No, I'm saying that they're exactly the same argument. Which they are. X causes Y, therefore X is Y. It's stupid.
— Bartricks
A knife is a viable murder weapon. Brain functioning is a viable explanation of mind.

A banana is not a viable murder weapon. Alcohol, apparently just being alcohol, is not a viable explanation of mind. — InPitzotl

And that's confirmed what I thought - you don't have a clue what follows from what, or what it takes for one argument to be the same as another.

1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind

1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind
— Bartricks
Again, you're just nay-saying. — InPitzotl

No, I'm saying that they're exactly the same argument. Which they are. X causes Y, therefore X is Y. It's stupid.

But like I say, if you think they're not the same argument, then I'm not surprised you think one of them is a good argument!

That's irrelevant. It doesn't logically follow. — InPitzotl

Forgive me, but I don't think you have a clue what does and doesn't follow.

That sounds like quite a bad analysis. It doesn't sound up to much as it is. The best analysis was given in the OP of this thread, in my humble opinion (though admittedly, many of those arguments are due to other people, including Plato, Descartes, Avicenna, Berkeley).

I don't buy that the argument is stupid. You're just nay-saying it. Let's look at why it's allegedly stupid:
Alcohol causes brain event, which causes mental event. Therefore mind is brain. It just so obviously doesn't follow I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it does.
— Bartricks
Well, it doesn't follow. But that doesn't imply it's stupid to conclude it. — InPitzotl

Alcohol causes mind to feel happy, therefore mind is alcohol. That's stupid, yes? That's the same argument.

1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind

1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind

Same argument. And it's stupid. And those who think it's a good argument are being stupid. Unfortunately you have to stop being that stupid to realize how stupid it is.

I see something outside my window that looks like my car parked in my driveway. It doesn't logically follow that my car is parked in my driveway; but that's still a good reason to believe my car is parked in my driveway. — InPitzotl

Er, that's not remotely the same argument. Again, I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it is. But then I have trouble understanding how anyone can think the original one is a good argument, so I suppose someone who thinks it is a good argument will likely think it the same as a completely different argument.

I asked 'why invite them?'. They can join if they want. Nothing stops them. But why should they be given special treatment? They are free to decide for themselves whether they wish to waste time on the stupid and rude (and how many professional philosophers have you met - rudeness abounds).

I was taught that if you want to get good at teaching philosophy - and at philosophy itself, frankly - it's a good idea to discuss philosophical ideas with precisely such people! They'll misunderstand things in ways you never thought possible, and you'll have to learn a good bit of patience too.

Anyways, you seem incapable of responding to or even recognizing critiques of your position so I won't waste any more time trying to help you. Furthermore, you’re dishonest, so there is really no use. (Ohhhh boy here comes the dunning kruger :roll: ) — khaled

How am I dishonest? And yes, obviously 'Dunning and Kruger'.

But to you, it is definitional that if an object is sensible it has infinite parts. — khaled

No, only if a sensible object is understood to be an extended object. So if materialism rather than immaterialism is assumed in respect of sensible objects. Of course, the word 'object' is a bit misleading if they are understood to be immaterial, as they're not so much objects as activities of a mind. But meh. The point, though, is that immaterial sensible objects wouldn't present any counterexample to my case, as I'm concluding that minds are immaterial. And electrons are extended in space and I'm not following any link you provide as it will not be to a philosophical paper, but a wikipedia page which, for all I can tell, will probably be written by you.

It is also not 'definitional' that an extended object has infinite parts, it is just clearly going to be the case. But well done for misusing words you Dunning Krugerite you.

And I noticed you dropped the objection to the 4th premise of the 4rd argument (that if you are a sensible object everything you do traces to external causes). You would rather avoid responding to an argument than admit you have no response. Dishonest and pathetic. — khaled

Where? I stand by that premise: if there are any extended things (and there aren't - see one of my arguments for a demonstration), then they have all come into being.

Yes, I know they can. That's why I said what I said!

However, Julia Roberts can't come to my birthday party because I haven't invited her and she doesn't know me from Adam (I also don't want her to come as she'd suck all the attention away from me, plus I don't like her acting). Whereas nothing stops a philosopher from joining and contributing to these forums if they so wish.

Do you think a professional philosopher should be given special treatment, then? Should they be shielded from imbecilic comments and appalling reasoning? Why?

Why have guest philosophers at all? If a philosopher wants to contribute, they can just join like anyone else.

Only after they have become autonomous (to some degree) can they be held responsible for their actions. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, but what it takes to be autonomous is what's at issue. My argument appears to demonstrate that it requires aseity and thus that one cannot 'become' autonomous. For to be autonomous in the way presupposed by moral responsibility requires that one's actions 'not' be the product of external causes (not wholly, anyway). Which they will be, of course, if one has come into being. So by suggesting that though one is not responsible for hte way that one is, one can nevertheless 'become' autonomous is already to have begged the question. If there is no false premise in my argument, then the very idea of 'becoming' autonomous is confused.

To be autonomous - to be truly the director of one's self - requires aseity. Then there is 'what' one is morally responsible for. And that can change over time and change with the acquisition of powers of reason. Plausibly one will not be morally responsible for defying Reason until one starts to hear her. But it would be a mistake to think that it was hearing Reason that made one autonomous. One was autonomous already, it is just that by coming to hear Reason one's autonomy now makes one responsible for how one responds.

But when we blame people, we are blaming them for their choices, and for the characters that they have displayed through making those choices, when they already were in possession of some powers of rational agency. We are not blaming them for their having had flawed characters when they first became rational agents. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, but that's not inconsistent with my argument. I have not argued that aseity is sufficient for moral responsibility, only that it is necessary.

Anyone can call themselves a philosopher. Anyone can call themselves a scientist. But to be a professional philosopher requires having an academic post, which in turn requires having a PhD and a track record of producing peer reviewed publications.

From what I can tell from my cursory search, he's no more a professional philosopher than some guy down the pub. Could be wrong, of course. But it's worrying to me that he doesn't seem to have a post at a university.

How is he a 'professional'? Does he have an academic post? I don't think so. Does he have any peer review publications in respectable philosophy venues? Does he even have a philosophy PhD? I googled him and I can't confirm any of the above.

No, I'm very serious which is why I am insisting that you dispute a premise and that you do so without begging any questions.

I don't think you understand what aseity involves. It means I was not created. It means I've always been in existence. It means there was never a time when I did not exist. So it means that there was never a time when facts outside my control caused my existence. It means, in other words, that premise 1 of your argument is false.

So if you think premise 1 if your argument is true, you need to provide evidence that I - we - do not exist with aseity.

And to do that you need either to provide independent evidence that we are not morally responsible (evidence that does not simply assume we do not exist with aseity - for that would be question begging), or independent evidence that we do not exist with aseity.

You have done none of these things and so I think you simply do not understand either aseity or the dialectic.

No, you need to dispute a premise in my argument and to do so without simply assuming that another premise is false.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future. — ToothyMaw

Premise 1 is false. I keep saying this.

Premise 1 is false if we exist with aseity!

I don't really care. — ToothyMaw

The representations of our reason is what evidence consists of.

So, what evidence do I have that this argument is valid:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

Well, that my reason and the reason of virtually everyone else represents it to be.

So, if you don't care what our reason represents to be the case, then you're not interested in following evidence. That is, you're not really interested in what's true.

What do you want from reasoning? To have an echo chamber in which you just hear your own view bounced back at you, or genuinely to find out how things are with reality? If the latter than you must follow reason, not yourself.

Now it isn't seriously in dispute that the reason of most people represents them to be morally responsible.
So it isn't seriously in dispute taht we have powerful prima facie evidence that we are morally responsible (and thus, by extension, that we possess whatever moral responsibility requires).

You need countervailing evidence that we lack moral responsibility. That is, you need to find even more powerfully self-evident premises that, together, contradict the premise that we are morally responsible. Simply not caring is not evidence.

I mean maybe you are forgetting, but my position originally was that we have no basis for the concept of moral responsibility. It is enough for me to show that we don't have aseity according to you. — ToothyMaw

I'm not forgetting anything. You can't escape having a burden of proof just by being the first to say something.

The reason of virtually everyone represents them to be morally responsible for what they do. That means that we have unbelievably powerful prima facie evidence that we are morally responsible.

I keep stressing this, but you don't seem to register it.

You have the burden of proof.

I have provided independent evidence that moral responsiblity requires existing with aseity.

That doesn't by itself show that we do or that we do not. It just shows that aseity is a vital ingredient of moral responsibility.

Until or unless you can refute that argument, the point holds.

But, importantly, the combination of the aseity argument and the fact we have evidence that we do have moral responsibility now constitutes evidence that we 'do' exist with aseity.

For example, ginger cake contains ginger in some form. Let's imagine that's true. Well, then if I have excellent evidence that there's a ginger cake in my cupboard, then I have excellent evidence that there is ginger in some form in my cupboard. That's how I'm arguing.

What you're doing is arguing like this: there's no ginger in any form in the cupboard. As there is no ginger in any form in the cuboard, there can't be any ginger cakes in the cupboard and anyone who says "but what about that apparent ginger cake in the cupboard - the one virtually everyone perceives to be there when they look?" is begging the question.

No, they're not begging the question. There appears to be a ginger cake in the cupboard. To reject such appearances on the basis of no more than your theory, is to have stopped following evidence: it is to have assumed how things are and then to have interpreted the data through the prism of your theory. That's perverse. That's to have allowed the tail to wag the dog.

The evidence - prima facie, defeasible evidence, no doubt - is that we are morally responsible and that being morally responsible requires existing with aseity. Thus, we have prima facie evidence that we exist with aseity.

No, free will requires power over the facts of the future; you would need to have magical abilities to be able to alter the facts of the past in the present, which is what — ToothyMaw

You don't seem to understand the point: if we exist with aseity, then there was never a time when all the facts of the past were ones for which we were not morally responsible.

So again, 'if' we exist with aseity, then premise 1 of your argument is false.

Again: this was your argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

1. We have free will only if we have power over the facts of the future.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we do not have free will. — ToothyMaw

Premise 1 is false. That means the argument is unsound. You can't now just assert that no one has power over the facts of the future: they do. Premise 1 is false. So your conclusion - 3 - has not been established.


What's my evidence that we exist with aseity - and thus that premise 1 of your argument is false? It is that we are morally responsible.

You are denying that we are morally responsible. I want an argument for that which doesn't simply assume it.

This, for example, is not a good argument:

1. We are not morally responsible
2. therefore, we are not morally responsible.

Yet that's what your argument amounts to.


So this premise - my premise 7 - is default justified and you're not entitled to reject it without an argument: I am morally responsible for some things.[/quote]

Your only basis for rejecting 7 is that you think no-one is responsible for facts of the past. But will be false if we exist with aseity, yes?

And do we exist with aseity?

Well, if we're morally responsible we do.

And we appear to be morally responsible.

Thus, we are justified in concluding that we exist with aseity.

Right, here's what I'm saying: free will requires this vital ingredient - aseity.

What you're saying is that free will requires having some control over the facts of the past.

I agree!! That's precisely what aseity delivers.

So we agree about that. But you're then just asserting that we do not have that control - and thus asserting that we do not exist with aseity - and concluding that we lack free will.

I'm saying that we do have free will and thus we do have control over some of the facts of the past and thus we must exist with aseity.

You, then, are just denying that we have free will, whereas I am saying that we have it.

But my claim - that we have free will - is supported by reason, whereas yours - that we lack free will - is not. Thus you need an argument.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

1. We have free will only if we have power over the facts of the future.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we do not have free will. — ToothyMaw

Premise 1 is false if the aseity argument goes through. So you're begging the question. Until or unless you provide independent grounds for thinking a premise in the aseity argument is false, you're not entitled to assume premise 1 in the above argument is true.

But you said this

But I want some confirmation before moving forward. — ToothyMaw

So I assumed that you took your scepticism about 7 to bear on the credibility of the preceding argument. Which it doesn't.

There are two issues: what's needed for free will and do we have it?

The argument up to 6 establishes what's needed: aseity. If you challenge 7 you are not challenging that we need aseity, you are challenging that we have it.

I think a thick embodied view of human agency doesn't comport well with the idea that past facts about you, your own body, character, cognitive abilities and dispositions, etc., all constitute 'external causes' of your actions just because they lay in your past. On closer analysis, the idea seems nonsensical. — Pierre-Normand

I do not follow you on this at all. If someone comes into existence, it really doesn't matter at all whether they came into existence gradually or all of a sudden, the fact will remain that they are the product of external causes. And that's sufficient to establish that they are not morally responsible for how they are.

If we have come into being, then there's a real question about exaclty when 'we' come on the scene. But this doesn't in any way allow you to escape confronting the issue: which is that we will nevertheless have come into being as a product of causes for which we are in no way morally responsible.

My reply is that you don't account for the effect of other's free choices, something that follows from assuming free will to support your premise:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity.
— ToothyMaw

Can we establish if this is the case? It seems as if you accept it here:

if 2 is granted, then one accepts that if one is not morally responsible for that which caused one's initial character, then one's non-responsibility for the cause transfers to the effect. If one grants that - and that certainly seems self-evidently true to my reason - then surely one must accept it when more causes for which one is not responsible are added?
— Bartricks

But I want some confirmation before moving forward. — ToothyMaw

I am not sure I follow. By 6 it has been established that aseity is necessary for moral responsibility/free will. But 6 doesn't tell us anything about what is in fact the case. It just tells us that a necessary ingredient for free will is aseity. 7 then asserts that we are morally responsible.

As I understand you, you are now asking for evidence that 7 is true. I think there's good evidence that 7 is true, but even if there was not, that wouldn't do anything to challenge anything upstream of 7.

My evidence that 7 is true is that our reason represents it to be. That is, the reason of literally billions of people. Perhaps our reason is malfunctioning on this matter and we are subject to a systematic rational illusion of free will. But that is not the default - far from it. The burden of proof is squarely on the one who wishes to deny that things are as they appear to be, and as we appear - and here we are talking about rational appearances, which is what all evidence claims are ultimately an appeal to - to be morally responsible, it is the denier of 7 who owes the arguments.

As the aseity argument is my argument, I certainly think it is sound.

As I said in the moral responsibility thread, it is not clear to me on what grounds 5 can reasonably be denied. For if 2 is granted, then one accepts that if one is not morally responsible for that which caused one's initial character, then one's non-responsibility for the cause transfers to the effect. If one grants that - and that certainly seems self-evidently true to my reason - then surely one must accept it when more causes for which one is not responsible are added? I mean, if I am not morally responsible for C when it is wholly the product of A - something for which I am in no way morally responsible - then surely I remain non-responsible for C if it is the product of A and B, if A and B are factors for which I am in no way morally responsible?

Perhaps all this does is show that 2 should not be granted either - that we can be morally responsible for our initial characters despite the fact they were created by causes for which we had no moral responsibility. But I can't se any reason why 2 should not be granted, given it seems self-evident to reason.

Perhaps one might object that when it comes to 5, although we are not morally responsible for our natures or the environment and laws of nature prevailing in it, we can nevertheless be morally responsible for what these things produce, namely our actions, provided they are produced in the right kind of way.

But I find that a kind of magic and on its face implausible.

As to the claim that we are morally responsible (and thus do exist with aseity) - well, as philosophers we should follow arguments where they lead. The conclusion - that we exist with aseity - is inconsistent with naturalism about us, but so much the worse for naturalism.

Too many - including too many contemporary philosophers - see in philosophy nothing more than a tool that should be pressed into the service of rationalizing conventional beliefs, whatever they may be. And so as naturalism is the prevailing worldview of the present day, at least among the thinking classes, philosophical arguments are considered good if they support the naturalization of some feature of reality, and absurd or questionable if they do not. But that's not good reasoning: that's not to follow an argument where it leads, but is instead to set limits in advance on where it can go.

So, I really do not see any good grounds for denying either that moral responsibility requires aseity, or for denying that we actually possess that feature.

Although I have not assumed that a sensible object must have all the sensible properties, it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?).
— Bartricks

Quantum wave functions, electrons, and many other things in the physics of small things have no sensible properties (color, smell, taste, shape). Yet we call them physical. Unless you want to distinguish between physical and sensible now, and claim something like "electrons are not sensible objects" — khaled

How does that challenge my premise? If they don't have sensible qualities, then they're not sensible objects, duh.

You claim that there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview, I reply that most people don't think there is such a problem, then you reply that you don't think there is just a problem? If you didn't think there was such a problem why would you point out that there are people who do. What kind of argument is that? — khaled

Well, you need to be above a certain level of intelligence (quite low, embarrassingly) to realize that everything I said was true and consistent.

Nor did I. Nor is that required for what I said. You just missed the point. — khaled

No, you missed the point. You need to say something that challenges a premise.

It's open to debate whether sensible objects are extended, or exist as subjective states.
— Bartricks

False dichotomy. They can not be extended and also not be subjective states. See: Quantum wave function. Or even electron. — khaled

No it isn't and no they can't. An electron is extended, and a Quantum wave function is something you need to say more about. For if it is a 'function' then it is not a thing at all, but, you know, a function.

But then it would also be a shit example as it would provide no evidence against anything I am arguing.
— Bartricks

It goes against premise 2 of argument 8. There are sensible objects that are not divisible. So it is not true that if a sensible object exists that it is infinitely divisible. Is it clear enough for you now? — khaled

No, because if what you're talking about is an unextended indivisible thing, then it won't be a counterexample to anything I've argued, because I'm arguing that minds are unextended things.

Here's how we're arguing:

Me: Ps are Qs because they are Rs and all Rs are Qs.

You: But you're wrong because Ts are Rs.

Me: Yes, Ts are Rs. How does that do anything to challenge what I said? I said Ps are Qs, because Ps are Rs and all Rs are Qs. How does pointing out that there are Ts that are Rs challenge that Ps are Qs?

You: because it does.

Me: Erm, it doesn't.

If you accept that the mind is the content, and consequence of the functioning of the brain, then what you're saying is trivial. But if you're saying that the mind exists independently of the brain - as you seem to be saying, then you're wrong, because of the effects of alcohol on the mind. — counterpunch

See my earlier comment.

I explained in the OP.

I do not believe there is a single good argument for the proposition that our minds are our brains. By all means prove me wrong, but note that this:

Premise: Brain events cause mental events
Conclusion: Therefore mental events are brain events

is a stupid argument. The conclusion doesn't follow (obviously). If you add this premise - If A causes B, then A is B - then the conclusion will follow. But that premise is clearly false. — Bartricks

You're making that stupid argument. Alcohol causes brain event, which causes mental event. Therefore mind is brain. It just so obviously doesn't follow I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it does.

A causes B, does not mean A 'is' B. I mean, by your logic, my mind is alcohol. After all, drinking alcohol causes mental events.....therefore alcohol is mental events. Therefore my mind is, what, the bottle?

Note: if you think 'alcohol causes changes in my mind, therefore my mind is alcohol' is a good argument, then I can't argue with you as you're below the threshold level of intelligence needed for coherent debate to occur.

Likewise if you think 'alcohol causes changes in my brain, which then causes changes in my mind, therefore my mind is my brain' is a good argument (obviously).

Quite. Here's how contemporary philosophers of mind generate the problem: "Let's assume that there are extended things - so, let's assume there exists a realm of things quite unlike minds. Now let's assume that everything is an extended thing. Now let's notice that this creates a real problem accommodating minds, given how they do not seem to be anything remotely like an extended thing, as well as a host of other problems, such as how on earth our minds could perceive the world, or have free will in it and so on. Now let's spend entire careers trying to solve these problems that we've generated by making stupid assumptions"

I meant mind. Stop nitpicking. — khaled

It's not nitpicking. You confused a mental state with a mind. That's a huge mistake. It's a category error. You should be ashamed of yourself.

What sensible property do electrons have? Or photons of light? Or quantum wave functions? — khaled

The first two have shapes, and I have no idea what a quantum wave function is.

Btw, which premise in which of my arguments are you trying to challenge?

A sizeable population of the people IN the philosophy departments would agree that there is no such problem. Dennett for one. — khaled

Me too. So?

False. Whether minds are lumps of something sensible is what is in dispute. We can both agree lumps of ham don't have minds. — khaled

Ham, bone, gristle, blood, whatever. Same applies. But well done for missing the point.

It makes sense to wonder how heavy a piece of paper is, but not how heavy light is. Even though both are sensible objects. In the same way, minds can be sensible, and also be such that it makes sense to wonder what they think, but not what rocks think. — khaled

Straw man. I did not claim that a sensible object has all the sensible properties. But it at least makes sense to wonder what other sensible properties it might have. So, I tell you that a hibbledip has a square shape. It now makes sense for you to wonder what colour it has, what texture it has, and so on. If it is transparent, then it does not have a colour. But it still made sense to wonder what colour it had.

By contrast, it makes no apparent sense to wonder what sensible properties a mind has.

If it did make apparent sense to wonder about such matters, then philosophy of mind wouldn't exist.

I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2).
— khaled

Yes, you could couldn't you.
— Bartricks

Yes I could. And with as much evidence and credibility as you use for your argument: None. — khaled

No, because all you'd be doing is saying something. And that's not evidence. By contrast, my argument appeals to a self-evident truth of reason, one that is discussed to this day (it's known as the 'existence condition' and it probably made its first appearance in the works of Epicurus).

This seems to be something ignorant narcissists have a problem with: they can't distinguish between things they say and self-evident truths of reason, for at some level they think they're god and all they need to do is say 'no' and it will be so.

We were talking about sensible objects. Not extended objects. So there ends your line of reasoning. To say "extended object" is to already assume it's divisible. — khaled

It's open to debate whether sensible objects are extended, or exist as subjective states. The latter is an idealist position and if it is true, then minds are immaterial and my case is won. However, if sensible objects are extended objects, then it becomes a matter of debate whether minds are such objects. But again, congratulations on not understanding the dialectic.

No, I'm saying there could be things that are metaphysically impossible to divide. An electron is a good candidate. — khaled

Yes, I obviously agree that there are things it is metaphysically impossible to divide, namely minds. I don't know what an electron is. If it is an extended thing, then it is not a good candidate but a shit one. If it is not extended, then it may not be divisible. But then it would also be a shit example as it would provide no evidence against anything I am arguing. So, shit either way really.

Describe to me what you're imagining then. — khaled

Thinking while not being subject to any sensible experiences.

so you're denying 5.

5 says "If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything"

Because you are not denying 1 or 2, you accept that if I have come into being, then I am not morally responsible for my initial character.

Because you have not denied 4, you accept as well that I am not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it.

So what you deny is that it follows from my lack of moral responsibility for those things that I am lacking in moral responsibility for what they produce, yes? I mean, what else is left? I am not responsible for my initial character, and not responsible for the environment and laws of nature in which my initial character finds itself, then what else is left for me to be morally responsible for save what those things produce?

In other words you think this principle - if I am not in any way morally responsible for A, and not in any way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, I am not morally responsible for C - is false, yes?

You think you can be morally responsible for an event - X - even when X was caused by matters for which you are in no way morally responsible. How?

You accept that I am not morally responsible for my initial character. But why do you accept that, given that you think one can be morally responsible for things that are the product of things for which I am in no way morally responsible?

I mean, I am in no way morally responsible for my own production - I didn't create myself, but am the product of alien forces. But that shouldn't trouble you, given that as far as you're concerned the fact I was in no way morally responsible for my own production and was instead the product of alien forces doesn't, in and of itself, suffice to establish my non-responsiblity for my initial self.

So your own position seems inconsistent. If you reject 5, it is odd to me why you accept 2 or 4. For the only reason, surely, for accepting 2 and 4 is the principle expressed in 5?

It is not modified. It is the same argument. I have just 'simplified' it.

You clearly do not understand how arguing works or what the terms you're employing mean. First, a premise can't be logically valid or invalid. Validity is a property of arguments, not premises.

Premises can be true or false. Which premise is false? You need to say, otherwise you're just not addressing anything I have argued.

Of course it's valid, but you are being a slippery eel, drawing attention away from the flaw in your argument by demanding I accept its logical validity — ToothyMaw

Right, so you need to deny a premise! I think you don't really understand what a deductively valid argument is. A deductively valid argument - such as mine - is one whose conclusion is true if the premises are. So unless or until you provide some grounds for thinking one of its premises is false, you have no grounds for rejecting its conclusion. Thus you need to dispute a premise. Which one?

Don't keep insisting I replace one of my premises with a different premise - I mean, think about it, why on earth would I do that given that my argument is deductively valid and has premises you don't seem to be able to dispute??

So again: which premise do you deny and why? Stop telling me about different premises of your own invention. Why do you keep doing that?? Address one of my premises and tell me why it is false. You need to deny the truth of one of my premises. Which one? This isn't going anywhere until you do this.

For your convenience, here is the argument that you agree is valid and thus agree that its conclusion must be true if is premises are:

1. If a, then b
2. if b, then c
3. therefore, if a then c
4. d
5. If c and d, then e
6. Therefore, if a, then e.
7. not e
8. Therefore not a.

Here it is again, with the letters replaced for my claims:

1. If I have come into existence, then I have been caused to come into existence by external events that I had nothing to do with.
2. If I have been caused to come into existence by external events that I had nothing to do with, then I am not morally responsible for my initial character
3. Therefore, if I have come into existence, I am not morally responsible for my initial character
4. I am not morally responsible for my environment or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything
6. Therefore, if I have come into existence, I am not morally responsible for anything
7. I am morally responsible for some things
8. Therefore I have not come into existence.

Resist the urge to tell me to replace one of those premises with a different one of your own invention. That's no more or less than to ignore my argument and ask me to defend a different one that you've come up with. Why on earth would I do that?!?

You agree that the above argument is deductively valid, so you agree that 8 is true if 1-7 are. So which of 1-7 do you dispute? And note: 3 and 6 are interim conclusions, so you can't deny either of those without denying some other premise.

There seems to be a confusion of "product of the laws of nature" and what I mean by "bound by the laws of nature". — ToothyMaw

No, the confusion is that you either don't understand that the argument I made was valid, or you don't understand that this means you need to challenge a premise (rather than, say, substitute one of my premises with one of your own)

You haven't answered my question. Is this argument invalid:


1. If a, then b
2. if b, then c
3. therefore, if a then c
4. d
5. If c and d, then e
6. Therefore, if a, then e.
7. not e
8. Therefore not a.

When you acknowledge that it is valid (and it is), I will then express it again substituting the letters for the claims of my argument, and then I'll ask you which one you deny. I predict that you will never do this - you will never say which premise you deny - because you do not really have a coherent objection to anything I am saying. But we'll see.....

Ah, another Dunning and Kruger moment, methinks. You don't have any expertise in philosophy, clearly.

You're just confused.

Yes, I use that argument. The argument you need to challenge is the one I gave in support of 1.

This one:

1. If a, then b
2. if b, then c
3. therefore, if a then c
4. d
5. If c and d, then e
6. Therefore, if a, then e.

The argument you just mentioned above just continues it:

7. if a, then e
8. not e
9. Therefore not a.

Again, do you think the above is invalid?

I don't need to deny a premise but rather carry out your argument to its conclusion: the conclusion is that we we have aseity and are not bound by the laws of nature. — ToothyMaw

Er, no. Now you're just being bad at logic. The conclusion of my argument is that if we are morally responsible, we exist with aseity. That follows from the premises.

I keep laying the argument out for you. Here it is again:

1. If a, then b
2. if b, then c
3. therefore, if a then c
4. d
5. If c and d, then e
6. Therefore, if a, then e.

Do you think that's invalid?

I can simplify my argument like this:

1. If a, then b.

(If I have come into being, then my initial character is the product of external events)

2. If b, then c.

(If my initial character is the product of external events, then I am not MR for my initial character)

3. Therefore, if a, then c.

(Therefore, if my initial character is the product of external events, then I am not MR for my initial character)

4. d.

(I am not MR for my environment or the laws of nature)

5. If c and d then e.

(If I am not morally responsible for my initial character or for my environment or the laws of nature, then I am not morally responsible for anything)

6. Therefore if a, then e.

(Therefore, if I have come into being, then I am not morally responsible for anything).

Now, which premise do you deny or do you think it is invalid?

Just deny a premise. The argument was deductively valid. You need to deny a premise. Which one?

I am doing - if I exist with aseity then I am not the product of anything, am I? Nothing created me. That's the point. If I exist with aseity then I have not come into being. Laws of nature govern what goes on, not what exists.

You're the one who isn't addressing the argument I made: you need explicitly to deny a premise in it. It seems you are now denying F. But if you want to deny F, that's fine - but I want an argument that has the negation of F as a conclusion so that I can see on what basis you're rejecting it.

If I have not come into being, then I am 'not' the product of my environment and laws of nature. I will still have an environment and be subject to the laws of nature, but I myself am not the product of them.

Now, if Tim says something and I punch him becasue of it, does the fact I had no control whaever over what Tim said mean that I am not morally responsible for punching him? No, obviously not. For although I did indeed lack entirely any control over what Tim said, I am morally responsible for being the kind of person who reacts as I did.

Apply that to my environment and laws of nature: I am not morally responsible for them. And it is thanks to them that I do what I do, just as it was thanks to Tim saying what he did that led me to punch him. But that doesn't mean that I am not morally responsible for what my enviornment and laws of nature make me do, does it? That's as bonkers as concluding that I am not morally responsible for punching Tim because I lacked control over Tim saying what he said.