To avoid this derailing, here is the objection this thread is about:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then moral values are contingent not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject

That argument is valid and it appears to be sound. And note, it doesn't seem to matter who the subject is. You could insist otherwise by insisting that if you identify the subject as 'God' then because God's nature is fixed, 1 is false. But that is not evidence that 1 is false, it is just an expression of a religious dogma. To defeat the argument you have to show - not stipulate - that either 1 or 2 is false.

No good just stipulating that the subject's nature is fixed. For on the face of it a subject's values are contingent, not necessary. And thus if you think this particular subject is the exception, you need to make a case for the reasonableness of that belief, rather than just express it with confidence (which I know many of you think can do the work of an argument, but can't).

And no good just insisting that premise 2 is false because it contradicts your theory, for that is question begging.

I think the argument is not sound. I think premise 2 is false. But I think it is first worth noting that the argument 'must' be unsound, because it can be addressed to all views, and not all views can be false.

To see this just substitute for 'a subject' some objective thing and see what happens.

I don't think you're in a position to judge what is and is not interesting from a philosophical perspective. Clue: it isn't constitutively determined by what 'you' think is interesting.

Those who haven't read Plato's dialogue Euthyphro are mistakenly thinking that this thread is about his dialogue, despite the OP making clear that it is about a particular criticism that has its origins in his dialogue. A distinction that is too subtle, it would seem, for you and certain others. You prefer to discuss a label than the view or criticism the label is being applied to. And when someone points out that the use of the label is perfectly legitimate and that it is the position that is important not the label that is put on it, you prefer to take issue with 'that' rather than anything philosophically interesting. Why? Becusae you don't know what is or is not philosophically interesting or significant. That's my analysis anyway.

Don't forget that moral realism includes all forms of ethical naturalism as well as some of the 'true to archetype' forms of virtue ethics, so the moral realism required for the premise to be acceptable (arguments from authority issues aside) is not specified by the survey. Ethical naturalism particularly would class as realist, but be in opposition to the premise that moral values are not our values.

Then there's realists about morality who don't see morals as values at all but laws, or those who think moral statements are not normative at all but descriptive, those who think morality is a virtue, not a value (but still a non-subjective one). All of whom would still describe themselves as moral realists.

In all, I think the number of philosophers who believe in a non-subjective external source of moral valuing (which is what the premise here demands) is very slim. Certainly a minority. — Isaac

The less they know, the less they know it. No, not "certainly a minority', but "the majority".

You really don't know what you're talking about, yet you're alarmingly confident. it's quite disturbing. For instance, you've run together metaethical and normative theories. Virtue ethics is a normative theory, not a metaethical theory. I'm not a virtue ethicists, but nothing stops me from being. That is, one can be a subjectivist and a virtue ethicist. One can be a subjectivist and a utilitarian. One can be a subjectivist and a deontologist. One can be a subjectivist and a pluralist. And so on.

That's because subjectivism is a metaethical theory, not a normative one.

Moral realism denotes a family of metaethical theories. A great big unruly family whose members do not get on.

What unites them? Well, they believe the following: that normative moral propositions - such as "X is right" or "Y is morally bad" - are truth-apt (that is, capable of being true or false) and that some of them are true.

The anti-realists take two forms, because realism combines two claims and one might deny either one.

For example, some anti-realists deny that normative moral utterances are truth-apt. They're the expressivists. The others accept that they're truth apt, but deny that any of them are true. They're the error theorists.

Now, my point is that whichever one of those views you hold, the Euthyphro objection can be raised against you.

They can't all be false though, can they? So, if the Euthyphro criticism would be just as effective against any view as it is against mine, then something must be wrong with the Euthyphro criticism.

Everyone must agree to that.

I have never come across anyone competent in such matters who refers to the Euthyphro dilemma as "the Euthyphro". — Fooloso4

That's because you don't hang out with people competent in these matters. They don't tend to mill about in the park. Anyway, if you prefer to talk about the dialogue Euthyphro - you know, the one whose title you got wrong - then start up a threat to do so. Here the topic is 'the Euthyphro', a problem to do with moral contingency. Read something written by an academic philosopher about it. Note that it is to do with the supposed 'arbitrariness' that identifying moral norms and values with those of a subject (be it me, you, God, a god, anyone) would confer on them. Which is just another way of saying that it is to do with the supposedly troublesome variability that moral norms and values would have if they were the values and prescriptions of a person. That's the problem. The problem I am trying to address here. It is a biggee. Huge.

Then, duly humbled, return with your head hanging in shame and resume trying to best me.

Value is a relation between an experiencing subject and the events/objects of their experience. It is neither an inherent property of the subject nor of the event/object. — Possibility

Er, yes, I said that. Me. My argument is that for something to be morally valuable is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. That's my view. Being valuable means featuring as the object of a valuing relation. See the moral subjectivism thread.

My argument is that only a subject - a subject of experiences, a mind - can be the one who is doing the valuing.

Therefore, for something to be morally valuable, it needs to be featuring as the object of a subject's valuing attitude.

I then argued that as if I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable, moral values are not my values. That is, though what it takes for something to be morally valuable is for it to be featuring as the object of a subject's valuing attitude, something is not made morally valuable by me valuing it.

Thus, I am not the subject whose values constitute moral values. There is such a subject. But it is demonstrably not me, not you, not one of us.

That's the argument.

You say it fails and then say some things that are entirely consistent with my view. You are presumptuous. You think you already know the argument fails - don't you? Without understanding either my position or understanding that the argument is logically valid, you insist it fails.

It doesn't fail. But if it does fail, it is going to be the Euthyphro that refutes it. Hence this thread.

And you haven't addressed the problem with your claim that Reason could simply change her mind (presumably by Divine Fiat) about what she values even though no circumstances had changed, and that we should follow her nonetheless (whatever following her could even mean given the problem of how we could know what Divine Reason values or dis-values) — Janus

Erm, this thread is about that problem. So, I'm addressing it here! That problem - or supposed problem - is the Euthyphro. A problem that is addressed to all subjectivist views. A problem I have outlined in the OP. A problem that I think is not really a problem. The first step to seeing that it is not a problem is seeing that it applies to everyone, objectivists too.

There's really no way I could be confronting the problem more squarely!!!

I've tried hard and failed to get a coherent answer, so I don't think the chances are looking too good. — Janus

You wouldn't know coherence if it built a house in your bottom. My view is coherent. To show it to be incoherent you'd need to show it to contain a contradiction. Where is that contradiction?

You really think you're in a position to lecture me on reading carefully? Again: you attributed to me an argument I did not make! I did not argue that moral values are not our values due to this making them contingent! I mean, they're every bit - every bit - as contingent on my view! I repeat, actually read what I say and stop projecting shop-bought views onto me.

If all we had to do was consult our faculties of reason about what is morally valuable then there could be no disagreement amongst those who did so and no need to posit Divine Reason. — Janus

What? How does any of that follow?

No, absolutely not - the word necessary is, well, necessary. If I am superman, then if superman goes to the grocery necessarily I go, because I am he. That is, there is no possibility of superman being in the grocery and me not, for superman and I are the same person. (It is not that superman is necessarily in the grocery - no, it is contingent that he is in the grocery - the point is that 'if' superman is in the grocery, and 'if' I am superman, then necessarily I am in the grocery).

Of course, in reality if superman is in the grocery it does not follow of necessity that I am in the grocery - I may be, I may not be. And thus we can conclude that I am not superman.

Likewise for moral values. If moral values and my values are the same - that is, if moral valuings and my valuings are synonymous - then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable. It won't just happen to be, it 'must' be if I am valuing it, precisely because my values and moral values are the same.

But clearly if I value something it does not follow of necessity that what I am valuing is morally valuable. It may be, it may not be. And thus we can conclude that my values and moral values are not one and the same.

I didn't mention God. My argument entails that moral values are the values of a single subject. Not necessarily God. And the argument - the Euthyphro criticism mentioned in the OP - doesn't mention God. It is an argument against any and all subjectivist views, not just one.

So, throw away your cheap off the peg come-backs and get tailoring.

This isn't about the dialogue. This is about the criticism - that is standardly titled 'the Euthyphro' of 'the Euthyphro problem' or 'the Euthyphro dilemma' or 'the Euthypro objection' - mentioned in the OP.

Again, this is not about the dialogue 'Euthyphro'. It is about 'the Euthyphro', the name given to an objection a form of which was first made in that dialogue.

Not the dialogue. The argument in the OP. Not the dialogue. Not the dialogue. The argument in the OP. Not the dialogue.

Don't make me go all Mr McGregor on you.

I think 2 is false too. But it is not clearly false. It appears clearly true.

Again, I stress, I reject 2. But I accept that it appears to be true.

Imagine someone committing an obviously immoral deed. Now imagine another possible world, that mirrors this one. And in this other possible world, someone commits an identical deed. Mustn't that one be wrong too? Someone who thought the first was wrong, but the second not, is surely confused?

We'd want them to explain why the first is wrong and the second not. Perhaps they merely appear the same, but the agent of one had a quite different intention to the other. But no, by stipulation, everything is the same in terms of the respective agent's intentions, and in terms of the consequences of the acts, and so on.

Someone who, despite recognising this, insisted that one was right and the other wrong, is, surely, confused? Two acts cannot differ in their morality alone, it would seem.

Do you agree?

You say that moral values cannot be the values of just any old subject, such as you and I, because we might disagree, and that would make moral values subjective or contingent in a bad way — Janus

That is absolutely not the argument I made! I think moral values ARE contingent.

Yes, moral values are not the values of just anyone, but just one person - the person whose values they are. A person we can call Reason.

But my basis for that claim is that it is manifest to reason that if you or I value something it is not of necessity thereby morally valuable. Thus, our reason - our faculties of reason - tell us that we ourselves are not the ones whose moral values our reason gives us insight into. That is, our faculty of reason is not another faculty of introspection.

It has nothing to do with the contingency moral values would have if they are the values of a subject. My evidence that my values are not moral values is that my reason tells me that they are not. I may be quite sure I value something, yet that does not settle the matter of whether it is morally valuable. I accept that though I may value xing, that does not entail that it is morally valuable. Again, I accept this because it is manifest to reason. both mine and yours and virtually everyone else who isn't crazy or in the grips of a theory.

I think this is an ongoing problem - rather than looking at the argument I have actually given, you project quite different ones onto me and then, when what I say does not seem consistent with the view you've projected onto me, you insist I am not being clear or making sense!

Anyway,

I have allowed for Reason changing her mind when circumstances demand, but if she were able to simply change her mind even though circumstances have not changed, then she could not be a reliable guide to moral values, unless you allow that they are merely subjective and contingent in a bad way. — Janus

Again, I think moral values ARE contingent. Most contemporary moral philosophers - indeed, most moral philosophers full stop - think they're necessary. Hence why they reject ALL subjectivist views on the basis of Euthyphro-based concerns.

I am a subjectivist. I think moral values and norms are contingent. I reject other kinds of subjectivist view - those that identify moral values with our own - not on the grounds that this would make moral values and norms contingent. No, I reject those views because they are self-evidently false upon reflection. I reject them because if I value something, it is manifestly not thereby made morally valuable - not of necessity, anyway.

You seem fundamentally not to understand the view my arguments have entailed. For you say that Reason would not be a reliable guide to moral value. Er, but moral values ARE her values. So how on earth - how on earth - could she be anything other than the most reliable guide to them?

Who is the most reliable guide to what Bartricks Potter values? Why, Bartricks Potter!

Who is the most reliable guide to what Hugh values? Why Hugh of course!

Who is the most reliable guide to what Reason values? Why Reason of course.

How has reason attempted to tell us about what she values - why she's given us a faculty of reason. So, if you want to find out what Reason values, consult your reason and the reason of others.

Now nothing I have said there engages with the Euthyphro. Hence why I don't see how what you're saying engages with it.

Those who think the Euthyphro criticism is a good one - so, you know, the vast bulk of moral theorists - think it is a good one because they think moral truths are necessary truths.

I think they're wrong about that. But my first point is that unless you agree that moral truths are necessary truths, then you can't use the Euthyphro to try and challenge my view - for you'd be committing theoretical suicide. And I am also pointing out that this is actually true whether you're a subjectivist or an objectivist about morality.

So my first point - my first step - is to wipe the smile off everyone who thinks the Euthyphro is a damning criticism by pointing out that it applies to objectivists and subjectivists alike.

I think the problem with you lot is that you in your minds - but not in my posts - you are confusing moral values with things such as moral judgements, or moral evaluations. But, like I say, that's what you're doing, not what I'm doing.

They are the same. Change "bag of turnips" for "moral values". Then change "wife" to "my values". It then follows that as moral values and my values are one and the same values, if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable. Note, moral values are valuings, and my values are valuings. So moral values - or valuings if you prefer - and my values - or valuings - are being identified.
If the bag or turnips and your wife are one and the same, then if your wife went to market necessarily the bag of turnips did.

Oh, I was just imagining lots of chickens about the place.

There's also a chicken on it.

What about this argument , or did I went wrong again?


1. If picture in paper of General Mszveslescvi - war criminal wanted for atrocities committed during people's uprising - is picture of me as young handsome man, then if I go to the pawn shop to sell gold medals to buy fake passport, then necessarily General Mszveslescvi, war criminal wanted for atrocities committed during people's uprising went to pawn shot to sell gold medals to buy fake passport
2. If I go to pawn shot to sell gold medals to buy fake passport, General Mszvelescvi did not necessarily go to pawn shop to sell gold medals to buy fake passport.
3. Therefore, picture in paper of General Mszveslescvi is not picture of me. (I General Slvednicodo, also wanted for atrocities committed during people's uprising)

It is the same argument. There is only one me.

I'll put it in terms you understand.

1. if bag of turnips is wife, then if wife go market, necessarily bag of turnips go market
2. If wife go market, bag of turnips not necessarily go market
3. Therefore, bag of turnips not wife.

I have answered lots of your questions, and I still think they are not in good faith.

Anyway, be so good as to answer some of mine.

Do you think this argument is valid?

1. If Bartricks Potter is Superman, then if Superman went to the grocery, necessarily Bartricks Potter went to the grocery
2. If Superman went to the grocery, Bartricks Potter did not necessarily go to the grocery.
3. Therefore, Bartricks Potter is not Superman.

Or do you need to put some things in sets? Or is there something wrong with the semantics?

If you think it is valid and understand what the premises mean, then just swap 'Bartricks Potter' for 'moral values' and 'Superman' for 'my values' and you've got my argument.

I have no idea what a 'hidden variable' is. And I have no idea why you think you need to talk about sets.

The word 'are' in my first premise identifies moral values with my values. That is, it means they're the same - one and the same.

If reason could value something other than what it values, or is valuing, per se, and not merely on account of differing circumstances, then what good could it be as a divine commander? — Janus

I don't understand your question or its relevance to the OP.

The argument I am considering is this:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject

That is considered by most to constitute a decisive refutation of all subjectivist views about moral values and prescriptions.

I think it is a bad argument. I think it will apply to all views, not just subjectivist ones. So it must be unsound because not all views can be false. And I think it is unsound.

But I don't really understand your question or how it bears on the above .Which is not to say it doesn't, just that I don't see it yet.

Bit pervy.

So good persuasive tactics from you. I'm sure folks are impressed. You'll have lots of followers soon. — Terrapin Station

Citation please.

I get places much faster by never stopping at red lights. It works until you have a major accident.

I'm not trying to convince you of anything. — Terrapin Station

Citation please.

If you ask me a question, you want something from me - an answer. Well, if you want something from me, you do the work - you're the wanter.

Still living by your rules.

If I leave the windows open in the car when I go through the car wash I get the inside cleaned too.

If you're asking a question, then you want me to give you something. So you do the work.

Now, provide citations in support of all of your claims please. All. Of. Them.

What I told you is that if you're just telling me your view then I wouldn't need a citation for anything — Terrapin Station

That's a claim. Citation please.

You tell me. I'm living by your rules for a bit. I've just put some food up my nose.

Were you only making claims about yourself? If so, then we don't need a citation other than you. — Terrapin Station

That's another claim. Citation please.

Again, it's a claim about me. I'm the source. It's not a claim about all or most philosophers or anything like that. — Terrapin Station

Citation in support of that please. It's a claim. Support it.

It's a statement of how I approach people making empirical claims. I'm tye source. I'm telling you something about myself. — Terrapin Station

Citation please.

More good points. You're coming along well.

Your claim that the one making the claim has to do the work. Citation please. I won't respond to you until you provide a citation.

Back that up. Provide a citation in support of your claim.

All good points. Your point?

Just put it in the internet. You know, the thing you're on now. Stop being tedious.

And no, it isn't. I was just being nice. And that's a claim. The claim that I have to back it up is a claim. One you made. Back it up. And when you back it up - and you won't - back up the backing. And when you do that, and you won't, back up the backing for the back. And keep doing that forever.

Here, I've done some for you: here's a quote from an academic article by Jonathan Danahar entitled "Necessary Truths and Theistic Ethics":

"But there is a problem with this commitment. The widespread view that moral truths such as pain is intrinsically bad or torturing innocent children for fun is impermissible are necessary seems to undermine it"

Widespread. Virtually all contemporary moral philosophers think moral truths are necessary truths. That's why they think the Euthyphro is a good criticism. Why do you think they think it is a good criticism? Because they like saying "Euthyphro"?

Stop focussing on me and focus on the arguments. And read charitably.

You have the internet. Do some research.

The word "reason" makes no sense to me in that sentence by the way. — Terrapin Station

Good, I consider that a compliment.