A methodological point. There's a mistaken view of language games that sees them as involving only words. the examples given in PI make it very clear that language games involve our interaction with the word - builders calling for slabs or blocks, grocers counting apples and so on. If one is looking at use instead of meaning, one is looking at how the words are used in the world, not at disembodied locutions.

Some here have failed to see this. They complain that looking at language is not looking at the world. But nothing could be further from the case. To look at how words are used is to look at the way the world is. Talk of the experience of red is talk of the way we use "red". Failing to account for this is failing to look at what you are doing.

That's not what Michael and I are getting at. — AmadeusD

Yep.

Then why the quote marks? But the speculation can be ended by the author.

What has been presented here by myself and others shows that there is more to the way we use the word "red", and hence to the place of red in our dealings with the world, than can be accounted for by the simplistic assertion that red is one of various purely mental or neurological phenomena.

This is not to say that the use of the word "red" does not involve individual mental or neurological considerations.

More likely that they had not given consideration to the difference.

It is about Biomechanics. Otherwise, your TE is pointless. If it were about self-report the first 1000 are unreliable anyway. — AmadeusD

Ok. There's no reply to that, it's so far off track. Central to the experiment are reports of colours seen.

But, you raise another point and that is if stimulation of V4 resulted in the subject seeing red and numbing V4 eliminated red from their seeing it, we'd be forced to conclude red was quite literally in their head and not in the pen. — Hanover

Sure - in this case. But it would be wrong to conclude that therefore the only way we use "red" is to refer to firing of certain cells in V4 - as worng as to conclude that "red" just is light at 700nm.

Your claim is not scientific. It's linguistic — Hanover

Yep.

But the argument being presented by Michale, Amadeus and perhaps yourself has the pretence of being scientific. Hence my pointing out some methodological flaws.

Johnson kicks stone. — Wayfarer

Johnson's is most satisfactory argument.

Then you render your position unfalsifiable? Or you classify Subject 1001 as abnormal?

You see, it's not only about biomechanics because it involves the subject's report. This is the bit that goes unrecognised in the "mental percept" account.

This isn't anythign to do with truth, but practicality. Taking those words as true is helpful. — AmadeusD

Of course it is to do with truth. But you can't say that because it undermines your antirealism.

The cup is in the dishwasher.

So we agree on this?

Yep. There's a category error happening here.

"Red" does not exist outside the mind. — AmadeusD

And yet there are red pens.

(note the obfuscation in "the mind", as if there were only one...)

If you position boils down to "Well, it doesn't matter - use it how you use it" then why are you here? — AmadeusD

To point out that red does not "exist" in "the" mind.

Honestly, AmadeusD, You do not seem to be on the same page at all.

The key here is what is to count as an "observer". You presume mind. That's down to you, not the physics. Alternative include "We don't know - shut up and calculate" and "whatever collapses a wave function".

Isn't this a bit loose? — Tom Storm

We can firm it up. There are true statements about unobserved things. "The cup is in the dishwasher" is true, even though we can't see the cup.

So if asked where the cup is, I'll say "It's in the dishwasher" rather then "I last saw it when I closed the door on the dishwasher, but I've no idea where it is now, or even if it still exists. You might try looking inside the dishwasher to see if it reappears".

Sure, the biological machinery acts the same. That's not an issue. — creativesoul

Only part of the machinery acts the same way - V4, apparently...

There's an old argument (from Davidson?) that is relevant here. Supose that we propose the theory that a certain firing in the part of the brain named V4 just is seeing red. We experiment on a thousand folk and in all cases we find the firing of V4 occurs just as they report seeing red.

But then we find subject 1001. When V4 fires in that way for them, they report seeing blue.

What are we to make of this? Will we be good scientists and acknowledge the theory falsified, because Subject 1001 reports that they see blue? Or are we going to say instead that Subject 1001 is mistaken?

I suppose it will depend on our funding.

Interesting to link this to the trouble @Michael had with keeping his promises. I'm not sure of your diagnosis, though.

@Michael wants there to be a something that is the same in his dreams and hallucinations as in his more lucid moments, in order to explain his use of the word "red" in all such cases.

In summary, @Michael, it seems that you think the word "red" must refer to a something, and in the absence of anything suitable in the world around us, you have resorted to claiming that it refers to a 'mental percept", borrowing the term from folk who use it to talk about what is seen by the subjects they put into MRI machines.

It's not that different to the folk who say that the word "red" refers to the concept "red", and think they have provided an explanation rather than just added a few words to the question.

You have previously said that colours are both appearances and something else. Except by this you just mean that the word "colours" can be used to refer to both appearances and something else. — Michael

I did? Where? I'd like the context.

Here's the OP:

Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?” — Mp202020

No mention of "appearance" in that. Indeed the use of quotes indicates that attention be paid to the word "red", as opposed to... the appearance? I read it as asking something like 'does our use of the word "red" refer to something that exists outside the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept referred to by the word "red"?' And I think from the discussions I've had with Mp202020 that they would readily agree this was not the best wording.

That is, it seems to me that the question is about the use of the word "red" rather than about the appearance of red.

And only the sense relevant to the question being asked is relevant, not any other sense. It is clear in context that the OP isn't asking if light or atoms reflecting light is mind-independent, and so any use of the word "colour" or "red" that refers to light or atoms reflecting light is irrelevant. — Michael

Oh, I quite agree. Odd that you think this worthy of mention. Seems to be the same misunderstanding as Amadeus.

I am pointing out that "red", in the sense of the colour word, does nto refer to a single thing.
— Banno

The single thing is a type, not a token. — Michael

All the more reason not to take an analogy with individuals ("morning star") seriously. But what I have said applies to type.

The term "colour" is also used to refer to the way quarks and gluons interact through the strong force, but that use is irrelevant to the question asked by the OP, and to the philosophy of colour in general. — Michael

Yep. "colour" has different senses. But that is not what I am pointing out to you. I am pointing out that "red", in the sense of the colour word, does not refer to a single thing, but at the least to multiple different things.

I might think that "you seem to be intentionally misrepresenting my position", but rather I will assume that the point I am making is somewhat difficult for you to grasp because of the background assumptions you make.

As a comparison, when we ask what the Morning Star is we are referring to a planet and are asking what it is (not knowing that we are referring to a planet and not a star). We don't respond to such a question by arguing that the term "Morning Star" is also used to refer to the archangel Lucifer. — Michael

"Morning star" is a definite description, functioning as a proper name. it picks out an individual.

Colour words are not proper names. They do not pick out some individual.

But, if someone were to mistakenly think of a colour word - say red - as a proper name, and hence to search for the individual named, they might well be obliged to invent a "mental percept" to stand in for the absent referent.

But they would then be stuck, because it is apparent that the mooted referent of "red" changes both over time and place, as well as from mind to mind.

If you work with a theory of language in which all words are nouns, difficulties will ensue.

The problem is even worse for those who think all things are signs.

The question "is the colour red mind-independent" is using the singular compound noun "colour red" to refer to a single thing, — Michael

Well, no, it isn't. The colour red of a sunset is not the very same as the colour red of the sports car out on the street.

Or, if you must have it this way, the colour of the sports car is not the same as the colour of the sunset. And yet we use the same word for both.

A point made multiple times.

Further,

Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?” — Mp202020

is not the vary same as

...is the colour red mind-independent? — Michael

"Mind independent" serves only to befuddle.

:wink:

, , you are addressing something vastly different to what I have written.

, thanks for your reflections.

I'd ask you to note that the notion of the noumena is not my invention - I didn't put the beetle in the box. The odd things here is that you insist that the noumena is not something about which we can know anything and then proceed to tell us about it. I'm just drawing attention to the inherent inconsistency that involves.

So if my sin is not to delve in to something about which we can know nothing, so be it.

I do think the fact that you can't admit to the simple fact that color is imposed on an external object and is a subjective interpretation is a serious difficulty with your position. — Hanover

I've been at pains to deny most of this. The argument I have been making is that colour is not only "subjective", since there is considerable agreement as to the colour of the things around us.. Your not noticing and accounting for this is also "a serious difficulty with your position".

Colour is not a solipsistic subjective interpretation. That does not mean it is not an interpretation.

we are using the word "colour" to refer to something in particular — Michael

How do you know this to be so?

Why do you think that there must be a something, which is the thing "colour" refers to?

Why shouldn't we use the same word to refer to multiple, different things... indeed this seems to be exactly how colour words are used. They refer to multiple things that are quite different.

But the question under consideration isn't "what are all the ways that we use colour terms in our everyday lives?". — Michael

If your theory does not explain the way we use the word "colour" then what grounds could there be for your claiming it to be about colour?

Here's the initial question:

Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?” — Mp202020

And here is my initial answer:

If "red" is just in your mind, when you ask for a red pen, how is it that the person you are asking hands you what you want? — Banno

and then:

If you ask for a red pen and are indeed usually handed a red pen, then red is not just in your mind; at the least it is also in the mind of the other person.

But also, the red pen satisfies both you and your helper. We agree that the pen is red, so "red" belongs to pens as well as to minds.

So there is something odd about claiming red is no more than a perception. — Banno

I've since added that there is nothing in the physiological accounts offered hereabouts that is contrary to this, apart from the conclusion "Color is in the perceiver..." (Kim et al)

What is being rejected here is not the physiology. What is being rejected is a reduction of colour to mere percept, because doing so fails to account for the use of colour terms in our everyday lives.

The quote from Kim et al continues: "Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus." Kim goes on: "The present study dissociated the perceptual domain of color experience from the physical domain of chromatic stimulation at each stage of cortical processing by using a switch rivalry paradigm that caused the color percept to vary over time without changing the retinal stimulation." Good stuff. Speaking roughly they claim to have separated the visual stimulus from the reported colour. Not all that surprising. Such experiments focus acutely on the physiology, and in so doing ignore the wider story.

And that's the main point here - that the place of colour in our wider world and life is not captured by calling it "subjective" or that colour is nothing but "mental percepts".

I'll again invite folk to have at least a cursory look at the Stanford entry on Colour, if only to note how long it is, and the sheer number of differing views on display. "There has been a strong resistance among philosophers, both to the Eliminativist tendency within the scientific tradition, and the related subjectivism." Colour is a much broader topic than can be explained by elimination or subjectivism.

If God's morals differ from ours, we are necessarily wrong. — AmadeusD

Why?

I have not given a great deal of thought to the philosophy of color. — Leontiskos

The SEP article on colour is worth a read.

Down to one cat, the wrong one. Otherwise, chooks are well and wife prospers. Coming out of winter now, starting to see the flowers. Grew capsicums and tomatoes in the greenhouse over winter for the first time.

The joy of small things.

Sounds like you are living well.

I agree with Banno that this is Kantianism run amok. — Leontiskos

Cheers...

Look, I don't know any more about God than anybody else. — BC

That's wisdom.

The trouble with making stuff up about god is that the story quickly becomes inconsistent. The way to treat those who claim to know stuff about god is to bring out those inconsistencies, displaying the irrationality of god-talk.

I don't think that there is any problem with this view. — MoK

And that is a problem. You are not critical of your own beliefs. It seems you are here to tell us what you believe, but not to listen or think about things in a new way. Not to do philosophy.

Challenge yourself.

"I think God cannot create perfect humans in one instant since God cannot cheat life. So we have to get through, evolve, and grow." — MoK

And what do you think are the problems with this view?

As I said in previous pages of this thread, asking for a red or blue pen is picky. — javi2541997

Especially now we all use keyboards anyway.

It's a shame that we can't type in red here.

The property of the pen itself is noumenal. — Hanover

yet

The noumena isn't known. — Hanover

It follows that we don't know any of the properties of the pen.

But we do know the properties of the pen. We know it is plastic, cylindrical, has a nib and an ink reservoir, is half empty and is red.

Hence the conclusion that talk of the noumenal is inept.

Maybe you think the pen is actually red, but I don't. — Hanover

So you want to say something like "the pen is red, but not actually red". This is enough to convince me that your account is mistaken. And shows well the sorts of word games you will play in your metaphysics.

I cannot be sure that the subjective color people see is the same either. — Echarmion

I want to take this a step further. I suspect we will agree that you can be sure, at least sometimes, that we can be confident the colour people see is the same. Like when we both choose the red pen. But when we prefix the word "subjective", that colour becomes uncertain.

Why not avoid using the word "subjective", and keep your confidence?

That is, perhaps the notion of a subjective colour is a misapplication, and colours are not subjective.

You're forever caught up in language games and not metaphysics — Hanover

Most of metaphysics is word play.

As if saying "(red) is not a property of the pen itself" were not word-play. What does "itself" do here, if not to invoke the muddled Kantian mode of talking about the "noumenal"? All you are doing is saying "don't play that word game, play my word game".

And yet the pen is red.

The world is just. — MoK

No, it isn't.

But perhaps you can't bring yourself to see that, because your faith depends on it.

If the world is already just, then there could be no "duty" for us to make the world just. Another contradiction in your position.

3. Colours, as ordinarily understood, are micro-structural properties or reflectances.
4. These micro-structural properties are mind-independent.

(1) and (4) are true, (2) and (3) are false. — Michael

How's that? If I put 4 and not 3 together, it looks as if you believe that there are mind-independent micro-structural properties that are not responsible for colour...

Then what makes the pen red? Why do you and I both choose the same word for the same pen, if nothing of the pen has anything to do with its colour?

Of course the pen being red is dependent on its chemical structure and the light falling on it. And of course it is dependent on the mind seeing it. And of course it is dependent on "red" being a part of our share culture. It seems that you want only to look at one of the multiple ingredients that go into the pen's being red.

You see red in your dreams and conclude that there is no red while you are awake. That's muddled.

If by "red pen" you mean to define a pen as comprised of redness, whatever that means, then sure, your red pen can look blue if you filter it. — Hanover

Ah - define... so what, setting out essence-of-pen? "Comprised" of redness? Nothing so sophisticated. Just one red pen amongst others, red and not so red.

My point is there no such thing as external red — Hanover

Then if you also think that there is no such thing as internal red, we might well agree.

So what is general to them all? — apokrisis

That there are circumstances in with each fails.

Yep.