The correct solution is non-descriptivism, which can still be cognitivist in its moral semantics, and naturalist in its ontology, while dodging the problems of all three of the above. — Pfhorrest

On such a view, who or what is the source of the prescriptions? It is not clear to me, as it stands, exactly what the view is.

You're talking about the content of morality, not its nature. That is, you're engaging in a matter that is the concern of normative inquiry, not metaethical inquiry.

Ethics dictate — SteveMinjares

Focus on this: the fact that ethics is about dictates, among other things.

Naturalism is the view that the objective natural world can dictate to us. Which is insane.

Non-naturalism is the view that non-natural Platonic Forms can dictate to us. Which is equally insane.

Agree?

Oh I see. So it wasn’t “Most philosophers agree to it therefore it’s true”. It was “Most philosophers agree to it therefore it’s a widely felt intuition, therefore it’s true” — khaled

Once more you demonstrate your inability properly to understand the English language.

No, of course they're not valid. And you didn't know that, did you?

and quite misguided — Banno

Oh, and you know your stuff do you? Based on your deep understanding of contemporary metaethics, you think what I wrote was misguided? Okaaaay.

May sound cliche but...

“There is no such thing as stupid just the unasked question.” — SteveMinjares

No, there is clearly such a thing as stupid (though it is not a thing, but a property of a thing). For instance, see anything posted by 180Proof. Or, indeed, the claim that there is no such thing as stupid.

Ethics is not universal so the code you create to define it constantly needs to be tested by circumstance to validate it to be righteous. — SteveMinjares

It is universal. And metaethical theories are not theories about the content of morality, but about what morality itself is.

Well, I doubt very much you possess the subtlety of mind needed to understand what I am about to say, but here goes.

The rational intuitions of philosophers are more reliable than those of others, or at least it is reasonable to suppose them to be. Why? Because they can grasp difficult concepts and understand thought experiments and not get distracted by irrelevancies.

Now you took the quotes out of context. When I pointed out that the bulk of philosophers have agreed that we have free will, that was not in itself evidence that we have free will, as the context made clear. (I mean, I said that explicitly). What that broad consensus was evidence of is the fact that the intuition that we are morally responsible for what we do is stronger than any rational intuition we may have about the compatibility or otherwise of free will with determinism. So, that wasn't doing philosophy by consensus. That was noting that a consensus was evidence for something, namely how powerful and widely felt a given intuition is. And those widely shared powerful intuitions were then in turn powerful evidence that a given premise in my case was true.

Similarly, most philosophers agree that one of the marks of a moral norm is that they have categoricity. That is evidence that the reason of those who are exceptionally good at attending to their reason - represents moral norms to be categorical. And that, in turn, is good prima facie evidence that this is indeed a feature of moral norms.

Now, do you have anything at all philosophical to say about anything argued in the OP?

Yep. More than once. But I don't hold grudges. — Isaac

Thought so. And you sound like grudge central to me.

Then I'll ask again. Are metaethicists not professional philosophers? Or do you have some definition of idiocy that does not exclude being an expert reasoner? — Isaac

Yes, some professional philosophers are metaethicists. And if this discussion was among professional philosophers it would not be at all like it is. There can be degrees of stupidity, you see. And stupidity can manifest itself in different ways.

I imagine you haven't read much contemporary metaethics, if any? If you understood my case and then read the literature, you'd recognise just how stupid most contemporary metaethicists are, despite their works being very sophisticated exercises in reasoning.

It takes great skill to defend a stupid view. And that's what the vast bulk of contemporary metaethicists do. They defend stupid views very cleverly. There are roughly three stupid alternatives to divine command theory: expressivism, naturalism and non-naturalism. They're incredibly stupid views. But they're approximately equally stupid. And most contemporary philosophers won't touch divine command theory with a barge pole, because they were told as undergrads that it is false because of 'Euthyphro' and so never think to revisit it. That, combined with the fact that most are hacks who are not really interested in what's true, but interested in showcasing their cleverness - which is precisely what the contemporary debate, dominated as it is by discussion of idiotic views - allows them to do.

See?

By ratiocination. And yes, I have read such books. Is this going anywhere?

Yes, I think that most professional philosophers would find the arguments I made in the op pretty interesting. But I have not said anywhere that I think they'd all agree they go through.

My mind has my thoughts.

If it does, then the fact that virtually every professional philosopher that's ever lived disagrees with you should give adequate cause to assume you're wrong (at least about the clarity of your argument). — Isaac

You're quite a crude thinker, aren't you? You don't do philosophy by consensus. You assess a position based on the evidence.

I think God exists. I don't think God is a figment of my imagination at all. My imagination has not been involved at all. So I still don't know what you're talking about.

Has a professional philosopher annoyed you or been mean to you or something? Professional philosophers are expert reasoners.

If philosophers have some special capabilities in reason then you should take seriously that fact that virtually all of them disagree with your conclusion. — Isaac

They're ignorant of the argument I have presented. Do you think they'd disagree with any of the premises? If so, which one?

I still do not understand your point.

Do you think the argument is valid? Do you have anything philosophical to contribute, or are you also another budding therapist who wishes to express their conviction that I need some?

I don't need therapy to reason like you do. I need a head injury.

You have not shown how my case is "bullshit" (incidentally, you don't know what bullshit is either - it has now become a technical term in philosophy since Harry Frankfurt published a book on the subject). You have simply ignored it or failed to recognize it. But oh well.

Also this is clearly begging the question. You’re asked to prove that your views do not lead to everything being permissible. It’s not clear at all that they don’t. So yes, the question is in fact whether this is so, according to your views. — khaled

You don't know what 'begging the question' means, clearly.

Look, I have already explained why 'X is just' does not mean "X is permitted" or "X is wrong" or "X is right". I have given examples illustrating this. This is pointless, like I say.

What?

If you say so. — Sir2u

No, if 'you' say so. If you can't see that it is deductively valid, then you're below the threshold level of intelligence needed to understand the proof. And you are. Clearly.

Actually, I think that the correct way to right it would have been.
1. All A are B
2. All B are C

But maybe you took a skip day when they had that class. — Sir2u

Er, no. It's all As are Bs.

About as deductively valid as my answer. Unless you want to draw the Venn diagram to prove it. — Sir2u

Like I say, I'd be more worth my while explaining it to my cat.

Let that be my problem. I'm an extremely fast typist.

He made a thread about it but don’t bother. The “proof” was complete nonsense. — khaled

Dunning and Kruger. Your expertise?

And they’re fallacious. But this is not the thread for that — khaled

No they're not.

Which is dodging the question. What was being asked is not what’s permitted (whatever that means) or not but what’s wrong or right. You’ve shown that acting immorally is not what God expects of you. But so what? Doesn’t make it wrong. That’s my point. In your paradigm, nothing anyone ever did was wrong. Just some of it was closer to what God wanted and some was further. But that’s not the same things as being wrong ethically. You’ve completely dodged the critique. — khaled

Yeah, now I don't have the first idea what you're on about. I explained why even if everything that occurs here is just, that does not mean that everything is permitted. It is consistent with everything that happens here being just, that some acts are right and others wrong.

The fact that doing X would bring about a just state of affairs, does not entail that it is right to do X.

Thus, even if, no matter what we do, our actions will bring about just states of affairs, it does not follow that, no matter what we do, we do right (or wrong, or what is permissible).

But anyway, this is now above your intellectual paygrade and things are going to get very silly very fast methinks.

You want me to prove God? Well, I don't think you're up to understanding it. So, a little test first before I waste finger-taps giving it to you. Is this argument deductively valid:

1. All As are Bs
2. All Bs are Cs
3. Therefore all As are Cs
4. All As have a D
5. All As have an E
6. Therefore all As are Cs that have a D and an E
7. Some As exist
8. Therefore, some Cs that have a D and an E exist

I think God would not disvalue or hate anything. — James Riley

You're doing things the wrong way around. Moral goodness and badness exist. Moral goodness and badness are valuings and disvaluings of things. Valuings and disvaluings are attitudes a mind is adopting towards things. Therefore, moral goodness and badness are made of the attitudes a mind is adopting towards things. If you don't want to call it God, that's fine. What's in a name?

But the mind whose values constitute moral values would also be the mind whose attitudes consititute the norms of Reason more generally, and thus would be Reason. And that mind would also, by dint of that fact, be omnipotent and omniscient.

So the mind whose attitudes towards things constitute moral values and disvalues is a mind who is demonstrably omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. If you have just decided in advance of inspecting the world carefully that any omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent mind that may exist in it would not disvalue anything, then all you have done is made yourself blind to any evidence to the contrary.

Universal Penentheism would have a God over gods. Compare: Universal Pantheism allows for all Gods and if any one wants to be top dog, okay. My lay understanding of physics dictates that it's all true, and not, at the same time (and not) and that is what brings me to Pantheism over Panentheism. — James Riley

Well, like I say, the argument I have given demonstrates that view to be mistaken. Morality is made of the prescriptions and attitudes of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent mind, that is what the argument - so, the evidence - seems to show. And that sounds inconsistent with pantheism as you have described it. Thus pantheism is false.

That's me, the birth disposition part. A — James Riley

Yep. Thought so.

And, by definition, it would not be besides the point. — James Riley

Yes. It. Is.

Here's my analysis of strawberry jam. strawberry jam is made of reduced strawberries and sugar.

Here's your point: "we are born with an inbuild disposition to like strawberry jam".

Er, even if that's true, it doesn't challenge anything - anything - in my analysis.

My analysis of morality: morality is made of the prescriptions and attitudes of God.

You: we have an inbuilt disposition to sense and believe in moral prescriptions and values.

Er, that doesn't contradict anything in my analysis. You might as well respond "It is raining". It's just irrelevant. I'm talking about morality, you're talking about dispositions to believe and sense it. Different. Things.

It only exists independent of bad in the relative perspective of those who are just trying to sound deep and hope that combination of sounds might do the trick. — James Riley

Once more, no. I have trouble understanding how anyone can reason like this - I mean, how on earth do you reach that conclusion? It's borderline madness.

Apply it to strawberry Jam. Here's our conversation:

Me: strawberry jam is made of reduced strawberries and sugar.

You: we are born with an inbuild disposition to detect and enjoy strawberry jam. Therefore strawberry jam is relative.

Me: er, so? What's that got to do with what I said? And how does it imply that strawberry jam is relative?

You: some gibberish

Again, just a series of non sequiturs. I have literally no idea why you think the compatibility of antinatalism and God should depend on whether God could exist absent us.
But God can quite obviously exist absent us anyway. I mean, why would one think otherwise?

It is easy to prove God exists.

But your reasoning is bizarre. I explained why God's existence is compatible with antinatalism. Omnipotence does not essentially involve having created everything. That's my case for their compatibility: it has to do with what omnipotence involves.

But you have suggested, on no basis whatsoever, that whether God's existence is compatible with antinatalism has something to do with whether or not God would exist absent mankind. Why do you think that has anything to do with it?

What the hell are you asking?

Is there a case where that which is deemed good has been made so via a confrontation with that which is bad? And if so, doesn't that make bad good? And wouldn't good and bad then be relative? — James Riley

I am talking about what moral goodness and badness are, in themselves. And the conceptual truth (which doesn't really get us anywhere by itself, but just clarifies what we're talking about) is that for something to be morally good is for it be valuable, and for something to be morally bad is for it be disvaluable. And what it is for something to be valuable is for it be being valued, and similarly for something to be morally bad is for it to be being disvalued. As valuing is something minds alone do, having moral value involves being valued by a mind (the mind of God, it turns out).

So your question seems to be whether God could value something because he dis-values it. Well, I suppose it is psychologically possible for a mind to do that. One can value something and dis-value one's valuing of it. One can love hating something, or hate loving something, for instance. And so I suppose it it possible to love something because one also hates it.

However, if one hates something because one loves it, then one's attitudes express a degree of self-loathing. And I think we can safely assume that God does not loathe himself, as that would be to manifest some kind of internal disharmony and it is hard to see why an omnipotent being would put up with being like that.

So, we can, I think, safely assume that where moral value is concerned, if something is morally valuable it is not morally valuable 'because' it is also morally disvaluable. But I haven't thought about it enough to be sure. (And I am not sure why you think it implies relativism....I mean, I think moral relativism is true, but I don't see why 'this' implies it).

That reminds me of a discussion in the other thread about "law is law" and the issue of "Natural Law." Some understandings we have about good and bad seem to be innate to our being. Sure, we have our aberrations, but generally speaking, we know better. As a universal pantheist (as opposed to universal panentheist) I've got not problem with calling it "God." — James Riley

I am not sure what universal pantheism is, but unless it is another label for my view, it is refuted by the case I have given.

Those who talk about things being 'innate to our being' are saying nothing clear. What do they mean? When one tries to pin them down one invariably finds that they either mean nothing at all - they were just trying to sound deep and hoped that combination of sounds might do the trick - or they mean simply that we are born with a disposition to believe or sense certain acts to be right/wrong or good/bad. Which may be true, but is beside the point when the issue is what the rightness/wrongness or goodness/badness 'is'.

Er, so?

You do not have to have any view about life's purpose for that to be wicked.
— Bartricks

False. For one, one could justify such an act by noting that NOT bringing in those people also comes with risks. In other words, since you’re supposed to act as if people are innocent (even if they’re not), then you also recognize that not having a child can cause harm, and so both alternatives are risky, and a cost benefit analysis is needed. — khaled

No, on the supposition that people are innocent, then the standard arguments for antinatalism now apply (we do not need to rehearse them here, as this isn't really about them). If procreation creates new people, then it would be wrong. And if it transfers people from elsewhere, then our ignorance of what conditions 'elsewhere' are like means we are not entitled to assume they are better or worse than here, in which case it would be wrong to force the transfer. Furthermore, on the assumption that God exists we can safely assume that 'elsewhere' is considerably better than here, perfect indeed. For God would not have placed innocent people anywhere else (and so on the supposition that offspring are innocent and God exists, we would be transferring innocent people from God's company into our own....which is wrong).

Thus no matter what you do, it was just. That’s an inescapable conclusion. So the prisoners are never wrong in what they do. Although they may not be living up to God’s expectations of them, they’re never unjust. Despicable? Obnoxious? Maybe. But did they do anything wrong? No. — khaled

Well, you've reasoned exactly as I said you would. Yes, everything that happens here is just. But that doesn't imply that all is permitted. I am not going to just repeat what I said again. I explained why that simply did not follow at all. But whatever.

You’d be holding contradictory views. That antinatalism is true although a triple Omni God exists. — khaled

No I wouldn't, for reasons already explained. Antinatalism is not the view that all acts of procreation are wrong, but that they are wrong in standard circumstances. Thus, it is consistent with being an antinatalist to admit that some acts of procreation are morally permissible or even obligatory.

Yes it is. Generally people refer to “hard antinatalism” when they say “antinatalism”. Otherwise everyone is an antinatalist. Because everyone thinks that procreation is wrong sometimes. Which is the same as thinking it’s wrong generally but with a lot of exceptions. There is no hard line here. — khaled

No, 'antinatalism' is the view that procreation is wrong in standard circumstances; default wrong, etc (it's a family of views). That doesn't make 'everyone' an antinatalist. Christ! That's as thick as insisting that being able to speak French involves knowing every damn French word for everything, and then when having the stupidity of that view pointed out to you replying 'well, if you don't have to know every single word, then everyone can speak french because everyone knows some French words". Who is the most famous contemporary antinatalist? David Benatar. And what's his view? Is his view that all acts of procreation are wrong? (No). Try reading the actual literature and not wikipedia entries.

If you are transferred from a worse prison to a better one, you're still in prison.

You are correct. You won't see me again in this thread. — Manuel

Good. Go randomly blurt elsewhere.

I think most people would say “you thought you did something wrong when you didn’t”. — khaled

Potato potarto. It doesn't affect the point. It seems clear enough that our blameworthiness is determined by what we think we are doing, not what we are actually doing (not saying that has to be the case, just that it in fact seems to be). If I attempt to kill Mrs Jones by giving her substance x - a substance I think will kill her - but it turns out that substance x is in fact the very substance she needs in her system to stop her from dying - I am still in the wrong and blameworthy even though my act saved Mrs Jones's life. We can say that 'an' act of administering substance x to Mrs Jones would be right under certain circumstances (such as ones in which an agent knew that doing this to Mrs Jones would save her life). But my act was wrong, because my act can't be divorced from the intentions with which it was performed.

So, let's just be clear about most people. Most people are fully aware of how dangerous this world is and how much ignorance it contains. And most people believe that anyone they bring into being here will be born innocent. Yet they do it anyway. Now that's wicked. You do not have to have any view about life's purpose for that to be wicked. It is sufficient that one believes one is bringing innocent beings into this world, a world one is aware is dangerous and full of ignorance. The fact that, in reality, those who are brought into being here are not innocent and deserve everything they get is neither here nor there.

What about those who believe that God exists; that none of us have been created; that this world is a prison, and that everyone who comes here deserves to come here (and have arrived at this belief responsibly)? Let's first be clear how many people satisfy that set of criteria. Me. I think that's it. Just me. Is it morally ok for me to procreate, given my beliefs?

No, I don't think so. First, consider that I think everything that happens here is just. This is a prison, and we deserve to face the risks of harm we face, and we deserve our ignorance. That conclusion is, I think, inescapable, for reasons already given. So that means that no matter what I do to someone else, that person deserves it, and no matter what anyone does to me, I deserve it. Now by your logic, that means that here all is permitted - that I have no moral obligations, for no matter what I do to someone else, that someone will deserve what I do to them. That is what you'd conclude, yes? You'd think "well, if everything that happens here is deserved, then I can do what I want".

But that's clearly not the case. I - we - have moral obligations to behave in some ways and not others, even though it is not possible for us to treat others in ways they do not deserve.

Why? Note, the issue is not 'whether' this is so, for it so clearly is. The question is 'why' it should be. Why should we treat others 'as if' they are innocent, even if we believe, like Pangloss, that anything and everything that happens to anyone here is for the best?

Rehabilitation. A convicted murderer who undertakes to kill other convicted murderers is not fit to be released back into the community. They've missed the point of their imprisonment, which was not for them to punish others, for for them to be punished and to learn how to behave among those who are 'not' guilty of anything. (Why else does our reason tell us to assume others are innocent, not guilty; and to adopt an attitude of goodwill towards them?). And their behaviour is repellant. I mean, who the hell do they think they are? They are behaving 'as if' they have the moral authority of a judge and jury - that their job is to mete out justice. No, they absolutely do not have that authority and for them to think that they have it is, well, obnoxious. The people they're killing deserve to die; but their behaviour in killing them is no less obnoxious for that. Their job is not to mete out justice; their job is to do their time, understand how appalling they are, and undertake to change their ways. They are behaving 'as if' they themselves are innocent, when in fact their job is to learn how to behave towards the innocent.

Anyway, let's say I'm wrong about the above and someone who sincerely and responsibly believes that this world is a prison and procreation provides more cells for criminals is someone for whom procreation will not be wrong. So what? I mean, that just means it is morally ok for me to procreate. That's all. Antinatalism is not an absolutist position. Antinatalists do not typically hold that every conceivable act of procreation is wrong. Far from it: there will be lots of exceptions. They hold instead that procreation is in general wrong or wrong under regular circumstances. Now, most people do not believe this world is a prison and that their offspring are born criminals who deserve every risk of harm they face, do they?

Okay officer. I mean, you won't find a more forthright defender of their positions anywhere on this site or, indeed, the world. But okay officer, whatever you say (most of which I can't understand).

Shouldn't you be out chasing criminals?

I was asking why you thought the world was equivalent to a prison, as an a priori truth (independent of any theistic or non-theistic constraints) — Aryamoy Mitra

What?

Let's discount the interpersonal quarrels. — Aryamoy Mitra

What?

1 is once again not a rationale; it's a supposition - which you may have acknowledged to be a premise (I can't decipher so exactly). Why would suffering be absent without a purpose, if God was existent? It's not self-evident. It's only if you presuppose an omnibenevolent being, with a specific set of moral virtues - one of whom is ennoblement through suffering, that one can arrive at that conclusion. God, as a term, might be reductive here; that's one contention. — Aryamoy Mitra

What?

1, 2 and 3 are likely complementary to one another, if that matter is resolved. — Aryamoy Mitra

What?

1 is predicated (as conveyed earlier) on an idiosyncratic understanding of God, and his/her motives - if an anthropomorphism is even appropriate, for an entity that's presumably transcendental.
If that matter is resolved, the remainder of the propositional sequence is likely coherent. — Aryamoy Mitra

What?

If those premises are unfounded, and implicitly restated - then that may not be a disconfirmation of an argument, but it is nevertheless a reasonable criticism. — Aryamoy Mitra

What?

Wait. — Aryamoy Mitra

Ok.

If an objective is inefficiently realized, then why would an omnipotent entity refrain from intervening? And what does 'retribution' entail, precisely? If you're referring to a literal variant of retribution, shouldn't it imply an egalitarian result (equivalently imprisoning and tyrannizing everyone)? Isn't this inconsistent with how the world's organized socioeconomically, for instance? — Aryamoy Mitra

What?

If you've attempted to answer the cardinal question (why the world is a prison), then - from what I can infer, you've invoked a retributive objective as a means to doing so.

Firstly, that doesn't in the slightest encompass the whole of what a prison entails (insofar as life's not inescapable, insufferable or a retributive experience for all its agents). More disconcertingly, it implies that existence is an eternal punishment designated to non-innocent individuals by an omnibenevolent being (as you've vehemently iterated earlier, in this thread). — Aryamoy Mitra

What?

No, that's reductive. Your devised an arbitrary, archetypal representation of a God-like entity with specific characteristics, and asserted that it'd imply a negative value to procreative exercises in a world that was equivalent, in its totality, to a prison. You haven't thoroughly explicated why you believe the latter to be the case, nor have you successfully addressed the internal contradictions engendered by the paradigm. — Aryamoy Mitra

I apprehended the criminal as he was perambulating the repository.

So far as I can tell, what you were using that thicket of words to try and do was to ask was why, if God exists, would it be reasonable to conclude that this world is a prison.

Well, I explained why our lives here can safely be taken to serve some kind of a purpose if God exists. Because you don't know an argument from your elbow, here it is all nicely laid out:

1. If God exists, no ignorance or suffering would occur in a life without it serving some purpose
2. Our lives here contain much ignorance and suffering
3. Therefore, if God exists our lives here serve some purpose

I then argued that if God exists, we are not innocent.

1. If God exists, God would not suffer innocent people to live lives containing much ignorance and suffering
2. Our lives here contain much ignorance and suffering
3. Therefore, if God exists we are not innocent.

Those are 'arguments'. They extract the implications of their premises. So, if you want to take issue with a conclusion, you now know what you need to dispute - a premise. (Most fools here think it sufficient simply to point out that an argument 'has' premises - this, they think, constitutes a profound point and a refutation).

Anyway, we now know by ratiocination that if God exists we are not innocent and that our lives serve a purpose. Well, does that not already give us what we need in order to know what our purpose is? Those who are not innocent are those who deserve to come to harm. And here we are, we non-innocents, suffering ignorance and the risk of harm. Stands to reason, then, that one purpose that is served by our being here is a retributive one. Propose any other purpose, save the others I mentioned (protection and rehabilitation) and you face an age-old problem. That being that God, as an omnipotent being, could have realized such ends without suffering us to live here and furthermore can reasonably be expected to have done so.

For example, some propose that God's purpose in suffering us to live here was to allow us free will. But though it is plausible (though questionable) that allowing us free will does indeed mean allowing us the possibility of doing wrong, the simple fact is that the ignorance we suffer, and the vast bulk of the risks of harm we are exposed to here, seem to do no work whatever in allowing us free will, and so it is simply not overall plausible that this is what purpose this world serves.

The same goes for any other purpose. Namely, the purpose either seems inconsistent with being moral, or seems inefficiently realized in this world. Thus, retribution is left as the only plausible contender - extremely plausible given that we already know that our lives do have a purpose and that we are not innocent.

In the interests of keeping this thread on the rails, my first argument is that God and antinatalism are compatible.

Most theists believe that God created everything. But if antinatalism is true, then God did not create us - or at least, we seem to have very powerful reason to believe that God did not create us.

So, is God's existence consistent with there existing other things that he did not create? Well, I think so. Crucial to this question is what omnipotence involves. Does being all powerful involve having created everything?

I think not. I think it involves having the power to destroy anything and everything that exists. And it involves having the ability to make it the case that one created everything. But if one has those abilities, then it doesn't seem to me to add anything to say that one has actually created everything. How does actually having created everything add to one's powers? A special case that brings this out clearly, if it was not already clear enough, is that of God himself. God did not create himself. But that, surely, does not demonstrate that God is not omnipotent. God doesn't have to have created himself in order to be all powerful.

They aren't arguments, that are commensurate with your assertions. — Aryamoy Mitra

They 'are' arguments, it is just that you lack the comprehension skills to see this.

First I argued that God and antinatalism are compatible.

Then I argued that God's existence actually implies the truth of antinatalism.

But, like I say, you need to know what an argument is in order to recognise that I made arguments. Most believers in God think that procreation is moral. They're wrong. Most believers in God think that God created everything. They're wrong. Those are interesting claims and I have made arguments in support of them.

I'm certain that this encapsulates the temperamental overtones mediating this thread; and yes, that is deliberately facetious. — Aryamoy Mitra

Stop trying to sound clever. You just sound like a policeman.

Having said that, I think telling people they should not have babies does not make much sense. Each person has his or her own reasons. They should consider the pros and cons of having a baby. But the focus on pain avoidance is too narrow, in my view. — Manuel

Again, relevance? Did you read the OP? Nothing you've said there addresses anything in it. I think you have literally just seen the word 'antinatalism' in the title and then blurted what you blurted. Bizarre.

But for anyone that has done these reflections, they would soon find that everyone here and everyone they bring here is not innocent. So I’m confused as to why you’re an antinatalist then. — khaled

Why are you confused? I explained! Here:

What if one does believe this world is a prison and that by procreating one is providing God with accommodation for other convicts (and one has arrived at this conclusion responsibly - that is, by carefully reasoning to the conclusion in the same manner I have done)? Well, that alters the moral quality of one's actions, but it remains wrong, I think, however the vice it displays would be presumptuousness, not wickedness. For God, being omnipotent, does not need anyone else's help providing accommodation; your job is just to do your time and mend your ways, not get involved in the administrative side of things. It is to set oneself up as a vigilante. — Bartricks

Then you say

Most people THINK they’re doing something wrong but by your standard they’re actually not. — khaled

Er, no. Baby steps. They are doing wrong. Not right. Wrong. Wrong. Wrongy wrongingtons.

Just because a state of affairs is good, does not mean that the acts that bring it about are right.

Again with my example: I did wrong to Jeremy, yes? But Jeremy deserved what he got. That doesn't mean what I did was right. It was wrong. But Jeremy got what he deserved. But my act was wrong, not right. But Jeremy got what he deserved. But the act that gave him what he deserved was wrong. (I'm imagining you've glazed over by now).

Well then why did he make it such that people CAN procreate in the first place? Him being omnipotent could’ve made it otherwise. Why is he giving us criminals the ability to bring in more people? — khaled

Why wouldn't he? No harm is done. They, by procreating, make themselves deserving of another lifetime in the prison. Good - that's what they deserve - and further accommodation is provided for other criminals (two birds, one stone). And those who listen to reason and decide instead either not to bring what they suppose to be innocent people into an ignorant and dangerous world, or - realizing this is a prison and that everyone here is getting what they deserve - decide not to be presumptuous and set themselves up as a vigilante but instead decide humbly to take their licks - will no doubt do well at their parole hearing, for they will have freely shown themselves not to be a self-indulgent busy-body git.

Relevance? I do not understand what you are saying. Friend or foe - I do not know