See how in the reply to Khaled he fails to address the criticism that if the world is a prison then its creator is an evil bastard — Banno

He didn't say that. He said this:

EITHER, an omnipotent omnibenevolent God exists and so everyone here, and everyone you bring here, must be a sinner (because God wouldn't have suffered innocent people exist here, your own words) in which case having children is fine (you're just putting criminals in jail). OR people here (or at least people you bring here) are innocent and God allows procreation in which case he is either not omnibenevolent/not omnipotent/not omniscient or a combination (if antinatalism is true, he either can’t stop people from having kids even though it’s wrong, can stop them but chooses not to, or doesn’t know that people are having kids). Or having kids is fine (if you want to keep the 3 omnis) — khaled

And I addressed that. Bertrand Russell said "never trust a stupid man's report of what a clever man has said". Seems we can add 'or a stupid man's report of what a stupid man has said" too.

Anything can be construed to be rational, if you commence with an unfounded presupposition. — Aryamoy Mitra

What? So, I make an argument - two arguments, in fact - and your response is to dismiss the entire project of using reasoned argument to find out about the world. Excellent. What you actually mean is that you want to believe whatever the hell you want and if anyone dares to use reason to arrive at a different view, then reasoned argument is to be dismissed.

Argue something.

↪Bartricks
But it also stands to reason that God would not have allowed innocent creatures to live in ignorance in a dangerous world.
— Bartricks

If this is true then this is false:

if you try and procreate you are actively trying to bring an innocent person into the prison to join you
— Bartricks

You can't have both. — khaled

Yes I can. You seem to be overlooking an obvious distinction: what's actually the case and what people believe to be the case.

This world is a prison, whether you believe it is or not. But most people don't think it is, because they haven't gone through the reflections above, yes? So most people think anyone they bring into being here, is innocent. So, as far as they are concerned, they made an ignorant innocent person join them in a world they knew was full of dangers. Wicked.

An analogy: Jeremy plans on punching me, but I have no idea about that. I think Jeremy is just some chap. Nevertheless, I don't like the look of him, so I punch him. That was wrong of me. I am a wicked person for doing such a thing. Even though, as it happens, what I did thwarted an unjust attack on myself and resulted in Jeremy receiving what he deserved.

What if one does believe this world is a prison and that by procreating one is providing God with accommodation for other convicts (and one has arrived at this conclusion responsibly - that is, by carefully reasoning to the conclusion in the same manner I have done)? Well, that alters the moral quality of one's actions, but it remains wrong, I think, however the vice it displays would be presumptuousness, not wickedness. For God, being omnipotent, does not need anyone else's help providing accommodation; your job is just to do your time and mend your ways, not get involved in the administrative side of things. It is to set oneself up as a vigilante.

It's much more likely that something is wrong with you than that something is wrong with everyone. — khaled

No, because I am demonstrably arguing something whereas others are demonstrably not. See this thread for evidence.

Bartricks is a bully. He likes to push people around to try to intimidate and humiliate them. That's what passes for rational argument with him. — T Clark

Ad hominem. Blub, blub, blub. Try and argue something. Notice the arguments I have made. Then try and address them.

Hmm. If there is something wrong with everyone you look at, perhaps you are looking in the wrong direction... — Banno

Are you George Bush?

Well you know what they say about psychologists.

Er no. You can't challenge it.

Did you actually read the OP?
What is wrong with you people? Rather than address the actual arguments you just decide the arguer is a misanthrope. Er, I'm not. I just follow arguments where they lead and don't pathetically decide that what's true is what i want to be. Now stop the ad hominems and try - try - and engage with the arguments if you can. Sheesh.

Okay, if you can't take it. Man has a view you can't accept, therefore that man needs counselling. The arrogance is breathtaking. Unhinged, one might say.

Ad hominem again. Are you a psychologist?

Yes, God would obviously still exist if we all stopped procreating. Why on earth would you think otherwise? And what is your 'yes' an answer to??

Ad hominem. Do you have a criticism of the argument or can you not face arguments for conclusions that you dislike?

no, you asked me a question and I answered it with an argument you cannot challenge.

How do you get from antinatalism to pro-mortalism (the view that we ought to kill ourselves) 'without' attributing to the antinatalist a really stupid moral theory?

This seems to be how some of you are reasoning. It goes like this:

"Dur, here's a really stupid moral theory - utilitarianism - and applying it consistently implies both that we ought not procreate (antinatalism) and that we ought to kill ourselves (pro-mortalism). Therefore any case for antinatalism will also imply pro-moratalism."

It's just ridiculous. Most antinatalists are not straight utilitarians. Why? Because utilitarianism is a stupid theory. That you can reach the antinatalist conclusion via utilitarianism does not mean that antinatalists are utilitarians. I mean, here's another stupid theory about morality: any act beginning with 'p' is wrong and any act beginning with 's' is obligatory. That also gets one to the antinatalist conclusion because 'procreating' begins with 'p', and to pro-mortalism as well, because 'suicide' begins with 's'.

Yes, but the question of who wrote it cannot be ignored. Your claim is that God wrote it. So, where is it written and how do you know God wrote it? — Fooloso4

Because the signs constitutive of moral norms need to have a writer if they are truly to be signs and not just 'apparent' signs.

The signs constitutive of moral norms do not have me or you as their author (for it is manifest to reason that if I order X to be done, that does not making Xing right; and likewise for you).

Thus the mind whose prescriptions to us are moral prescriptions is a mind other than any one of ours.

Moral prescriptions are just a subset of the prescriptions of Reason.

Thus, the prescriber whose prescriptions are moral prescriptions is a prescriber whose prescriptions constitute the prescriptions of Reason. The mind is therefore Reason.

As Reason is not bound by her own prescriptions, she can do anything. For what is or is not possible is in her gift. Thus with her all things are possible.

She is also the arbiter of knowledge, for 'to know' something is for there to be a reason for you to believe it, and having a reason to believe something is a matter of her wanting you to believe it or a matter of her approving of how you have come to believe it. And so she is omniscient as knowledge is constitutively determined by her attitudes.

She is also going to be morally perfect, for by hypothesis being morally perfect involves being fully approved of by Reason. And she is going fully to approve of herself as she is omnipotent and so if she disapproved of any aspect of herself she could just change herself so as to bring herself into line with her attitudes.

Thus, the mind whose prescriptions constitute moral prescriptions is a mind who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. That is, she is God.

I do not see your point.

A sign, to be a sign, needs a sign writer, yes?

"Keep out" is not a sign expressing someone's desire that I stay out unless someone wrote that sign.

Moral norms are no trespass signs. They need a sign writer.

You are making an unrelated point, namely that sometimes the signs seem to contradict.

So what? Does that imply signs don't need a sign writer? How? How on earth does that follow?

Does it imply that I wrote the signs? Er, no. How on earth does it imply that?

So I don't know what relevant point you are trying to make. You just seem to be reasoning very badly. I mean, are you seriously saying that if you are walking in the woods and you come across two signs next to one another and apparently painted by the same hand, one saying "stay out" and the other "welcome" you would conclude "well, I must have written those myself"?!? That is just bonkers.

No. By that logic one could do anything to someone without their consent on the grounds that if they don't like it they can always kill themselves.
Plus the option is far from always available.

Is it wrong to slip someone 5 dollars? Well, normally yes. I mean imagine you wake up and find five dollars on your bedside table. I sneaked in at night and left it there for you. Was that ok? No.

What if I've got a suitcase with 2 million dollars in it . It is heavy and I am on the top of a very tall building. Nevertheless I want to share my wealth and I am in a hurry, so I decide just to throw it off the building and onto the busy street below. I know that it'll injure - possibly very seriously - whomever it strikes. But what the hell - they'll be 2million dollars up on the deal, so they can't complain, right? No, they can complain and throwing the suitcase off was wrong.

Your questions don't make much sense to me.
Imagine I come across a freshly painted sign that says "keep out". I conclude that someone doesn't want me to go any further. Analogous questions would be "are you claiming to know the mind of the signwriter or simply the signs given to us?" (Well, I know 'something' about the mind of the signwriter from the sign). And then your next question would be "how do you know that whichever sign you choose are by the sign writer and not your own?" Well, I appear to have come across the sign, not created it myself.

I do not see your point. I said most contemporary metaethicists are stupid, I didn't say most contemporary philosophers are stupid or that people who are not contemporary metaethicists are less stupid.

Well, I think most contemporary metaethicists are very stupid. They either think that the natural world somehow wants us to do things, or they think Platonic forms do. They're idiots, or insane, or they are hacks.

Yes, I know it is impossible to get their consent. That doesn't mean you can do without it.

Let's say I like coercing other people. Well, the nature of coercion is such that one cannot consent to be coerced. So, if I want to coerce you, I can't get your prior consent. Does that imply that it is morally okay to coerce people? Er, no. The opposite. Coercion is default wrong precisely because it can't be consented to (a point Kant made much of).

You can't consent to be coerced. So it is default wrong to coerce you. You can't consent to be brought into being here. Therefore it is default wrong to bring you into being here.

The point of the agony case was to show that it is more important to prevent suffering than it is to preserve a species.

Humans cause vast amounts of suffering. It is more important to prevent that suffering than it is to preserve the species.

And the point of the example of everyone voluntarily deciding not to procreate was to show that a) there is no positive obligation to preserve the species and b) that it is more important not to impose significant things on people without their consent than it is to preserve the species.

As it is more important not to impose significant things on people without their consent than it is to preserve the species, and as procreation clearly involves imposing something significant on someone without their consent, it is more important not to procreate than it is to preserve the species.

I thought these points were obvious.

The end of the human species would not be a bad thing, and even if it was, that wouldn't justify procreating in order to prevent it.

The only people who think preserving the humans species is a good thing are, you know, humans. By any objective assessment, we are not a force for good in the world. We cause an obscene amount of suffering to other creatures. The idea that our absence from the world would be bad is laughable, as laughable as suggesting that the extinction of cancer would be bad.

Imagine that the only way to preserve the species, would involve creating humans who'll live in absolute agony for their entire lives. So, we can preserve the species, but the species would exist in agony thereafter. I think now even most prejudiced humans would agree that it would be better if the species went extinct. The brute continuation of the species doesn't really matter much, not compared the amount of suffering such lives create. More important to prevent suffering, then, than to preserve the species. As there's no reason to think our suffering matters more than the suffering of other creatures, and as even happy human lives cause masses of suffering to other creatures, it is better if we go extinct.

I think there's no reasonable way of avoiding that conclusion.

But anyway, even if the extinction of the human species would somehow be morally bad, that wouldn't automatically mean it is justifiable to procreate to prevent it. I mean, imagine no-one wants to procreate. Is it morally justifiable to force people to breed to prevent extinction? Surely not. So, it seems more important to respect another's autonomy than it does to preserve the species. Well, breeding itself violates another's autonomy - for those who are brought into existence here have been forced to live here by other people's breeding decisions.

So, imagine no one wants to procreate. And the species consequently goes extinct. Well, even in the unlikely event that this is a bad thing, no-one did anything wrong, did they? People just voluntarily decided not to breed. No-one was wronged. No injustice was done. The species went extinct. But that did not wrong anyone. We do not have obligations to the species, but to each other.

As to your cat, it is not aware of the possibility of any philosophical standpoints, so your point there is profoundly irrelevant. — Janus

Yes, that was the point. So pointing out that there are some who see no reason to believe things - such as my cat - was profoundly irrelevant.

The contradiction consists in saying there is no reason to believe anything, and yet I believe something, if the claim is that one should not believe anything without reason. — Janus

That's not a contradiction in the thesis, that's self-refutation. You're just saying what I said but putting different labels on things

It seems clear to me that the “they” he mentions is not merely a rhetorical device, but maybe I'm wrong. It really sounds like he's adressing an argument he read or heard about from other philosophers. — Amalac

Yes, but the argument he describes there seems as if it is the self-refutation argument, not the contradiction argument. And Hume's response to it seems confused - he seems simply to be noting that the sceptic is fated to have to appeal to reason to undermine reason's authority, but this is no more than to acknowledge the inevitability of self-refutation, not to answer the charge.

Sure, that applies to the person who believes normative skepticism is true, For a start, the very idea of normative skepticism is self-contradictory, because to hold such a position would be to believe that everyone must hold the same criteria for judgement as oneself, and this would obviously be, contradicting the thesis, a positive belief. — Janus

I do not know what you mean. Normative scepticism - that is, the view that there are no reasons to do or believe anything - is not self-contradictory. There is no contradiction contained in the idea. But it is self-refuting in that anyone who attempts to defend it will have to assume it is false. It is indefensible, then, as if a defence works, then it is not true (for if there is epistemic reason to believe normative scepticism is true, then there is no epistemic reason to believe normative scepticism is true).

But a person can be a radical skeptic on the more modest basis of finding no reason to believe anything. The two positions are not the same. — Janus

Not really sure what your point is. Yes, we can distinguish between not being aware of a reason to believe something and positively believing there is no reason to believe something. My cat, for instance, doesn't see any reason to believe anything. But it'd be odd to describe my cat as a sceptic.

Let's assume that normative scepticism - which I will stipulate is the view that there are no reasons to do or believe anything - is false. Well, if that's true, then someone who doesn't see reason to do or believe anything is just suffering from a kind of rational blindness. They don't represent a philosophical position anymore than a visually blind person does.

Maybe they were lying and fabricated the arguments. Personally, I don't see any reason for them to lie about that, but I'm open to that possibility. — Amalac

Don't philosophers do this all the time? Not lie, I mean. But anticipate a range of objections to their own view, and then refute them. However, many of the anticipated objections have not actually been made by anyone.

But I meant rather “self-contradictory”. Perhaps I should correct the title. — Amalac

I think that's a straw man though, as the view that there is no reason to believe anything clearly contains no contradiction.

What I mean is that the academic sceptic makes negatively dogmatic claims such as “No belief can be justified”, “We know nothing”, etc. whereas the phyrronian suspends judgement and doesn't make any claims, neither affirmative nor negative. — Amalac

What is the Phyrronian thesis, though? That there is as much reason to believe any given proposition as disbelieve it?

Yes, but this is tendentiously put: making it out to necessarily be a positive belief when it need not be. — Janus

No, it's just accurate. The person who believes that normative scepticism is true, must also believe that there is no reason to believe that normative scepticism is true, otherwise in what sense do they truly believe that normative scepticism is true? To believe that normative scepticism is true, is to believe that there is positively no reason to believe anything. So they believe that there is positively no reason to believe that there is no reason to believe anything. They're irrational then, right?

I have given a quote by Sextus Empiricus, as well as the Hume quote in the OP, that show that a significant number of philosophers in the past did claim that, and at present you may find that many people do claim that scepticism is selfcontradictory (not merely impossible to believe). If you don't believe me — Amalac

But who has made the argument you are addressing - so, the argument that radical scepticism contains a contradiction (as opposed to being self-refuting)? (I mean, Sextus and Hume are sceptics, right? So they are not the ones making the argument, they are simply addressing it - but that's not evidence that anyone has actually made it).

I get your point here, but some kinds of sceptics (phyrronian sceptics, as opposed to academic sceptics for example) would not put forward the argument as a proof that no argument can be proved, or claiming that we should believe that “there is no reason to believe anything”, rather they would mention it si that they could pit the arguments against the claim “there is reason to believe something” against those in favor of it, and then suggesting that we should suspend judgement as to whether or not there is reason to believe anything, since we seemingly have no way of knowing one way or the other in view of the apparent equipollence of each opposing argument. The practical choice between the two would then be a matter of taste, they may say. — Amalac

I do not really follow your meaning here. You accept, I take it, that the thesis that there are no reasons to do or believe anything is self-refuting?

All those points you mention will surely get us off topic, so I won't respond to them further, unless they are more directly related to the OP. — Amalac

Well, I suppose what I'm saying is that you're conflating 'self-refuting' with 'contains a contradiction'. When philosophers dismiss radical scepticism on the grounds that it is self refuting, they are not thereby asserting that the thesis contains a contradiction. Yet that's what you've taken them to be doing and then proceeded to address that straw man argument.

It seems clear enough that radical scepticism - which I will understand to be the view that there are no reasons to believe anything - contains no contradiction. So I do not believe that there are many philosophers who would claim otherwise.

The claim, rather, is that it is 'self refuting'. "It is raining, but nobody believes it is raining" is one such thesis. It contains no contradiction. But it is self-refuting, for to believe it is to render it false.

The same is true where "there is no reason to believe anything" is concerned. For someone who believes it must, if they are not confused about the nature of what they believe, understand that this means there is no reason to believe that there is no reason to believe anything. This person therefore believes something and at the same time believes that they have no reason to believe it.
As Hitchens put it once, "what we have no reason to believe, we can dismiss without reason" or something like that.
Well, that applies to normative scepticism. The normative sceptic believes there are no reasons to believe anything, including that there are no normative reasons to believe things. They are, then, irrational. Not that they'll care, of course.

It seems to me that you are arguing that there is no contradiction involved in the sceptical thesis and thus that the sceptical thesis is not self-refuting. (Unless I have misunderstood).

But although I accept that there is no contradiction involved in the thesis, I take it that a theory is 'self-refuting' when there would be a practical contradiction involved in believing it. So, for instance, "I do not exist" would be a self-refuting theory for anyone to hold, even though there is no contradiction involved in the thesis. If I hold it, I do exist. And "It is raining, but no one believes it is raining" would be another, as although it is possibly true - there seems nothing impossible about the scenario described - to believe it is to render it false.

The charge against radical scepticism is surely that it is self-refuting in this way. That is, it is not that the thesis describes an impossible scenario. Rather, it is that anyone who believes it is justified, is confused: for if it is indeed justified (as it could be), then it is false.

I suppose you might respond that this does not establish that radical scepticism is false, just that believing it is something we can never have epistemic reason to do. (For if it is true, then we have no epistemic reason to believe it; and if it is false, then we have no epistemic reason to believe it, because one can only have epistemic reason to believe a proposition if it is true).

However, I take one of Descartes' lessons to be that self-refuting positions are more certainly false than those that contain contradictions. For I know more certainly that I exist, than that the law of non-contradiction is true. And so when we have shown that it would be self-refuting to hold a particular view, we have established that to hold it would be to hold a false view.

The past. — counterpunch

Er, no.

The question you asked?! — counterpunch

Er, no.

I can explain where norms and values come from. The behavioural intellligence of hunter gatherer tribes - looking after each other to survive. Interestingly, it's why Nietzsche is wrong in his nihilism. He needn't have worried himself to death. Man in a state of nature could not have been an amoral, self serving brute - who was fooled by the weak. The human species could not have survived if primitive man were Nietzschian, and Jane Goodall et al., show that not even animals are animals! — counterpunch

No.

Why can't you explain where your supposed norms and values come from? — counterpunch

I did. A moral foundry outside Sheffield.

Bravo, only - my argument is more that morality is fundamentally a sense formed in the pre-intellectual, behaviourally intelligent ancestors of homo sapiens. — counterpunch

Oh, get a room already.

Where do norms and values come from? Do they grow on trees? Are they mined from deep in the earth? Do they fall from the sky when its very, very cloudy? — counterpunch

You know London? Where does it come from? Where does London come from?

That's called a confused question that only a very confused person would ask.

Here's another:

"where do moral norms and values come from?"

They're not projectiles or cars. They're prescriptions and attitudes. Anyway, pointless saying any of this isn't it? They come from a moral foundry outside Sheffield.

You really don't.

Yep, pointless debating with you. You're not addressing the issue, but you also won't be taught, so you know, tara.

You've got nothing to say, but you're not letting that stop you are you?

If you've got no argument to make, go away Rowena.

Go derail someone else's thread. And if you want to know what a Rowena is, put "Jam - Thick People" into youtube.

Like I say, no point in debating with Rowenas