Platonism not needed; it is just the idea of a black square that is being represented, an idea which can be re-presented in countless ways, just as the form of a tree or a human face can be re-presented in countless ways. — Janus

You say Platonism is not needed, then launch immediately into an explication of platonism.

I'd still be inclined to call that art — Moliere

Trouble is, the custodians would not call it art.

Art is an aesthetic judgement, an object detachable from it's surrounds, to be moved, sold or exhibited, whilst this is created as an obligation to the land, inseparable from it's location, the very connection between people and land.

Hot possibility became constrained by gauge symmetry. — apokrisis

Ok.

I'd say it may be said to be one possible representation of a black square, a picture of a black square, and that it also may be said to be just a black square because squares are abstract objects. — Janus

Well, if you must. The idea that a black square only represents a black square looks a tad too platonic for my taste... it smells of perfect forms and such nonsense.

It does have to be recognizably art in some sense — Moliere

What could that mean, if not that it must participate in some game in which we call it art?

There is a community who claim continuity with the Murujuga artists...

Guess so.

Oh, perhaps Tim's engine will spin by itself. It's how it makes contact with the world that might make the difference.

I don't see it gaining much traction for you and I.

Tim can't articulate your criticism in his terms, it seems.

But wasn't your original argument that Thomism was internally self-undermining? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not really. It seems you think it consistent, but using a way of talking about consistency that is itself Thomist.

Someone who thinks there is a difference between justice and mercy will not need an explanation of how they are different in the face of the simplicity of god, if they do not accept the simplicity of god.

And so, around and around, the various cogs spin without meshing.

The artist's intention to create "a piece of art" will not suffice - They might be rubbish at their supposed profession.

Being a piece of art is taking a certain place in a complicated game played with words, deeds and money.

The Murujuga rock carvings might be up to fifty thousand years old - far older than any art found in Europe.


There's no way we can enter into the intent of the artists; too long ago, too far removed from us, now...?

No frame, no museum.

It's ok, they are going to build gas export facilities over the top of them, so they won't annoy the anthropologists and art historians.

We're engaged in forming an "ontology", no? That amounts to sorting out what we are talking about. It seems useful to be able to distinguish a thing from a representation of that thing - to differentiate between picture and thing pictured. It is useful to be able to point out that Black Square does not represent anything, but is a black square, and is a painting.



That appears to be what Kazimir Malevich had in mind... his intent.

But it seems we agree.

The Op is satire.

Frank asked "How does a person [moderator redacted] make sense of this?"

You provide an answer in the sophistry of Thomism, which is quite unlikely to appease Frank.

(I hope the mod redacting was not one of those participating in the discussion.)

All of which just takes the Thomistic metaphysic as granted.

An absurdity can seem internally consistent.

This:

...yes, it doesn't make any sense. Christianity is about loving another person. — frank

may be as helpful as Summa Theologica.

Ok. In your first post you said a paining was a picture. Now you say that a picture need not be a picture of something, and so avoid the difficulty posed by abstract art. that seems an odd usage, but is perhaps consistent.

I's just say that a picture is usually a representation of something, that a picture pictures something other than itself. And that art need not represent anything other than itself - as is the case for the red rectangle and so on. And that hence not all paintings are pictures.

I think this is a better approach than yours, which appears to me to collapse painting and pictures, and so lose some explanatory power.

Do you really think that there was a chance of @frank accepting Thomism as an answer to his questions? Wouldn't he simple see it as a more verbose expression of the very same confusions? And indeed, with good reason.

I am all ears. — Bob Ross

I've suggested silentism as the most reasonable response to such issues - admitting that we don't know the answer.

Thomism relies on divine simplicity. It understands god as pure and as simple. So mercy and justice are for god the very same. This is how Thomism responds to the Euthyphro; the good and god's will are the very same.

But if we cannot make meaningful distinctions between such notions as justice and mercy, then we cannot use them to explain the nature of god.

Weirdly, Thomism undermines itself, showing that theology is impossible.

If course, Thomism has responses to these criticisms. But equally, more theology simply serves to undermine theology further.

And you're happy to accept the Thomist metaphysics on which this account sits? A mediaeval logic? Nothing since then appeals more?

the first is intended to be 'art', — javi2541997

Interesting. So is art "intended"? If that were so, then the intent of the chap with the roller is what decides if the wall is art or not... We would need to ask him his intent.

Rothko's red rectangle is a noun — LuckyR

Plainly, it isn't. A noun is a word. The red rectangle is not a word. You might argue coherently that "Rothko's red rectangle" (quotative) is a noun-phrase.

And this?

Is Rothko’s red rectangle a picture of a red rectangle? Or is it just… a red rectangle?

Too far off topic.

Ontology is definition.

Well done. Yes, one of the take aways from all this is the separation of intent from meaning. Seeing how this works takes some effort. The idea that the meaning of an utterance is found in the intent of the speaker is somewhat ingrained. We say "That's not what I meant", after all; And we also say "But it's what you said!"

We can backtrack this to the discussion of Lewis, and conventions. It's hard to see how conventions might work without invoking intention - we intend to act in accord with the convention. But what we've seen here is how interpretation precedes convention. I think we can maintain a sort of continuity between Davidson, Searle and Lewis, but there is plenty here to work on.

But we can see that conventions do not determine the meaning of an utterance.

Maybe they're right? Social stability is a life-and-death issue. Having a logical story isn't — frank

:wink:

Fair. So it comes down to what you value.

Good response. You've been reading his paper Intending? That's the topic there.

There is no guarantee that our surmised intent is the correct one, no law-like structure that locks intent in with action and belief. Intentions are future-directed and shaped by beliefs and desires but not reducible to them.

Radical interpretation is a process for assigning truth values to utterances, not a process for determining intent. But this does not rule out that intent might enter into the interpretation. "Pedro intended to climb Everest" is true IFF that was Pedro's intent.

We might surmise intent, charitably, by presuming holistic coherence and rationality. Of course people do not always act holistically nor coherently. The process is not algorithmic, not law-like, and not infallible. It's human.

How's that?

I literally responded with a philosophical account of why God had to sacrifice Himself, devoid of faith — Bob Ross

Accepting that account requires accepting that Jesus is the son of god... it's in the first sentence. That's not philosophy.

A painting is a picture whose predominant medium is paint. — Janus

I've not been claiming that all paintings are pictures, as though there were some context-independent fact of the matter, but that all paintings can count as pictures — Janus

They are not all pictures but can all count as pictures.

Ok.

I have remained silent on the issue for a number of years. — Punshhh

Can't say as I'd noticed.

I don't think it's mutually exclusive. — Michael

I don't disagree. Although asking someone to "dance the flamingo" need not be an intentional malapropism, and yet still be understood as a request to dance.

The issue is, which is to be master? We have the convention of treating tables differently to seats, but before we can do that, we needs must understand which is a table and which a seat. That's an interpretation.

If someone asks us to "dance the flamenco" we must first interpret it as a request to dance the flamingo in order to recognise it as a malapropism. Recognising the breach of convention requires first recognising the convention - and hence first interpreting the utterance as an (illegitimate) instance of the convention.

So it's not that language does not make use of convention, but that the recognition of convention is itself dependent on interpretation.

As you will recall, Davidson focuses on a situation where you don't know the language Jenny is speaking. You don't recognize any of the words. All you get is behavior and the assumption that she believes the same things you do. — frank

In the extreme case, yep.

So how did you gather that Jenny uses "the cat" to talk about Jack? What behavior did you observe that caused you to conclude this? — frank

Extended empirical observation of Jenny's behaviour within the community in which she participates. Watching her pet the cat, buy cat food, chastise someone for not chasing the cat off the mat. A Bayesian analysis of behavioural patterns, perhaps, although we don't usually need to go so far in order to recognise patterns in the behaviour of others.

The interpreter assumes that Jenny and the others in her community have much the same beliefs as the interpreter - that there are cats, bowls, mats, and so on to talk about.

The inconsistencies you have noted do not matter to those who believe.

Part of the reason is that they have been taught that belief is of greater import that consistency.

It follows that any argument you might offer is irrelevant, because what is at stake is not rational.

It's why the replies from believers consist mostly of repeating doctrine rather than responding to the inconsistency. To reaffirm the creed is to participate in the truth.

This also explains the segue into theology, which consists in attempting to cover, or as they might prefer, "explain", the inconsistency.

When faces with the profound, inexpressible, existential mystery, the rational response is I don't know.

But silence is difficult.

Davidson seems to be fine with settling for the physical state language game , without recognizing what he may be missing by excluding the other game. — Joshs

What game is he excluding? He gives quite a sophisticated account of intentionality.

Jenny says "the cat is on the mat"

Jenny often uses "the cat" to talk about Jack, the black cat. So she says things like "The cat's bowl is empty" when Jack's bowl is empty.

Jenny uses "...is on..." when one thing is physically on another.

Jenny uses "the mat" to talk about the prayer rug near the door.

So I offer the following interpretation: Jenny's utterance of "The cat is on the mat" is true If and only if Jack is on the prayer rug. (notice the T-sentence)

I can now proceed to check this interpretation as more information becomes available.

From this I can also infer that Jenny believes that Jack is on the prayer rug. Might further infer that she intends to scold me for allowing him to do so. But these are post hoc. following after from the interpretation.

If we’re trying to capture the meaning of a statement and the meaning is encoded in intentional terms, — Joshs

Are we? Davidson's aim is to set out the meaning of some utterance, not to set out folks' intent. Their intent can be quite incidental.

Davidson's reply is that there is no law-like relation between physical states and intentions.

you said not all paintings are pictures, as though there were some fact of the matter, — Janus

A pretty weak restriction, if what it does is allow some paintings not to be pictures.

I'm finding this conversation a tad tedious.

I'll allow for paintings that are not pictures. If you see that as too restrictive, I don't much care. It's you who insists that Black Square is a picture as well as a painting. I think it's a black square, as opposed to a picture of a black square.

Charity is basically about attributing intent to the speaker. — frank

Odd, that you say

Charity is basically about attributing intent to the speaker. — frank

Then use a quote in support of that, that does not mention intent

We can indeed use a presumption that the speaker's beliefs are much the same as our own in order to interpret their utterances, and thereby surmise their intent.

Charity is supposing that others have much he same beliefs as we do.

In about 10 years we may have... — Joshs

Been that way all my time.

Heuristically programmed algorithmic computers, parallel processing, neural networking... each promised more than it delivered.

The missing bit is that a description of an intentional state is not a description of a physical state.

a drawing, painting, photograph, etc. — Janus

I'll go over the thought again, I guess. Any definition given for art will invoke a counterplay by some artist. The act of defining art - and by association, painting or drawing or picture - stipulates a view that can be overturned.

The analogue in logic is that any axiomatic system sufficient for arithmetic will exclude some truths.

It's always open to you to stipulate that this is art, that isn't... But that'd be pretty arbitrary, and we need not accept your stipulation.

It's more fun not to.

I know you're doubtful whether there could be a useful interpretation of holy books — J

Not useful - folk do put the texts to various and varied use. But that there is one interpretation that is the correct one - that's, shall we say, undecided, perhaps undecidable.

Part of the reason is that giving an interpretation is not a single act, it's an ongoing process.

...A better interpretation... — J

Better for what? Again, no absolute scale is available.

They seem to go hand in hand...?

The idea is that there is a correct interpretation.

Amongst others. I'm not a close follower of Supreme Court process, but the idea that we can discern some imagined shared intent amongst the authors of your constitution is absurd. We might play on "author-itarian" here.