Yes it is, something metaphysically necessary cannot fail to exist by definition, it's existence is purely necessary, so you've got your definitions confused like in the last comment. — Elliot Fischer

No, this is just confused. I could explain again, but you've already made up your mind.

Responsed above - it's logically contradictory for something metaphysically necessary to not exist, and I've explained what omnipotence is in the two main Abrahamic religions. — Elliot Fischer

Er, yes - that's why God doesn't exist of necessity. Blimey. And no, what you said was false and irrelevant. Anyway, I can tell this isn't going anywhere - bye.

You can fail to exist due to your contingency, God's necessity renders His non-existence logically impossible. On the Christian and Muslim tradition, Omnipotence is power over all logical or metaphysical possibilities. — Elliot Fischer

Irrelevant. I have the power not to exist, yes? So, an all powerful being must have that power too. He wouldn't if he exists of necessity.

What you say about those traditions is also false and irrelevant. Both Jesus and the Koran describe a God who can do 'anything'. They do not describe a necessary existent. But anyway, this is a philosophy forum not a 'describe your favourite tradition' forum.

No, I never said all contingent existences requires explanations, this isnt the SPSR this is the WPSR, I merely stated this is possibly the case. A necessary existence is not grounded in anything because it is absolutely fundamental. — Elliot Fischer

Yes, but you can't get to your conclusion unless you assume that all contingent existences require explanations.

Causal determinism isnt true though. — Elliot Fischer

Beside the point.

No, you've made numerous mistakes. — Elliot Fischer

Dunning and Kruger.

1 begs the question because it presupposes existent things can be uncaused. — Elliot Fischer

No it doesn't. It assumes that all things that exist have either been caused to exist, or they haven't. Like wot it says.

4 isn't true, actual infinites are possible. — Elliot Fischer

No they're not. And even if they are, this would undermine your case as one could then have an actual infinity of prior causes and one wouldn't need either to posit an uncaused causer or a necessary existent.

I now want to go through those divine attributes you list and show why, in my view, necessary existence doesn't imply any of them - indeed, is positively incompatible with some.

Beginningless:The necessary being exists necessarily, hence the fact that it exists must be true no matter what period of time or else timelessly. Therefore the necessary being is everlasting/eternal. — Elliot Fischer

A necesary existent is not necessarily everlasting. If causal determinism is true - and the laws of nature and the past are necessary - then everything that exists exists of necessity. Yet clearly not everything is everlasting. So, you cannot validly conclude from something's existing of necessity, that it exists forever.

Immateriality: — Elliot Fischer

The same applies. If causal determinism is true, then everything that exists exists of necessity. It would appear that some of what exists is material. Thus it would seem that something can exist of necessity and be material. Existing of necessity does not, therefore, establish that the existent in question is immaterial.

When it comes to omnipotence, you say this:

a) If the power of the necessary being was arbitrarily limited to some extent rather than other, then it seems conceivable for it to have more or less power, thus making it contingent and hence requires an external explanation for its limitation. It seems weird to say something is necessarily limited to some extent rather than another. But in order to causally explain something one needs power, hence the power of the necessary being cannot have an external explanation because the necessary being cannot explain its power without having power to begin with. Therefore, the power of the necessary being is necessary, and hence without limit. — Elliot Fischer

You are quite right to think that an all-powerful being's power is unlimited. But that's precisely why it can't exist of necessity. For if it exists of necessity, then it lacks a power: the power not to exist at that moment. So, far from necessary existence implying omnipotence, it implies the exact opposite. An omnipotent being can do anything, including taking himself out of existence. Thus an omnipotent being does not exist of necessity. (Exists, yes, but not of necessity).

Agency: you're case for the being possessing agency depends on his being omnipotent, which he wouldn't be if he exists of necessity.

I don't think it is a compelling argument.

First, if it goes through it does not prove 'God', but rather a 'necessary existent'. That thing will not be God, for if it exists of necessity then it cannot not exist, and thus is not omnipotent. This is an argument I have made elsewhere on this board. But briefly, it is plainly absurd for me to have powers that an omnipotent being lacks. I can take myself out of existence. Thus, an omnipotent being has that power too. Thus an omnipotent being is not a necessary existent, but exists by the grace of its own will (and so exists contingently, not of necessity).

Of course, that is not a reason to think the argument is faulty, it is just to point out that - if it works - it disproves God rather than proves him.

But as to the argument itself, it is faulty for you have make two false assumptions. The first is that all contingent existences stand in need of explanation. The second is that a necessary existent would not stand in need of explanation. Both of these assumptions are false.

Imagine that causal determinism is true. Well, in that case everything that has come into being, has come into being of necessity. For determinism is the thesis that everything that happens 'had' - that is, was necessitated - to occur, given the past and the laws of nature. And so if we stipulate that the past and the laws of nature are themselves necessary, everything that exists, and everything that occurs does so of necessity. Yet clearly the fact there is a cup of coffee on my desk is still a fact that cries out for explanation.

What's the problem here? The problem is that even though something may exist or occur of necessity, it can still have a cause of its existing or occurring (as in the case of my cup of coffee being on the desk - it's there by necessity, but it was still caused to there). So, 'being cause to be so' and 'being there of necessity' are compatible. And that's why establishing that something exists or occurs of necessity will not by itself suffice to explain it - for it remains an open question whether it was caused to exist or not. Thus we can still intelligibly ask of anything that exists of necessity "was it caused to come into being or not?" Thus, the 'necessary' and 'contingent' distinction is not one between 'needs an explanation' and 'doesn't need an explanation'.

Contrary to popular belief, 'it exists of necessity' is not a satisfactory answer to 'why does this thing exist rather than not?' And positing necessary existences will not stop an explanatory regress.

Turning now to contingent existences - is it true that they always require explanation? Well, no. We can, by ratiocination, discover that if anything has been caused to exist, some things must exist uncaused. Here:

1. If anything exists, it either exists uncaused, or has been caused to exist
2. Some things exist
3. Therefore, they have either been caused to exist, or they exist uncaused
4. There cannot be an actual infinity of causes
5. If all things that exist have been caused to exist, there will be an actual infinity of causes
6. Therefore, not all things that exist have been caused to exist

I made no appeal to contingency or necessity above. So, without appealing to those notions, we can soundly conclude that some things that exist, exist uncaused.

That's sufficient to establish that such things do not require explanation. For when we ask for an explanation, we are surely asking for causes? If, then, we know, by the light of reason, that if anything exists at least one thing must exist that has no cause, then we know, by the light of reason, that if anything exist, at least one thing does not require explanation. Explanations, after all, must come to an end somewhere (to challenge this is to insist that nothing can be explained). And they terminate, as this argument shows, not in a 'necessary existent' (for that would not terminate the explanation), but in an 'uncaused causer'. (This does not establish that the uncaused causer exists contingently - that remains an open question - the point is that whether it exists of necessity or contingently is not the fact about it that is doing the explanatory work).

There's another argument that verifies the above one, though it is controversial because it appeals to the existence of God. But as I have just argued above, if God exists, then all things - including himself - exist contingently. Yet God himself has not been caused to exist. So, if God exists then we have an example of a contingent existent that has no cause of his existence.

It might be as well to drive home further why a sensible use of Ockham's razor is by itself sufficient to establish that we are dealing with one mind and not many.

After having established that imperatives of Reason require a mind to be their issuer, Ockham's razor - itself an imperative of Reason - enjoins us to posit one mind, not many. For why posit lots of minds when one mind will do?

But by the same token, we should not posit extra minds unnecessarily. So, given that we are aware of our own mind's existence (and have better evidence for its existence than we have of any other), we should start by assuming that the mind of Reason is our own mind.

However, that thesis is contradicted by the evidence. For as the rest of my argument demonstrates, if I myself am the mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then I will be God. And clearly I am not God. I cannot do anything and everything. It is evidently not in my power to destroy all things, and so on.

So, I now have extremely good evidence that I am not the mind in question. Thus, I should assume the mind is a mind other than my own.

Note, it would make no sense to suppose instead that I am the source merely of 'some' of the imperatives of Reason and other minds are sources of other imperatives. That would not be a simple thesis at all. And the same evidence that implies I am not the source of 'all' of the imperatives of Reason implies as well that I am not the source of any of them.

Again, then, I should now proceed to assume that the mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason is some mind other than my own.

And you don't need to know the first thing about Anselm to recognize that there is no fucking way that you can use logic (Reason, ratiocination, etc) to prove this sentence is true:

There is an omniscient being who has the ability to create a square circle in a galaxy 20 billion light years away if He so chose, but He has not done this.

To use the vernacular, this is just bat shit crazy. — EricH

But I did precisely that.

BUT - maybe I'm wrong. Maybe right now - in this very exchange - I'm demonstrating a classic case of Dunning Kruger and these posts will be quoted 100 years from now. So in your response to me (and I know you will respond) please demonstrate the logic that proves the sentence just above. Give me your definitions/premises and how you arrived at your conclusion.

If you can do this then you are truly a genius of the highest caliber. — EricH

Yes, your responses do constitute a very good illustration of the Dunning Kruger effect.

Questio pasted the argument on my behalf. Then, rather than acknowledge that I had indeed presented an argument, you just insist it is full of holes and asked your inane questions once more.

I don't understand your response.

You asked me why one mind is posited rather than multiple minds. I explained.

There are lots of other reasons why one mind should be posited, but I wasn't going to give them all when one would do. So I gave you one: Ockham's razor.

Then you have just told me that you believe that our own minds issue the imperatives of Reason. Ok, just ignore the evidence then. Posit lots rather than one. Go for it. I mean, by hypothesis, what you think is the case now is the case. If you tell yourself that contradictions are true, they will be - right? If you tell yourself that 2 + 8 = an elephant, that's true, right? You have reason to believe it and none not to. I mean, that's what you're telling yourself about what 2 + 8 = and you're now Reason.

Or are you only responsible for one or two imperatives of Reason? In which case, which ones are yours? Pray tell. And who determines whose imperatives are the imperatives of Reason? Cos that person would be Reason - that is, God, right? So it must be no-one. So, you'd have to endorse an extreme form of individual subjectivism about reason. In which case, once more, if you tell yourself that 2 + 6 = a giraffe, then it does and that's all there is to it, because you're your reason and I'm mine.

So, so silly.

This is getting tedious now.

As to forward the idea of any entity or reality that can exercise the power to bring about self contradictory state of affairs would itself rely on consistency, cohesivness, intelligibility in order to be forwarded. — Questio

To be honest, I don't know what you mean here and I've been charitable in assuming you mean that there is something incoherent in using reason to establish the existence of a being who can flout reason.

If that's not what you are trying to say, then why not just lay it out as a deductively valid argument? If it 'is' what you are trying to say, I addressed it. You are simply reasoning fallaciously.

"therefore this mind or being may overthrow the object of his mind" — Questio

I didn't say that though. I mean, I don't know what that even means. Overthrow the object of his mind??

I just keep explaining and you keep willfully misunderstanding.

Forget God and focus on me. I am sat at a computer. I want you to believe this - I am telling you that it is the case. Because of this you have reason to believe I am sat at a computer. But I can lie. I can bid you believe things about me that are not true. Does that mean you no longer have reason to think I am sat at a computer? No. You still have reason to believe I am sat at a computer.

God can make true propositions be false at the same time. But he's told us that true propositions are not false at the same time. Does the fact he's told us that true propositions are not false at the same time give us reason to believe that true propositions are not false at the same time? Yes.

A proposition - including a proposition about an imperative of Reason - does not 'have' to be true to be true. It just has to be true.

If you want to find out about Reason, consult your reason. And if you do that, you'll see that your reason tells you that Reason is a mind who can do anything.

You think that's not possible, right - that it is not possible for our reason to tell us about the existence of a being who is not bound by reason? Well, a) I've demonstrated that it is possible by actually doing it and b) that's as silly as thinking that words can only tell you about words.
Here: there are some things that can't be expressed in words. Presumably you consider that utterance incoherent?

Yes, they could be. But they aren't. There's a burden of proof to discharge. One mind is the default, not multiple minds.

There are lots of other reasons to think that it is one mind - and that the mind in question is not your own - but might as well stick with one for the time being.

Really? Okay then.

Your begging questions with every extra foot step you take over the "Logic is not necessarily true" line. Its not my fault I just so happen to point it out. — Questio

How? Here's my argument again:

1. If the imperatives of Reason are the imperatives a mind is issuing, then that mind is not bound by those imperatives
2. The imperatives of Reason are the imperatives a mind is issuing (see my proof of God for that).
3. Therefore, the mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of Reason - God - is not bound by those imperatives.

No questions begged. Perhaps you think that a mind that issues imperatives is thereby bound to obey those imperatives - okay, but where's your argument for that? I mean, you need one, for it is prima facie false. "Don't go outside!" There. I issued an imperative. Am I suddenly stuck indoors now?

Of course, if I say "Don't anyone go outside!" it is entirely reasonable for you to suppose that I myself plan on staying indoors. But the point is I am not stuck indoors.

Similarly, if I say "believe I am indoors" you have every reason to suppose I am indoors, for that's the simplest explanation of why I am telling you to believe I am indoors, especially if I also say "it's very important to me that you believe what's true".

Now by your logic there would be something impossible in me being able to convey this information to you at the same time as being perfectly able to be outdoors. Yes?

Well, your logic is faulty.

Read Plato's Meno.

Look up 'laws of Reason'. Look up 'imperatives of Reason' (that fool Kant will come up).

Now, I gave you some examples of imperatives of Reason, didn't I? Their existence is not in dispute. Their content is.

You have described my reasoning as 'bizarrely nonsensical'. Back that up.

This argument is deductively valid, yes?

1. If there are imperatives of Reason, there is a mind whose imperatives they are
2. There are imperatives of Reason
3. Therefore, there is a mind whose imperatives they are

Does that strike you as nonsensical?

Are you seriously - seriously - maintaining that the idea of an 'imperative of Reason' is nonsensical? It isn't nonsensical. Philosophers dedicate entire careers to trying to discern their content, including Kant no less. Christ.

Is it nonsensical to suppose that an imperative requires a mind to issue it?

There's nothing nonsensical about the argument.

Now, I believe that in addition to having no expertise whatsoever in this subject, you are also someone who genuinely enjoys winding people up. Just my opinion. For you ask questions, I answer them, and then you ask them again and again and again and insist I haven't answered them. You seem to think that if you don't understand the answer, then I haven't answered it. I am going to answer your questions again - some of which I have answered before, and some of which are new. I do this fully expecting you to reject every single answer as 'nonsensical', but I do it for the record.

So, for the record, here is an imperative of Reason: if doing X is in your interests and doing it does not conflict with any other imperatives of Reason, do it.

Kant called that a hypothetical imperative. Don't dispute its contents. It's contents are disputable. But it's an imperative. That's why Kant and others call them - oo, what do they call them...I wonder...oh, it's 'imperatives'!

Here's another: don't posit more entities than you need to when explaining a phenomenon.

Again, don't cavil over the contents - the contents are not the issue. The point is that it is an imperative. It is an instruction to do something.

Now to your next question

What is meant by the word "are" — EricH

I am asserting the existence of some imperatives of Reason. Premise 1 says "if P, then Q". Premise 2 says "P".

Why is it "a" mind and not many minds?
And when he says "a mind whose laws they are" - to me this implies ownership - there is "a mind" that "owns" these as of yet undefined "laws of Reason". What does all this mean? — EricH

Not 'owns' (what does that mean - how do you 'own' an imperative?).

There needs to be a mind to 'issue' an imperative. Imperatives have minds that issue them, yes? Not mysterious. "Be smart!" That's an imperative. I issued it. To you. I don't 'own' it. I 'issued' it.

Why is it 'a' mind. Numerous reasons.

First, a bunch of minds isn't a mind. Imperatives can't be issued by bunches of minds. They have to be issued by individual minds.

So for any given imperative, there is a mind whose imperative it is.

Second, another imperative of Reason, mentioned above, is Ockham's razor: do not multiply entities beyond necessity. The default, then, is that there is 'a' mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of Reason, not multiple minds. The burden of proof, in other words, is on the person who would posit lots of minds.

For, if the God of your conclusions existed he could very well make two plus two equal 7, despite reason; say what you will about whether he would do so, but so long as he could we really dont know if what we reason to is true, false, meaningless, or something in-between. — Questio

Again, you just keep begging the question. First, yes, of course God could make 2 + 2 = 7. Has he? Consult your reason. Oh, he hasn't. In fact, he's very adamant we should believe it equals 4, for he tell us we 'must' believe that.

So, how do you get from the fact that God 'can' make 2 + 2 = 7, to 'therefore we don't really know if it does or not"??

I could be in Paris. I mean, it is metaphysically possible. By your logic that means I can't know that I'm not. But I do, yes? I know that I'm not in Paris.

I could not exist - I do not exist of metaphysical necessity, I assume you'd agree. So, it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist. Does that mean I can't be sure I exist? No, of course I can be sure I exist.

So, God could do anything - he could make 2 + 2 = 7, hell he could make 2 + 2 = a giraffe. But has he? No. How do I know? My reason tells me 2 + 2 = 4. It tells me it 'must'. That doesn't mean it 'must' in any metaphysical sense, of course. It just means God is adamant about it.

Clearly what I wrote was an argument, although not in a formal deductive format. In order for you to forward an argument or even merely assert the existence of an entity which may go contrary to reason (and thus one who may establish an irrational world, or a world which abides by seemingly rational laws but isn't, or a world where we think we're being rational but aren't) would itself need such an idea to be false to be forwarded, — Questio

I did respond to your argument, though admittedly it was not entirely clear to me what it was. And it still isn't. But I assumed that you thought - fallaciously - that what we can discover by reason, is thereby bound by reason. Which is false. Our reason is a faculty. It brings us an awareness of the imperatives and other norms of Reason. That is, it gives us an awareness of what Reason - which my argument demonstrates to be God - wants us to do and believe. But that does not mean that Reason himself is bound by what he wants us to do and believe. And that itself is something our reason reveals to us (that is, our reason reveals to us that Reason is not bound by what he tells us). As I said, it is the same as fallaciously inferring that what we can see by sight is thereby limited by our sight, as if our sight determines what's there.

So, as far as I can tell, all you're doing is insisting in one way and another that our reason is incapable of bringing us an awareness of a being who has power over reason. I see no justification for insistence. And I am actively demonstrating it to be false. For I have provided an argument - an argument that your own faculty of reason should confirm is sound - that appears to demonstrate that God is Reason (the source of the imperatives of Reason) and exists. And that argument, as it demonstrates that God has power over the imperatives - it's up to him what their content is, for our own commands do not exercise any authority over us, their issuers - it demonstrates that God can do anything, including things that he forbids. For 'he' forbids them. And the forbidder is not prevented by the forbidding from doing what he forbids.

I will respond to the rest in a piecemeal fashion.

I done understand the first part of what you said or how it connects to what I said. At what point did I deny that words are malleable?

And as for the second part: I am arguing that the concept of Jenny God is a coherent one and that she exists.

Ah, again with the advice. My posts do not inhibit others from posting. So that's false. And if someone talks 'about' me to another poster, I think it's perfectly appropriate for me to chip in. Anyway, I am going off to 'chill' as you put it, for I am off to the bar, as is my wont. Cheerio.

Also, he who smelt it, dealt it. Another profound philosophical truth for you.

Yes. The 'most likely' is important. Presumably you would not dismiss Dunning and Kruger's article on this basis?

How would one know that one is not manifesting the effect when raising it? Why, one considers whether one is an expert in the field in which one is declaring oneself to be.

If you do that, you will find that the answer is 'no'. It's 'yes' when I do it.

It is not semantical. The definition of omnipotence is an attempt at capturing a concept; the concept of an all powerful being.

If I define 'omnipotence' as 'a container of tea', I have not thereby shown that God is a teapot.

That's what those who define omnipotence as 'being able to do all logically possible things' are doing. They're not capturing the original concept, but replacing it with something else (as I did above).

So, who, of these two beings, has more power:

Tom God: Tom God can do all things that are logically possible.

Jenny God: Jenny God can do all things that are logically possible and all things that aren't.

Jenny, obviously.

Who's more arrogant, the expert who thinks he's an expert - that is, the person who has actually gone to the trouble to make himself what he believes himself to be - or the non-expert who thinks he's an expert?
Anyway, philosophy isn't a popularity contest. We're trying to figure out what's true, right? So one needs to get over oneself and get stuck in.

And now who's more powerful - someone who can do anything, or someone who can do some things but not others?

I’m not an expert in the matter, — Wayfarer

You don't say!

Nor is Questio.

But you'll confirm each other. And that's good enough for you, yes?

If you're not an expert, why are you listening to yourself?

Why not listen to an expert?

The distinction that Questio drew is one that I drew right at the outset (and drew far more clearly). And then, despite my attempting to explain why a being who is bound by what is logically possible is less powerful than one who is not - something I'd have thought would be blindingly obvious to virtually everyone - you (and Questio) persist in mentioning this distinction again and again in the hope that somehow that'll constitute a refutation of what I've argued.

That's all you're doing. You're telling yourselves again and again that I'm unaware of a distinction that a moment's attention to anything I wrote will tell you I'm abundantly well aware of and that I am making it my business to show is a distinction between a being who is omnipotent and one who is not.

All Questio is doing with all this 'intellect' talk is suggesting that if the God's nature is fixed, then somehow this is not a constraint on the God's power. Which is obviously false.

Two problems. First: it 'is' a constraint for a God whose nature is not fixed will have greater power. Second, what, exactly, is constraining the God? God? In that case God's nature is not constrained and he can make himself however he wants. Or laws of nature are constraining it. n which case a being not constrained by those laws would be more powerful....and thus we no longer have a description of an omnipotent being on our hands.

See?

I told you. Jeez. Ratiocination. Look it up.

So you're asking if everything that happens is happening 'due to' the omnipotent being?

On the face of it, it would seem not. I mean, what I am doing right now seems to be being done by me, not the omnipotent being.

As I noted much earlier in this thread (when this thread was two, much clearer, focussed threads), being omnipotent does not essentially involve having created everything.

For instance, our reason tells us that some things that exist, exist uncaused. Well, by hypothesis the omnipotent being has not created those things.

It is sufficient that the omnipotent being 'could' create all things and could destroy all things. THe omnipotent being does not, qua omnipotent being, have actually to have created everything. For not having created everything is not itself a deficiency in power.

Why would an omnipotent being do anything? — Uglydelicious

Because he wants to, presumably.

How do we know an omnipotent being isn’t doing everything, always? — Uglydelicious

Reason and observation. Our reason is our guide to reality. And our reason tells us that some things are happening and others not and some things have been created and others not. And our reason tells us that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. And so if it is true that I exist, it is not also false that I exist. And thus I can conclude that I exist, and that an omnipotent being has not destroyed me, even though this is something he could do.

So can the omnipotent being create another being that is MORE omnipotent than him? If yes, then that newly created more omnipotent being can create yet another that is even more omnipotent. Lather, rinse and repeat and infinite number of times. — EricH

Yes, he can do all that. Are you on a sponsored go-slow or something? He can do anything. I then explained - goodness knows why - that 'can' doesn't mean 'is'. So, he 'can' create a being more powerful than himself, but he hasn't.

He can do contradictory things. But he hasn't. He can do things that make no sense to us. But he hasn't. And so on. Now please, kindly absorb that information and stop asking he if he can do this or that. The answer is 'yes' no matter what you ask.

So an omnipotent being cannot create another being that is equally omnipotent - that would be terribly frustrating for those poor omnipotent beings. — EricH

I didn't say he cannot do this, I said he has not done it. This isn't hard, or at least I didn't think it was.

Again: there's what 'is' the case, and there's what's possible.

Anything is possible. It is possible that you'll eventually grasp the point, for instance. But it 'is' the case that you aren't. And so on.

Our reason is our guide to what 'is' the case. But as God is not bound by reason, our reason is not our guide to what is possible, except insofar as it tells us that God, not being bound by reason but being its source, is capable of anything.

I imagine it must be that time on the ward when you're allowed a bit of computer fun before din dins and drug induced catatonia.
You haven't addressed or understood anything I've argued. Now, you are manifesting the Dunning Kruger effect because you're hugely overestimating your own expertise and you think - are quite convinced, I'm sure - that I'm an idiot, yes? Of course, you won't be able to recognize that you are manifesting it until you become more expert, which is going to be hard given that experts strike you as idiots from whom you can learn nothing but who instead need educating by you.
Why don't you try actually reading the Apology rather than quoting from it.

As many people in this thread have tried pointing out to you, the very notion of omnipotence is inherently illogical. — EricH

Yes, so? Again: Dunning Kruger. You think 'they' are the experts, right? After all, they must be becuase you are and you think I'm being illogical, and they all think I'm being illogical - so I must be being illogical. Your test for expertise is "does this person think roughly like me?" That's a good test if you're an expert, but really bad if you're not. And you're not.

Now, given Dunning and Kruger, what would we predict would happen if an expert in philosophy entered a forum populated mainly - perhaps exclusively- by non-experts? We'd predict that the expert would, in no time at all, be considered an idiot, yes? His arguments would be much better than others, and he'd defend them much more ably, but most of those on the site would think his arguments were bad, and that he's defending them badly. Right? Or do you think Dunning and Kruger would predict the opposite?

So, forget other people's assessment of my arguments and focus instead on the arguments themselves. And stop assuming that they're 'illogical' just because you don't quite understand them. That isn't the test of illogicality.

You're arguing very badly. You say this:

Can an omnipotent being create another being more omnipotent than itself? If no, then such a being is not omnipotent because there is something that it cannot do.

If yes, then you have an infinite number of omnipotent beings, each of which creates a yet more omnipotent being - and thus there is no omnipotent being. — EricH

I've already addressed this point, but I'll do so again. Yes, of course an omnipotent being can create another omnipotent being. He can do anything, so he can do that.

Does it follow from that - as you seem to think - that we'll then have an infinite number of omnipotent being? Er, no.

I have no idea how you reached that conclusion. There's a missing premise. But if I had to guess, I'd say you've confused having the ability to do something with actually doing it.

But being able to do something does not mean one is doing it. The omnipotent being has not created another omnipotent being. He can. He hasn't. He can. He hasn't. He can. He hasn't.

How do I know that? My reason tells me that if there is an omnipotent being, there is only one.

Our reason is our guide to what's what. So, if you want to know what's actually the case, consult your reason. Our reason is also a guide to what powers God actually has. And it tells us that God's powers exceed what reason says is possible.

You provide no evidence that I am begging the question and appeal not to arguments, but authority figures.

Have I denied the law of non-contradiction? No. I think that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. I believe that as firmly as you do. If you are labouring under the impression that I deny it, then you're confused and you're attacking a straw man.

You are doing what others do. You are confusing having an ability with exercising it. God can create a true proposition that is also false. That doesn't mean he has (although perhaps he has, of course - perhaps "this proposition is false" is one....but let's not get into that as it's beside the point). So, again, in reality no true proposition is also false. You're not more confident about that than I.

Now, if you want to add to the law of non-contradiction the claim that it is 'necessarily' true that no true proposition is also false, then I deny that. For I deny that anything is necessarily true or necessarily existent. And I deny that becuase God exists and God can do anything and thus nothing is necessarily true or necessarily existent.

But denying that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth is not the same as denying that it is true, yes? So again: I think no true proposition is also false. I think it is 'possible' for God to bring into being such a proposition, for it is down to God that no true proposition is not also false, and thus up to him whether that continues to be the case. But there's what is the case and what can be the case.

I am begging no questions. You think I am, because you think that if I appeal to reason to establish that God can do anything, then somehow that means that what I prove with reason is bound by reason, yes?

That's just simply false, or at least I can see absolutely no reason to think it is true. That's like thinking that what I can see with my eyes is bound by my eyes, as if my eyes have power over what exists. It's fallacious. I can see lots of things with my eyes and only with my eyes, but that does not mean that my eyes exercise power over what exists.

Similarly then, what I can discover by reason is not thereby bound by reason. I can discover by reason - as can anyone who exercises it as carefully and diligently as I do - that God exists, for I can discover by reason that reason's imperatives are the imperatives of a mind and that the mind in question, by virtue of being the mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason, will be able to do anything.

Now, if you think I have not uncovered this by my reason, then you can simply highlight an error in my reasoning below:

"A law of Reason is an imperative or instruction to do or believe something.

But imperatives require an imperator, instructions an instructor. And only a mind can instruct or issue a command. Thus this premise is true:

1. If there are laws of Reason, then there is a mind whose laws they are

It is also not open to reasonable doubt that there are laws of Reason. For if you think there are not, then either you think there is a reason to think there are not - in which case you think there are, for a 'reason to believe' something is an instruction of Reason - or you think there is no reason to think there are laws of Reason yet disbelieve in them anyway, in which case you are irrational. Thus, this premise is true beyond a reasonable doubt too:

2. There are laws of Reason

From which it follows:

3. Therefore, there is a mind whose laws are the laws of Reason

The mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason would not be bound by those laws, as they have the power over their content. A mind that is not bound by the laws of Reason is a mind that can do anything at all. Thus, this premise is true:

4. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omnipotent

The mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason will also have power over all knowledge, for whether a belief qualifies as known or not is constitutively determined by whether there is a reason to believe it - and that's precisely what this mind determines. Thus:

5. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omniscient

Finally, moral laws are simply a subset of the laws of Reason (the moral law is, as Kant rightly noted, an imperative of Reason). And so the mind whose instructions and commands constitute the laws of Reason will be a mind who determines what's right and wrong, good and bad. As the mind is omnipotent, the mind can reasonably be expected to approve of how he is, for if he were dissatisfied with any aspect of himself, he has the power to change it. And if this mind fully approves of himself, then this mind is fully morally good, for that is just what being morally good consists of being. Thus, this premise is also true beyond all reasonable doubt:

6. The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omnibenevolent.

It is a conceptual truth that a mind who exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent 'is' God. Thus:

7. If there exists a mind who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then God exists

From which it follows:

8. Therefore, God exists."


So, I have not begged any questions for I have not assumed that there is a being who can defy Reason, rather I have concluded that there is.

And it is also self-evident to Reason that a being who can defy the imperatives of Reason is more powerful than one who cannot. And thus it is self-evident to reason that the being you describe -a being bound by Reason - is not all powerful and thus not God.

My good friend, it seems as if you have a bad case of thinking yourself superior to two thousand years of Christian theistic thought and reason. Which is fine, I'm okay with that, and encourage it to some extent. Just don't claim me to be a man subverting the traditional idea of God with a much cooler and hip "new" concept, for St. Augustine, St. Aquinas, and St. Anselm would like a word with you. — Questio

I think St Anselm and I would get along like a house on fire. He'd bloody love my proof of God. I mean, it's better than his, isn't it? And in 2900 your future twin will be talking in hallowed terms about St Bartricks and how foolish are those who put themselves above him. I mean, it has quite a ring to it - St Bartricks. I like it.

I know you find it hard to believe. That's because you lack expertise. You think an expert will say things you easily understand and agree with. That's because you radically overestimate your own expertise and so think expertise looks and sounds approximately like you. Right?

Now in an attempt to drag this ruined and messy thread back to something philosophical, God exists because imperatives of Reason exist and require an imperator - an imperator who will be God. And that imperator will be able to do anything - including things he forbids - because they're his imperatives.

That's the point. Of course it doesn't show to you. That's the Dunning Kruger effect. You need to be an expert to recognize one. To you I will appear an idiot. To someone with a similar level of expertise, I will appear to be an expert.

No, God can do all things. That means he can destroy all things if he so chooses. That means that nothing that exists has to exist. All things that exist, exist contingently (including God).

God would not be all powerful if he 'had' to exist, for then he would lack a power, namely the power to take himself out of existence.

It is absurd to suppose that an all powerful being would lack powers that we have. We can take ourselves out of existence if we so choose. So too, then, can God. Rational reflection shows this: doesn't your reason confirm that it is contradictory to suppose that a being who can do anything can nevertheless not do some of the things that you can do? Whatever powers you have, God has too and then some.

I fail to see how you get from 'is able to do all things' to 'has done them all'.

To go from 'possible to exist' to 'exists' is quite a leap.

Having a power and exercising it are different. I have all manner of powers I don't exercise.

So, how do you get from God can do X, to God 'has' done X?

I think you should look up irony too.

And you find that funny why? People with low levels of expertise on a subject often - perhaps invariably - dramatically overestimate just how expert they are on that subject. They also tend to judge those who have much greater expertise than they do to have much less. Which is understandable, of course, as those stupider than ourselves, and those cleverer than ourselves, will both often say things that don't make a great deal of sense to us.
Presumably the mirth is a result of you confidently believing that both EricH and yourself are more expert than I on matters philosophical, yes? Yet I'm about as qualified as it gets, whereas from the quality of your posts I doubt either of you has even a BA in philosophy.

Nor can God will that a four sided triangle exist, or that the internal angles of a triangle be any more or less than 180 degrees in Euclidean space. And no, that does not mean that God is thus limited by some principle above him such as logic and thus is not highest being (which is also an absurd proposition, as highest being cannot be actus purus, only being itself can be). Instead, it is to say that the divine intellect, which is God, is first before the divine will, which is God, and as such God only acts in accordance with his intellect, which, as all perfect intellectual activities must be, is cohesive and noncontradictive. — Questio

It most certainly does mean that he is limited by something above him. Freight what you say with as much latin as you like, the fact is you think God is limited in what he can do - you think he can't will that a four sided triangle exist. Even I can do that!!

He jolly well can will a four sided triangle to exist, and it with forthwith exist. He's God. He can do anything. If you think 'anything' means 'some things and not others' then you're just profoundly confused.

And you are, of course. The 'divine intellect' is not God. It's God's intellect. My intellect is not me. It's my intellect. And what does "God only acts in accordance with his intellect" mean if not "God does what he does"? And then you just pop in 'noncontradictive' at the bottom, out of nowhere.

That's not a case. It's just a convoluted way of saying "God can't do everything". He can do anything. Why? Because the laws of Reason tell us what is possible and what is not, and those laws are his laws and thus do not bind him.

You are just like the rest and think of God as straightjacketed. That's conceptually confused. It's also, of course, offensive to God - telling everyone that he can't do this and can't do that...the cheek of it!!

I cannot discern an original objection in what you say. Because this thread has now been made into an unfocussed mess, I assume that you are attacking my view on what omnipotence involves. And you are pointing out, as I myself did, that many theists interpret being able to do anything as the power to do that which Reason permits. And I am arguing that this cannot be correct, for being able to do anything includes the power to do what Reason forbids.

I don't see that you've said anything to challenge that view. The problem is that you're going to have to beg the question to make a case against me. That is, you're going to have to assume that Reason restricts an omnipotent being before you can show that it does. And that's question begging. So you can go on and on about how making a four sided triangle is not an ability, but your only evidence that this is not an ability is going to be that Reason forbids it (which is not in question).

By contrast, my view begs no questions. It also stands to reason, for it is self-evident to reason that a being who can do X has a power that a being that can't do X lacks.

I take it that you would agree that it is by using our reason that we find out about what actually exists?

Does an omnipotent being exist? Yes. Our reason reveals this when properly used.

And that omnipotent being can do anything at all - anything - as our reason reveals (including, of course, doing things that reason forbids, for the omnipotent being is the source of that forbidding and thus is not bound by it).

Can the omnipotent being that exists do things that our reason says are impossible - yes. However, that does not mean that our reason ceases to be our guide to what actually exists. For being 'able' to do things is not the same as doing them.

So, though God can make a four sided triangle and a married unmarried man, we know by the light of reason that there are no such things in reality. We know this without even having to inspect the place (God saves us the trouble, by telling us that they 'cannot' exist).

Our reason says that there cannot be more than one omnipotent being, for two beings with equal powers can frustrate and destroy each other (so their powers operate as limits on each other). Thus there is only one omnipotent being.

That omnipotent being could, if he so wished, create another omnipotent being (perhaps this was what you were getting at), for he can do anything including things that our reason says are impossible (as our reason itself tell us).

But is there more than one omnipotent being? No, there is just the one. And we can know this as certainly as we can know anything.

Question begging. And tedious. Up your game.

That's question begging. They're not omnipotent for neither of them can do all things.