Crudely, contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. Each one is very stupid. I mean, just obviously false. But they're approximately equally stupid, which means that there is a lot of debate over who has the most stupid view. But, like I say, they're all stupid. The naturalists and expressivists will agree that non-naturalism is bonkers. The naturalists and non-naturalists will agree that expressivism is bonkers. And the non-naturalists and the expressivists will agree that naturalism is bonkers. So my view that all three views are bonkers is very well supported by contemporary metaethicists! — Bartricks
May sound cliche but...
“There is no such thing as stupid just the unasked question.” — SteveMinjares
Ethics is not universal so the code you create to define it constantly needs to be tested by circumstance to validate it to be righteous. — SteveMinjares
Ethics is not universal... — SteveMinjares
It is universal. And metaethical theories are not theories about the content of morality, but about what morality itself is. — Bartricks
Ethics dictate — SteveMinjares
The correct solution is non-descriptivism, which can still be cognitivist in its moral semantics, and naturalist in its ontology, while dodging the problems of all three of the above. — Pfhorrest
I say 'objective' because no contemporary metaethicist would defend individual subjectivism about morality (because it's really, really stupid). — Bartricks
contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. — Bartricks
Ev'rybody's talking about
Bagism, Shagism, Dragism, Madism, Ragism, Tagism
This-ism, that-ism, is-m, is-m, is-m
On such a view, who or what is the source of the prescriptions? — Bartricks
It is not clear to me, as it stands, exactly what the view is. — Bartricks
Neat summation. — Banno
What are your objections to individual moral subjectivisim? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism.
— Bartricks
Naturalism and non-naturalism are the two main theories of moral realism, whereas the latter refers to a branch of non-descriptivism. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The person uttering the moral proposition is the one making a prescription. — Pfhorrest
it's not about what do moral claims mean to say, but when and why are they right to say so, when and why they are true. — Pfhorrest
it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X — Bartricks
So what is true is just that which seems to your to be true, but what is right cannot be that which seems to you to be right? — Isaac
Naturalism is the view that the objective natural world can dictate to us. Which is insane.
Non-naturalism is the view that non-natural Platonic Forms can dictate to us. Which is equally insane.
Agree? — Bartricks
Er, no. I didn't say any of that.
If something appears to be the case, that is prima facie evidence that it is the case. That doesn't mean it 'is' the case, just that it is evidence that it is the case. So, what's true is not just that which seems to me to be true. — Bartricks
If individual subjectivism is true, then if I tell myself to do X, then necessarily it would be right for me to X (for by hypothesis the rightness of Xing 'is' my instruction to myself to do it). Yet it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X (anymore than if I tell myself that 2 + 2 = 5, then it will = 5). Thus individual subjectivism is false. — Bartricks
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