But forget 'certainty' if it cannot tell you whether something is possible or impossible or actual. To know something goes beyond a particular case, and has a sense of generality, even if we talk purely of sense experiences and not the objects in themselves (whatever that might mean). — Miles

I do not know what you mean. As I have said repeatedly, I think there are many true propositions. I think there's a reality. I think we can know about aspects of it. And so on. What I deny is the reality of necessity. That's not equivalent to denying the reality of things, or truth, or reasons, or Reason, or knowledge.

As I mentioned before check out demonstration or negation of the Law of contradiction. This law is a necessary truth because we use it to demonstrate or to negate it. There are many examples of it. — Miles

I do not understand this point. The law of non-contradiction is true, but it doesn't have to be necessarily true. If it is true, then I am justified in rejecting a view that generates a contradiction. Not because the view in question is necessarily false, but because it is false.

Incidentally, even its status as true is debatable - I mean, "this sentence is false" seems, on the face of it, to be a proposition that is both true and false at the same time. Perhaps it isn't - I am not saying it certainly is - but it 'seems' to be.

That's by the by, of course. The point is that I can draw all the distinctions you can, without having to invoke the reality of necessity.

The law of non-contradiction is - most likely - true, but it can be true without being necessarily true.

Note, the law itself says that no true proposition is also false. It does not say that no true proposition can also be false. It says no true proposition is also false. It does not, in other words, itself invoke the concept of necessity. Which is precisely why I can affirm it without affirming the existence of necessity.

And you clearly and confidently replied no you wouldn’t check it because you agree there cannot be any square circles. — Miles

No, I didn't say that. I said there are certainly no square circles in reality. I didn't say there cannot be. I said there aren't.

Again, I think you're confusing quite different notions. Certainty and necessity are not the same, yet whenever I express confidence in a proposition's truth you take me to be asserting that its necessity. I am not.

Similarly, to be aware of something a priori is not of a piece with being aware of its necessity. Again, if - if - there are necessary truths, we will be aware of them via our reason, but it does not follow from this that if we are aware of a truth via our reason that it is therefore a necessary truth. I am aware, a priori, that there are no square circles in reality. But that does not mean that it is necessarily true that there are no square circles in reality.

But then you add ‘it is not necessarily never’ as though you are making a valid statement. — Miles

Again, I do not understand what you mean. Denying that there is necessity in reality is not the same as saying that there is necessarily no necessity in reality. It is metaphysically possible for there to be necessary truths, I just deny that there are any. That's consistent. What would be inconsistent would be saying that necessarily there are no necessary truths. I have not said that it is impossible for there to be necessary truths, I have said there are 'actually' none.

What you don’t seem to appreciate is that ‘cannot be’ just means ‘it is impossible’. — Miles

First, you are seeing 'cannots' where there aren't any - where have I said 'cannot be'? - and second, that's not actually what 'cannot' means. It is 'one' meaning of the word, not the only one.

The word 'can' is subject to considerable debate. There are conditional and unconditional interpretations of 'can' and 'cannot' and so on. And it often functions expressively, as it does if I were to say "I cannot abide him!" or "you cannot be serious!"

If according to reason something is impossible, we cannot then say well maybe it is possible outside of our reason. That my friend is a meaningless statement for reasons I gave in the above paragraph.
And then you talk of mistakes in reasoning in trying to explain your views on the faculty of reason vs. our particular reasons. — Miles

I have not said any of the things you're attributing to me. Nothing I have said is 'meaningless'. You're attacking a straw man.


What I have said is that our reason (which is a faculty distinct from Reason and her prescriptions - that later being what it gives us insight into) 'represents' many truths to be incapable of being anything other than true.

What I then said is that these representations are ambiguous because they can be taken to be functioning expressively, not descriptively.

If they are functioning expressively - as 'must' 'always' 'necessarily' typically do when we use them - then those rational representations are not evidence of actual necessity, but rather of Reason's attitudes.

But we have errors in judgment as we have error in senses. Different organs and parts are involved and sometimes these organs are weakened or something else gets in the way and they do not process the information, sometimes it is lack of familiarity sometimes it is lack of remembering certain facts an so on. Things are not as simple as you outline them. — Miles

You're straw manning again. I have not suggested that anything is simple.

The norms of reason are what our faculty of reason gives us insight into, just as in a similar (but not identical) fashion our sensible faculties give us insight into the sensible world. Our sensible faculties do not 'constitute' the sensible world. Likewise, our faculty of reason does not constitute Reason, or the norms of Reason - no, our faculty of reason tells us about the norms of Reason. But what it tells us can be false. Why? Because its 'tellings' do not constitute the norms of Reason.

I am not saying you are wrong, I am just saying you need to go into far more detail to see whether you are presenting a powerful argument. — Miles

I am not sure what you mean. Here the issue has become whether necessity is necessary. I am arguing that it is not. I think necessity does not exist - but I have not argued that, just expressed my disbelief in necessity.

So, as I emphasised earlier, I take it that it is the 'coherence' of my view that is in question, not its plausibility. A view can be coherent but implausible. My view is coherent and plausible. But so far I have only sought to show its coherence, because you seem to think that necessity is necessary, and I don't.

But I have not denied - indeed, I've repeatedly stressed - that the existence of necessity seems well supported by our rational intuitions.

All I've done is show that do not 'have' to interpret those intuitions descriptively, and we do not 'have' to appeal to the concept of necessity to argue for things.

(The other thing I can see is maybe you are trying to talk about objective truth, subjective truth, and these in relation to necessity. Maybe what you are trying to say that such truths as ‘there are no squared circles’ are subjective as in subject to reason, but not objectively true. If this is what you mean then the discussion needs to be focused just on these so that we can have targeted discussions). — Miles

No, I think what you've said there is confused. 'Objective' doesn't mean 'necessary' so I don't know why you'd think I reject objective truths on the basis of what I've said so far.

I am not trying to say anything other than what I've said. And what I have said is that there are no necessary truths and we do not need the concept of necessity in order to be able to argue for things. In other words, I am saying that one can consistently deny the existence of necessity.

I am still thinking about the vegetarian aspect of the argument. However, I do not feel the kidney example matches abortion. I bear zero responsibility for the guy with bad kidneys, however, when I get my abortion, I had some role in creating the need for that abortion?? I am not sure if that changes the conclusion, but it certainly implies MORE obligation than if I had no role in creating the need. If someone had punched me in the kidneys, and I die unless they hook themselves up, would I expect it...no. Would I do it for someone I had injured, I don't know. But I would call it the "good" thing to do (purely subjective opinion, but that is all morals for me). — ZhouBoTong

I do not want to get too side-tracked into debating its implications for abortions, as that's not my focus (although I believe we can come up with alternative thought experiments that are more closely analogous to regular pregnancies, and the intuitions remain the same).

So, sticking to meat-eating - well, 'I' did not create the meat industry or kill the animals whose meat is now on sale to me in shops. And I did not actively cultivate an appetite for meat. So, it is not my fault that animals are being reared and systematically killed for their meat.

So, through processes for which I bear no moral responsibility, I have an appetite for meat and foregoing it would now require radically altering my diet in ways that will be very inconvenient and uncomfortable.

That seems relevantly analogous to the Mat situation. It is not my fault that Mat is ill and needs me to forego all sweet food from now on if he is to survive. Am I nevertheless obliged to forego sweet foods from now on?

I think plausibly not (of course, I accept that as we adjust the case so that it becomes closer and closer to the meat eating case, it may be intuitive that I have an obligation to do 'something').

So, if Mat needs the use of my kidneys for the rest of his life, I am obliged to give him the use of them?

Even if your intuitions say yes, most people's intuitions say 'no'. It would be a praiseworthy thing to do - that is, to agree to be hooked up to him for life - but not obligatory (which is precisely why it is praiseworthy).

What if he only needs the use of them for 9 months? Am I obliged to hook up?

No - or at least, that's what most people's intuitions say.

And this doesn't seem to be a case of self-interest corrupting our intuitions, for our intuiitons say the same when roles are reversed. When I reflect on whether I am entitled to the use of someone else's kidneys if I need them in order to survive, my intuitions say that I am not.

Thomson's original thought experiment has exerted such an influence precisely because people's intuitions are like this - for the case seems relevantly analogous to cases of abortion and thus to imply that most abortions are morally permissible, even if the foetus has a full right to life.

Well, it seems to me - and I suspect most people - that I am not obliged radically to alter my diet for life, even if that is what Mat needs me to do if he is to survive.

I am not arguing that the badness of the meat industry's practices do not generate any kind of obligation for us to alter our diets. It is beyond dispute that it is wrong to kill an animal just for the pleasure of eating its body. And that should not be allowed - that is, states should outlaw it. But does it translate into an obligation for us to forego eating something we've come greatly to enjoy eating? It translates into 'something' - perhaps we should try and eat less meat and put some effort into cultivating alternative appetites. But foregoing it altogether?

I am unclear how you are getting from the fact that we seem to have some information about reality imprinted on our souls, to the conclusion that therefore everything exists at once. That doesn't seem to follow at all - it's a crazy leap.

I mean, we do know some things independent of experience, otherwise we'd be unable to take experiences to imply anything.

But that doesn't imply we know everything independent of experience.

It doesn't imply there's no past or future or present.

It doesn't imply that I am the same as the objects I seem to be experiencing.

If everything is one, then you deserve punishment for my wrongs - yes? I mean, you committed them as much as I did, for we're one and the same person.

Yet that's manifestly absurd as the reason of all but the insane will confirm. So we're not all one. And if we're not all one, everything is not one.

What we can say of metaphysics is what we can know, otherwise we may as well say any thing we like and throw the books in the bin. — Miles

I have not denied that we can know things.

You are consistently confusing my claims with other claims, quite distinct from mine.

For the record: I think we can and do know many things.

I think there are many truths that we are aware of by reason alone.

I think we can know some things with certainty.

I think the law of non-contradiction is true (well, I'm actually tentative about that - there seem to be counterexamples - but for the sake of argument, I will accept that it is true).

I am doing philosophy, not undermining the need for it.

For example, you can't see, touch, hear, smell, or taste necessity, can you?

So, this 'necessity' that you think exists is not part of the world of sense. It is not, then, some feature of the sensible world.

How are we aware of it?

Well, by our reason.

Our reason tells us that some truths are necessary, yes? It does this by making us aware of prescriptions of Reason, These prescriptions - some of them, anyway - tell us to believe that some truths cannot be false. Our reason tells us not just that 2 + 2 = 4, but that it 'must' do. Our reason tells us not just that no true statement is also false, but that no true statement can ever also be false. And so on.

Now, I do not see how you can disagree with me up to this point. I mean, it is surely beyond dispute that necessity is not empirically discerned. And it is beyond dispute that necessity is something our reason tells us exists by representing it to exist.

But I think that the 'musts' in Reason's representations are operating expressively, not descriptively.

So what you take to be really good evidence that necessity exists, I take to be good evidence that Reason is either really certain about something, or really adamant that we believe it.

The problem for you is that you take these representations at face value - and that means you owe a truth-maker. I don't, note. Consider my shopping list again. It said "If there are mars bars, you must buy me a mars bar". That 'must' doesn't require a truth maker, does it? But if you took that 'must' to be descriptive, then it would need a truth-maker.

So, what I want to know from you, is what is the truth-maker for these representations of Reason - the ones that represent certain truths to be necessary.

I do not think you are going to be able to do that. I predict that, as with the law of non-contradiction, you will either just reiterate that it is necessarily true - when what I wanted is the truth-maker, not more confidence in its necessity - or you will simply explain why it is actually true (which, once more, will not tell me what the truth maker of 'necessarily' in 'necessarily true' is).

I asked for the truth-maker of a necessary truth. But what you did it just tell me that a necessary truth is a necessary truth. For in attempting to explain why the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true, all you could do is point out to me that denying it would result in a contradiction! But that's a problem if the law of non-contradiction is true; it is not a problem if it is false! So by assuming that it is a problem, you're presupposing that it is not possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false - which is precisely what I am saying 'is' possible.

I do not dispute that the law of non-contradiction is true. I deny that it is necessarily true.

You think it is necessarily true. So, what's this 'necessity' that makes it true, then?

Oh man, how could you make this assertion:
how can you say epistemically there cannot be any squared circles but metaphysically they can be??? — Miles

I didn't say that - I said that, as far as I am concerned anyway, there is no epistemic possibility of there being any square circles. Which is just another way of saying that I know for certain that there are none. That's entirely consistent with their metaphysical possibility. Again, as I keep saying, there is no epistemic possibility of my existence being illusory - I am certain I exist. Yet my existence is not necessary.

You can't conclude that a truth is necessary from the fact that there is no epistemic possibility of it being false.

Your line of thought is not clear again, you need to structure the arguments better. — Miles

I am being as clear as I can.

This, surely, is clear:

1. If there are events, some events are the product of substance causation
2. There are events
3. Therefore some events are the product of substance causation

All you need to do is challenge a premise, which you can do by presenting a similarly clear, deductively valid argument that has its negation as a conclusion.

Likewise, this is clear as well:

1. If any objects exist, some simple objects exist
2. Some simple objects exist
3. therefore, some simple objects exist

I explained why 1 is true, and 2 is self-evidently true. Again, all you need to do is challenge a premise.

And again, this is clear:

1. If some simple objects exist, they exist uncreated
2. Some simple objects exist
3. Therefore some objects exist uncreated

And likewise, all that's needed is a challenge to a premise.

And as I've said, I really don't see why it matters that I think their soundness is contingent - what matters is their 'actual' soundness, not whether it is contingent or necessary.

The distinction between our reason and the faculty and reason and so on, all not clear at all. — Miles

Again, I beg to differ. There is the faculty and then there is what the faculty gives us an awareness of. There is sight, and then there are the objects of sight. Our reason is a faculty and it gives us an awareness of the prescriptions of Reason, among other things.

'Reason' in 'prescriptions of Reason' does not refer to the faculty - how can a faculty issue prescriptions?

It is a mistake to think that our reasoning as a process (faculty or a vehicle) is separate than what we reason we about. Just like any process, our faculty is a potential that becomes actualised when we reason. — Miles

It's not a mistake. There are prescriptions of Reason. But no faculty issues prescriptions - they're not in that line of work. They make us aware of Reason's prescriptions, but they do not issue them (else how can our faculties of reason sometimes go wrong?). Thinking that our reason issues prescriptions is akin to thinking that our sight sees. No, we see with our sight, but our sight doesn't itself see things. Likewise, we discern prescriptions of Reason with our reason, but our reason does not itself issue those prescriptions.

Sometimes the problem with forums is before you know it you lose the thread of the original question and the topic becomes very confused. — Miles

Well, I do keep saying that it doesn't actually matter whether the arguments are necessarily sound or contingently sound - what matters is 'are they sound?' I think they are.

You are constantly making general statements which carry with them force of necessity without which they cannot be general statements. — Miles

No, you're confusing necessity with other things. "There are no square circles". That's true. "It is necessarily true that there are no square circles." That's false.

Unless you now retract that statement and concede there is a possibility that there can be squared circles. And that would mean it is possible for this object in this room to be a squared circle. — Miles

No, you are confusing epistemic possibilities with metaphysical possibilities. There is no epistemic possibility that any object in the world is a square circle - by which I mean I am absolutely certain that there are no square circles in the universe. But square circles are metaphysically possible. That doesn't mean I have to allow that there might actually be some.

You are having trouble accepting that I can be as certain as you are about these things without believing in their metaphysical impossibility.

But that's the problem - you're confusing 'necessarily true' with 'certainly true'. Which is understandable, given that 'necessarily' often functions expressively - that is, we often use it to express certainty.

Look, the statement you made when you agreed with me that ‘there are no squared circles’ is a general statement without you having checked every inch of the known world. And this is why this statement just means ‘there can’t be any squared circles’. You yourself made a general statement implying necessity. — Miles

"There are no square circles" does not mean the same as "necessarily there are no square circles".

It is by reason alone that I am aware of its truth. But that is a claim about how I am aware of it, not a claim about whether it is a necessary or contingent truth.

There is a tendency to conflate truths we are aware of by our reason alone with necessary truths.

If there are necessary truths it is by reason that we are aware of them. But it does not follow that if I am aware of something by reason alone that it is a necessary truth.

So, I am absolutely certain there are no square circles, and I am aware of this by my reason alone. But in saying those things I am not thereby committed to having to say that it is 'necessarily' the case that there are no square circles.

I think it would be useful for you to contemplate about what makes a statement true, the truth maker so to speak. — Miles

I have. What is the truth-maker of a necessary truth?

But reason is our faculty as rational beings. — Miles

That's not my view. The word 'reason' in 'our reason' refers to our faculty - our faculty of reason. But Reason itself is that which our faculty of reason gives us insight into. It is not itself the faculty. That's to confuse a vehicle of awareness with its object. So, our faculty of reason makes us aware of Reason's instructions.

Many of those instructions include musts. But I interpret these 'musts' to be operating expressively, not descriptively, just as they would be if they appeared in instructions of mine. If I said "you 'must' believe me!" or "you must buy me a mars bar" or "you must pay me what you owe me" - then the word 'must' is expressive, not descriptive. Likewise when it turns up in Reason's instructions.

And then you talk about how truths such as 'squared circles are impossible' cannot tell us anything about objects that actually exists such as their size and so on. Sure, perhaps so. But my point was to demonstrate there are different types of truths and some are necessarily true, not that all are. — Miles

My point was to demonstrate that I too can make sense of there being different types of truth without having to make appeal to any actual necessity.

As I said you definitely need to let go of this need to get rid of necessity because your arguments are missing the target. I would understand your insistence if we were somehow conflating between necessary truth and true necessarily, in which case you could target your arguments better at that conflation. But this has never been the case here. — Miles

I do not see any evidence that this is the case. My arguments make no appeal to necessity. And they are valid. If their premises are true, then their conclusions are. And their premises are true - or at least, you have yet to challenge their truth. And it is challenging their truth that you need to do.

So, take this argument, which I take it we both agree is valid:

1. If there are events, some of those events trace to substance-causes.
2. There are events
3. Therefore some of those events trace to substance causes.

I think it is also sound. If you think it is unsound, then you need to make a case against a premise. It really doesn't matter that I think its soundness is contingent. I do not think it is sound, and its being sound is all it needs to be for 3 to be true.

So I think it is actually you who is missing the target. For rather than challenging a premise, you are taking issue with my belief that there is no necessity in reality and thus that its soundness is contingent.

It is what's true that ultimately matters - I mean, that's what we're interested in as philosophers, surely - and if the argument is sound then 3 is true. It doesn't matter whether its soundness is contingent or necessary - it is the fact it is sound that matters.

I am not aware of having contradicted myself. I would be contradicting myself if I said that something was necessarily true. But I have consistently denied this, and denied necessity is implicated in any of my arguments.

If your position is that everything is possible (in order to avoid that somethings are impossible) then you are in for a shuck: for the statement 'everything is possible' means 'impossible is also possible' which is a contradiction, unless of course you mean 'impossible is not possible' in which case somethings are not possible. — Miles

There is no contradiction there, so far as I can tell. It is possible for there to be necessary truths, there just aren't any. So I do not say it is impossible for there to be necessary truths - which would be contradictory. Rather, I say that there are, in fact, no necessary truths.

Perhaps it will be objected that by allowing the possibility of necessary truths I must accept their actuality as well. But that is to beg the question against me by assuming that there are, in fact, some necessary truths (such as that if it is possible for X to be necessarily true, it is necessarily true).

So I do not think I am contradicting myself. I have not said "never say never" - which is a contradiction - I have said "do not say never".

To say "they certainly do not exist" just means they can't exist. — Miles

No, that's clearly not true. I gave an example to demonstrate this. I am certain I exist. I do not exist of necessity, however.

So, I am certain there are no square circles. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily true that there are no square circles.

If not then your notion of 'certainly' becomes pointless and adds no value or extra information to the sentence. — Miles

No, I think you're confusing certainty with necessity and vice versa. Once more, I am certain I exist, yet I do not exist of necessity.

And take this sum - 18 x 3. What's the answer? Well, if - like me - you are not especially good at mental arithmetic and have just done the sum in your head in the last few seconds, then - like me - you are fairly confident, but not certain, that it is 54. Yet whatever it equals it equals of necessity, yes? (I mean, I don't believe that - but you do). So that's an example of something that is a necessary truth - if you believe in necessary truths, then it is necessarily true that 18 x 3 = 54 - yet that you are not certain about.

So anyway, this tendency to confuse certainty with necessity is, I think, why you are finding what I am saying more confusing than it actually is. For whenever I deny that something is necessarily true, I suspect you think that I lack confidence in its actual truth - whereas in fact I am going to be as confident as the next person in its truth.

So, I am absolutely certain that there are no square circles and no married bachelors and so on - absolutely, 100% certain. But I deny that these are necessary truths and deny that certainty and necessity are equivalent.

I will reply to the remainder in another post as this one is probably getting too long (I am replying as I go along).

If you create a painting, do you exist in it? — Devans99

No, but if you create time then you do exist in it, for there is now a now and you are in it. For if you have created time yet do not exist in the present moment, then you do not exist. For what is it not to exist apart from not existing in the present moment?

So, if God exists in the present moment, then God is in time - which is consistent with God having created time. Which he did.

Now, from what I understand your claim is that we can just say ‘is’ or ‘is not’ rather than ‘can’ and ‘cannot’. In other words you wish to replace ‘how something must be’ with ‘how something is’. — Miles

Yes, that's right. Nevertheless, I still think some claims are certainly true, and others only likely true, and others false.

I should stress that I accept that necessity appears to exist - our reason represents many truths to be necessary - and that the burden of proof would be on me to argue that it does not in fact exist. But I take it that at the moment it is simply the coherence of my position that is in question, rather than its plausibility.

So take square circles. I think they certainly do not exist. But I do not think they 'necessarily' do not exist. Still, I am absolutely certain they do not exist. By contrast, a square object the size of the moon is something I think very likely does not exist.

Importantly, then, we're both convinced that there are no square circles, it is just that you think there can't be any such things, whereas I think there just certainly aren't.

If I asked you ‘is this object a squared-circle?’ what would you reply?
In your system of thought you will say ‘it is not’.
I will say on what grounds do you say that, and you will say well I have examined it and it is not.
I will then say maybe your examination was not correct so is it possible that you are wrong and is it possible that X is a squared-circle? — Miles

That's not quite how it'd go. I would indeed say that the object is certainly not a square circle, but I would say that without examining it. For I know it is not a square circle on the basis of my reason: my reason represents Reason to be adamant that there are none in the world - indeed, represents Reason to find them utterly inconceivable. (Whereas, by contrast, about square objects the size of the moon it says nothing at all about their actual existence - hence why where they are concerned I have to rely on empirical inquiry).

If you were to ask me if it is possible that the object is a square circle, I would say no. For I believe the proposition "there are no square circles" is true and so I am certain that it is not a square circle. But if you were to ask me the slightly different question "is it possible for there to be square circles" I would say yes.

For an analogy: if you ask me if it is possible that I do not exist, I would say no. But I am not thereby saying I think I exist of necessity. I am just certain I actually exist. If you asked me if it is possible for me not to exist, by contrast, I would say "yes".

To suggest its possibility is to suggest a contradiction. — Miles

No, it is to suggest the possibility of a contradiction. And although I am certain that no contradiction is true, I accept that it is possible for a contradiction to be true.

The only path to dismantle the original God or first cause argument is to reject its key premises. And remember it had two halves; the 1st half concluded that a causal chain needs a first uncaused cause, and the 2nd half defined the uncaused cause as something simple and unique in number. — Miles

Yes, although I am not arguing that it is unique in number - that's what others are arguing, not me. I am arguing that there are uncaused causes - substance-causes - and that these substances (of what number I do not know) are simple, uncreated, immaterial entities.

I think it does not matter that I am a necessity sceptic, for the issue is whether the premises are actually true, not whether they have to be.

And no point saying ‘well we will just accept the conclusion until some other argument comes along to reject it and that the conclusion is not necessarily true because one day it may be proven wrong’. That is not in the spirit of a philosophical or scientific enquiry. — Miles

I think that's very much in the spirit of philosophical inquiry. I mean, I'm never going to rest on my laurels or be complacent. I can't think of an approach more in the spirit of philosophical inquiry, as my mind is permanently open.

For the scenario you present, you should stop eating meat and become a vegetarian because the changing your diet is, if you believe me, a trivial affair compared to the untimely death of a cow reared under suspicious circumstances. — TheMadFool

But that doesn't engage with the thought experiment. Am I obliged radically to alter my diet - and to deprive myself of things I want to eat (for a lifetime) if not doing so will result in Mat's death?

No, you really don't.

I found that if you highlight a section of someone else's post then a little box appears that says 'quote' and you click on it and it then appears in your reply.

You're talking about our faculty of reason and its fallibility. I am talking about 'Reason' - she is the person, the god, whose prescriptions our faculty of reason gives us insight into. And yes, it - our faculty - is fallible and can - and often is - corrupted.

I think it is just true. Certainly true. I am sure I am as certain as you are that there are no square circles.

We can’t just start an argument with a statement that is neither true nor false and draw conclusions from it. Because the conclusion will be neither true nor false. And statements like ‘sit here’ or ‘buy me a mars bar’ are neither true nor false. That’s that. — Miles

Yes, I agree with all of that. I have not said otherwise.

I think there are true propositions.

I think no true proposition is also false.

I think prescriptions are not true or false.

I think valid arguments, if sound, have certainly true conclusions.

And every argument that you think is valid, I am confident I will think is valid too.

I just don't think anything I have just said is necessarily true. I don't think anything is necessarily true.

Like I said is it the shear number that’s immoral, or is it just obscene? — Brett

Yes, and I sought to address that point in my previous reply. I was not obliged to hook up to Mat in January, or to John in February, or to Mildred in March.

Now change the example so that to save Mat's life I have radically to alter my diet. Again, I am not obliged to do so in January, and he subsequently dies. I am not obliged to do so in February, and John subsequently dies. I am not obliged to do so in March, and Mildred subsequently dies. And on and on. It can keep going, can't it?

Thus, apply it to animals. If I do not radically restrict my diet a cow will die every month. Okay, but if I was not obliged to radically restrict my diet when a person would otherwise die every month, surely I am not obliged radically to restrict my diet if a cow will otherwise die a month?

But the rational intuition I was appealing to is about 'nothing', and it says that nothing comes from nothing. A mind that is empty of thoughts is not 'nothing'. Limiting the thinking activity of minds - and trying to make a virtue of it - has long been the practice of charlatans. I mean, if your worldview will not survive rational scrutiny, then the first thing you must do is ensure that those you've attracted to it do not now subject it to that rational scrutiny. And a good way to do that is to persuade them that it is a virtue to think nothing.

Is it possible there are aspects of reality that may be beyond what we consider reason? — jgill

No, I don't think so, given that Reason determines what's true and thus reality is a creature of her will.

If there were many, many “Mats” and just as many people like yourself, then I imagine you would come under a lot of social pressure. Without doubt your refusal to go on the diet would be regarded as immoral. — Brett

Well, social pressure is one thing, morality another.

Let's say in January Mat needs the use of my kidneys for life otherwise he'll die. Well, I am not obliged to go and hook myself up to him and live the rest of my life in a hospital bed beside him, yes? It would be saintly of me to do that, not obligatory.

So, I don't do it. And Mat dies. Then in February John finds that he needs the use of my kidneys for life otherwise he'll die. Well, if I wasn't obliged to hook up to Mat, surely I am not obliged to hook up to John either.

So I don't. And John dies. And then come March Mildred finds that she needs the use of my kidneys for life otherwise she'll die.

Surely it does not matter how long this continues happening, at no point am I obliged to go and hook up to one of these people?

You may wish to reject the structure and force of a deductive argument but the point remains that in both valid and sound arguments the conclusion is implied by the premises, such that to deny the conclusion would be to a contradiction. — Miles

I do not follow you here - they retain all of their force. I think a sound argument establishes that its conclusion is certainly true.

Something can be certainly true without having to be necessarily true. It is certainly true that I exist. It is not necessarily true that I exist.

I am every bit as certain as you are that the conclusions of sound arguments are true. It is just that you think they have to be, given the truth of the premises, whereas I think they just most certainly are, because Reason is telling me that they are.

But truth or falsehood doesn’t apply to your mars bar statement because you are not asserting a state of affairs (be it concretely or abstractly). — Miles

Yes, prescriptions can't be true. But descriptions of prescriptions can be. It is true that I have said "if there are mars bas in the shop, then buy me some". And we can reason about prescriptions of this sort:

1. If there are mars bars in the shop, then he wants me to buy some.
2. There are mars bars in the shop
3. Therefore he wants me to buy some.

Which brings us to what Aristotle would call the first principle of thought, the law of non-contradiction. We cannot accept that something is both A and not A at the same time and in the same respect. — Miles

I think it is true that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. I just don't think it has to be.

Why does it matter whether I think it is just 'true' as opposed to 'necessarily true'? I am as confident as you are that no true proposition is also false. And if you show me that my position contains a contradiction, I will abandon it as surely as I would if I believed the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true.

But you're begging the question against me. You're giving a descriptive interpretation, I'm giving an expressive one.

So, you take the laws of logic to be descriptive. I take them to be prescriptive.

You take 'must' to mean 'will necessarily be the case' whereas I take it to be expressive of a strong desire.

When Reason says of the conclusion that it 'must' be true, she is not saying that it is necessarily true, but is expressing her conviction that it is true, just as I would be expressing my commitment to being honest if I said "I must be honest!"

It really doesn't matter, of course, because your objection to a premise in the argument should work either way.

My point is just that the ambiguity over whether words such as 'necessary' 'must' 'always' and so on are functioning expressively or descriptively allows me to make all the distinctions you make, but just to do so in an expressive way. Hence how I can avoid having to accept the reality of necessity.

its impossible to exist in an uncaused state within time, so the uncaused cause has to be beyond time. — Devans99

But as I've already argued, that's false by your own lights - God, having created time, would exist in it, yet God is uncaused.

You could insist that God does not exist in time, but you'd need an argument to show that. And so far as I can tell, your only argument is that he created it. But that fails because creating something does not preclude one from being in it. I create a cave, I am in a cave.

I don't practice Zen. Look it up on Wikipedia. — jgill

Then why did you mention Zen? If neither you nor I know anything about it, why mention it as if it had some importance? And why would I look it up on Wikipedia? A) I am not remotely interested in it (you - you - mentioned it) and B) Wikipedia is unreliable and not peer reviewed.

Is reason axiomatic? How do you think it develops or arises in the human mind? Can it change as a culture changes? — jgill

No. Note sure. Yes.

Ultimately, God's first action (be that creation of spacetime or whatever) has to be uncaused. So this action counts as an event and it has no cause. So you terms, think of the substance moving on its own with no prior reason; this is not caused by the substance, it simply has no cause. — Devans99

It won't be uncaused - if there can be events that are uncaused, then we do not need to posit God, we can just say that some events just occur uncaused. So God's first action is caused, it is just that it is caused by God the object, rather than by some event.

B. I do not see that you have proved substance causation; God could be composed of parts that all exist timelessly. — Devans99

I do not follow you. You mentioned God, not me - I don't think the first cause argument can get you all the way to God.

What the first cause argument does is demonstrate the existence of substance causation. If there are any events - and clearly there are - then there are substance causes, because all causal chains are going ultimately to trave to such causes.

That has been established by it following from these claims: every event has a cause; there is no actual infinity of events; there are some events.

C. I feel it is remiss to leave out the start of time from such arguments as it has a pivotal role. — Devans99

No it doesn't, as I've just shown. We can run the argument without having to mention time. Time throws up a host of philosophical problems so introducing it into the argument does nothing but make matters an order of magnitude more complex than they need to be.

So we must present at least one arguments to weaken the universality of P1, and at least one argument to weaken the observation made in P2.

And I do in fact think there is a way to make one such decisive objection. — Miles

Well, I agree that all of this necessity talk is by-the-by, interesting though it is, as we both accept that this argument's conclusion is true if the premises are:

1. If every event has a cause, then some events are substance-caused
2. Every event has a cause
3. therefore some events are substance-caused

It really doesn't matter that I think the argument is contingently sound. I think the premises are true and I think the conclusion is therefore true. And if you can give me reason to doubt a premise then I will cease to be so sure the conclusion is true.

Please remember:

The conclusion of such a deductive argument, although necessary true, isn’t some necessary truth. That much we both agree on. It is a contingent truth as you say, but contingent on P1 and P2. Meaning it is necessarily true ‘if’ we accept P1 and P2. Which, as I stated, can either or both be contested. — Miles

I am not in danger of forgetting this, but it is not the point I am making. I am denying that making sense of deductive arguments requires invoking necessity. I think it is contingently true that the conclusions of sound arguments are true.

So, to be clear, my claim is that anything you distinguish I can distinguish too without invoking necessity. For our evidence that there is necessity in the world is that our reason represents there to be. But those representations should not be taken literally. Instead, what we have is not actual necessity, but conviction and strong desire (albeit on Reason's part, not ours).

What's the difference between a conclusion that is entailed and one that is merely made likely true? Well the conclusion that is entailed is one Reason is now certain is true, or categorically wants us to believe, whereas the conclusion that is merely made likely is one that Reason thinks is now probably true, or to some extent wants us to believe. (I do not mean that Reason is certain 'because' it is entailed - no, I mean the entailment is no more or less than Reason expressing her certainty....so 'what it is' for a proposition to be entailed by others is for those others to be making Reason certain that it is true).

So, just to be clear, although I accept that it is indeed a fallacy to go from thinking that if all houses have foundations, and this is a house, then necessarily it has a foundation to thinking that therefore foundations exist of necessity, that is not the point I am making here. You seem to think that is the point I am making, but it is not.

I am denying that necessity exists and denying that we have to invoke it to make sense of what needs to be made sense of - denying that we need to invoke it to be able to distinguish the valid from the invalid.

You are right, deductive arguments can be sound but not valid, but this is why we have the crucial ‘if’ which enforces a ‘conditional’ validity. — Miles

That wasn't my point - I accept, of course, that arguments can be sound but not valid and valid but not sound, but my point was that we do not need the notion of necessity to make sense of what the validity of valid arguments consists of.

The characteristic of the conclusion is different that P1 and P2. The ‘therefore’ in the conclusion just means ‘X cannot fail but to Q’ if we have accepted the validity of P1 and P2. — Miles

It doesn't have to mean that. I don't accept that necessity exists, yet I can still distinguish between the conclusion and the premises and make sense of what the 'therefore' means.

Let me clarify what I take rules of logic to be. They are prescriptions. Prescriptions of Reason.

Let's forget them for a moment and focus instead on my prescriptions. Let's say I give my partner a shopping list and on it I write "If they have mars bars, then buy me some". What does it mean? Does it mean that if they have mars bars she 'must' buy me some in some metaphysical sense of that term? That it is now 'necessarily' the case that she will buy me some? No, obviously not. It just expresses a desire on my part - a desire for mars bars.

Now return to the laws of logic. They too are prescriptions. It is just that they are prescriptions of Reason, not of me. And some of them say "If a premise of this form is true, and if a premise of this form is true, then believe that this conclusion is true". In fact, of course, they often say something stronger, namely "then this conclusion 'must' be true", but that 'must' is, I think, operating expressively, just as mine would be if I wrote on the shopping list - as well I might - "if they have mars bars, you 'must' buy me some!". Anyway, clearly prescriptions of this kind are the kind that define valid arguments.

So, when it comes to arguments like this:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

my reason tells me that if the premises are true, then I am to believe the conclusion is true. I am instructed to do so - told that the conclusion will be true if the premises are. But that does not mean that the conclusion is 'necessarily' true. It just means Reason is adamant the conclusion is true if those premises are, just as I am adamant that my partner should buy me some mars bars if the shop is stocking them.

Compare this to this kind of a claim: "if there are some mars bars in the shop, maybe buy me some" or "if the premises are true, then the conclusion probably is". Well, there's no strong conviction being expressed there.

So about some things Reason is quite certain - she says "If the premises of the above argument are true, then the conclusion certainly is" - and about some other things she is not as certain.

So what you take to be a relation of necessity, I take simply to be Reason expressing her certainty. And anytime you invoke necessity, I will deny it is needed and take it to mean instead that Reason is expressing her certainty that something is the case, or expressing her strong desire that we believe it. And that enables me to distinguish what needs to be distinguished without having to saddle myself with the troublesome notion of metaphysical necessity - a notion that, I believe, we have come by simply by taking Reason too literally.

In deductive reasoning if the conclusion was not the necessary conclusion of the premises then in wouldn’t be much use. The conclusion is in fact a ‘must’, given the initial premises. — Miles

That's the conventional definition of a deductive argument, I grant you. And defined that way, I don't believe there are any deductively valid arguments. But what's in a word?

My reason says of some arguments that if their premises are true, then their conclusions are too. It says it of this argument, for instance:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

I express this by saying that the argument is 'valid'. But why do I need to think that its conclusion 'must' be true? I draw the conclusion, and I am confident - as confident as anyone else, I am sure - that Q is the case, given that 1 and 2 are - yet I do not think it must be true. I do not think 3 must follow from 1 and 2, but I believe no less confidently than you that it does, in fact, follow from 1 and 2.

For an analogy - it is common to confuse causation with deterministic causation. That is, to think that if an event has been caused, it has been determined to occur. This is a mistake. There can be indeterministic causation. An event that has been indeterministically caused has been no less caused than one that has been determined. It isn't that we're dealing with causation in one case, and a lack of it in the other. No, we have causation in both, it is just that in one the caustation necessitated the event, in the other it did not.

It seems to me that we have something analogous going on here. I am saying that valid arguments - or, if you want to build 'necessity' into the definition of valid, then 'arguments of the kind just mentioned above' - are contingently valid. You are saying that they are necessarily valid. But we both think they're valid - we both think their conclusions are true if the premises are, and their conclusions will be true either way. They're no less true for being contingently true.

In deductive reasoning if the conclusion was not the necessary conclusion of the premises then in wouldn’t be much use. — Miles

How so? I am using them, even though I do not believe their conclusions 'have' to follow. It is sufficient for them to be useful that their conclusions do, in fact, follow.

Earlier I was speaking with the vulgar, so to speak. So yes, I have probably used terms like 'must' throughout up to now, but they were functioning expressively. (Which is how I think they generally function). I haven't believed in necessity for some while, but I continue to use terms like 'must' both out of habit, and because they can function expressively, and because I normally want to bracket that issue. (For the most part, when I say 'must be so' I am expressing my confidence that it 'is' so).

But anyway, my argument is not invalid. It is not me, but others who have introduced necessity and contingency. I haven't mentioned them, except to warn against conflating other things with them.

So, my version of the first cause argument goes as follows. Every event has a cause. I don't think that has to be true. But I think it 'is' true.

There is no actual infinity of anything. Again, I do not think that has to be true, but I think it is true - I am completely certain of it (so certain that I often express this by saying that it 'must' be true).

It follows from this that some events have causes that are not events. It does not 'have' to follow, but it does actually follow. All actual events have causes, and there is not actually an infinity of causes. Thus, some events have causes that are not events.

Every claim there is contingent. Certainly true, but also contingently true - but no less true for that.

Likewise for my other arguments. In each case, take the assumptions to be claims that I think are true, but assume that I do not think they 'must' be. And take ever claim about a conclusion 'following' to be the claim that it 'actually' follows, not that it 'must' follow. They work just as well. For 'true' and 'necessarily true' don't denote a difference in truth. And it is truth that matters, truth that explains.

It seems to me that you are thinking that until or unless we say 'must be so' we have no really explained why something is the case. I think that's demonstrably false, precisely because we can explain why there are in fact some substances that are simple, that have not been created and that are causally responsible for the existence of all else, and we can explain these things without ever having to say 'must'.

Why are you listening to 'Zen' (whatever that is when it is at home) and not 'Reason'?

Doesn't your reason - your faculty of reason - tell you that nothing comes from nothing?

Doesn't your reason tell you that if something happens, there was a cause of its happening?

Forget how certain you can be of the truth of these representations - they do appear to be true, yes? I mean, the reason of virtually everyone says the same thing about these matters which is why you find this kind of argument - a first cause arugment - being discussed and found persuasive throughout history.

Now, are these representations actually true? Well, what grounds do you have for doubting them? That it is 'possible' they're false? Well, it is far more likely they're true. I mean, it is possible the moon landings were faked, but that's not good evidence they were faked. It is possible you killed Kennedy. That's not good evidence you did.

Perhaps your grounds are that you think physics is philosophy and that only physics is studying reality and anything and everything the majority of physists say - regardless of whether it is about physics or philosophy - is true and you've heard some physicists say "something comes out of nothing".

Well, then you're just confused about what physicists do and what authority to accord a physicist's statement when it is about something outside of their bailiwick.

Perhaps you think it is not true because its truth conflicts with something 'Zen' says. Well, then you have faith in Zen rather than Reason - a faith based on nothing more than your own conviction rather than evidence. That is, you put yourself above Reason, which is foolish given you don't know everything (whereas Reason does).

So, anyway, I wait to hear on what rational basis you doubt the deliverances of your - and virtually everyone else's - reason on this matter.

These substances that youre talking about have anything to do with, the gaps in cause and effect possibilties? — BrandonMcDade

I do not know what you mean. By a 'substance' I just mean a thing - something that has properties. But I don't know what you mean by 'gaps in cause and effect possibilities'.

My arguments are what they are and I have 5.

The first - a version of the first-cause argument - notes that events have causes. So, if there is an event, then that event has a cause.

Events themselves seem to cause other events. However, not all events can have other events as their cause, for that would set us off on an infinite regress.

Conclusion: some events are caused by substances - by objects - rather than by events involving objects.

The second - which I suppose we might call the mereological argument - notes that things that exist are composed of something. However, if everything that exists is composed of things simpler than itself - that is, if everything that exists has more than one ingredient - then we will be off on an infinite regress of ingredients. Thus, it would seem that some things that exist must be composed of nothing simpler than themselves - that is, they must have no ingredients, but are simple things lacking parts.

The third explores the implications of the second. We know from the second that some substances - some objects - are simple. But material objects are divisible and thus not simple. Thus, the simple objects whose existence the second argument has established, are immaterial objects.

The fourth, like the third above, also explores the implications of the second. Because simple objects have no parts, there is nothing from which they can be created, and nothing into which they can be deconstructed. Thus, a simple object is not the kind of thing that has been created, nor is it the kind of thing that is destructible.

The fifth unifies these arguments. We know that causal chains terminate with substances - that is, the first cause of any and all causal chains is a substance, not an event. These substances are not themselves caused to exist, for that would restart the regress they were invoked to stop. Thus, these substances are self-existent - that is, they have not been created, but exist by their nature. We know from arguments 2, 3 and 4 what these self-existence substances are. They are the simple, immaterial things from which all else is constructed. For nothing else fills the role the first argument created.

Another thing, let's clean up the semantics and terminology. The main standpoints that everyone is taking is too vague to be effective. — BrandonMcDade

I do not think that's true. My standpoint is not vague. Nor am I using excessive terminology or using it oddly.

By contrast, you are doing precisely this.

Immanence- Are the causal relata immanent, or transcendent? That is, are they concrete and located in spacetime, or abstract and non-spatiotemporal? — BrandonMcDade

What are the words 'immanent' and 'transcendent' adding apart from confusion? Also you seem to be confused. I use the term 'material' to refer to an object that is extended in space, and 'immaterial' to refer to an object that is not. But immaterial objects are - or can be - as concrete as any other. Indeed, if anything it is material objects whose concreteness is questionable.

My mind, for instance, appears to be an immaterial object, for it seems to make no sense to wonder what shape, size or colour it has, and my reason represents my mind to be something that is not divisible (which it would not be if it was extended in space). So, my mind gives every appearance of being immaterial. Yet it is as 'concrete' as you like, for it exists with total certainty.

In practice, one finds two main arguments on the question of immanence. First, there is the argument from pushing, which maintains that the relata must be immanent so as to push things around. Second, there is the argument from absences, which maintains that the relata must be transcendent so that absences can figure in causal relations. — BrandonMcDade

And again, how is this making matters clearer? It is an odd way of expressing a familiar argument - the argument from first causes.

Events have causes. But if all events have events as their causes, then there is an actual infinity of events. But there is no actual infinity of events. Therefore, not all events have events as their causes. Some events are caused by substances - that is, by objects.

In this simple way we arrive at the conclusion that there are objects that cause events - and are the ultimate causal originators of any and all causal chains.

Note, no mention was made of materiality or immateriality. The same argument could be run whether one is a materialist or immaterialist.

Obviously I think that materialism ultimately does not survive Reason's cold hard stare, but the first-cause argument does not presuppose materialism or immaterialism as its premises are compatible with both.

My main point however is that it is unavoidable to say ‘there must be’. As I said before if we agree all houses have foundations, and then also agree we do in fact and actually have a house, then it follows, unavoidably, that there must be a foundation. It is working the problem backward. — Miles

I do not think it is unavoidable - not at the moment - for we can just replace every 'must be' with 'is'. So, let's agree that all houses have foundations (not that they 'must', but just that they do), and also agree that what is in front of us is a house, then we conclude that this house has a foundation. Not that it 'must' but just that it 'does'. You say it 'must', I say it 'does' - but we both believe equally confidently that it has a foundation.

And rather than saying of this argument:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

that the conclusion 'must' be true if the premises are, we say instead that the conclusion 'is' true if the premises are.

So I think we can dispense with all talk of necessity with no real loss.

In light of this, I think my arguments show that the following is true (not that it 'must' be true, just that it is in fact true):

Substance-causation is a reality. Some simple substances - at least one, but perhaps more - exist and are the ultimate cause or causes of all else.

Some simple substances exist. They have not been caused to exist, and they are going to continue to exist (conclusions we can reach by just reflecting on their natures). But we can resist adding that they 'must' exist and 'must' continue to exist.

I do not deny that we have apparent evidence of necessity - many of our rational intuitions represent some truths not just to be true, but necessarily to be true. My point is just that the 'necessarily' doesn't really add anything and we can dispense with it.