What exactly do you say metaphysics is? — tim wood

The study of the fundamental nature of things.

Van Gogh is in a totally different league to Cezanne and Gauguin - blows them out of the water. Best artist in the world ever. Ever!

There are all manner of reasons why he didn't sell in his own lifetime (he did exchange paintings with others, and he did sell one - albeit to the sister of a friend). But one reason is that neither he nor his brother made any great effort to sell them. He loved his own paintings. He also valued them highly and priced them far above their market value. For instance, he thought his sunflowers paintings should be sold for 500 francs each (somewhere in the 7,000 pound region in today's money) - the same price as a vase of flowers by the (at the time) very well known and collectible Monticelli. And the first and only painting that he sold in his own lifetime - The Red Vineyard - went for 400 francs. That's a huge sum for a work by a complete unknown (much more than Gauguin was selling his works for). He also didn't paint for very long - his entire artistic career was only 10 years, and of those he only really hit his stride in the last 2 - almost all of his best works come from those final two years. And he spent one of those years in a mental asylum. So the main focus during the last two years of his life - the years when he was producing his best work - was not on selling, but on staying sane.

The early reviews of his work also leave one in no doubt that some, at least, did recognise that his work was in a league of its own (Octave Mirabeau's 1891 review holds nothing back). Monet thought he was great too, and I seem to remember reading somewhere that in the first exhibition of his work after his suicide Monet walked into the room full of Van Goghs and said "My God! He's beaten us all!"

Anyway, Van Gogh can do no wrong in my book and the idea that Cezanne and Gauguin are better is just, well, absurd! The man's a god.

Have a good look at his work and read a biography about him. — Brett

Have you? Have you read his letters? Read his letters. They're like nothing else. Read Jo Bonger Gogh's touching biography (the wife of Theo Van Gogh and one of the great unsung heroes of art - she dedicated her life to promoting his work). Then look at his works. If you still can't see that they're masterpieces there's no hope for you! Gauguin indeed - pah.

Well, I am glad you've adopted my view - which is that 'necessary' functions expressively, not descriptively.

Please display yours. If they exist I'm not seeing much evidence. — jgill

That's because you don't have them. The argument I just presented is a proof of a god's existence. But you don't recognise that, because you don't know what a proof of a god's existence would look like when it's at home. Someone with credentials would or would at least know what to do to test whether we've got the real-deal on our hands.

But then, I have almost none, so what do I know? (I can guess your reply) — jgill

You guessed correctly.

No it isn't.

"There is at least one total dumbo on this thread" does not mean the same as "There is necessarily at least one total dumbo on this thread". And if I deny the latter - which I do - I am not thereby committed to denying the former - which I most certainly don't.

Read your own sentences more carefully.

Don't overthink it. — 3017amen

Don't underthink it.

This is the classic 'god of the gaps' argument. — A Seagull

No it isn't. I don't think you know what you're talking about.

Do you have any formal qualifications in philosophy?

Okay, do you realize you just agreed to a necessary truth? By agreeing that there exists at least one true proposition, that is considered a necessary truth. — 3017amen

You do realize I absolutely didn't? This: "There is at least one true proposition" does not mean the same as "There is necessarily at least one true proposition".

I think the former is true, the latter false.

Now get me to contradict myself.

Or, alternatively, you won't address the argument at all, but just say something about what it reminds you of.

But I'm sure I have missed the more subtle features of the argument. — jgill

You missed it in its entirety. Bad dog!!

You've yet to show me that I'm wrong, though. That is, you've yet to show me that by denying necessity I am committed to affirming contradictions. All you're doing is insisting I'm not playing by the rules.

I am playing by the rules, I am denying that playing by the rules requires affirming the existence of necessity.

If A is B and B is C, then A is necessarily C. — Zelebg

No, I think "if A is B and B is C, then A is C".

You will have shown that I am not playing by the rules when you show me that I am committed to affirming contradictions.

If you believe it's true then it's true by logical necessity. Here's why:

There is at least one true proposition. Call this proposition A. Is A necessarily true? Suppose I contend that is false. Call this proposition B "A is false."

But if A is false so is B because B is a proposition. And if A is false, there are no true propositions. So A must be true.

It is therefore logically impossible for there to exist no true propositions. — 3017amen

So, I think proposition A is true.

What about the proposition "A is necessarily true"? No, I think that proposition - proposition B - is false.

I think A is true, and B is false. So far so good.

But now you say this - "But if A is false so is B because B is a proposition. And if A is false, there are no true propositions. So A must be true"

That's clearly confused. I think proposition A is true. Proposition A says "there is at least one true proposition". I think that's true, not false!

But this proposition "Proposition A is necessarily true" I think is false. That proposition says not that there is a true proposition (which I think is true), but that it is necessarily true that there is a true proposition - which I deny.

So you absolutely haven't demonstrated that I am committed to contradicting myself. Not yet, anyway.

It is therefore logically impossible for there to exist no true propositions. — 3017amen

And that is false. That's just to state that it is necessarily true that there are some true propositions. I deny precisely that. There are some true propositions, but it is not necessarily true that there are some true propositions.

Both truths still exist, — 3017amen

Well, I'm sceptical about precisely that - but happy to be corrected. (By that, of course, I mean that I am sceptical that 'necessary' and 'contingent' truths exist, but I do accept that those truths that have been said to be necessary or contingent are true - so I agree that the truths exist, I just do not think a 'necessary' or 'contingent' describes anything real about the truths.)

1. There is at least one true proposition. — 3017amen

Yes, I agree that that is true.

It seems to me that your idea is that art is a concept — Brett

No, I've said explicitly that art is 'that which answers to the concept of art'. The concept of a chair is not a chair. Chairs are chairs. Concepts are concepts.

Art is not a concept. Art is art. We have a concept of art - an idea - and it is by applying this idea to the world that we are able to recognise that it contains some art.

Note, the word 'concept' is actually one of these bullshit words that turns up all over the place and fairly reliably indicates confusion.

Replace it with its synonym - idea - and things become clearer (or do for me).

We have an 'idea' of art. But art is not an idea. It is the object of the idea of art.

Edit: and culture doesn’t determine art. — Brett

'Determine' is ambiguous, but yes, culture does not 'constitutively' determine what is or is not art. We can all recognise this insofar as we recognise that many artists go unrecognized as such in their own culture.

I don't think that's what 'always' means (since something could always be the case, yet not be necessarily the case).

'Has' to be the case would be more accurate. And that's what I'm denying - I'm denying the reality of has-ness. There are true propositions. But adding to the claim that a proposition is true that it 'has' to be true describes nothing real about it, it just expresses conviction, I think.

It's hardly trivial.

Anyway, once more you've yet to show me how denying the reality of necessity commits me to affirming contradictions.

'Determining it' is ambiguous. It can be used to mean the same as 'discerning it'. (The witnesses determined that Sarah was stabbed by James). If that's how you're using it, then yes - they are determining it, in the sense of 'discerning it' (though with the proviso that it remains possible that their judgement is mistaken).

But they are not 'constitutively determining' it. That is, its status as art is not of a piece with its being judged to be art by objective judges. If it is art then we would expect objective judges to discern this about it, but their judgements and its status as art remain distinct.

Ah, I now see that the 'it' refers to 'exclusivity'.

Well, in a way what you've said just underlines my point - which is that words like 'necessary' 'always' and so forth, function to express convictions, desires, that kind of thing, rather than to describe some feature of reality.

Some propositions are true and some are not. And there are methods we can employ to distinguish the true from the false. But we do not need to invoke the concepts either of necessity or contingency in order to be able to do this, I think.

It adds constancy, assures predictability, determinism. — Zelebg

What does the 'it' refer to?

t says “no magic allowed”, no god or other some such potential devil could sneak up from outside of the equation and change the result or conclusion. — Zelebg

I don't follow you. I'm not arguing for magic. I mean, it is necessity and contingency that seem to require magic, not their absence.

Anyway, whatever desires of yours the reality of necessity would or would not satisfy, I am arguing that we can dispense with the notion and not be committed to affirming contradictions. You have yet to show me that I am wrong about that.

they are equally deciding what is and is not art. — Brett

They are not 'deciding' it, but discerning it.

If we can just 'decide' these things then just decide that art is a piece of cheese and be done.

It's like saying the witnesses just 'decided' that James stabbed Sarah.

Can something non-agential write a prescription?

I understand that and I appreciate your test. But can you be sure that your own contemporary views about art are not prejudicing your opinion against “The Venus”, can you be sure that you’re not bound, unconsciously, by the norms of contemporary culture? — Brett

No, not completely - one of the reasons why it is not a perfect test. But taking that possibility too seriously amounts to just being a radical sceptic.

If four or five independent witnesses report seeing James stab Sarah, then that's pretty darned good evidence that James stabbed Sarah. Now, yes, how can we be sure that the witnesses aren't corrupt? Well, we can't be entirely sure. But that doesn't mean we aren't very well justified in now believing that James stabbed Sarah.

Similarly, if four of five archaeologists dig up that venus thingy and each one independently judges it to be a totem not a work of art, then that's pretty good evidence that it is not a work of art - for the rational faculties of five independent people delivered that verdict.

Now, that's not conclusive proof because our reason is not infallible and is liable to corruption by the influences of the age in which we live. But this test can reasonably be expected to overcome many such corrupting forces precisely because the judges in question - the archaeologists - are passing judgement about something they believe to belong to another culture.

No, I wouldn't say 'exclusively'. I don't see what that adds.

This is the test, I guess. Why would it be regarded as art 20,000 years from now? — Brett

If archaeologists dug it up now, and because of where they dug it up from conclude that it is 20,000 years old, would they consider it a work of art?

Yes. Obviously.

So why do you think archaeologists 20,000 years from now won't also consider it a work of art?

Note, the whole point of the test - why it is a good test - is that it helps us overcome the prejudices of our current age and look beyond the norms of our own culture.

That's why it is a good test now, and will be a good test 20,000 years from now. And anything that passes the test now, will almost certainly pass it at any time.

It's not secret - I've made it on this forum before - it's just not on topic. But here it is boiled down to its basics:

1. Prescriptions of Reason exist
2. All prescriptions have a mind that issues them.
3. Therefore, the prescriptions of Reason have a mind that issues them.
4. None of the prescriptions of Reason are issued by my mind (and that applies to you too, of course)
5. Therefore, the prescriptions of Reason have a mind that issues them, and the mind in question is not my mind, or your mind.

That mind - Reason's mind - is a god, and with a few more steps it becomes more reasonable than not to suppose that the mind in question is 'God' (where 'God' is taken to be a mind who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent).

although I may be ill-equipped to critique it. — jgill

Yes. I predict, like I say, that you will either end up questioning the probative value of any argument for anything, or you will dismiss the argument on the grounds that it has premises that entail its conclusion (which, I suppose, amounts to the same thing).

I trying to determine why the artefact is not a work if art. — Brett

Well, first we should not assume that there is some set of features that all artworks have to have in common in order to be art.

What I am proposing is not a definition, but a procedure for testing whether something is a work of art (though a procedure that is not 100% reliable). It is a good procedure, I think, because we are first and foremost aware of art via our reason and this test is a way of accessing its least corrupted deliverances on this matter.

From what you say you believe that these artefacts from the past, these totems, have no relationship to art, and, possibly, that there was no art then. — Brett

I have said nothing so strong as that. My thought experiment is regularly put into practice. That little totem is an example. It was dug up. And it seemed and seems to most of us to be a totem, not a work of art. Looked at objectively, then, it doesn't seem to qualify as art. Which is good grounds for thinking that it is not art - for what better grounds could we ever have for thinking that something is or is not art than the disinterested judgements of rational beings?

It does not follow from this that there can be no relationship between totems and art or anything else and art. Nothing in my proposed test prevents an object from being classified as both a totem 'and' a work of art. My point is just that in this particular case, it seems just to be a totem - that, when looked at objectively, it does not seem to be art, just totem.

Nor does it follow from this that I think there was no art in the past. I am unclear why you think my test commits me to that view? If the mona lisa was dug up it would be considered a work of art, regardless of the age from which it was thought it came.

If A is B and B is C, then A is necessarily C. — Zelebg

That's what you say. I say "if A is B, and B is C, then A is C".

It means the conclusion “logically follows” or is “implied by proposition”, that better? — Zelebg

I don't think those don't mean the same as 'necessarily'. For instance, most would hold that the laws of logic are necessary truths, but they do not mean by that that they somehow 'follow' from something.

Plus even if they are synonymous, my position would then be that we can do without them and rather than saying 'logically follows' can simply say 'consequently is the case' or some such.

Take. Your. Meds.

But instead you want to accept a premise just to deny it, and if you do not see the contradiction, at least you should realize how pointless it is. — Zelebg

I am arguing that we do not need necessity - that we can dispense with it and still be able to reason about reality just fine, find out stuff, and not commit ourselves to affirming contradictions. And I am saying the same about contingency.

That's what I'm arguing here. So to challenge me you'd need to show that I am wrong about that. But what you're now doing is questioning the point of this. Well, the point is a) it would solve a lot of problems elsewhere, such as how to account for the truth of conditional statements, and b) I think there's a good case for thinking that necessity and contingency are not real. But that case would be undermined if dispensing with them would commit us to affirming contradictions.

Ok, let us hear your reasoning then. — Zelebg

I am not arguing here that necessity and contingency do not exist - although that is what I think - I am arguing that we do not need to affirm their existence. That is, we can, as I say, get along just fine without them. It is that claim - that we can do without them - that I am defending, and I am defending it by showing how those who claim otherwise cannot show me that I must commit myself to contradictions when I deny the reality of necessity (maybe they can - but they haven't yet).

So you, for example, said that necessary truths are truths of definition. But I did not see how the existence of truths of definition would commit me to accepting the existence of necessary truths. For, again, though I accept that it is true by definition that bachelors are never married man, and accept as well that Roger is a never married man, I just conclude from this that therefore Roger is a bachelor.

Roger is a never married man. Never married men are bachelors. Therefore Roger is a bachelor. What would adding "must be" do apart from serving to emphasise the obviousness of it all?

All you are doing, it seems to me, is insisting that there are necessary truths. You are not showing me why I must, on pain of incoherence, accept them.

So, once more, I accept this definition of a bachelor: a bachelor is a never married man. I accept that Roger is a never married man. And I conclude that Roger is therefore a bachelor.

No contradiction there. I have not said anything about Roger that contradicts what I have said about the meaning of the word 'bachelor'

But again, I take it that you would insist that as Bachelors are, by definition, never married men, and Roger is a never married man, then it follows 'of necessity' that Roger is a bachelor.

That's precisely what I deny.

You haven't, then, explained necessity by explaining how necessary truths are truths of definition, for your explanation presupposes that necessity exists, rather than explaining its existence.

Again, I accept that it is true by definition that Roger is a bachelor, yet I deny that there are any necessary truths. I have not, so far as I can tell, contradicted myself.

I don't really follow you.

Let's say I define 'bachelor' as 'never married man'. Well, as Roger is a never married man, then Roger is a bachelor. That's what I'd say. But presumably you'd say that as Roger is a never married man, then 'necessarily' he is a bachelor. That's what I'd deny.

So the definition of a mind, is that which hosts a conscious state. — Punshhh

That's a misleading way to put it. It doesn't 'host' conscious states (for that implies they could exist elsewhere - they just happen to be attending a mind). No, it 'bears' conscious states.

An analogy: water can be gas, liquid, or solid. Those are 'states' of water. We would not say that water 'hosts' its solidity. No, 'solid' is a state that water can be in - sometimes water is solid.

Consciousness is a state - a state of mind. So, 'a mind' is the object - the thing - that is sometimes in the state of consciousness.

Am I saying that minds are always conscious? No. That may be the case (Descartes thought it was). But it does not follow from anything I said.

If something is conscious - which means the same as 'in a state of consciousness' - then it is a mind. But something can be a mind and not be conscious.
Consciousness is therefore sufficient to make something a mind, but not necessary (though again, some - Descartes - disagree and think that minds are essentially conscious and thus can no more be lacking in consciousness than a material object can be lacking in extension).

ust a few more questions to clarify, is a bacteria conscious? — Punshhh

You have already asked me that - no, I don't see any good evidence that bacteria are conscious.

Minds - the objects that bear consciousness - are associated with brains. Bacteria do not have brains. So it would not be reasonable to believe they have minds. They 'could' have minds, but we have no reason to suppose they do and so believing that they do would be akin to me believing you've murdered 10 people (you 'could' have done so - there's nothing metaphysically impossible about it - but brute possibilities are not good evidence).

Does a mind require neurons? — Punshhh

No.

What do you call the self aware consciousness found in a human? — Punshhh

Self-consciousness.

Note, it is not a 'thing'. It is a 'state of a thing'.

Consciousness is a state, not an object.

I think the bulk of the philosophical community - naming them all would take years.

But the vast bulk would accept that some truths are necessary and those that are not necessary are contingent. And they mean by this (well, 'precisely' what's meant is a matter of dispute) that some truths must be true - they are true 'in all possible worlds' - whereas others are not, they just happen to be true but it is possible for them to be false.

I think that every truth is just true. I think no truth is necessarily true, but at the same time I do not think that it is true that a true proposition 'could be false'.

I didn't attribute minds to trees and bacteria. I said they may be conscious and that they produce art. — Punshhh

Conscious states are 'states' of a thing. That thing is, by definition, 'a mind' ('a mind' being just 'that which bears conscious states'). So if you think a tree has conscious states, then you think that the tree either is, or possesses, a mind. To deny this is akin to denying that never-married Tim is a bachelor (I didn't say he was a bachelor, I just said he was a never married man!).

The reason I asked you these questions about animals and plants was to determine what you mean by the word mind. — Punshhh

I hope it is now clear. I am using the term in its conventional sense to denote an object that bears conscious states - that is, something that can be in a state of consciousness.

If you think there can exist conscious states that are not the states of any object, then I would like to sell you the shape of my house (not my house - just its shape).

if you accept that conscious states are the states of a thing, then you now know how to use the word 'mind' correctly. It refers to that object.

Well, if this is the case: that one can prove it in metaphysics, using those tools, then the proof has not effectively convinced, certainly the lay public, and even within metaphysics the proof (or proofs) are not consensus accepted as holding up. — Coben

You expressed in an earlier post your conviction that God's existence could not be demonstrated rationally. That's really neither here nor there, but nevertheless I did not want to let it pass and so I expressed my justified belief that it can be demonstrated rationally, for I have done precisely that here - that is, demonstrated it rationally (not this thread, but elsewhere). Or so I think.

As to my view not being accepted by the majority of experts in the field - well that's true in one sense and false in another. It is false in that the majority of expert metaphysicians do, actually, accept that God's existence can be demonstrated, or at least shown to be more reasonable than not. You are confusing the current crop of expert metaphysicians with 'all' expert metaphysicians. But there have been expert metaphysicians for millennia. And most have thought God's existence can rationally be demonstrated. So, that's the sense in which what you say is just false. Among those whose expertise is not in question - among those whose brilliance is undisputed - there is a broad consensus that God's existence can be demonstrated.

The specific proof that I was talking about, however, is not currently widely known. So we cannot really look to the expert community's judgement about it, for it has not yet been formed. Academic publications are not widely read, so the whole process from discovery to academic respectability is a very long and drawn-out one. As such lack of widespread current acceptance doesn't really tell you anything important about the credibility of the argument.

If it was a widely known argument, and if the majority of the expert community, being aware of it, has judged it to fail, then I grant that would provide non-experts with prima facie reason to think it probably doesn't work.

But this thread is about expertise. So we can put the specifics of the proof aside and just consider things in the abstract and think about what it would be reasonable to believe in light of an expert judgement.

Say an expert in a field thinks he/she has made a discovery in that field. You - a non-expert - think that X is the case. But this expert in the field is very confident that X is not the case. His evidence has yet to become widely known in the field and so it has not yet been widely scrutinized.

What should you, as a reasonable person, now think? You know that this person knows a lot, lot more about this matter than you. And you know as well that this person is very confident that X is not the case (which is unusual, because normally experts are more circumspect).

Well, I think you should take very seriously that X is not the case.

Does this mean that there is no “art” to be retrieved from that era and that the appearance of “art” only appeared at a particular time in human history and hasn’t always been there. — Brett

I don't see how that follows from what I said. It just implies that that particular artefact is probably not a work of art (and something produced today that resembles it, is therefore probably not a work of art either as were it to be dug up in a few thousand years it too would be classified as some kind of totem rather than a work of art).

If you had six beers in the fridge, and I took some of them, then you would have less than what you put in. How many less, would be contingent on how many I had taken. But that there was less, is a necessary truth. If you knew I took two, then there would necessarily be four remaining (given that only you and I were involved.) I don't see anything else to say, but someone else might. — Wayfarer

There were six beers in the fridge. You took two. Now there are four (which is fewer than there used to be).

Bartricks has knowledge about the existence of God that he will not divulge since we are untrained in the intricacies of metaphysical analysis, and thus unworthy. But if we collectively plead with him, he might give us a glimpse of the Truth. — jgill

Partly right. It would be like showing a Rembrandt to a dog. But also it would be off topic.

An expert in metaphysics would be one who knows about 'metaphysics' as a subject matter. — creativesoul

What a brilliant piece of analysis. Do say more.

Nonetheless... experts can be wrong. — creativesoul

Really? I never realized. Me learn lots. clap clap.

In philosophy, it seems quite readily evident to me - when it comes to my forte - than many are. — creativesoul

Hm, that's a bit of a thinker.

Even to make this argument there have to be necessary truths. — Wayfarer

I don't see why. I have not claimed that necessarily there are no necessary truths, only that there are not in fact any.

If what you argue is only contingent, then it has no binding power, as it only happens to be true from time to time, if at all, and there's no reason anyone should accept it. — Wayfarer

None of that follows. First, I am not arguing that all truths are contingent, for I deny contingent truths too. Propositions are just true or false, they are neither necessarily true, nor contingently true - just true.

If a proposition is true, then there is (normally anyway) a reason to believe it (an 'epistemic reason'). But I fail to see why a truth has to be 'necessarily' true before we have reason to believe it - mere truth is sufficient. For example, I have reason to believe I exist, because it is true I exist. Yet clearly it is not necessarily true that I exist. So it is just plainly false that we lack reason to believe anything other than necessary truths.

Necessary truths comprise the relationship between ideas. 2 is always greater than 1, in all possible worlds, as a matter of definition. Again if it were not so, how could logic itself gain any traction? — Wayfarer

Well, take any law of logic you like, and call it 'necessarily true'. Well, I will just say that it is 'true'.

So this argument:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

is valid. You will claim that if its premises are true, necessarily its conclusion is. But I will simply claim that if its premises are true, then its conclusion is. We can both reason just the same - we will both reach the same conclusions, it is just that you will think your conclusions are necessarily true given the premises, whereas I will simply think they are true.

The reason you don't think that the descriptor 'necessary' adds anything of value, is because you're thinking of it tautologically - in effect, what about 'necessary' is 'necessary'? And the response is, necessary truths are true necessarily. If they were true on some other grounds, then they wouldn't be necessary. — Wayfarer

No, I just don't think necessity exists and I think the only evidence we have of its existence - namely rational intuitions representing there to be necessary truths - are more reasonably interpreted to be functioning expressively, rather than descriptively.

What I want to see is whether, by denying necessity and contingency, I am committed to affirming contradictions.

I too am confused as I am not clear how what you've said connects to what I've said.

By our reason. We cannot know something by instinct, for unless or until that belief which was formed by instinct is ratified by reason is does not count as 'justified' and knowledge involves having justified true beliefs, whatever else it may involve.

Yes. That's why it isn't disputable. The idea of art is the idea of art, and art itself is that which answers to the idea.

But although that sounds trivial, what is not trivial is the mistake of confusing the concept of a thing with the thing it is the concept of. So, although we have the concept of art, and art is that which answers to it, art is not a concept.