The use of contingency and necessary is the following: contingent just means dependent on a causes/s — Miles

I think, perhaps, we are just using these terms differently. I would not use 'contingent' to mean that, for that rules out the possibility of deterministic causation. In a deterministic universe every event that occurs is necessary, yet it's occurrence depends on causes.

I would not talk of caused and uncaused, but of 'event-caused' and 'substance-caused'. Event causation can be indeterministic or deterministic, and I take it that the same would be true of substance causation too. Hence why I think it just confuses matters to keep talking of contingency and necessity.

So, the first-cause argument establishes not the existence of some 'necessary' existent, but the existence of a substance-cause or causes.

Whether you like the terms or not, talk of necessity means given the world of events means we ‘cannot fail’ but to have a non-event causing it, meaning it is necessary that this is to in this world. Now, you can switch ‘necessary’ with ‘cannot fail’, I have no issue with that but both mean the same thing. You pick. — Miles

I suggest we drop all talk of necessity and its cognates, just to see if that's (ahem) possible. Obviously I am guilty of sometimes using such terms for convenience, but as I don't think anything - anything at all - is necessary (a view I hold tentatively and will drop at a moment's notice if it becomes incoherent), let's just say that something 'is' the case, rather than 'must' be.

So, if I am being tediously accurate, I would not that every event 'must' have a cause, but that every event 'does' have a cause. And I would say not that if events exist, some substance causes 'must' exist, but that if events exist, then some substance causes 'do' exist, and so on. Whether it is possible to talk this way throughout, I am not sure. But it seems to me to be an interesting experiment.

This is a reply to the second half of your post as I thought my reply to the first part was perhaps getting too long.

Yesterday we also agreed this this thing must be simple and non-composite, so at least one in nature if not yet agreed to be one in number. That was agreed so because if it had parts it would be contingent on its parts. We then arrived at a simple definition. — Miles

Because I do not want my view conflated with similar-sounding but distinct views - views I would not defend - I must take issue with what you've just said.

My argument for the actual existence of simple things is not that complex things are contingent. I have not made such a claim.

My argument is this: anything that exists must be made of something. But nothing can have infinite ingredients. So, some things that exist must be made of themselves and nothing else. Those things will be simple things - for that's just what a simple thing is. A simple thing is something made of itself and nothing else.

Simple things will not be material things. For material things are extended in space and anything that is extended in space is divisible and is thus composite.

So, simple things are immaterial. That is, they lack extension.

I have arrived at these conclusions without mention of contingency. Everything I have said holds true even if the complex things exist of necessity. So contingency and necessity are not the issue.

The existence of a simple thing is self-explanatory. Why? Because once we truly appreciate that we are talking about a simple thing, it's existence is explained. For instance, we cannot ask "what brought it into being?" for this thing, being simple, is not made of anything and thus is not the kind of thing that can be constructed. And we cannot sensibly ask "why does it continue to exist?" for again, being simple, there is nothing into which it can be deconstructed.

Thus, the nature of simple things explains their existence at least in so far as continuing to ask about their existence does no more than betoken a lack of understanding on the part of the questioner.

It is a short step from here to the conclusion that the substances that exist and are causally responsible for all else must be among these simple things. For the substances that exist and are causally responsible for all else clearly cannot themselves have been created, for that would set us off on the very regress that positing them was meant to stop. So, the substances that exist and are causally responsible for all else are uncreated things.

Well, the uncreated things are the simple things. For it is simple things alone whose existence is self-explanatory, and thus simple things alone that do not raise the question "what caused it to exist?"

Simple things exist. And simple things - some of them, anyway - are causally responsible for the existence of all else.

We then took the chain to be a set of all things caused and called it the contingent set. — Miles

Ah, I didn't do that - I didn't call it 'contingent' (that would be the point at which the conflation occurs - the conflation I was warning against). For we then have these troublesome and distracting notions of contingency and necessity getting in the way (or being used in ways that will confuse).

If every event has a cause - and we are taking that to be self-evidently true - then because there cannot be an actual infinity of events, we must conclude that some events are not caused by events, but by substances.

We do not need to talk about contingency and necessity to get to this conclusion. I have reached it without invoking those concepts. All that is needed is the self-evident truth that all events have a cause, the self-evident truth that there are some events, and the self-evident truth that there cannot be an actual infinity of anything. Those claims are sufficient to get us to the conclusion that some events are substance-caused, rather than event-caused.

Whether any particular substance that does the causing exists of necessity, or does the causing of necessity, is really neither here nor there, so far as I can tell anyway. For I do not have to claim that all 'continent' events require a cause - just all events - or that all substances that cause things exist of necessity (just 'exist' is sufficient).

This we called the necessary existent by which we meant something non-contingent.
So far is the summary of what we said before. — Miles

Like I say, I do not think that's true. These terms 'necessary' and 'contingent' have just appeared at a certain point - I did not introduce them - and they seem to be referring not to actual necessity and contingency, but to other things. So, what you are calling 'contingent' are 'events'. But 'contingent' doesn't mean 'events' or 'set of all events' or whatever. And what you are calling 'necessary' are the substances that exist and are the ultimate causes of all events. But that is a strange use of the word 'necessary'. So again, I think what's happening is that completely different notions are being conflated.

If there are events, those events have causes. It doesn't matter whether the events are occurring contingently or of necessity - the same applies either way.

And there are no actual infinities of anything, so if there are events then ultimately their causal chains must trace to instances of substance causation, not event causation.

Again, no mention of contingency or necessity - for what I have just said is true regardless of whether the events are occurring contingently or of necessity.

And the substances that are doing the causing exist. That follows, but what does not follow is that they exist necessarily.

Meaning; given there is a world of events, we can conclude that in this world there necessary exists some non-contingent being. In other words given there is a world of events it is necessary that such an entity exists. — Miles

That, I think, does not follow. Here's what follows given my assumptions (those being 'every event has a cause' and 'there is no actual infinity of anything'). Given there are events, we can conclude that in this world there are substance causes. That is, there are substances and some of these substances cause events. Whether these substances exist of necessity or not is not something we can conclude from this argument. You are, it seems to me, committing the very mistake you highlighted earlier. You are going from 'given X, Y must exist" to "Y exists of necessity". Given that there are events, substance-causes must exist. But it does not follow from this that the substances in question exist necessarily.

So, in my view all of these things can be established:

There are substance-causes
The substance causes are simple
The substance causes are self-explanatory.

But I do not think any of that entails that they exist of necessity.

I note too that you haven't answered my questions.

So, again: when something happens, do you wonder what caused it?

And again: can something come out of nothing?

Can something completely disappear?

Hence, a thought you hold true must always be reflected in nature. Metaphysical actuality. — jgill

Er, no. But if my reason and the reason of others represents something to be the case, that is the best and only possible evidence we can ever have that it 'is' the case.

Now, my reason - and the reason of many, many others - represents it to be a truth of Reason that every event has a cause.

That's good evidence - and I stress, the best and only evidence we can ever have of anything - that every event has a cause.

You could simply deny that every event has a cause because you don't like the thesis in question (pehaps because accepting it would lead to conclusions you don't favour). But then you are deciding how things are with reality rather than following evidence, yes? You'd be guilty of following 'you' rather than following Reason - and what's the point in that?

Or you could try and find other equally or more self-evident apparent truths of Reason with which this one appears to conflict - that is what a philosopher would do. If you do that, I'll happily change my position.

Tell me, if there is nothing - absolutely nothing - can anything come out of it? Can something come out of nothing?

And the reverse - can something that exists, cease to exist altogether? I mean, can it literally disappear?

I think the answers to those questions is obvious - as obvious as the answer to "does 2 + 1 = 3?" . The answers are 'no' and 'no'.

Something cannot come out of nothing. So if anything exists, some things exist with aseity. And those things that exist with aseity will never go out of existence.

Let me anticipate your answer: physicists say otherwise and what physicists say is true even though they're talking outside their areas of expertise when they say such things....but physics, yay!!

So when something happens, you don't wonder what caused it?

It's a self-evident truth of reason that every event has a cause. It's why we have disciplines that look into the causes of things.

And the initial cause must be timeless. — Devans99

No, if - if - time has been created, then its cause will be a substance, not an event. Why? Because events happen in time.

But it is simply false that the initial cause must be timeless - for as I've stressed above, what stops it from being in time upon creating it? Nothing. indeed, it is the reverse - its remaining outside of time despite having created it - that seems incomprehensible.

So I think this talk of 'timelessness' is unhelpful. That which causes time would not be 'outside' time prior to creating it, because there's nothing there for it to be outside of. And upon creating it, it would be in it, not out of it. So it's not helpful - it's confusing (despite the popularity of such talk).

I mean, imagine I dig a cave. Now, prior to digging the cave, was I 'outside of the cave'? No, the cave didn't exist. When I dug the cave was I outside of the cave? No, I was in it - my creating it put me in it.

Maybe God is indivisible which I guess would meet your definition. Or he could be composed of parts that all exist timelessly and permantly. I am not sure which. — Devans99

You're the one who brought God into this by identifying the first cause with God - and I questioned how you got to this conclusion.

There are a variety of ways of arriving at broadly the same or complimentary conclusions.

So, every event must have a cause. But not every event can have been caused by another event, for that leads to a regress. So, objects - substances - must be able to cause things too.

So, therefore there are some objects that cause things to occur without themselves having to have been caused to cause them.

Also, not everything that exists can have been brought into existence by something else, for once more that lands us with an actual infinity (this time of things, rather than of events).

So, therefore some things must exist by their nature.

And it clearly must be those things - the things that exist by their very nature - that are causally responsible for everything else. (Denying this once more sets one off on a regress).

So now we have established the existence of substance causation (and note, being able to understand it is not a condition of its existence - we know it exists, even if we can't understand 'how' it can). And we have also established the existence of some self-existent things.

Another argument that adds to this: anything that exists is made of something. But not everything can be made of more basic ingredients, for - once more - that sets us off on a regress. So, some things are made of themselves and nothing else. Those things are 'simples' - simple things.

Clearly simple things are self-existent, because there is nothing more basic from which they are made, and nothing more basic into which they can be destroyed.

So, there exist some simple things and they are self-existent and they have substance-caused everything else.

Such a simple thing can have caused time to exist, for time - if it has been caused to exist -must have been 'substance-caused' to exist, as event causation would require time already to be on the scene.

But if you want to show that God's existence is implied by all of this, then you need to go even further and show that a) there is only one simple substance of this kind and b) that it is a mind (and then show how the other attributes accrue to this agent).

To my mind you have not done these last tasks. You have not provided any reason to think the simple existences that must exist must in fact number 1 and no more. And you have not provided any reason to think that this one simple existence must be a mind. And then there are the other attributes - why would it be omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent?

I'm not sure how you can cause something without it being an event. — Devans99

Then you can't run the first cause argument. If every event if caused by a prior event, then you get an infinity of events. And if you're fine with that, then you don't need God.

On the other hand, if you're not fine with that and think that there needs to be an initial cause of any chain of events, than that initial cause cannot be an event, but must be a thing.

Those who run the first cause argument typically identify that thing with God.

I didn't say a good act was obligatory. — khaled

No, but you implied that if an act was obligatory, then we cannot say of it that it was good.

For I said that doing something that averts a harm - whether by act or omission - is typically good. You said that getting angry but resisting the temptation to hurt someone was not good, just obligatory. This implies that you think that if an act is obligatory, then the consequences of the act can no longer be considered good or good-making features of the act.

I am simply pointing out that I think many acts and omissions are good due to the fact they avert harm, but I am not thereby saying that all such acts are obligatory or not. Some may be obligatory, some may not be.

It seems that some sort of atemporal causation is required to cause time but this is not the same as our familiar temporal form of causation. — Devans99

As I said earlier, bringing in 'time' into this has simply muddied the water as this discussion is showing.

The issue is to do with causation, not time. There's event causation - that's the familiar kind in which one event causes another event. But we know - know - that not all causation can be of this kind. It has nothing to do with 'time', but everything to do with the impossibility of there being actual infinities.

If all causation is by events (whether prior or concurrent) then we would have to have an actual infinity of events.

There cannot be any actual infinities of anything.

Therefore, not all causation is by events. Some of what is caused to occur must be caused to occur not by any event, but by objects - substances.

Not, note, by the object undergoing some change - that would be an event. No, 'directly'. The substance causes the event, not by means of another event, but 'directly'.

That argument establishes that there is substance causation and that such substances exist. Furthermore, as such substances cannot have been caused to exist by any prior event - for then the regress starts again - such substances must be self-existent. That is, they exist by their nature.

The only kind of object that exists by its very nature is a simple object.

Thus we can conclude that there exist some simple objects and that these simple objects are ultimately causally responsible for all else that exists.

Time doesn't come into it. We can get to that conclusion without invoking time.

But note that 'creating time' requires timeless causation - which is exactly what substance causation would be, given that it is 'events' that are essentially in time.

If God is a simple substance with the power of substance causation, then God can create time by 'substance causing' it to exist. As substance causation is not causation by an event - and it is events that are datable - this explains how God can create time.

We do not understand what timeless causation could mean so it is hard to answer. God's first act could have created time. But 'first' has no meaning for a timeless entity. — Devans99

We know timeless causation exists, however, for how else was time created? So, timeless causation exists.

We know that substance causation exists, for not every event can have been caused by a prior event.

And by describing God as timeless you are begging the question. God is the creator of time, and he is - now - in time.

But your position contains a contradiction - you're saying causation requires time and in the same breath saying that it doesn't.

Does it or doesn't it? If any and all causation requires time, then God can't have caused time to exist, but instead time must be among those simple existences that have not been created.

If, on the other hand, God did create time, then causation does not require time.

I do not see how you're not contradicting yourself.

You think God created time, yes? (I agree - he did).

But you also think causation requires time - yes?

That's contradictory. That means God would be unable to create time until or unless time exists.

Causation does not require time. Time is caused to exist. So clearly causation does not require time, otherwise how could it be caused to exist?

Think about 4d spacetime. There is no past/present/future in 4d spacetime. All moments have the same status. So I introduced the moving spotlight idea (not mine) as a way to have eternalism and have a distinction between 'now' and past/present. We can distinguish now from past/present so the concept seems to be a requirement. The moving spotlight moves over Jan 2020 and then X billion years later, it moves over Jan 2020 again. — Devans99

This doesn't address my point. Put all the fancy labels you like on things, and talk about spotlights to your heart's content, you're not addressing the point.

The point is this: on your view, 'now' is also 'future' and 'past'. So, this moment right now, is also future and also past. No good saying that it is just 'presently now', for it is also presently future, and presently past - on your view.

That's incoherent.

Again: on your view I will watch a film 'for the first time' numerous times - that doesn't make sense, does it?

Once we are beyond time, we are beyond the familiar comfort of cause and effect. And therefore beyond the possibility of an infinite causal regress. — Devans99

That's false and it contradicts your own position. You think God created time - yes? Well, how did he do that if causation itself requires time (which it doesn't)?

I think slightly different concepts are being conflated. An act can promote a good outcome without being obligatory, and an act can be obligatory without promoting a good outcome.

Not harming people - where harming people was an option - will often (not always) be a good feature of an act or omission. But that is consistent with it being obligatory. And it is consistent with it not being obligatory.

For instance, imagine Roger has just mugged someone and so deserves to be mugged himself. He is then mugged by Dave later in the day (Dave, who is ignorant of Roger's earlier acts and is just - like Roger himself - another mugger). Well, Dave's act has a good aspect to it - it gave Roger what he deserve. But Dave's act was wrong - Dave was obliged not to mug Roger. So sometimes an act can promote a good outcome, yet be wrong.

I'm suggesting it could be that you have one life and experience it multiple times. So each time you experience it, you never remember the previous time, so it feels like the first time. If you remembered the previous experience, it would not be the same life. — Devans99

Again, this simply doesn't make sense. You can't watch a film for the first time numerous times, can you? On your view you can. So much the worse for your view. It doesn't make sense.

You can live your life once, not numerous times. You can live numerous indistinguishable lives. But living numerous indistinguishable lives is not the same as living the same life again and again. Living the same life again and again would mean watching a film for the first time numerous times - which is obviously impossible.

I imagine a moving spotlight rotating around the circle of time. Where the light shines, that is 'now'. So all moments have a real existence but only one is present at any time. — Devans99

That doesn't make sense - you're invoking time. You're getting too caught up in a metaphor. If time is cyclical, then the present moment is also a future moment and a past moment. It is not 'presently a present moment'. That's to invoke the idea of a fixed present - the very idea your theory denies is true!

So again, on your view 'now' is also 'future' and 'past'. It is not currently now and will be past and was future. It is currently all three - which is incoherent.

What set the plethora of simple substances is motion? There must be a first cause for that too. — Devans99

No, because we're positing a plethora of 'simple' substances. Simple substances exist by their nature and are not caused to exist.

You must already accept the existence of such things, for 'God' is one. What I am saying is that you are not justified in insisting that there is just 'one' such substance. Other things being equal it seems as reasonable - if not more reasonable - to posit a plethora.

How can something cause without itself being effected? It must be self-driven. The first cause cannot be an automation because they need creating. So the first cause must be intelligent. — Devans99

'Substance causation' is causation by a substance - by a thing - rather than by an event, by a happening.

Now, some think the idea of substance causation is incoherent. But I - and you too - cannot think that, for it is precisely this possibility that stops an infinite regress of event causes.

Not everything that happens can be caused by a happening, for then one has an infinite regress of happenings. So some things that happen - including, of course, the first happenings - must be caused not by prior happenings, but by substances.

So we know from that argument that substance causation exists. That is, we now know that it is not only events that cause things - substances can as well.

But that leaves entirely open whether the substances that have this power are agents or non-agents.

You're just leaping to the conclusion that they are agents without providing a bridging argument.

It is possible to prove God is benevolent but I don't believe one can prove him omni-benevolence? — Devans99

But 'God' with a capital G refers to a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent.

But anyway, if you think the god is just benevolent, it is still unclear why he'd make us live the same lives over and over.

More fundamentally, however, your view is incoherent. As I said, if you're proposing cycles in time, then the present moment is also a future moment. I mean, how can you deny that? It is in the future, and it is present, and it is past. It is all three. Right now. Right now, it is all three. Yet they contradict. if an event if present, it is not also future and past. If it is past, it is not also present and future.

An analysis of time that does not respect the incompatibility of past, present and future is not really an analysis of time at all, but something else.

For an analogy: if I watch a film multiple times, I am not watching it for the first time lots of times - that doesn't make sense. I am simply watching it again and again. The idea that I could watch the film 'for the first time' numerous times is equivalent in incoherence to your proposal that we live our lives over and over. It doesn't make sense. You can watch a film for the first time once and once alone. And you can live your life once, and once alone. The present moment is never going to be present again. The future moments will never be future again. And the past will only ever be increasingly past.

Saying physics investigates reality is like saying detectives investigate reality.

What we're interested in is the fundamental nature of reality - what does it consist of? Is it material or immaterial? And so on. These are not questions physicists ask. Many physicists make philosophical assumptions - as do police detectives - and then, in light of these philosophical assumptions, make pronouncements about the nature of reality (to the frustration of philosophers). But they're still not doing philosophy.

But the first cause must be causally effective; able to cause an effect without itself being caused. So it must be intelligent and not just a 'simple thing'. — Devans99

How does it follow that it 'must' be an intelligence? It must be a simple thing that has the power of substance causation (substance causation being causation by a substance, rather than an event involving it). But you've made a leap by concluding that it therefore must be intelligent.

And why must it be unitary? A plethora of simple substance causes seems perhaps more reasonable than the posit of a single simple substance cause.

Good point, but the thing that creates time may stay outside of time. It might be diminishing of its powers to enter time. — Devans99

I do not understand how something existent can be outside of time if time exists. But anyway, unless you rule out the possibility of the simple substance causes of time being subsequently inside time then your claim that anything inside time requires an external cause is false.

God is either in time or out of time:

1. If he is eternal in time, then he has no start, no coming into being so cannot exist
2. If he is in time but there is an empty stretch of time before his coming into being then there is nothing to create him - creation ex nilhilo - which is impossible
3. That leaves just a timeless God as the only possibility. — Devans99

I don't see why you think premise 1 is true. If God is a simple thing then he is uncreated, which is not the same as not existing. The simple things that are required for anything to exist are of precisely this kind - that is, they have no beginning, yet nevertheless exist.

2 is also false if God is the creator of time, for then there is no empty stretch of time before he created it.

God exists with aseity. That is, if God exists he has not been created. His nature explains his existence.

God does create time, I think. But he is not outside of it, for what he creates now applies to him, just as the writer of an autobiography is the author of a work that has him/herself as its main subject.

Ah, I was not engaging in Avicenna scholarship so much as arguing that existing in a self-explanatory way does not seem to be equivalent to existing of necessity.

I'm personally sceptical that anything exists of necessity, but I nevertheless think some things require no explanation.

So, take the claim - whether made by Avicenna or not - that anything that has come into being needs a cause of its coming into being.

Well, if that's true - and it certainly seems true to me - then we can conclude that some things have not come into being (for otherwise we would have an actual infinity of things-that-have-come-into-being on our hands).

But it would be to go beyond the evidence to then claim that those things that have not come into being exist of necessity. For all the argument actually establishes is that they exist uncaused.

Or take the claim that anything that exists must be made of something. Well, nothing can have an infinity of ingredients, so some things - the basic constituents of reality - must be simple. That is, they must be made of themselves alone and have no more simple ingredients.

That establishes the existence of simple things, but it would once more be to go beyond the evidence to conclude that these simple things exist 'of necessity'.

We can, it seems to me, understand that a things existence requires no explanation, without having to think that it exists of necessity.

Re two things requiring explanation - I still do not see this point. If understanding the nature of object A suffices to explain its existence, and if understanding the nature of object B similarly suffices, why would there by a question about why A and B exist?

Yes, one could ask why there are not three or four or more - but one could ask that of A alone (why is there one, rather than none?).

So I still do not see how one can get from the self-explanatory nature of an object, to its being the only one of that kind possible.

I do not understand you or why you are weeping with laughter. Bakers, in their capacity as bakers, do not inquire into the fundamental nature of reality, even though their job requires them to make bits of it into dough. Likewise for physicists. Physics isn't philosophy.

It seems to me that in the above 'necessary' and 'self-explanatory' are being conflated.

I agree with Avicenna that all complex things require explanation, and agree that simple things do not. But that does not make simple things 'necessary' things.

If - if - anything exists, then at least one simple thing exists. But nothing 'has' to exist, some things just do. And of those things that exist, some require explanation, and some do not.

And 8 seems clearly dodgy. There seems no reason why there should be only one simple thing. If simple thing A does not require explanation (due to its being simple), then simple thing B does not either, and nor does the existence of A and B. To think that they do, is simply to have overlooked their simplicity. It is really no different to thinking - confusedly - that A's existence requires explanation (which by hypothesis it does not, given its status as simple).

So, as far as I can see, nothing about simplicity precludes there being multiple simple things.

These last two points, especially 8, is, I think, designed to avoid the conclusion that elementary particles could be viewed as the candidate for necessary beings. — Miles

I don't think that's right. What rules out elementary particles is the fact they would be complex. For such particles would have to occupy space and anything that occupies some space is divisible - and anything divisible has parts (namely those into which it can be divided). So no physical entity is ever going to qualify as simple, as any physical entity - no matter how small - is going to be divisible.

Simple things are, by their very nature then, immaterial entities.

Not necessarily, but in the main - yes. Doing something that prevents harms is - often - good. Not always, but often. But it is one way - one way among many - that acts can get to be good. It is - in the main - a good-making feature of an act.

Philosophy - not physics - is the study of what's real. Saying that physicists do not worry about it is akin to saying bakers don't worry about it - yes, of course they don't, it isn't what they're studying.

Why would God, who is perfectly good, make us live our lives here over and over?

Also the proposal seems incoherent. I cannot live 'this' life again, I can at best live another life that is indistinguishable from it. Yet on your proposal that is not what happens, yes? On your proposal this present moment will be the present moment again, in the future. That's incoherent - the present can't be present again in the future, for that would make this present moment both present and future, yet these are manifestly incompatible properties.

not procreating is a 'neutral act'. It is a positively good act. — Bartricks
How so? Assuming having children is wrong because it harms someone then not having children can't be good simply because it doesn't harm someone. Unless you think that not having children actually benefits someone more than it harms the parents that want said children — khaled

Well, I take a 'neutral act' to be one that is neither morally good or bad - such as choosing to have parsnips rather than swede. Positively deciding not to have kids is, I think, a good act due to the harms one has averted.

This is a response to your opening post.

It seems to me that 'time' is playing no real role in the argument. All that is needed is the principle that anything that exists has either been caused to exist by something external to it, or is self-explanatory.

From that we get to the conclusion that if anything exists, some self-explanatory thing or things must exist.

I don't think that conclusion gets you to an agency, much less God. I think what it gets you to is the existence of simple things. For a simple thing, having no parts, requires no external explanation. Thus simple things are self-explanatory.

So, the ultimate causes of all else must be simple things. But why think these simple things are, in fact, one simple thing? And why think that the simple thing in question must be an agency? These steps seem missing. You've jumped from everything needing self-explanatory causes to there being one and only one such cause, and you've attributed agency to it on no very compelling grounds.

I mean, I can see why we might have 'some' reason to think these things. The principle of simplicity might favour us positing one simple thing rather than lots (though that's controversial - it may be simpler to posit lots of simple first causes, given how complex the created world appears to be....I mean, when I see an ocean liner I do not posit one mega-creator, but many mundane creators). And given that I myself appear to be both a simple thing and an agent, that gives me some reason to suppose that if something is simple then it is an agency - but not a very powerful reason.

Anyway, bringing 'time' in seems to me to add nothing to the argument, but only muddies the waters further. For your claim that "everything in time must have a cause" seems false by your own lights. I mean, I assume that by 'a cause' you mean some kind of external cause. And you think time itself has a cause, for there has to be a first moment and it needs a cause. But after time has been created, then that which created it would be 'in' time. For how could it not be? And yet this creator or creators, would now be in time, yet would not have any cause external to themselves. Thus by your own lights not everything in time has an external cause of its existence, for the creator of time is in time and does not have an external cause of its existence.

You are assuming, it seems to me, that to have caused time is not subsequently to be in it. I see no reason to think that's true. If I build a house around me, the house is created by me, yet I am also now in it.

I should add, I do not deny your conclusion - I think we do have overwhelmingly good reason to think that the universe has a single first cause and that the first cause is 'God' at least in some sense of that term. I just do not see how your argument, as it stands, gets us with any confidence to that conclusion.

I do not see how anything in your opening post provides evidence in support of the thesis that I am eternal (I believe I am eternal - but I don't see how you're getting to that conclusion).

You invite me to imagine my self existing apart from my body. I can do this with ease, of course, and it is one way of establishing - as Descartes noted - that my self does not appear to be my body.

But by itself this does not imply that I exist eternally. For how does evidence that two things are distinct provide evidence that one of them exists eternally? My body does not appear to be my chair. That is not evidence that either my body or my chair exists eternally. So how does the fact my mind does not appear to be my body provide evidence that my mind is eternal?

The problem with this line of thinking is that the other guy can just say "No I don't" and call you a pessimist. — khaled

They can 'say' it, but it won't be true. And in calling me a pessimist - which is not true, I'm not pessimistic - they'd be committing the ad hominem fallacy.

Note, I am not saying that life for a human is bad overall. I am saying most human lives do more harm than good.

For instance, if I say "you ought not to eat meat because of all the harm the meat industry causes to animals" I am not thereby saying that it is not pleasant to eat meat. I think meat tastes very nice and a life spent eating it would be very enjoyable. But I also think we ought not to do it.

So, when I say "you ought not to breed, for chances are - and the odds of this are obviously overwhelming - your offspring will be moral banalities who'll achieve nothing great and do more harm than good" I am not saying "life is shit"

I think the free will defence is a partial success.

It is very plausible that free will essentially involves not being under the control of another being. Free will involves autonomy, which requires that one's decisions originate with oneself.

It is also very plausible that free will is very valuable in and of itself. And it is plausible that its value is so great it eclipses the disvalue of the moral evil it allows those who have it to engage in.

Given these things, it is plausible that a good god who had the power to deprive others of free will and control every one in ways that guaranteed no evil would be done would not exercise that power.

I do not see why heaven and hell create problems either. For free will creates other goods, such as desert. That is, if I freely do good then I deserve reward (because I did it freely) and if I freely do bad then I deserve punishment (because I did it freely). And it is good if people get what they deserve. As heaven is where good people get their just deserts, and hell is where bad people get their just deserts, I fail - at the moment anyway - to see why they raise a problem.

This is a response to the criticism mentioned in the opening post and is addressed to procreators.

I do not see it in any real challenge to the credibility of antinatalism, nor - as an antinatalist myself - do I recognise the characterisation of antinatalists as thinking that not procreating is a 'neutral act'. It is a positively good act.

I am not a consequentialist about morality - I think consequences sometimes matter, sometimes don't. And when it comes to procreation, many of the arguments for antinatalism are deontological, not consequentialist.

But even if we just focus on the consequences - well, humans cause untold harm to other creatures. Don't they count?

And the idea that you ought to procreate on the off chance that your offspring will be saints who'll not perpetuate the suffering of others is wild wishful thinking.

If you have kids, they're going to be just bland, mindless 'more of the sames'. You'll think they're special. They're not. They're not going to discover the cure for cancer; they're not going to write great literature. They're going to be utterly uninspiring moral banalities. You know, like virtually everyone so far. And in living their lives they're going to do more harm than good. You know it, I know it, we all know it.

I mean, what are 'you' like? Are you a saint? Can you even manage to forego meat and dairy? Do you send all your spare money to good causes? Your kids are going to be as rubbish as you! Get some self-awareness and stop burdening the world with more of yourself. Live your own life - it's not your fault you're here, that's on your parents. But for crying out loud, don't repeat their self-indulgent mistake

So, how exactly do you know that a benevolent god would issue a prescription that we shouldn’t torture Tom? Also, how do you know that benevolent god would issue a prescription against procreation? — TheHedoMinimalist

We're going in circles. I have explained why it is reasonable to think the god is benevolent to some extent. And I explained why a benevolent person would not have created a world like this and made innocent people live in it. And I explained why a benevolent person would not want us to do the same - would not want us, who live in it, to force others to join us.

I'll do so again. First, why is it reasonable to believe the god is benevolent? (Note, don't change this to 'know' - I don't 'know' that the god is benevolent, I simply think it is more reasonable than not to believe her to be, given the evidence).

Here's why. This is slightly complex. First step: we know - know - that there are prescriptions of Reason enjoining us to believe what is true. How can we know that? Because we have intuitions representing us to believe what is true and if you try and make a case against the probative force of those intuitions you will have to presuppose that they 'do' have probative force. So, it is self-refuting to try and argue that it is true that there are no prescriptions of Reason enjoining us to believe what is true. The intuition that we have reason to believe what is true is not debunkable, then.

Step 2: we live in a world in which it is extremely useful to believe what is true. Yes, there are occasional exceptions. But they stand out because they are the exceptions. In the main, believing what is true - and applying one's reason to the world to figure out what is true - means you do better than those who do not. If you don't believe me, try it. Stop listening to your reason - stop trying to figure out what's true and just blunder about. I don't think you'd survive 24 hours. So, it is damn useful to believe what's true and to use one's reason to try and figure it out.

Now, given that we know that Reason is a person who is encouraging us to acquire true beliefs, and know as well that this is an extremely beneficial thing for us to do, we can now conclude that she's benevolent to some degree. For that seems to be a benevolent thing to do - to encourage us to believe what's true in a world in which believing it stops you suffering and dying.

I stress: that is not a proof. Maybe she's not benevolent and had some other reason to encourage us to acquire true beliefs about the world we are living in. But it is a reasonable conclusion to draw.

So, it is reasonable to believe Reason is benevolent.

Now, why do I think she doesn't want us to procreate? Numerous reasons, one being: because she's benevolent!

A thought experiment: imagine you wake up one morning to find that you are in a prison. You are surrounded by dangerous people. Some of your fellow inmates are nice, but a lot are not. And this seems like a generally dangerous place. Would a benevolent person bring children into such a place for some company? No, of course not. That's not a benevolent thing to do - it's a selfish thing to do. Would a benevolent person want you - you, the inmate - to do that selfish thing? No.

Benevolent people do not create worlds like this and then force innocent people to live in them. So she - Reason - hasn't.

Benevolent people, upon finding themselves living in worlds like this one, do not selfishly force others to live in it with them. Nor do they approve of others doing so. So Reason, being benevolent, does not approve of us procreating.

So, now you seem to be implying that the debunking explanation doesn’t have to be the sole explanation but rather just the best explanation. — TheHedoMinimalist

You're seeing inconsistency where there is none.

Starting with 'best' - by a 'best' explanation I mean the most reasonable one. I do not mean 'the only possible one'. There may be lots and lots of possible explanations for why X is the case, but they're not necessarily equally reasonable.

When I used the phrase 'sole explanation' I meant something quite different. A 'sole' explanation, as I was using the word (and I am not suggesting it was the best word to use - 'complete' may have been better), contrasts with one that is partial. So, let's say that the explanation of why the match is alight is that it was struck against a matchbox. That is a correct explanation, but it is not complete one. A fuller one would mention that I struck it against the matchbox in order to light a candle.

So, applied to the evolution of our intuitions, if a sole evolutionary explanation of an intuition is best, then that debunks the intuition. I explained as well why this is. It is because the best explanation makes no mention of the intuition's accuracy. But an evolutionary explanation could be correct, yet not complete. It could be more reasonable to think of the evolutionary explanation as partial.

For the record, I think all - all - of our moral intuitions have evolutionary explanations. But I think in many cases the evolutionary explanations in question, though correct, are more reasonably believed to be partial - they are like the 'the match is alight because it was struck against a matchbox' variety) - rather tan sole.

So, when we have good reason to believe that an evolutionary explanation of an intuition is a complete explanation of it, then we have good reason to believe that the intuition lacks probative force.

That doesn't mean that all evolutionary explanations debunk intuitions. It means 'some' do, namely those we have reason to believe are sole.

What you're doing, it seems to me, is thinking that if it is just possible to give an evolutionary explanation, then it is both the best and sole explanation. That's just false

The 2nd question I want to ask is what exactly is “the power and knowledge” of reason. I don’t think I have ever heard of anyone saying that someone could have power and knowledge of reason. — TheHedoMinimalist

I don't really understand your question. If Reason is a person, then by definition she has the power and knowledge of Reason.

What does that consist of? Well, precisely what it is involves is debatable. But what's not debatable is that it is considerable.

For instance, she - Reason - determines what's right and wrong. Now that's considerable power, yes?

Reason determines when a belief is justified (for 'being justified' just involves a belief being one that Reason approves of you holding). That's considerable power too.

I think - but this would need arguing - that Reason determines what's true. If that's correct, then she's omnipotent, for what more power could anyone have than having the power to determine what's true?