[edit:fixed]
That’s worse. Then Searle's argument makes a wrong presupposition that it is an adequate model of how understanding works. It’s like first postulating little gremlins make the world go around, just to deny it - but there are no little gremlins, so the world stands still.

If that's what you are doing too, as I expect, you are in the respectable company of nearly everybody. It's a catastrophically tempting confusion.

I said Searle’s reduction of computation to “symbol manipulation” is arbitrary point of view, incomplete and misleading. It’s like arguing chemistry is just stupid atoms following laws of physics, so they can not possibly give rise to things like biology, language or consciousness. Where is the confusion?

The Chinese room argument holds that a digital computer executing a program cannot be shown to have a "mind", "understanding" or "consciousness", regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave.

It’s impossible to even begin with it because you would first need to know what is "mind", "understanding" or "consciousness". And as I said, reduction of computation to “symbol manipulation” is arbitrary point of view, incomplete, flawed and misleading.

And speaking of Descartes, he anticipates such arguments:

His conclusion is already shown to be false by the work done with AI. In any case, I haven’t made any arguments yet, they have almost nothing to do with what Descartes was musing about.

Here is Descartes's direct quote. Note that he's anticipated your idea by almost 400 years.

He’s talking about simulation in the context of epistemological uncertainty. I’m talking about simulation in the context of ‘virtual entities’ to address “explanatory gap”. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap

Who or what is it that's having the experience?

Virtual machine, a kind of program, called ego, self, or consciousness. The machine called subconsciousness hosts or emulates virtual machine called consciousness inside of itself, so for the consciousness it is practically existing in the simulation created by its “master-machine”, which can feed sensations, emotions, and cognition signals by direct transfer, by fake signal, by modulated signal, or it can invent whatever new context with signal-meaning pairs, like colors or sounds, and present it to the “slave-machine” as actual reality.

What if the computer tells you it is aware of itself and not simply aware to the extent it can answer questions? What would be your test for self-awareness?

If the program could spontaneously, without any learning or explicit programming of any philosophical or sentience related data, arrive to some thought along the lines of “I think therefore I know I exist”, or question like “Is your red the same as my red?”

Basically, observing its own curiosity towards its own existence and functionality should be revealing above anything else I can think of.

this op is entirely nonsensical - it doesn't convey anything about the original argument, nor any insight into what might be wrong with the original argument.

Uhh. Searle postulates computation is just symbol manipulation. I simply explain why that very first step is a flaw, it’s arbitrary. See more details in the post above.

But, computation can give rise to virtual realities
— Zelebg

What does that even mean?

Virtual reality is a simulated experience that can be similar to or completely different from the real world.

Humans write the programs to create the virtual realities out of meaningless bit patterns.

The virtual reality program I’m talking about was also created by humans, only unbeknown to them and against their will, by their own brains.

Computation does nothing but flip bits.

Atoms do nothing but follow simple laws of physics, and yet here we are.

With emergent properties there are different levels of abstraction. Each one tells its own story in its own context, so general description of interactions at one level of abstraction does not explain interactions or causations on other levels.

Imagine an actual and simulated ball and switch. When either the actual ball falls on the actual switch or the virtual ball falls on the virtual switch, an actual light-bulb turns on. We have to look at the abstraction level of effective causation, and here it is not about flipping bits, it’s about two virtual entities interacting.

Virtual ball and virtual switch. The difference between these two virtual entities and their actual counterparts is superficial, but virtual entities are not only material like actual ones, they are better, they are also "immaterial" like only virtual entities can be.

sounds like hypothetical mumbo-jumbo, not evidence.

I explicitly said it is a reason and not evidence. Sounds like we reached limits of your attention and perhaps comprehension too, but let’s try again just in case you are drunk right now or having a stroke.

Try to claim this statement is false: the only explanation we actually already know of, for the existence of things that do not actually exist, such as unicorns or qualia, is virtual existence. Once you realize it is actually true, then my point should be self-evident.

Not true. Your computer program will still have pre-determined behaviors even its functionality and/or goals can be expost facto updated, which is completely unlike humans who's behavior is not deterministic in any way or at any moment in time b/c, unlike the computer program, humans (and rats et. al.) have an "I" which is self-determined sufficiently apart from their genetic code/programming to have true 'free will'.

Oh yes, it is very true. I already told you "I" is a program in private virtual reality created by the brain. And according to what physics you conclude that human behaviour is not deterministic in any way?

A program that can redefine its set of defined functions and goals.
— Zelebg

bad example. just b/c the programmed changed its 'goals' it is still a deterministic program which is constrained to a (narrow) set of pre-determined behaviors and functions. So, it seems your example fails my request.

Semantics. Such a program is indeed deterministic at every instant in time, but that does not mean its future functionality is determined at any time, just like humans.

at least b/c it is an objectified and unified state which happens apart from time and apart from its hardware or embodiment (incl. any programming) and considers/'feels' all constraints at a single moment. state-machine programs or processes cannot achieve that 3rd party state of entwined being.

I'm not sure what you just said, but it looks like an assumption coupled with an assertion.

Can you evidence they can?

Haven’t you already agreed with me previously that all the evidence points to “self” or “I” being a virtual entity? Anyway, plenty of evidence, but for some reason it’s not convincing for everyone, so I’ll give you something that is maybe even better than evidence, I’ll give you a reason.

There is only one thing that is not exhausted by reductionism and thus singly holds the hope for some more meaningful understanding for the phenomena of subjective experience. This thing is a ‘virtual reality’, a world of algebraic abstractions and recursive algorithmic interactions, a realm where almost anything is possible.

The only explanation we actually already know of, for the existence of things that do not actually exist, such as unicorns or qualia, is virtual existence.
.

again, just asking you for your definition of 'free will' for which your statements and examples are based upon. If you continue to resist then I will just assume you have no definition and you are 'testing the waters' (like a sophist) on some ridiculous idea the all computer programs have human style 'free will', but you really don't believe that, which is why you will not provide your definition that supports that degenerate (case) view. I guess I'm trying to "squeeze water from a rock" with you on this 'free will' topic, and I'm not interest in rhetorical banter on things you really do not believe to be well reasoned and true.

I already told you. Freedom of volition is proportional to how much it is determined by "self", and inversely proportional to how much is determined by anything else. And I already told you not all my statements relate to this same definition, so you need to quote me if you wish to have meaningful discussion.

Those are obviously leading questions, which do hint at/point to my answers. My leading questions there are effectively begging you for your definition of 'free will'. That gets to the point of where you are coming from. So, why are you avoiding taking your stab at that?

It was incoherent and unrelated to my question. If you can not articulate an answer to WHY question with BECAUSE answer you're wasting everyone's time.

My current working hypothesis is that 'I' cannot be a program

Why not?

Experience is qualia, in that experience consists of one or more different and simultaneous qualities.
— Zelebg

I disagree.

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quale

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

I'm just asking you for a clear definition of 'free will' and for you to compare/contrast that to the 'common definition' to apparently alluded to. If you do not care to do that then I dare say all your opinions on 'free will' are not meant to be taken seriously as they are not open for debate towards a true, but just to state/spread your position.

There is no clear definition of free will. It is sufficient that we agree on the definition relative to the context we are talking about. But what is the context we are talking about now? Did I say something you disgree with, then just quote it already and show me what it is.

please give us an example of a stable deterministic program which is not constrained to a set of pre-determined behaviors and functions, yet achieves goals and/or has utility.

A program that can redefine its set of defined functions and goals.

how is determinism relevant to "knowing itself"?
— Zelebg

would you agree that all true independent agents acting in the world have a goal? would you agree that a more meaningful decision made by an agent when it "knows" that its decision(s) is/are best for its overall goals? would you agree that best overall decisions can only be achieved if the agent has a state of awareness (e.g., conscious) of its totality of needs and if the agent has the ability to realign its behaviors and/or beliefs and/or goals according to the experienced/predicted consequences of its behaviors and/or beliefs and/or goals ? If so, then would you not agree that a conscious agent is exercising more meaningful 'free will' than the automaton programmed agent, and a self-conscious agent exhibiting still more meaningful 'free will' than an only conscious agent?

Questions are not answers. Answer to my question needs to begin with something like this: determinism is relevant to "knowing oneself” BECAUSE…

It's like you want me to argue something I do not care about. Simply state yes / no question so I know what is this about, or quote my sentence and point what you think is wrong with it.

Yes / no question would clarify.

I do not want to argue about semantics. I do not see where is this supposed to lead, what is the point or importance, what is your position, what is supposed to be my possition... I have no idea what are we arguing about or why.

Sure, what do you say is the 'common wisdom' meaning of "free will" and exactly where/how do you reason that is not accurate/true?

I do not. What are we talking about, what is the argument?

Not common wisdom. Common definition of free will. What's this about, can you phrase it as question?

What is it you were expecting to be able do with it?

I was hoping you to say something about why those differences / changes / relations, whatever they physically are, why they feel like they feel, where do “warm / cold”, “sweet / sour”, “bright / dark” come from, are they arbitrary, why “bright / dark“ instead of “abc / xyz”, something along those lines.

an agent can certainly learn and make choices w/o sentience or consciousness, and you seem to be contradicting yourself by saying that the purpose of sentience or consciousness (which the robot doesn't have) is so we can have "free will" (which you said the robot does have)

In one case I'm talking about 'conscious free will' as most people understand it. In the other case I am talking about my personal definition of free will which does not require consciousness.

your robot is operating 100% deterministic on its program. So, your robot cannot represent or know itself.

Deterministic program does not equal deterministic function. But in any case, how is determinism relevent to "knowing itself"?

Yes, that is free will, program does what program wants
— Zelebg

so, how can you have a 'will' w/o a sentient agent?

Sentient agents are sentient programs.

Standard definitions seem to require the "I" be present in the agent. So, my robot example won't cut it, esp. since it cannot ever have the cogito ergo sum dilemma. That is, how can one say it made a willful choice when it does not have self-consciousness to know it is choosing anything? thus, no free will there b/c you don't have a sentient free agent.

“I” is a kind of program. Are you saying your robot can not have “I” or that no robot ever can have it?

So, if you actually consider imagination to be a virtual experience then must it have qualia to render the experience part?

Experience is qualia, in that experience consists of one or more different and simultaneous qualities. So let us call it an event, external event and internal event. Why is either event experienced is the same mystery. Though, external events are always first converted into internal events before they are actually perceived / experienced.

Colour exists potentially in the brain as conceptual or five-dimensional relations, developed through prediction error to be relatively accurate in relation to our experiences so far. The information we refer to as ‘colour’ is irreducible in this sense.

Sounds good, but I don't know what to do with it. It's too general, can you narrow down "development" thing - developed via what elements, what value / property is that preduction error relative to?

if better vision has more (e.g., energy) cost than its survival benefits then Darwin would say that better performing vision is even worse than worse vision.

Yes, and I have no clue what are we talking about now.

Colours are five-dimensional conceptual structures of chemical and energy relations.

Sounds true enough. Why five dimensions?

They exist potentially as values - any reference to the ‘actuality’ of a colour is a reduction of information using particular value structures: light wave frequencies, chemical ‘signatures’, computer ‘code’, etc.

I can’t disagree, and you definitely said something, but it feels kind of empty. Can you elaborate on ‘reduction of information’ thing with some examples if possible?

So in the above metaphor, I would say that the colour yellow exists potentially in the program, not actually in the computer.

Is that different than how colors exist in the brain / mind?

Can you answer any of those questions?

I already answered your question 4. What in the world is not clear about better vision being better than worse vision?

If pragmatics of better visual discrimination is not self-evident, then I think you need to explain where is the disagreement first.

Agent is the program itself. Meat or metal, human, lizard, insect or a single cell bacteria, body doesn’t matter except in the degrees of freedom. The usual problem with the popular understanding of free will is that people think it must not be determined to be free. The error there is not understanding that free will is 100% free only if it is 100% determined, that is determined 100% by the ‘person’ and 0% determined by anything else. So the essence of the problem is really, or should be, about defining what is a ‘person’ or 'self', rather than with the determinism per se.

Yes.

Colors do covey temperature and mostly increase contrast between four general categories: ground, water, plants and animals, so they are useful.

I ask again: How do you implement 2 and 5?

You are misinterpreting and I already explained your error.

You said you offered suggestions on how to implement 2 and 5. I didn't see them.

No, I did not say that. I asked you what is the problem, then suggested you do not know what is the problem, and finally I said what is the real problem and how to solve it. Overall, nothing to do with 2 and 5, but 3 and 4.

OK, so I make a robot that evolves its own personality, goals, and decision making by way of a genetic algorithm, and then have it makes its own final action decisions based on its personal/unique personality, and goals, and, in part, on a random number generator to help bias it to action when split decisions are experienced (likely not too different than what most humans do). So, according to your definition, have I not invented/created a robot which has 'free will'?

Yes, that is free will, program does what program wants. Aything else takes away that freedom, even if it is a simple freedom, like a crazy wish to print "Hello world!" on the screen over and over again. Of course, some might want to include sentience and qualia for the free will to be complete, that's fine by me.

in a previous reply to discount me saying that we cannot imagine infinity you said that was b/c "Well as we are talking about what can be imagined, not experienced, it seems you can imagine infinity.", but now you say imagination is almost synonymous w/ virtual experience in re 'To learn by imagining, that is mental / virtual experience in advance'. I strongly suspect you are confounding distinctly separate and different human faculties into one, which has you flip-flopping on definitions.

It looks like you mixed me with someone. In any case, I don't see you disagree, so is there anything else I should say or explain?

Ok. How do you implement 2 and 5?

You think the problem is 2. and 5. and I say the so called 'hard problem of consciousness' is 3. and 4., which needs to be implemented with some kind of display / camera system, rather than by any kind of software algorithm.