Sorry to say, but this is once again sounding like something from a secondary source. — Xtrix

I document what I say with primary and secondary sources. You seem to ignore both. For example:

But Heidegger doesn't think of it as "perverted" or "wrong." — Xtrix

What kind of question is this? Heidegger repeatedly accuses Western philosophy with negative concepts that imply falsity in many ways, both in Being and Time and in the Introduction to Metaphysics. And in all cases, in comparison with Greek philosophy In the first section of Being and Time (#1) four basic errors of Western philosophy are pointed out. A few later (p. 22/43-4) western philosophy is qualified as: "deteriorated," "dogmatic," and " concealment".

The term "misinterpretation" applied to Western philosophy appears from the first pages (7/10) and throughout the work. The same as "fall away from the truth" (p. 111/154). I particularly recommend page 11/14 where, explaining the perversions brought about by the Latin translation of the Greeks, he describes it as "deformation and decline". The following paragraph is illustrative:

But now we leap over this whole process of deformation and
decline, and we seek to win back intact the naming force of lan-
guage and words; for words and language are not just shells into
which things are packed for spoken and written intercourse. In the
word, in language, things first come to be and are. For this reason,
too, the misuse of language in mere idle talk, in slogans and phrases,
destroys our genuine relation to things. (11/15)

I do not think that I need to underline Heidegger's words that make direct reference to the concept of truth, both in the common sense and in the sense that Heidegger gives them. And something must be said about that because the question that follows is not understood.

What "truth"? In Heidegger, it means something very different. — Xtrix

Heidegger understands truth as aletheia. He describes it with various words that refer to a revelation or unveiling of the concealed. (Very poetic). Cf. Being and Time (223/265). That's what I'm talking about. I don't know what other sense you're talking about.

Exactly. Philosophers of the last 2,500 are right within the scope of "presencing." — Xtrix

I don't know what scope that is. What do you mean by "presence"?

Heidegger is explicitly referring to the realm of that mysterious stuff called Being. At least it can be said that this Being is universal. He says so. He does not mention a restricted scope, as is the case of Newtonian physics. So Western metaphysics cannot have the excuse of applying to a special field. It is the realm of Being and everything that Heidegger says about it is applied to it without restrictions.

If we lived in an unreal world, our pleasure wouldn’t be real either and so it wouldn’t be really pleasurable. — Congau

Pleasure is a feeling and, as such, it is independent of metaphysical considerations about its object. If something gives you pleasure, it gives you pleasure, be it something imaginary or real. Another thing is that you can evaluate that pleasure according to other considerations about what has caused it or its consequences. But these considerations cannot deny that pleasure has existed.

We don’t want to have illusions either and we don’t wish we believed in something we believe is untrue even if the idea in itself is pleasing. — Congau

This is a psychological description of what men do. I'm not sure it's correct. Many people prefer to believe illusory things like Houris' Paradise or Saints' Heaven, rather than endure the harsh reality. Or shoot a daily ration of drugs to forget about it. That drug can be chemical or mental, like plugging into the TV or a console.

I believe that people who consciously or unconsciously choose to escape from reality in the name of happiness are far more than they seem. Especially if we include those who turn away or think about something else when they encounter something they don't like. There are billions of them.

Again, was Newton "wrong"? — Xtrix

Newton was (and is) right within the scope of his theory. Newton was right against his Cartesian rivals. The Cartesians were wrong.

Nevertheless, Heidegger poses a question with a universal scope: Being. According to Heidegger, Western metaphysics perverted the correct questioning of the Greeks. Therefore, the Greeks were right and western metaphysics was wrong. So much so that philosophy needs to start again, which does not happen until Heidegger arrives. Of course. (Without the Holy Spirit, I suppose). He accepts some partial successes in some exceptional philosophers, but not on the fundamental question: Being.

Hermeneutics, with Heidegger at the head, claims something confuse or contradictory: truth doesn't exist ("Truth is untruth", in Heidegger's words). They (you) don't say that absolute truth doesn't exist. This would be reasonable with some additional clarifications --I have done some above. They (you) claim an absolute truth against the truth. An absurdity.

If what you (or they) mean is that all truth fits within a scope, that is not denied by anyone outside the field of rationalist metaphysics. It is a rather trivial truth. But it does not prevent us from saying that, according to Heidegger's own words, the Greeks were right in the face of scholastic medieval metaphysics or Cartesian rationalism, for example.

Of course, like every prophet, Heidegger changed his theory later because he wanted to and reserved the truth for poetry. About the inconsistencies of this "second birth" of Western thought we can talk if you want.

So what if it wasn’t limited? Would there be any reason to ever disengage? — Pfhorrest

This situation is not predictable neither a short or medium term.
In our real world the evasive pleasure is counterbalanced by the reality principle.

Our actual problem is this alternative: pleasure against lucidity. Nobody can predict what would be his answer in a fantastic situation where someone feeds you meanwhile you are endlessly plugged to a pleasure machine.
We can --and we need to-- debate what are the consequences of addiction to present pleasure-machines (no need to give examples) and who is interested in them.

This is the very problem and I would like to debate it.

Defend what point? — Xtrix

There's an example up there. "It's either half empty or half full." Perfect hermeneutical relativism.To err in the wrong direction by degenerating the answers to the point of needing a "new beginning" is to be half right.


I like to call bread, bread and wine, wine. It is a question of taste, you would say: bread can be wine, depending on how you want.

Almost off topic: The American philosophers' mania to summarize a long-debated topic in the history of philosophy in a scandalous way that perverts the real problem gets on my nerves.
In the end everyone discusses the Problem of the Machine, the paradox of the Two Blind People or the Brain in the Vase instead of going into the depth of the problem actually involved in these little mind games.

I'm going to found the APIEP (Association for the Prohibition of Imaginary Experiments in Philosophy). I'm sure many will join.

What is the point of talking about science fiction instead of the real world? Does the imaginary assumption of the infinite pleasure machine clarify anything about real life? Or is it metaphysical speculation? — David Mo

From what little I know about Nozick, I think it's futile speculation. He imagines an extreme hedonist who does not correspond to any philosophical hedonistic theory. The hedonistic philosopher -- not the imaginary one -- knows very well that he has to compensate for pleasures in a rational way. There is no contradiction between hedonistic philosophy and the postponement of a pleasure. Scales of values can be established according to their duration or the avoidance of subsequent pain. The case of fictitious pleasure can be taken up by a hedonist who rejects it because of its unsatisfactory quality. In other words, the hedonistic philosopher can assume Nozick's point of view while still being hedonistic. Only a fictitious hedonist in a fictitious situation would be refuted by Nozick's machine.

Summarizing: a real hedonist is not a junkie dove.

My intuition is that I would rather have a machine that gives me an unending variety of different pleasurable experiences, — Pfhorrest

What is the point of talking about science fiction instead of the real world? Does the imaginary assumption of the infinite pleasure machine clarify anything about real life? Or is it metaphysical speculation?
In real life any imaginary good has its time limit and when man comes to himself he finds the real world as it is. Is it useful to seek a perpetual escape that does not exist or is it better to face reality with all possible lucidity even if we do not like it?

I don't have any doubts. Artificial paradises end in disaster.

I'm not sure what Nozick's point is.
Is it a psychological issue? That is, what do men really do?
Is it a moral issue? That is, what should people do?

Is he opposing the virtual good to the real good? That is to say, the problem of evasion of reality.
Does he criticize extreme hedonism or any kind of hedonism?

If we cross these questions we find at least four different themes. Which one are we talking about?

People, like the poor rat, will do anything for pleasure — TheMadFool

This is factually false. Many people control their pleasures. This is a fact.

Why? This is the (first) question.

Only childlike naivety can explain someone believing that people have things other than raw, unbridled pleasure on their minds. — TheMadFool

Perhaps the hedonist can prove that people who only want more intense pleasure are wrong. That's what Epicurus thought, at least.

For example, an experiment: a rat that can stimulate itself with a lever to get more and more intense pleasure ends up dying of pleasure. It just squeezes the lever again and again and even forgets to eat.
If the human being is not a rat, he should evaluate the limits of pleasure and its consequences.

I don't think the search for more intense pleasure is justified from a hedonistic point of view. Nor do I believe that a moral argument is justified because "people" do it.

If Heidegger is doing anything he's pointing out that there has been something overlooked — Xtrix

It is evident that we speak different languages. According to Heidegger there is an essential question: What is being? He dedicated several books and many lectures to it. He considered that Western philosophy had overlooked, deformed, degenerated, etc. this question since the time of the Greeks. If overlooking, deforming and degenerating a main subject is not to be wrong, what does it mean to be wrong for you? I'm afraid you speak a language that I don't know. And it's not English.

Well I'm not sure what you mean by the first sentence, but I'm not advocating for irrationalism or mysticism if that's what you're hinting at. — Xtrix

Irrationalism or extreme relativism, which is the same thing. You refuse to defend your point because "there are many theories", "I don't know what Being is", etc.

Two don't discuss if one doesn't want.

I think it means what we want it to mean -- how we interpret it. I think history bears this out, in fact, in terms of the history of ontology. Here it's "substance," there it's "idea," or it's "god," it's "energy," it's "will," it's perhaps the "thing in itself," it's rationality, it's "nature," etc etc etc. — Xtrix

What "is" being apart from our interpreting it? Well, it's not a "thing" (a being) at all, or an object at all. That's why the confusing statement that "Being is not a being." Is it a kind of "nothing," then? Sure, but even the idea of "nothing" is something. — Xtrix

Your first two paragraphs have a lot to talk about. You'll allow me to stand on them.

You define the method of interpretation as going anywhere in any way. That's very Heideggerian, but it doesn't work for me. The act of knowing is supposed to be reasonably shared, but if all is fair the result can be chaos and confrontations can take us anywhere. I don't think you're serious about this.

The proof that you don't seriously mean it is that in the next paragraph you put "apart from the interpretation". But here too you are remarkably confusing. From what you write next I get nothing. That Being is neither this nor that. The conclusion does not seem to be very conclusive, truth be told. Besides, how do you arrive at the question of what Being really is apart from the interpretation? Is there any other method that you have not told us about? I hope it would be more precise that interpretation.

But that's all different from saying they're "right," — Xtrix

I will quote you one last text:

The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein' s very understanding of Being-that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle.
At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle. — Heidegger: Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 225/268

If after this quotation you continue affirming that for Heidegger Heraclitus, Parmenides and the Greeks who were in this line were not right, it is that we do not understand the same for "being right".

I will continue with the rest of your commentary when I have time to read it.

As far as the self goes -- I have thoughts on the self, but what's the connection to Heidegger?. — Xtrix

Nothing. I think I explained that. It's a dirty trick of the word processor program of auto-correction. It has a mania for change "Being" for "Self". Also "pressence" for "pressure". Although I correct its mistakes, sometimes I miss one. I should take out the auto-corrector, but sometimes it comes in handy.

I don't see Heidegger necessarily thinking Parmenides or Heraclitus somehow got it "right" — Xtrix

There are many Heidegger's passages on the capital importance of correctly understand the "concealed" message of Greeks. An example:

Once again, we will rely on the two definitive thinkers Parmenides and Heraclitus, and we will try once again to find entry into the Greek world, whose basic traits, though distorted and repressed, displaced and covered up, still sustain our own world. — Heidegger: Int to Meta, p. 96/132

I think it is impossible to understand Heidegger without his personal version of them. However, it is possible to discuss Heidegger's philosophy without Heraclitus and Parmenides if someone wants to defend him. I am not sure you want to do so.

Anyway, I will repeat my answer properly corrected:

What Being means to you? Why is it so important?

But I don't think Heidegger does have a theory of Being. — Xtrix

This is Heidegger's problem for me:
There is no definition of "Being".
There is no intersubjective method of knowing Being.
No theory of Being...

... And a continuous insistence in rejecting every opponent because he does not understand or despises this mysterious (though essential) Being.

In my frustrated attempts to understand Heidegger I have read many times the word "mystic". That, I think I understand. But I don't like it.

There is no "independent knowledge," as you claimed -- being is simply understood when referring to any entity. — Xtrix

To put it another way: the being of any object or entity whatsoever is presupposed or implied when talking about anything at all: — Xtrix

Also: babies and animals have an innate sense of causality. Is that entering the realm of the "irrational intuitive"? — Xtrix

Lastly, I appreciate the time you've taken to actually read Introduction to Metaphysics and your take on it. In case there's any doubt, I do respect your views. — Xtrix

I also appreciate your efforts to answer my questions, even when I feel they are not correct or as inextricably confused as Heidegger himself.
I also appreciate your recognition that Heidegger is not "always clear". I would say that he is almost always confused. But I am predisposed to give the benefit of the doubt and to think that this confusion is not a deliberate device to leave the door open to a possible retreat, but the result of a basic misguided approach to metaphysical pseudo-problems.
What is interesting, however, is your interpretation of these confusing points.

o confuse this as being his own view is just a misunderstanding. Understandable, given his way of lecturing, where it's not always clear if he's speak from the perspective of the Greeks or giving his own thoughts. In this case, it's certainly not his own thought, — Xtrix

You're getting lost here. Why is Heidegger making this long journey to the Greeks' vision of Being? Is this just to leave them when it's over? That would be absurd.

There's a general reason and a particular reason for that.
In general Heidegger thinks that the Greek philosophy - Parmenides and Heraclitus especially - was in the right direction and only with "lanitinization" Western philosophy lost its way.

In particular, this path is especially marked at the end of this chapter: The "horizon" of Being was "pointing our understanding" on the path of "presence and subsistence". It is not necessary for him to write the word, although he does: "substance". This is exactly what pressence and subsistence mean.

Strong arguments are needed to change this conclusion. I do not see them.

The above seems clear to me, even if you don't like it. It is not so clear, or rather, it is very confusing, why don't you admit that the knowledge of Being that is obtained through language is - or pretends to be - some kind of intuition.
As far as I know, there are three forms of knowledge: rational discursive, empirical -- also known as empirical intuition -- and intuitive. It is obvious that Heidegger's "pre-ontological" knowledge of Being matches the third type.

Said in his confused way of writing:

Because the understanding of Being fades away, at first and for the most part, in an indefinite meaning, and nonetheless remains certain and definite in this knowledge—because consequently the understanding of Being, despite all its rank, is dark, confused, covered over and concealed—it must be illuminated, disentangled, and ripped away from concealment. — Heidegger: Introduction to Meatphysics, p. 63/87

This is simply incomprehensible. It is impossible to get any "definite" knowledge of anything we don't know what is ("indefinite meaning"). The first step of any knowledge is to precise its terms. And confusion is increased when he adds that this "definite" knowledge is "dark, confused, covered over and concealed". My God, what a words dance!

Your example does not add any clarification. Babies and animals have no "definite" knowledge of the causes. They are simply conditioned to respond to certain stimuli with certain behaviours. Something like a pre-concept of cause slowly makes its way into children's minds through a repeated process of generalising responses. We have to wait for the formation of abstract language to talk about a "definite" knowledge of the concept of cause that is accompanied by a defined understanding of the word "cause". Dissociating one thing from the other is impossible.

I don't even talk about animals. I don't think Heidegger was thinking about Pavlovian conditioning.


I think your effort to personally interpret Heidegger is most interesting assuming you are willing to defend Heidegger's theory of Being. In this assumption I would ask you what the Self means to you. Why is it so important?

If we take the correspondence theory of truth, then truth is by definition objective, as it is what is in concordance with the objective world. If we take coherence theory or coherentism, that truth is simply what is concordant or what coheres with a set of beliefs or propositions, then truth is subjective. — IP060903

By mixing two different concepts you've really made a nice mess.

According to correspondence theory of truth, something is true when it matches the facts. Something is false when it doesn't match.A proposition or subjective belief would be a form of falsehood in which the subject's point of view prevails over the pure description of the fact itself. In this theory true statements should be consistent. Inconsistent ones would be false by definition.
In the theory of truth as coherence there is neither objective nor subjective. There are coherent and incoherent statements. A coherentist denies that it is possible to make the objective-subjective distinction.

So the problem between the two theories is whether the "correspondentist" (sorry for the neo-barbarism) can make the subject-object distinction coherently. To avoid this problem some philosophers defend an intersubjectivist theory of truth, of which I have spoken a few comments ago.

It's easier to talk about subjective-intersubjective than subjective-objective.

A statement is intersubjective when it is shared by two or more people.
When an intersubjective statement meets some specific conditions we call it objective because we think it is closer to an ideal of objectivity.

It is a matter of denominations, because an entirely subjective truth cannot be called strictly "truth" and an absolutely objective truth is not possible.

I am talking about statements of fact.

I'll respond in detail when I have time. — Xtrix

I look forward to it.

A reification fallacy common to platonists & sophists alike. — 180 Proof

Not all sophists, I think. Gorgias: "Being is not; if it were it could not be known and if it were known it could not be expressed".(I quote from memory). This is a direct attack on Parmenides and his Platonic aftermath.

In general, sophists establish an interesting distinction between physis and nomos and are sceptical about the former in some/ quite a few cases. "Man is the measure of all things; of things that are in so far as they are and of things that are not in so far as they are not" (Protagoras), also gives cause for thought.

In your criticism of Heidegger I think we agree very much.

I do remember Camus trying to pass an argument suggesting that the logic of life recommends being an actor. The tendentiousness of this line of reasoning always felt egregious and the conclusion silly. — Tommy

Camus liked to provoke. In the midst of a depressive phase, at the end of his life, he even said that the only two things that deserved him respect in life were football and theatre. Forced to explain himself, he said he was passionate about football because of its spirit of cooperation and respect for the opposite. (I think football today would make him want to vomit.) And theatre because it recreated an ideal life that allowed him to escape from the absurd. Paradoxically, he said that the life of theatre seemed to him to be the only real one. Not very coherent for someone who had criticized the ideologies of escape. But I have said that it was very worn out.

More seriously, he was always a defender of a vital hedonism that respected the rights of others. He wasn't always consistent in this, but let he who is without sin cast the first stone. It is this hedonism that led him to defend that by assuming the absurdity, the lack of meaning in life, one can also be happy. The Myth of Sisyphus ends with an image that caused astonishment and forced him to write The Rebel: Sisyphus, happy in the exhausting and inexhaustible task of carrying his rock for nothing.

By the way, he didn't consider himself an existentialist and I don't think he was. Rather, he was one of the last humanists.

Who's claiming that one must have a "knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees"? Or to translate: Where does Heidegger say we have an "independent knowledge" of being when we talk about any particular being? — Xtrix

How are we supposed to discover the much-invoked particular, the individual trees as such, as trees—how are we supposed to be able even to look for such things as trees, unless the representation of what a tree is in general is already lighting our way in advance? (…) Earlier we stressed that we must already know in advance what "tree" means in order to be able to seek and find what is particular, the species of trees and individual trees as such. This is all the more decisively true of Being. — Martin Heidegger: Introduction ot Metaphysics, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 84

It is obvious that the postulation of a special Being whose meaning does not depend on particular entities forces Heidegger to invent an extra rational knowledge that I have called "intuition" to make it intelligible. To speak of "pre-ontological", as Heidegger does, seems to me to introduce an unnecessary neologism for what classical philosophy defined as what is neither empirical nor discursive: intellectual intuition.

Not "defined," and not just any term -- but when speaking of anything at all, in fact. What else could be presupposed but the "is"-ness, "such"-ness, or "being"-ness of what is talked about? It doesn't mean there's a special knowledge about something "behind" or "beyond" things, as with Plato's Ideas, but it does indeed signify a pre-theoretical understanding that something is there. In any culture and in any language. — Xtrix

The word "Being" is thus indefinite in its meaning, and nevertheless we understand it definitely. "Being" proves to be extremely definite and completely indefinite. According to the usual logic, we have here an obvious contradiction. — Heidegger, Op. Cit., p. 82

Therefore, there is a special knowledge ("pre-ontological") that goes beyond the individual entities.
This means opposing the empirical to the irrational intuitive which is becoming more and more complicated. Because if Heidegger recognizes here a logical contradiction he does not have any other choice but to impugn the own logic, which he does in another part of the book. He has already challenged philology and the history of philosophy. Now logic and experience fall. Open field for irrationalism.

I can't think of any examples where "is" doesn't imply that something appears, is there, or "exists" (as in being) in some respect. — Xtrix

Said in this way, the problem of "Being" loses all its semantic mystery. It is nothing ineffable, unless we understand that the only words with meaning are those that refer to "something". When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem. — David Mo

What "problem"? — Xtrix

Being isn't a "fact" or an "entity" at all. — Xtrix

In fact, Heidegger's claim is that "Being" has been discussed and interpreted in many different ways. That's hardly "ineffable." It's either taken, theoretically and abstractly, as something "present" - like a substance, or God, or energy, or an "object," or "will," — Xtrix

... he "assumes that 'being' implies the designation of something" is itself rather "fantastic," assuming one's read Heidegger. — Xtrix

I would say that the problem is not only with Heidegger, but also with you (so much love gets contagious). You cannot deny that Heidegger speaks of Being as " something " and say at the same time that it implies the designation of " something ". In fact, Heidegger is forced to adopt a substantialist language to define Being. But as he had said before that it was "ineffable" he now has to camouflage it as a "common horizon" to all the diverse meanings of being (this is just what meaning is):

The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth. — Op. Cit., p. 96

Didn't you say that Being has nothing to do with substance? Well, here it is said with all the letters. And from contradiction to contradiction this Being is becoming more and more like God: ineffable, an entity different from the entities but by which the entities are what they are, the object of an intuitive knowledge and the end to which all things must tend. Without God, I mean without Being, even nations sink into the darkest decadence. And, of course, this Being also has his prophet: Heidegger.

In short:
Heidegger is forced to assume an irrationalist position because of all the confusion introduced by his lack of a semantic analysis of the concept of being. You affirm, with Heidegger, that the concept of being has a meaning ("horizon", he says) only that you assimilate to the existence. Heidegger, who never wants to be clear, adds to the existence ( presence ) the substance. It would be necessary to conclude that this Being is something with substance (then definable) and existence (then detectable). But, obviously, all of us who are not Heidegger or related do not have such capacity of a "pre-ontological" knowledge, it appears that is justified only by the supposed capacity of all languages to use intuitively the word being in a "defined" way.

Against this claim I wrote in a previous comment. In short, my arguments were basically two:
The word "is" does not exist in all languages. It is not universal in that sense.
Nor in all languages does "to be" mean the same thing.
When used as a copulation, for example, "is" does not mean that something exists, but rather that a property is linked to a subject. It can be said that there are things that exist or not, but this is not said in common language with "is", but by "exists", " there is", etc. The confusion between being as existing and being as a logical link is caused by the twisted use of the same word. In some languages, especially the logical ones, but also common ones, there are resources to express this difference without resorting to a common term like "is". Of course, you can pretend it's “implied”, but that's cheating. First, because we're talking about the meaning, not the circumstantial implications. Second, because if even the absence of Being – Nothingness – , is Being, Everything is Being and the concept of Being lacks meaning, sorry “horizon”. Not to mention that we have killed Parmenides, who was supposedly a venerable idol. You know, what the goddess forbade Parmenides in the first place, the way of foolishness: Not-being is. (Let us not talk about Heraclitus, who is worse).

My view is that Camus's solution would not work for many people including those who are religious. — Ross Campbell

He was an existentialist, so I don't know if he wanted everybody to accept his idea of the absurd... maybe that would be arrogant. — ChatteringMonkey

If a person wants to "believe" (guess) there is a GOD...and that guess brings the person comfort and contentment in some measure...why would that be an "inauthentic" path? — Frank Apisa

All his life Camus claimed he didn't believe in God and his opposition to Christianity was also permanent.
He didn't believe in God because he thought it was a fictitious and purely escapist solution to the problem of the absurdity of existence. He didn't believe in Christianity because its rejection of the world favoured the belief in a universal guilt which was contrary to its paganising vitalism.

Like any person with more or less firm convictions, he believed in what he was saying, and it seemed to him that his opponents were wrong. Otherwise he would be a sceptic and Camus was not.


But he was never a fierce rival to his opponents. He gave some talks for believers and distanced himself from the atheists of his time because he found them too belligerent.When he said this he must have been thinking of his number one enemy Sartre, who was a militant atheist.

I am sorry I cannot continue this interesting debate right now. But I'll be back, as Patton said. — David Mo

"God is." "The earth is." "The lecture is in the auditorium." "This man is from Swabia." "The cup is of silver.'' "The peasant is in the fields." "The book is mine." "He is dead." "Red is the port side." "In Russia there is famine." "The enemy is in retreat." "The vine disease is in the vineyards." "The dog is in the garden." "Over all the peaks / is peace." (ItM: 68/93)

These examples are offered by Heidegger to demonstrate his thesis that "Being" is not an empty word, but is paradoxical since it is intuitively understood in its daily use, but mysteriously resists being defined. This is in spite of the fact that, according to him, the term "Sein" is the most "high", that is to say the most general, and is presupposed in every language in such a way that, if it were not understood, the language itself would disappear. Heidegger's analysis of his own examples is disappointing for several reasons.


First of all because it is not true that the use of a term means any defined "intuitive" understanding. Nor is it true that without a perfect understanding of "is" there would be no language. Words are learned through successive trials and errors until they reach an acceptable use by the community of speakers. This does not imply that our use or "understanding" of that word is "defined", nor that there is a universal community of speakers. On the contrary, both children and adults are often called upon to misuse a word they thought they were using correctly. Therefore, the question of "Being" does not make much sense if we do not look at the uses of "being" in various communities of speakers. It is not true, then, that in order to use the word "tree" one must have a knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees that have been presented to the speaking subject. The concept is formed from them and used in a process of continuous variation. It does not exist as an immutable entity and prior to the use of language achieved by who knows what mysterious intellectual intuition. The same with "tree" as with "being".


There are some fundamental observations in the examples Heidegger proposes that he "surprisingly" overlooks. First, they involve three different uses of the word "being" that correspond to three different language communities. Most are simple copulations that attach a predicate to the subject of the sentence. Ex: "The cup is of silver". These are the ones that correspond to the common language and do not offer any metaphysical difficulty. Another, "Over all the peaks / is peace" is a poetic language that, as is well known, is not descriptive but metaphorical and emotional. We can park it because it does not enter into the subject.
But the first two sentences are properly metaphysical or theological. In ordinary language no one says "The dog is". But a metaphysician will say "God is."

As Carnap says, the problem with Heidegger is that he makes a jumble of all these uses to build a fictional "entity", which is-but is not-one thing or a "fact": the " Being". In the Heideggerian explanation any use of "is" is confused with "exist". Now, when a theologian speaks of God's "being" he can say two things: his existence or his essence. God exists or God is immutable, eternal, etc. When a normal person wants to say that a communist exists or is in the garden he uses expressions like "there is," "is in" (or he names it while pointing it out!), but he does not make "Existence" a problem. In fact, the problem of the existence of something is easily solved because it is understood as the "absolute position of the thing"--I think the phrase is from Kant--the relationship that is established between one thing or event and others in the world. When I say that "there is a communist in my garden," I am not referring to a mysterious quality of being of that communist, but I am putting it in relation to the context of the world of speakers. If I say that God exists, it is because I establish some relationship between God and my world.

If what is spoken of is the essence of God, what is mentioned is the set of attributes that define the word "God". It's the same as if I say "That communist is honest". But it is important not to confuse the two things.

Said in this way, the problem of "Being" loses all its semantic mystery. It is nothing ineffable, unless we understand that the only words with meaning are those that refer to "something". When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem.

Heidegger's conclusion is totally fantastic. He assumes that "being" implies the designation of something (a substantive use of the word) and that there must be a common essence to that something. That the word is polysemic does not even occur to him. What a lack of imagination!

Just because Heidegger makes a pseudo-problem his modus vivendi doesn't make him a charlatan. I would say it's some sophisticated form of delusion. Much less when he's able to transfer his monomania to many intelligent people. Complicating one's life with false problems seems to be part of the human condition and the smartest are not exempt. So I see no reason to insult anyone for it, unless their monomania becomes a danger to others. That Heideggerian monomania necessarily led to the justification of Nazism is an interesting subject that we can leave for another time.

Heidegger admitted later in life that his book on Kant went too far in that regard — Gregory

Can you pass me the reference? Thank you.

The two mentioned above are not saying he wasn't accurate, — Xtrix

Of course they do. More delicately than I do, but they say that what Heidegger sees in the text is not in it. Or what you think "to violate a translation" or that he makes a "translation" (with quotes) mean? You don't capture the nuances of the language, I'm afraid. Any philologist who was told that would be more than nervous.

This is to say nothing about Heraclitus and Parmenides, which you also leave out. — Xtrix

I beg your pardon! I quoted Heidegger's conclusion that it is blunt in itself:

“But it was Christianity that first misinterpreted Heraclitus. The misinterpretation already began with the early church fathers.” (97/133) — David Mo

Isn't this saying something from Heraclitus?

Regardless, in this context, whether or not his critics disagree with his translations says almost nothing. — Xtrix

It happens that they are not "his critics", it is practically all the experts on the subject. Something like that would have baffled anyone with less aspirations to be a philosophical Messiah than Heidegger. He wouldn't run away for such a little thing.

Now you're shifted tone a bit, feigning expertise — Xtrix

I haven't pretended any such thing at all. I'm not an expert on Heidegger and I've said so several times. My knowledge of Heidegger is limited to three books of him, two monographs and about four articles on him. Regarding Introduction to Metaphysics, I am reading it now -due to your kind recommendation- and I comment on what I am reading. I know a little more about Heraclitus and Parmenides and that is why I can criticize the interpretation he gives. Modestly.

Note: If I have enough books on philosophy at home, it's not because I'm dedicated to it. It's for family reasons that are beside the point.

If an examination of Aristotle’s text should show that much of what we say here is not to be found there in the text, that would not be an argument against our interpretation — waarala

I think this short sentence summarizes Heidegger's position: What I say is not in the text, but the interpretation I make is the good one. Amazing hermeneutic method.

What Heidegger hides is that he is not facing a "popular" interpretation that does not take into account of I do not know what totality, but that of the experts in the subject, who base their reasons on philological and historical arguments (what is called "critical apparatus"). He even recognizes that his interpretation of a fragment of Heraclitus clashes with the most obvious translation and that it contradicts other fragments of the same author. In front of them Heidegger can only say that his interpretation is convenient to his interpretation and that is why it is "revolutionary". And so much so.

Knowing here does not mean the result of mere observations about something present at hand that was formerly unfamiliar. Such items of information are always just accessory, even if they are indispensable to knowing. Knowing, in the genuine sense of techne, means initially and constantly looking out beyond what, in each case, is directly present at hand." — Xtrix

It's this kind of explanation that's misleading. Although it is true that Platonic terminology can be ambiguous in some cases, in its clearest formulations the word techné is associated with the world of shadows that Plato had condemned without nuance in the Republic (el oficio del sofista, el retórico y el médico). And this is something similar to what happens with the world of appearances in Parmenides and also in Heraclitus. I do not know the reasons why Heidegger forgets the obvious to confuse the knowledge of physis with that of the senses, which also does not fit very well with his theory. From what I know of it.

I commend your patience. — 180 Proof

La paciencia es la madre de la ciencia (Patience is the mother of science), Spanish proverb.

But it's not just patience. I like to get into these battles because I practice English and I remember philosophers I read in another life far away. Both are good things.

Right now I have just dusted off the books I have at home dedicated to Heraclitus and the Presocratics. As expected, none of them mention Heidegger, which reinforces my initial statement: Heidegger's Greece is only suitable for Heidegger fans. They draw a lot of things from it that they've put in before.

Beware of Nietzsche who is not very faithful to classical Greece either. It seems that in both cases Greece inspired in them a devout love, but they were not respectful sons to their spiritual mother.

I am sorry I cannot continue this interesting debate right now. But I'll be back, as Patton said. And I won't be as long as he was.

Please give one example where he even implies Christian theology "perverts" the approach of Parmenides and Heraclitus. — Xtrix

From what I've read, nearly all scholars recognize his accuracy in his translation of Greek words — Xtrix

On the fidelity of Heidegger's translations:

"Hölderlin scholars, especially Berhard Böschenstein, have no trouble showing that Heidegger's readings are often unfounded (...)
In this case, as in the famous "translations" of the Presocratics, Heidegger takes to very violent extremes the hermeneutic paradox according to which the subject of interpretation can "go behind" the text”. George Steiner, Heidegger, 240-41.

“Now, given that Heidegger refuses to call on historical or philological evidence in any decisive way to support his readings, how does he go about establishing a position within the circle, getting into it in the right way, as he put it? He does so principally by summoning the metaphor, and perhaps more
than a metaphor, of hearing. (...) But how do we manage to give ourselves Greek ears? Not by familiarising ourselves with early Greek literature, since that would, once again, be to land in the domain of historiography and philology. Such hearing occurs when we are led by ‘that which calls on us to think in the words’ (WCT: 232)”. (Pattison, GuideBook to the Late Heidegger:138)

The experts I have consulted do not agree with you. Note the significant quotes in the text. I have consulted the translations I have at home of the fragments of Heraclitus, including the prestigious The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers by Werner Jaeger, which, of course, have nothing to do with Heidegger's free lucubrations. Some examples of Heidegger's "free interpretation" of the texts can be found in the Introduction to Metaphysics that you recommended, where the absence of any critical apparatus, essential in any serious philological study, is evident.


On his opposition to Christian theology, Heidegger maintains that historically the forgetfulness of the Greek ideals that he maintains begins from the moment one passes from Greek to Latin. That is, in the theology of the Western Church at least. Expressions contrary to Christianity can easily be found even in political texts. I am not an expert and I have found several. For example, in a speech in June 1933 Heidegger declared that ‘A fierce battle must be fought’ against the present university situation ‘in the national Socialist spirit, and this spirit cannot be allowed to be suffocated by humanising, Christian ideas that suppress its unconditionality’.

“Turning from jugs and shoes to the big picture, Heidegger then adds that the dominion exercised by the matter–form distinction was, historically, significantly enhanced by the way in which it was taken over from Aristotle by medieval Christian theology and applied to the total relation between God and the world, such that the world becomes what God has made for the fulfilment of His purposes, however these are conceived. But this effectively reduces the world to the status of mere instrumentality, a useful means to an end, rather than something of value in itself” (Ibid: 92).

Also in the Introduction to Metaphysics, in several passages. This one, for example:
“But it was Christianity that first misinterpreted Heraclitus. The misinterpretation already began with the early church fathers.” (97/133)

(I don't need to tell you that Heraclitus, together with Parmenides, are the fundamental thinkers in the "recovery" of the Greek philosophy proposed by Heidegger).

NOTE: I am surprised that you – who accused me of not reading Heidegger carefully – have overlooked these passages from a book you recommended. Because there is more than one in the same sense.

I don't think I said I wanted to watch a youtube. But thank you anyway.

"Techne is generating, building, as a knowing pro-ducing" (p 18). That requires further clarification, of course, but it's hardly him defining it as "knowledge." — Xtrix

[techné]which means neither art nor technology but a kind of knowledge (...) It would require a special study to clarify what is essentially the same in phusis and techne. — Heidegger, Introudction to Metaphysics, p. 18

Techné, in platonic and post-platonic context does not mean "generating knowledge similar to physis (sic)", but in the sense of an inferior form of praxis. It is not true knowledge, science, which is attributed sensu stricto or by eminence to intellectual thought. It is a clearly derogatory term. To overlook this turns out to be a real manipulation.

By the way, I did not refer to the appearance of techné in the Introduction to Metaphysics but in the acceptance speech of the rectorate of Fribourg. If I remember correctly.

As for "capricious" -- it's hard to take that seriously coming from you (no offense meant), — Xtrix

Gee, I didn't realize that attacking Heidegger could be an offense to you. You don't take it too personally?

This is just one example, but very typical of Heidegger. He is not rejecting, disqualifying, or belittling the Greeks, nor the variations of Greek ontology in the form of Christian theology, — Xtrix

Heidegger did not consider the Greeks to be competitors. It was the period when, according to him, the question of the Being had been most correctly posed. It is precisely Christian theology that perverts this approach which, in its fairest form, comes from (his version of) Heraclitus and Parmenides.
The problem is that Heidegger's translation is manifestly pro domo sua. The translator of the edition of the book you recommended that I have consulted has to recognize that Heidegger's version of fragments 1 and 2 of Heraclitus, which is fundamental to him, is "deviated" from the "conventional" version. "Conventional" means the one that true experts in classical philology give. Something similar occurs with Heidegger's other main focus of inspiration: Hölderlin. With a few manipulations, he turns it into an antecedent of German conservative nationalism, which Heidegger himself professed.

But the manipulations of Heidegger's history are of little interest to me. I would like to discuss what an archaic thinker like Heidegger can say to the men of the 21st century.

"search for the Self"? What does this mean, — Xtrix

I'm sorry. Automatic correction program jokes. Although I do go over it, sometimes I miss some of its pleasantries. Read: "search for the Self Being".

I don’t know why you persist in this. — Brett

Don't you think there are often obvious contradictions in what people say they do and what they actually do?Do you accept the statement of politicians who say they are not racist when what they say is full of racism? Heidegger says that Being is not a subject, but he writes constantly as if it were.

I'll complete the answer when I have a minute. Thank you for your patience.

I think you yourself are acknowledging my main accusation against Heidegger: ambiguity and vagueness. The text you recommended to me (Introduction to Metaphysics) is a clear example. It is all dedicated to an analysis of the treatment of the problem of being through Greek philosophy. Given Heidegger's admiration for the Greeks, it can be considered that his conclusions are assumed by himself... or maybe not. For example, the whole search for the Self leads, in his opinion, to the concept of ousía. But, either Heidegger is giving to this term a particular sense or he is accepting a totally substantial concept of the Being (which is what ousía means).

The former would not be surprising because Heidegger's translations of Greek are quite capricious (he goes so far as to translate techné into "knowledge", which is something any student of philosophy knows not to be the case). The second would be surprising. But, leaving both paths open, Heidegger reserves a possible escape route face of his critics, which may be very intelligent, but not very philosophical.

Einstein wasn't "disqualifying" Newton any more than Heidegger is disqualifying the history of Western thought. — Xtrix

According to the dictionaries I have consulted, disqualifying means rejecting someone from a "competition" because they have done something wrong. This is what Heidegger did with regard to all philosophy from the Greeks to him. Things are not so drastic in science. Einstein only limited the field of application of Newtonian physics, he did not reject its validity.

Regarding the capitalization: that's just a mistake, in my view. It's not capitalized in every text, and I believe it shouldn't be for exactly the reason you mention: — Xtrix

It cannot be said that Heidegger does not capitalize on the word "being" and that in German all nouns are capitalized. Indeed this was my thesis: that the capitalization implies that the Being is used as subject by Heidegger in spite of his own refusal. Many translators in English and other languages think that Sein's substantivity is so evident in many passages that it deserves to be capitalized. Exactly the same way as Dasein. This is not a widespread whim but an insight of the ambiguity inherent in Heidegger's discourse.

True, by "bother" there I meant really take him seriously enough to read carefully. — Xtrix

If you don't remember what Ayer and Carnap say about Heidegger, your accusation is a priori. Read it first. You will see that the Carnap article I mentioned does a thorough analysis of the concept of Nothing through Heidegger's article "What is Metaphysics? It is a clear case in which a concept is substantialized without logical foundation.

Not once does he disqualify anyone for "not understanding what the Being is," — Xtrix

If to say that everyone has forgotten or trivialized the essential question of philosophy is not to disqualify, I do not understand what disqualify means.

Heidegger argues we all not only have a tacit understanding of being, but that talk about "being" is taken for granted as something obvious; — Xtrix

In Heidegger's usual contradictory way to have an immediate understanding of what it means to be seems that it is not in contradiction with having forgotten or trivialized the question of being. So that intuitive understanding seems to be quite trivial or ineffective for walking through philosophical life. As he themes it, it is truly trivial. In my opinion.

To get a brief summary of what? — Xtrix

Obviously I was asking for a summary of what the fundamental concept of all Heidegger's philosophy can mean: the Being. That being with a capital letter that sometime comes to qualify as "divine". If I remember correctly.

Western thought has interpreted being from the "horizon" (standpoint) of time, particularly the present. — Xtrix

His thesis in Being and Time is that in the Western world, since the Greeks, "being" has been defined in terms of what's present before us,

It seems you're trying to give me the explanation I asked for. The Being would be the "present horizon", which obviously can mean anything. If that is all that can be said about the Being, it is tremendously vague to me. Poetic, but vague. But since you refer me to the Introduction to Metaphysics as a key text, I will take a look at it to see if I can find out better. Fortunately I have it at hand.

Ayer and Carnap are analytical philosophers, who -- like Russell before them -- never showed they really bothered with Heidegger at all. — Xtrix

Ayer mentions Heidegger's metaphysics as a "superstition" on page 49 of the Spanish edition of Lenguaje, Verdad y Lógica (Language, Truth and Logic) and refers to Carnap, who analyses the concept of Nothing in Heidegger in section 5 of his article "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language" and concludes that it is the result of a "gross logical error".
I don't know if "bother" is the right word in English, but of course Heidegger's metaphysics didn't appeal to either of them.

It's not even a "subject." — Xtrix

Heidegger uses the term "Being" as a subject on countless occasions, adding to it the capital letter, which makes it especially substantial by making it a proper name.