Good summary!

I agree with everything except "always abhorred the Jews." Husserl and Arendt with both Jews, as you know. — Xtrix

"Some of my best friends are black," you know.

It seems that the publication of the latest Black Notebooks has left little doubt about Heidegger's anti-Semitism, which had already been denounced by Husserl and Jaspers, among others.

Heidegger disqualifies his rivals and the entire universal philosophy for not having understood what the Being is. — David Mo

No, that's simply wrong. — Xtrix

From the very beginning:

The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being
This question has today been forgotten. Even though in our time we deem it progressive to give our approval to ‘metaphysics’ again, it is held that we have been exempted from the exertions of a newly rekindled gigantomakía peri tés ousías. Yet the question we are touching upon is not just any question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on or a theme for actual investigation. What these two men achieved was to persist through many alterations and 'retouchings’ down to the ‘logic’ of Hegel. And what they wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena, fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long since become
trivialized. — Heidegger, Being and Time, #1

I don't know exactly why you accuse me of being a "believer" -- but that's nothing but a term of abuse. — Xtrix

I was not referring to you, whom I do not have the pleasure of knowing, but to a certain type of Heidegger followers who function as believers in a mystical sect.
I'm sorry, if you felt referred to.

He does indeed go through the history of this, thoroughly. — Xtrix

Do you have to read all 102 volumes of his complete works to get a brief summary? Gee, it is hard!

Anyone who knows about a subject is supposed to be able to give a brief explanation of it, even if it is only approximate, but this is the typical response of Heidegger's followers to any request for clarification. It should not be stressed that I find it very unphilosophical.

Heidegger does not define or explain anything because there is nothing to define. Carnap and Ayer closed the problem in less than a page. Heidegger confuses the use of "being" as the subject of a sentence with a name of something. Basic logical error into which Parmenides already fell, by the way

"Something is happening out there."
"Something smells rotten in Denmark."

Then there is a stuff called "Something" that is at the origin of everything because we can say of everything that is "something". We have to elucidate what "Something" is before we go into any other subject. But Heidegger makes an ontologically rude mistake. Too much influenced by Parmenides, he believes that the alternative is between Being and Non-Being, when in reality we have three types of First Reality: Something, Totality and Nothing (I am Hegelian and I do not believe that Non-Being is not). And along this path I go where I want. And nobody should ask me for clarification because it is so obvious that one has to be blind not to see it... (or similar answer).

And I leave the thing here because I'm getting excited about my parody and I see myself writing a hundred and two volumes in paste.

The characteristic of poetry is that it plays with language to create a world of ambiguity that is suggestive and emotional. The characteristic of philosophy should be that it provides some kind of clarity to the basic questions of life. If you mix the two things up, you create nothing but confusion. Thus, a poet is sold to us as if he were a philosopher. That sounds like a guru, as I said before. And I don't like gurus. I think humanity needs light and not having its guts stirred up with magic wands.

he repeatedly insists Being should not be thought of as 'a being,' and that Being can not be understood as 'objective presence' which is how philosophy/metaphysics has typically 'covered over/concealed' this character of Being. — Kevin

To say that x is not y is not to define it. To define a thing is to give a series of characteristics that make it recognizable when it is presented. Nothing you mention is a definition.

Moreover, in Identität und Difference he goes so far as to say that the attempt to separate the Being from entities is useless. Since he had said that the knowledge of the Being is a prerequisite for the knowledge of entities, this means an invalidation of all his doctrines.
NOTE: I have not read the book in question, but it is cited in the book that George Steiner dedicates to him ( page 256 of the Spanish edition).

He is quoted as saying it was “The greatest stupidity of his life”. — Brett

But he never said clearly what that stupidity consisted of. He never disavowed the assumptions of his philosophy that led him to that "stupidity". He never denied the political basis that led him to glorify Hitler and his party. He always abhorred the Jews, communism and democracy.
So I don't think that elusive ways of shake the burden off are to be taken into account.

Make up your mind. — Mww

Honi soit qui mal y pense.

What is contradicted in the first sentence is the assumption that Aristotelian logic is the only one possible. Not that formal logic contradicts Aristotelian logic, which is what the second sentence refers to. They are two different things.

I'm not saying I can't contradict myself, but not on this occasion.

An analytic judgement can be false. Because “the inconceivable is not the impossible” is false, it is not true under any condition. — Mww

An analytical statement is supposed to be tautological and cannot be false. If what I said is false, it's because it's not analytical. In my opinion, impossible and inconceivable are two words with different meanings and therefore have different meanings. Do not tell me that this "deduction" can be false. It would be chaos.

"The clarity. The clarity of the explainable, of the indubitable, of what results from avoiding contradiction, is not in its essence any clarity, because it can only shine where darkness is and where it forces as a foundation of thinking, that is, where darkness does not disappear with clarity, but unfolds". — Martin Heidegger, Cuadernos Negros, Editorial Trotta, 2017

To think about what the hell kind of clarity is that which " unfolds" the darkness. Very poetic and very unphilosophical, I'd say.

Could probably be lots of intricate quantum entanglement effects as their chemistry isn't limited to functionality for synapsing. — Enrique

There may also be an angel and a devil pulling each to one side of the synapse. Why not?

Modern formal logic doesn’t contradict him any more than Einstein didn’t contradict Newton......you know that story. — Mww

Not only because of phrases like that but because the whole Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason is mounted on syllogistic logic. Of course it can be reformulated, but it was not Kant's idea.
It is not a question of contradicting, but of saying things that cannot be said within one logical system or another. So Newton's physics cannot express the theory of relativity and Aristotelian logic cannot say what contemporary formal logics say.

The inconceivable is not the impossible. — David Mo

Under what conditions would this not be true? — Mww

It's not about conditions. It's an analytical statement.

Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound. It is so timid and dislikes going into the water. — F.N., The Gay Science

Sure, but the problem is that Nietzsche is perfectly understood (sometimes more than his fans would like) and Heidegger is not. What's more, Heidegger uses a few resources to provoke darkness, not lightness, which could be shared by any esoteric sect guru. For example, a specific jargon that is never clearly defined and that provokes endless discussions among his followers about what the master said. You know, "that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest they should be converted and their sins forgiven!" (Mark 4:12).

Unable to give an explanation? I've tried a number of times, and I'm happy to answer any questions. It's not so difficult to do once you've gotten into his funny language. — Xtrix

Heidegger disqualifies his rivals and the entire universal philosophy for not having understood what the Being is. He does so systematically. I have been searching uselessly in Being and Time for an answer to that question. I consulted several qualified commentators (not believers) of his work who told me that, precisely, Heidegger never made something similar to a definition of the Being and even recognized that the Being is an indefinable concept. If you have an answer to what the Being is and you can base it on some text of Heidegger, I would be grateful if you could tell me. It will dispel the terrible suspicion that haunts me: that Heidegger did not know what he was talking about.

NOTE: A text, please, not a simple quote.

He believes being is that on the basis of which we define ourselves and everything else in the world, and that although the question has been forgotten we still walk around with a "pre-ontological understanding of being" - which has gone through many variations (creature of God, a subject with desires to satisfy, etc) but which has remained Greek through and though. — Xtrix

But he ended up recognizing that he had been unable to give an explanation of the problem of Being. So much effort and so much praise for Hitler for nothing.
In my modest opinion neither he nor those who followed him were able to give an explanation of the fundamental concepts of his doctrine or of his affiliation with the Nazi party. His deliberate obscurity and changes of position made it impossible to fully understand ten pages in a row of Being and Time. In my opinion.

My point is you, or any philosopher, can't deny that the human brain is a host for a being which is as yet beyond the preview of science, or our understanding. — Punshhh

What I am saying is that the discourses on the mind and those on the brain run parallel paths many times. That doesn't mean they're different realities. There are well-documented indications that what we call mind is a product of the brain. I have no evidence that there is a thing inside my brain that science can never discover. It's my brain doing its own thing. Some of it I'm aware of. Some I don't. And that's it.

hence, such an assumption is inconceivable & therefore can’t even be thought, let alone assumed. — aRealidealist

The inconceivable is not the impossible. Kant demonstrated that the principles of logic are indissolubly associated with the forms of our intellect. But we cannot be so proud to think that our intellect is the only one possible in all possible universes. Any day an artificial superintelligence can give us a hard time. In any case, Kant believed that the only possible logic for our understanding was Aristotelic. Modern formal logic contradicts him. There are other possible logics. In my previous comment I quoted some of them to you.

Thus synthetic apriori truths are based on pure understanding & reason, not experience or what’s empirical. Therefore, in principle, metaphysics is purely formal — aRealidealist

Sure, but Kant here has introduced a Copernican twist, as he says. Classical metaphysics has sought to find synthetic principles a priori about things. Kantian metaphysics dispenses with things and explains synthetic a priori principles as conditions of a priori knowledge. For example, mathematics is based on a priori synthetic principles because it does not speak about things, but about the a priori conditions of sensibility, space and time. The same happens with logic, which deals with the a priori conditions of understanding, categories and judgements. Only on the condition that it becomes epistemology does metaphysics become a science. "Formal", as you say.

The only thing that Kant did not justify is that mathematics or logic are absolutely a priori. There are various mathematical and logical systems and this calls into question his theory. And that is why I said that, in my opinion, the only synthetic knowledge, that is to say, that informs something outside of itself, is that of experience. If something else was understood, I apologize.

Can you give me an example of a logical principle that isn’t a pure formality, i.e., that isn’t independent of particular materials altogether? — aRealidealist

When logic is applied within a hypothetical deductive system or in ordinary life.

Logical systems are only good as long as we stick to one way of thinking. The syllogism is only valid for thoughts that are organized around the subject-predicate relationship, the logic of predicates only in terms of individuals and attributes, the logic of propositions for thought that uses veritative functions, etc. Not counting the various forms of inductive logic. There is nothing incongruous in assuming that a world with rational beings that organize their experience in another way could have a different logical system.

So that if it’s empirical, it isn’t either purely or formally rational; the latter pertaining to what’s apriori, the former to what’s aposteriori. — aRealidealist

Excuse me. If metaphysics were merely formal, it wouldn't be a scandal for Kant. The problem with it is that it pretends to be both pure and synthetic. I'm with Kant on this. The only synthetic source of reason is experience. But that doesn't make it any less rational. In fact, the concept of science as a fundamental part of Reason is typical of the Enlightenment, which Kant culminates. A reason that combines the analytical with the synthetic.

This is why scientists can’t claim to have obtained anything absolute; hence, Lawrence Krauss states, “In science, we don’t... claim to know the absolute truth. — aRealidealist

Nowhere is it written that rational knowledge has to be absolute and synthetic. Logical principles are absolute as long as they are kept to pure formality. When they are applied to experience they may have to transform even their axioms. For example those damned particles that are in several places at the same time or that are and are not wavy.

What modern relativists (Feynman?) mean is that systemic reason cannot reach absolute truth unless it loses all real content. And this does not mean anything in favor of irrationality, but rather of epistemological caution.
When they are applied to experience they may have to transform even their axioms. For example those damned particles that are in several places at the same time or that are and are not wavy.


The advantage of rationality over irrationality is that it is subject to rules that produce results and strategies that allow open confrontation of points of view. A philosophy that does not allow this becomes irrational and dangerous since the first of the conditions of rationality prevents superstition and the second condition of scholastic totalitarianism. These are two important things.

Yes, but have we established that a human is not millions of tiny consciousnesses? — Punshhh

But what about what philosophy has to say about it, is idealism nonsense? — Punshhh

Trillions of self-conscious cells? What a scandal! It would be worse than a session of the British parliament.

Qualia are a separate dynamic from what the sense organs do, arising as some kind of additive superpositioning and quantum entanglement of particles (vibrating energy concentrations in motion). — Enrique

This is purely imaginative. If you didn't use scientific words it would be like a fairy tale. Where did you get the idea?

For me the mind is what the brain does in relation to the person, or the self, the acting being. — Punshhh

So you are including in mind everything the brain does, is it confined to the brain? — Punshhh

I would prefer to distinguish consciousness ( awareness ) from mind, but these words are used the same in this forum and I preferred not to launch semantic wars.

It seems that the concept of human mind includes some functions of the body, but I will not say so.

Of course, if life=consciousness a paramecium has consciousness. And every cell in our body. Then we are composed of millions of tiny consciousnesses. Why not?

Obviously, because it's not like that when we talk about consciousness.

I asked you for a thought proven to be true and you mentioned a finger in boiling water, it is you who are confused. My next point was that your body will act independent of your mind and consciousness (something else you use interchangeably). — Punshhh

They're two different problems.
Reflex acts of the body are independent of the conscious mind, but there would be a lot of talk about the pre-conscious and the sub-conscious. I don't know if you want to reduce the mind to the conscious.

"Living" seems to me a very ambiguous term to define consciousness. A paramecium is also living.

The mind is a mental space, and a space is something. — Olivier5

You can say that if you like. But you risk having some conceptual problems. "Is space a thing or a property of things?" Well, I don't want to deflect the discussion.

his was basically my point; modifying the term “reasoning” with the adjective of “rational” is insignificant, — aRealidealist

From a logical point of view, yes. From a rhetorical point of view, no, because it emphasizes something that should be taken into account. "The cat was advancing with feline steps." "The argument is rational." All cats' footsteps are feline and every argument is rational. But there are those who haven't realized that and it's worth emphasizing.

Only in colloquial terms can the method of ‘science’ be called “rational,” as its mode of investigation isn’t apriori but aposteriori. — aRealidealist

It's not just colloquially. When Kant speaks of metaphysics he adds the term "pure" reason because it claims to be the science of the a priori. But it does not occur to anyone to say that empirical science is not rational. It's just not pure. In any case, empirical reasoning is the opposite of the irrational, which is what we are talking about, I think.

“Reason,” in the original or truest sense of the word, — aRealidealist

I don't think you've realized that rebutting any argument with Aristotle's authority, or pretending that Kant's terminology is "the real thing," is a bit old-fashioned.
You lose sight of the fact that the problem we are discussing is whether you can talk about science as rational knowledge as opposed to the irrational. And we are not opposing, I am not at least, the rational to the empirical in Kant's way.

About the multitude of articles that talk about "scientific reason"; https://philpapers.org/s/scientific%20reason
That works for you?

The brain mind issue is a problem for materialists. For idealists not so — Pop

I don't know what the problem of materialists is, but the problem of idealists is not to have problems. When they can't explain something, they put a ghost in the machine. Or an invisible dragon, if they're Chinese. And it always works!

A science without problems is suspicious.

Let's say you are watching something extraordinary like a pig flying, then you accidentally put your finger in boiling water. I doubt you would have any thoughts about it, all your thinking would be occupied with trying to believe that you were really looking at a flying pig. — Punshhh

I don't know if you've noticed that you're describing consciousness all the time in terms of ideas (of a pig), perceptions (of things), and sensations (of pain). If we don't talk about them we can't talk about any consciousness.
I think you confuse the concept of consciousness as nothing with the concept of non-existence. Consciousness exists, but you cannot define it or describe it with consistent properties. That's why I say it's nothing. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that it is a void. Choose the word you like best.

Winger won a Nobel, and Von Neumann — Wayfarer

That is not why they are considered eccentric, but because of their interpretation of the problem of observation in quantum theory. Winger didn't get a Nobel Prize for sticking the consciousness of the observer in the middle. As far as I know.

it is nothing substantially speaking, I insist. — David Mo

Modern realism, generally, has the conceit that it can see the world ‘as it really is’, — Wayfarer

I wasn't talking about the reality of the world, but the substance of consciousness.

That’s why there are still so many books about the topic subtitled the ‘battle for the soul of science’ or the ‘battle for reality’. — Wayfarer

The problem is the role of observation, not the human soul. This "soul" thing is a sensationalist headline.

ut they don’t posit consciousness as ‘a component’. It’s the condition for making an observation, and in the case of some of the fundamental experiments of quantum physics, the outcome is observation-dependent. — Wayfarer

The collapse of the wave function creates reality whilst it is measured. And according to Wigner this is because an observing mind intervenes. I think Von Neumannn is going the same way. True, they are very eccentric and few physicists take them seriously. For very reasonable unscientific reasons.

The mind is what provides the framework within which all such judgements are made; you can’t ‘take away the mind’ and still have anything whatever to say. — Wayfarer

Try to explain what the mind consists of without using terms referring to feelings, sensations and thoughts. You can't. As I said, the mind is nothing substantial, but a vector, a trend, a project. Of course, without it there would be no project. But it is nothing substantially speaking, I insist.

Chalmers is pushing for a science of consciousness, — Pop

I don't think Chalmers' stuff has anything to do with science. I don't think a subjective science is possible. I don't think his "logical" experiments prove anything. We can pit Blade Runner replicants against Chalmers' zombies and we're not out of science fiction. It's simple philosophy camouflaged by four terms that sound to science.

It’s very simple. Seeing implies looking, looking implies someone who looks, and that observer is never part of the picture. — Wayfarer

Thinking implies someone who thinks and that someone is never part of the thought. — Isaac

I know the idea may seem strange to common sense, but I am nothing more than what I am feeling or thinking. If you take away my feelings, my sensations and my thoughts, I am left as an empty space. I am strictly nothing. Only a vector towards future.

Overall, I do agree that science is becoming more holistic and less materialistic, — Wayfarer

Science is not more or less materialistic because the concept of matter is not scientific. It is true that many interpretations of quantum mechanics are not mechanistic. They introduce chance as a component of the described reality. What this reality is is not clear. But the idea that consciousness is a component of quantum reality is only held by two or three eccentric physicists.

That's putting it strongly. Whether scientific ideas correlate to reality is tested. The idea can be wrong, there's no obvious difference in terms of their ideas. But well-tested ideas, yes, are thought to describe something about reality to some (presumably higher than previous) level of approximation. — Kenosha Kid

The approximation clause is present in (almost) all formulations of contemporary scientific realism. The situation is the same as that of a study that has established that the only cause of train delays is the poor condition of the rails, but it cannot predict exactly which train and how long it would be delayed. The anti-realist insists that there are also some ghosts on the line.

Einstein, who didn't believe in ghosts, introduced the same clause in the relationship of Pythagoras' theorem with reality. He knows that its formulation is an ideal that only works in reality as part of a particular mathematical-deductive system and added rules of correspondence between formal and real entities.
Heisenberg and Russell - in a phase of their philosophy - also defended the reality of mathematics. But Heisenberg was more evasive, and Russell spoke of a mathematical reality as "subsistent" that is not exactly the same as the reality of the world.
I believe that, with relativity and quantum mechanics in sight, strict mathematical realism is impossible. Strict mathematical realism = mathematics describes factual reality.

Can you give me a thought that has been proven to be true? — Punshhh

If you put your finger in boiling water, it will burn. I'm sure of it, and I advise you to be, too.

our philosophy gets smaller by the day. — Punshhh

Your are not gonna make it great by telling bedtime stories.

Does my TV understand the meaning conveyed by Bach's toccata and fugue? — Punshhh

Music has a merely emotional or aesthetic meaning. It is not knowledge.

So were we to consider these things we don't know, we would be writing science fiction then?

You can't banish the "alien", because you don't like it. Theology a respectable branch of philosophy would'nt like it if you were to banish the soul, which is hosted by the brain. — Punshhh

Theology does not seem to me to be a respectable branch of philosophy. I think Kant put it in its place, that is, outside of all rationality.

The realization that there is something we don't know ends here. Any attempt to give it a name and to elaborate a whole theory about it is pure fiction. Fiction is fine when we use it for entertainment. But it becomes a hoax when we put the label of truth

What this says is that ideal Pythagorean theorem is a belief, not a fact, that is: the idea itself exists in Einstein's head, not out there somewhere. — Kenosha Kid

Indeed. Note that Einstein, who knows very well that Pythagoras' theorem does not work in non-Euclidean mathematics, introduces the clause "approximately". That opens the door to anything. If you don't like my principles, I have others.

It is the same clause that appears in any form of current realism. It is stated that human ideas (scientific or otherwise) coincide with reality but "approximately".
I am also a realist, but I believe that a univocal idea (law) - reality relationship cannot be established. It can simply be said that science as a whole must have some real correlation that is difficult to establish on a case-by-case basis.

Within this spectrum it seems logical to me to distinguish physical and mental, and there are many other such cases. — Wayfarer

But getting back to limestone, or inorganic stuff generally - what it doesn’t convey, or embody, is information. I mean, unless you’re really eccentric, rocks don’t think - actually the thing I don’t like about ‘panpsychism’ is that it seems to suggest they actually do. — Wayfarer

Life seems to embody a symbolic code, to embody information on a fundamental level. DNA, which has been mentioned here, is the obvious example. — Wayfarer

And many of the exponents of biosemiotics recognise that the laws that govern signs, exist independently of those that govern physical objects, even if in some sense they’re dependent on them. — Wayfarer

Semiotics points to another form of dualism namely, matter form (hylomorphic) dualism. — Wayfarer

The problem you've got, though, is that (for example) Pythagoras' theorem would be true (to quote Einstein) 'whether anyone discovered it or not' — Wayfarer

We seem to agree on the rejection of the consciousness of the universe and material things.

But you're trying to replace it with the concept of information. I don't agree. There's a big difference between the concept of "bioinformation" and human information, between the information a rock produces and the information the front page of the Washington Post produces. Even in the information produced by a tweet from President Trump, which is the closest thing I know to a rock. The concept of semantics only works in the natural world by analogy. The genetic code is not a symbolic language like human language. There are many differences. For example, human language uses symbols that need a human mind to interpret them. A human symbol is polysemic in itself. A human language has pragmatic means. No natural code is capable of asking a question. There is a controversy among biologists about whether the concept of genetic "code" and information theory is a useful model or an inconvenient one. In either case, there is nothing in the genetic code that involves consciousness, intentionality and abstraction.

Every natural code, so to speak, exists only when there is a human mind to decipher it. In nature there are processes. These processes are read as causal or descriptive laws in a coded language. And these laws do not exist outside the human mind and without a specific human language, be it an ordinary language or a science. Even the Pythagorean theorem (a2+b2=c2) is not an object outside of science. The fact is that Pythagoras' theorem only exists in Euclidean mathematics.

What I am saying does not justify a metaphysical dualism. I'm advocating an epistemological dualism. When we describe the laws of nature we use a language. When we describe the mind we use another language. It is the same that we use a scientific language to speak of macroscopic entities (Newtonian physics) and another one for microscopic entities (quantum mechanics). But the referred objects are the same: be rocks or brains. But they are different languages that serve to speak of different levels of a common reality, which we can call matter. In the case of the human being, all his behavior refers to the nervous system. That's the material substrate that is referred with different languages.

Could it possibly be a host to the mental, or a cause of the expression in the host? — Punshhh

I don't think we're invaded by a parasite called "mind". We're not in Alien. We're not doing science fiction.
What there is is an exact relationship between the mind, which is the manifestation of certain verbal and gestural actions, and the brain. Remove one, and the other ends. There's no indication of a mental parasite. And if a word has no directly or indirectly observable reference, a word has no meaning.

a lot of your statements come down to nuances of language, or “language games.” — aRealidealist

And in your case too. It's natural with any language that isn't univocal like science.

Rational reasoning is tautological, just as empirical experience would be. — aRealidealist

It's not a tautology, it's a redundancy. To say "rational reasoning" is a redundancy because every argument we want to make for or against something will use reason in one way or another. Therefore, to demand that reason be justified with non-rational arguments is an absurd demand. If it is possible to justify reason, it will always be with rational arguments. Here the irrationalist violates the common use of language by creating a pseudo-problem. Also when he says that reason cannot be justified with reason. Reason is not a method of justifying anything. It is not the method of proving that the current pandemic is caused by a virus. That is demonstrated by one particular method that has proved very effective in detecting the bug. As scientific methods have proved very effective in similar cases. And we call those methods and other similar ways of thinking rational or "reason" for short. And I don't think what I'm saying is inconsistent.In every case, you seem to be unable to prove that it is, because you have avoided rationally justifying your accusation of inconsistency.

You did, check your fifth post on the fifth page of this thread. — aRealidealist

I haven't seen it. I think you attribute something to me that I haven't said because you identify reason and logic. Don't make me work in vain and quote my exact words, please.

If you can give me the citation where Aristotle specifically distinguishes between logic & reason, — aRealidealist

Aristotle does not distinguish between logic and reason because these two terms are alien to his terminology. But he does distinguish between the study of the forms of argumentation and categorization (which would be roughly equivalent to today's logic) and the sciences (which would be equivalent to today's reason). According to him logic is not a "science" (it is not included in any of the five sciences mentioned at the beginning of Physics), but a propaedeutic that helps to shape syllogistic deductions so that they are rigorous. That, at least, is the interpretation that the Aristotelians gave to their treatises on logic. What we call "logic" now, of course.

Now, there are different types of logic not because logic itself is variant, but because of the different types of objects that it’s applied to; — aRealidealist

Yet you distinguish between these two, logic & reason; so can you please, for my understanding, define how you distinguish the two words? — aRealidealist

Years ago I took a course in formal logic that made me sweat blood. Although I don't remember everything, some things I did get out of it.
Firstof all, that formal logic (that of predicates is the one I remember most of all) consisted of establishing a series of deductive steps that started from axioms to conclude (demonstrate) theorems by means of a series of inference rules. Logic is therefore a method of deduction that allows us to move from premises to conclusions, from some statements to others. You can call that a method of "formation" of statements, but not hide that this formation is a deductive procedure of passing from some statements to others.

Moving from one statement to another is also the goal of Aristotelian logic (from premises to conclusion), but in the course I learned that contemporary formal logic is not the same as Aristotelian logic, since the latter contained some deficiencies that were overcome by current formal logic, which was very different from Aristotelian logic. Syllogistic logic has remained something that can be used in everyday life and that from time to time is tried to be reformed, but in its pure state it is a thing of the past among today's logicians and mathematicians.
There I was explained the differences between formal logics which were quite a lot. Neither the terms nor the rules of deduction were the same. Especially if we add the inductive logics. Therefore, to say that there is "one" logic (please, note this "one") is an abstraction that we use in ordinary language to talk about or group the different logics. A logician will always specify the branch of logic in which he works.

Leaving aside Aristotle, who is a bit old, I follow the current philosophy that makes a clear distinction between logic and reason, considering logic a part or instrument of rational procedures of thinking. It is a part that deals with the possible ways of passing from one statement to another, the form of deduction or the admissible rules of inference. Say it as you like. But reason (rational methods of thinking) has many other components. For example, valid systems of collecting empirical information, language analysis, rules of interpretation, etc. etc.
Simply put, the concept of reason is broader than that of logic.

I hope I have made my position clear because it has taken me a while.