God is unlimited or infinite. — SpaceDweller

I do not see how that follows. Consider: God is all powerful. Thus, he can do anything. And that means that, if he so chooses, he could furnish us with everything he knows.

I do not understand what 'infinite' knowledge means - there is not an actual infinity of known propositions. At any one time, there will be a finite amount. God beliefs in all of them - indeed, it is due to him that they qualify as knowledge in the first place - but the point is that God's knowledge is not 'infinite' in any meaningful sense of that term.

My point here is I see no problem with assigning infinite property to God compared to finite one. (God is not God if limited) — SpaceDweller

I see a big problem, namely that it conflicts with what God himself tells us (via our reason), which is that there are no actual infinities in reality. Note, if God had infinite knowledge, then he could become ignorant of half of what he believes and would still have infinite knowledge - which seems incoherent. That is, our reason tells us that this is not so.

God and time are therefore infinite in every aspect, however obvious is, while God is omnipotent this does not apply to time. — SpaceDweller

And this just ignores the arguments I gave that appear to demonstrate the precise opposite.

Time is not infinite. What does that mean? That there is an actual infinity of past events? That makes no sense - for half infinity is still infinity.

Time has a beginning. A believer in God is duty bound to believe this on pain of rational incoherence. God is all powerful by definition. And that alone tells us, if we just reflect on it for a moment, that God created time. And thus time had a beginning.

But we can go in the other direction as well: if time did not have a beginning, then one would have to posit an actual infinity of past events. But again, there can be no actual infinity of anything and to suppose otherwise is to affirm absurdities. Thus, as there are no actual infinities in reality, there is not an infinity of past events. If there is a finite number of past events, then time had a beginning.

So, reflection on God reveals time had a beginning; and reflection on time reveals time had a beginning.

Changeless = Time doesn't exist. — TheMadFool

But that's false, as I argued in the OP. If time exists, then an event will change in its temporal properties. So change cannot require time, but is instead something time requires.

If, as I have argued, God created time, then it is God who changes his temporal sensations about an event and, in so doing, brings it about that the event goes from being future, to being present, to being past.

oo, yes, I see now. Truly i am blessed to be receiving such treasures from your insight bowels, and for free too.
Yes, I remember now when you established that tax was fair and did so without any assistance from reason whatever. Truly you are a fine philosopher

You are correct. Again, you excrete knowledge on me.

Address the issue. If you want a bike and don't have one but I do, are you entitled to take mine?

oo thank you, Pue, for those wisdomous words. I am learning good.

Yes, I can see that I have a lot to learn from you. Teach me more!!! Tell me, Peu, can you steal something off no one?

But the argument I have given- the second one, also outlined in my reply - seems to demonstrate that time is made of the temporal sensations of God. So, time itself is made of some of God's experiences. Time is some sensational activity on God's part. Hence how it can be the case that he created it: he is the originator and controller of his own sensations.

One difference, then, between God's temporal experiences and ours, is that his constitute time, whereas ours are 'of' time. However, this difference, though great, would not amount to an experiential difference, but rather a difference in their metaphysical status. For an analogy, looking at a superb fake of the mona lisa and looking at the actual mona lisa may be experiential indistinct. However, there remains a significant difference - in one case I am looking at a Leonardo, in the other I am not.

I don't see how there can be a total difference experientially between God's temporal sensations and ours, for if there were such a radical difference, our sensations wouldn't be 'of' time at all,but something quite different.

I am not entirely sure what it means to say God is eternal. If it means that God exists for all time, then yes - for if time is made of God's sensations, then those sensations will depend on God to exist and thus God will exist for all time. In that sense, God is eternal and is eternal by don't of being time's creator and sustainer

Did you?

You can't answer a question with a question. Stop being tedious and answer the question. We both know what the answer is.

To address the OP, my proposal - as an alternative to taxation and that is also, so far as I can tell, entirely just as it violates no one's rights - is that the state could simply print money. That is, the state could pay for itself by printing more cash.
It would create inflation, but how does that violate anyone's rights? I don't have a right to money retaining its value and nor does anyone else. So it seems to me that while taxing us to pay for the state is unjust, there would be no injustice in the state printing money to pay for itself.

Er, so you think you are entitled to steal the hermit's turnips. Okaaay.