You're dancing on a tightrope.

Your objections to my interpretation of Heidegger (by the way, this is the standard interpretation) are only based on words. — David Mo

"Standard interpretation" to claim that Heidegger believes all of Western philosophy, excluding the preSocratic Greeks, are "wrong"? What can I say -- if that's true, so much for the "standard interpretation." Kind of a weak appeal to authority.

But yes, I am taking issue with words. I said so from the beginning. They're rather "nit-picky" but relevant nevertheless.

If you want to say that Heidegger's words against metaphysical Western tradition (degenerated, deteriorate, concealing, dogmatic, etc.) are not negative I think we have different dictionaries. And so it is impossible any serious discussion. — David Mo

Not different -- he just never applies it in the way you're saying. As I've gone over with you several times now, there's a distinction to be drawn between translations and the entirety of Western thought. He does not believe the latter is "wrong" -- but rather that an essential thing has been overlooked: that all of our various ways of interpreting being has been on the basis of the present -- and that perhaps it's time to go to the "things themselves" (the cry of phenomenology) by understanding and overthrowing this tradition.

Or maybe Heidegger thinks Plato and Aristotle and Descartes and Kant are all completely "wrong." Have it your way. But there's no evidence of it.

Thinking is l'engagement by and for the truth of being. The history of Being is never past but stands ever before us; it sustains and defines every condition et situation humaine. In order to learn how to experience the aforementioned essence of thinking purely, and that means at the same time to carry it through, we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking. The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle. They take thinking itself to be a techné, a process of deliberation in service to doing and making. — Heidegger: Letter on Humanism.

Thank you for this. It says it better than I could have. I read it AFTER I wrote what I wrote above.

If getting rid of does not imply a negative evaluation, tell me which dictionary you use. — David Mo

He doesn't say "get rid of," he says we must "free ourselves" from an interpretation of thinking that "has its beginnings" in Plato and Aristotle. Just as we must about time. Just as we must about being. Just as we must about truth. Etc.

What dictionary are you using where this somehow becomes a negative judgment? Un-doing and un-learning what we've learned from a long tradition, in order to open new horizons of thinking, hardly means that what was learned is without merit or greatness. In fact Heidegger praises Kant, Hegel, Aristotle, etc., many many times. Odd for a bunch of wrong-headed people who have mislead us for so long, no?

If you are accusing me of saying that Heidegger's negative evaluation of Western metaphysics implies that nothing it says has any value, I would ask you to read what I write. — David Mo

I don't think you're saying that necessarily...but think about it: if they're all "wrong" in their interpretation of being and beings and of time, then what value do they have?

Doesn't matter though, because he isn't saying that in the first place.

First you have to tell us what "God" is.

But I wonder why you say "perverted the question"
— Xtrix

The answer is in the very texts by Heidegger and his commentators that I have quoted here.
For example:

"The verb 'verfallen' is one which Heidegger will use many times. Though we shall usually translate it simply as 'fall', it has the connotation of deteriorating, collapsing, or falling down". (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, p. 42, footnote). — David Mo

"Falling" has nothing to do with the question of being. This is out of context.

"Greek ontology and its history which, in their numerous filiations and distortions, determine the conceptual character of philosophy even today-prove that when Dasein understands either itself or Being in general, it does so in terms of the 'world', and that the ontology which has thus arisen has deteriorated [ verfallt] to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident -merely material for reworking". (Heidegger: B&T, p. 22/43)

If you don't like the word "degenerate," you can take "pervert" or " deteriorated". I don't see the difference. Anyway, the word "degenerate" is also used by Heidegger (Ibid, p. 36/61, for ex.). And "peverted" on a B&T quote I placed above.

Why does Heidegger say this? We should ask him. In my opinion, he wasn't clear. But in his words, it seems that substantialism is to blame for this degeneration, perversion, deterioration or fall. Because it turns the mystery of being into an intelligible "thing". And what is understood made it nervous. He was into mystery, poetry, fog and vagueness. —

Yes, the question has "deteriorated" and become reduced to something self-evident. "When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed." (B&T p. 43)

It's worth remembering what we're talking about:

Heidegger respected Aristotle and Kant - I am not so sure about Descartes - but he thought that they were part of a philosophical tradition that perverted the question of Being, which is the mother of all questions. — David Mo

But I wonder why you say "perverted the question" -- I think they've simply overlooked the question. — Xtrix

I stand by that. You'll not find Heidegger saying that these men "perverted" the question of being -- why? Because they never asked it or, better, they overlooked it. Take this example regarding Kant:

"There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme..." (p 45 B&T)

It's hard to pervert the question when it's become so concealed, so taken for granted, that it's no longer even asked.

"Instead of this, Kant took over Descartes' position quite dogmatically, notwithstanding all the essential respects in which he had gone beyond him." (p 45)

The question of the meaning of Being has been neglected and concealed since the inception of Western philosophy, which ended in Aristotle. Even in Aristotle it was becoming concealed and transforming from phusis to idea and ousia. This is the point. We can negatively judge all philosophy afterwards if we choose, but that's our business. No need to project it on to Heidegger -- he doesn't do this. He's simply pointing out that it's happened. He offers no interpretation himself, and if he did he would hardly call it the "correct" interpretation. Rather, he further points out that all interpretations in the Western tradition have inadvertently made their interpretations on the basis of temporality, which is what we are as human beings. Human beings -- our perspectives, values, interpretations, words -- is where all of this philosophizing comes out of. If we are temporal creatures, then it's fairly easy to see, once it's pointed out, that our understanding of what it means to "be" human, and what it means to "be" anything at all, is filtered through our temporal lens. Kant pointed this out in his own way. In the Western world, Heidegger argues, it's been especially from the "present" that Being gets interpreted -- ousia as parousia (constant presence). "Time" itself has been interpreted from temporality (experiential time, lived time) and has thus been likewise concealed in its phenomenological basis. But none of this has anything to do with accusations of perversion, "incorrectness," falsity, etc. It's simply one way that one group of human beings, 2500 years ago, interpreted the world. If in the present day we want to find new directions and new values, we have to shake off this tradition by recognizing this fact and thus opening new horizons for thinking.

I struggle to see how phenomenology could be considered objective and noumenology could be considered subjective, as Heidegger claims. — gurk

Heidegger never claims this.



Excellent response.

I hear you. It looks like Biden is pretty malleable, and so hopefully we can push him on progressive policies once he's in office. But one thing has become clear: four more years of Trump and we're toast.

No, it isn't. Looking under a rock is not science. If we define that as "science," then apes do science as well. It's an absurd definition.
— Xtrix
Then apes do science. — Harry Hindu

OK! Would you excuse me for a minute...

A year and a half! Wow! I may have written more than you've read. I might not be any more impressed if you said a decade and a half. But, keep reading, and keep a sharp eye on how your reading changes over a lifetime. Then maybe you'll recognize what the real question is. — Gary M Washburn

I said I've been reading Heidegger (carefully) for a 1 and a half. Philosophy generally has been a lifelong interest on mine. Try reading more carefully.

Heidegger strikes me as the kid who doesn't like his role in the game and takes the ball away, expecting to be begged for his return, under his terms. I gave up on Heidegger when the Neitzsche series came out. What a hatchet job! — Gary M Washburn

Yes, I'm sure you waded through the hundreds of pages of Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche very carefully and that was the deciding factor in avoiding him. A "hatchet job" -- excellent critique.

Stop being a child. If you have anything interesting to say, please say it soon.

So, no, I am not going to go chapter and verse. — Gary M Washburn

In other words, you can't back up anything you say. What a shocker.

I don't believe for one minute that you've read any Heidegger, given the nonsense you've been talking. Secondary interpretations, however -- maybe you've done a little perusing.

So given that this thread is about Heidegger, and that I was clear from the beginning that one should have at least read Being and Time, your incoherent ramblings are welcome elsewhere.

I suggest you read Plato's Gorgias. — Gary M Washburn

I suggest you read Heidegger.

So, if you cannot explain yourself except by reiterating the assertion that is at issue, then let me try. — Gary M Washburn

Explain what? You haven't asked anything -- you've simply made incoherent statements.

What is at stake is the articulation of the worth of time. That articulation only comes in sudden bursts of intensity or moment. It always leaves nothing, no term in any language, no issue in any life, unmoved and unaltered. And until this is recognizable in a way no "Being" can remembrance there is no worth in "Being" at all. — Gary M Washburn

This is complete gibberish. "Articulation of the worth of time"? This is completely meaningless, and not ONCE in Heidegger. The "worth of time" means nothing whatsoever.

Heidegger talks a great deal about time as the horizon of interpreting Being, which I can explain to you if you want to learn about it, since you've not read him: Heidegger's thesis in Being and Time is that from the Greeks onwards, "being" has been interpreted on the basis of one mode of time -- the present. It has been called "ousia" in Aristotle, and has gone through variations since then. "Ousia" Heidegger links to "parousia," which means constant presence. It gets translated as "substance." Being gets objectified in the same way we objectify objects in our environment when things break down -- like a hammer. The hammer becomes an object with properties when we're looking at it scientifically or philosophically, in an abstract or theoretical way, which Heidegger calls "presence-at-hand." This same mode of abstract thinking or "presencing" is the mode we're in when thinking theoretically, which is the state of philosophy and science and has been since the inception of Western philosophy in the Greeks.

So it is on the basis of TIME that Being has been interpreted for 2,500 years. TIME, however, has also been interpreted as a being, as an entity -- as a sequence of "nows," as a kind of number line, as measurable motion -- which itself is a present-at-hand, theoretical kind of "being," and so another object of thought. This is not how Heidegger sees time. This very concept also dates back to Aristotle and his essay on time in the lectures on Physics, and Heidegger goes over this in lectures after B+T, in "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" and others. So rather than confusingly using "time" in discussing where this very concept emerges from (which is the human being), Heidegger uses "temporality" instead. Temporality is one way of interpreting what a human being is -- through its activity.

We are caring, willing, feeling beings -- and are always moving towards ("towards which"), on the way to something, doing things now for something later ("for the sake of which"), etc; striving, future-oriented beings with unconscious goals and plans -- displayed through our actions, habits, skilsl, and "average everyday" activity. (Aristotle in many ways has this "right" and you can see the influence on Heidegger.) Looking at average everyday activity phenomenologically (looking at what's hidden), which is mostly ready-to-hand activity (coping, engaged action), we see that human beings are mostly "care" (Sorge), and that "care" is essentially temporal -- e.g., "anticipating" something involves feeling, desiring, and willing, and where we conceptualize "future." It's not only "thinking time," in the traditional sense of "thought" as logic, rules, and theory.

The common concept of "time" is thus grounded in our being, which is caring: "anticipation" can be thought of as the future, as something not yet happening.

There's much more to say about it, but this is a general outline. All of which can be supported with actual passages from Heidegger, and all of which is far more interesting and clear than your unlettered incoherence.

I guess I'm not getting the ball back. I'm not your enemy. I know what it is like to become addicted to Heidegger talk. It was like rehab getting out of it. And I was helped because I was all along pursuing a strain of thought of my own. If the book is getting in the way of thinking for yourself it's time to put the book aside. — Gary M Washburn

I don't consider you my enemy, nor do I treat Heidegger as ultimate truth. I have, however, made a genuine effort to understand his thinking -- as I have done with Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Chomsky, etc. I started this thread to discuss it with anyone who has done likewise. You have shown you're simply not one of them. I haven't said this very nicely, it's true -- but I'm not always a nice guy. So it bothers you that I say this, but it's still true -- so you instead project onto me that I'm a blind follower of Heidegger, as if in a cult. Makes it very easy to ignore the fact that you don't know the material. Creationists say the same thing to me when talking about evolution -- they make the claim that I've been brainwashed by Darwin. It's predictable and boring.

Either you've read Heidegger or you haven't. It's easy to bullshit in philosophy, but I give no quarter for it here: here, in this thread, you actually have to do some work. David Mo, who I obviously have little agreement with, has at least made the effort to read. You have not. And it shows. Simple as that. Spin it how you will to save face, I don't care.

Not arbitrary at all -- ordinary usage.

"There is ongoing disagreement (and no general consensus) as to whether animism is merely a singular, broadly encompassing religious belief[49] or a worldview in and of itself, comprising many diverse mythologies found worldwide in many diverse cultures."

I think the latter is clearly the case.

But again, to retroactively call tool-making and cave art "science" or animistic beliefs "religious discussion" is a just confusion.

Discussions of animistic beliefs aren't religious discussions? What an odd thing to claim. — RogueAI

That's hardly "religion." Again, maybe a kind of "primitive" religion, meaning a system of beliefs, but that's not at all the same as later, codified systems that appeared.

To claim people were sitting around having "religious discussions" is kind of ridiculous. It's simply what everyone believed.

So why take that perspective? That's what I'm asking. What is it that appeals to you about it, or are you just offering it as an option? — Isaac

A bit of both. It seems almost like a truism to me. "Good" and "bad" aren't magic words, we use them all the time in everyday activity as a shorthand for evaluating our actions, and whether or not those actions take us towards or away from our goals, ideals, objectives, ends, etc. I don't see what's troublesome about it.

If one wants to be healthy, then you do xyz. If one wants to be happy (depending on what we mean by this), you do xyz.
— Xtrix

Right. Why do we need any more than this? Why associate either of those things with a universal concept, they work perfectly well as modalities. — Isaac

Are both desirable ends? Yes. Thus, actions which lead towards these ends are therefore good or bad, right or wrong -- within that context. The meaning is the same -- they're just different words to judge actions. A "moral" action, according to this perspective, is one that aligns with one's values and goals -- be it health or happiness.

Nothing "more" is added.

I'm asking why we would do that 'if'. To say 'if' implies we have a choice (ie we might not make that association), I just don't understand why you think we would choose to make that association, what does it gain us? — Isaac

To associate happiness with "good"? Because by doing so you can have a "science" of morality, which has been rejected for a long time.

To determine what the "right" action is, you have to have a context in which judge it. You have to have a goal of some kind. If one wants to be healthy, then you do xyz. If one wants to be happy (depending on what we mean by this), you do xyz.

I'm not seeing where you think an unnecessary step arises. Why associate "health" and "good"?

Here's another incoherent question: Which one of us is us? Which "being" is what "Being" is? — Gary M Washburn

"Being" belongs to any entity whatsoever, including humans. It's the "is-ness" of anything that exists, or that is.

So which one of us is "us" doesn't really make much sense. Every one of us, as individual entities, is just as much a "being" or "exists" as much as that tree or that rock or anything else.

His answer was to seek some lost ancient or antecedent completeness that we can somehow revive or reinvigorate to heal the wound of reduction — Gary M Washburn

OK -- references please. Because I've read a lot of Heidegger for the last year and a half and this looks like complete nonsense to me.

Have you read Heidegger? What have you read? Upon what are you basing your interpretations?

I, for one, am not allowing the mistakes of past thinkers to hand around my neck like a millstone. — Gary M Washburn

Good for you.

but he thought that they were part of a philosophical tradition that perverted the question of Being, which is the mother of all questions. Of course, Parmenides and Heraclitus are an important part of the philosophical tradition, but they were not part of this misleading tradition. — David Mo

This is much better, in my view, than what you've said before. But I wonder why you say "perverted the question" -- I think they've simply overlooked the question. Heidegger says Kant basically took Descartes' position on that question, and Descartes in turn assumed the Scholastic framework. So neither really addressed the question at all. That's not really perverting it, it's not even addressing it. By that point the question had been essentially taken for granted as "self-evident," or "God," or substance, etc. You see what I mean? Again I'm nit-picking, but it's important to careful here.

Right. Now do that without the morality. Science can tell us what produces happiness (I don't really agree with this, but for the sake of argument...). If we want happiness we can consult science to find out how to get it.

Why have we gone through the additional stage of equating happiness with "good", what purpose did that bit serve? — Isaac

"Good" as something valuable or desirable, a positive outcome of some kind. As opposed to bad, which is something undesirable, which one should like to avoid. It's another way of saying what we want or strive for versus what we wish to ignore or avoid, in my view. Traditionally, it's been thought that science has nothing whatever to say about values -- the is/ought claim of Hume and others.

But again, I don't see myself (or Aristotle) equating happiness with "good" per se. In his philosophy, happiness is perhaps the highest good in a hierarchical structure, but a cup of tea is good too. It's just a catch-all term to connect all actions, a way to encompass all actions in terms of what their striving for, ultimately. One may or may not accept this formulation, but it's fairly straightforward.

No, it isn't. Looking under a rock is not science. If we define that as "science," then apes do science as well. It's an absurd definition.

Looking under a rock CAN be science. It isn't always science and it isn't always not science. The scientific method wasn't codified until recently, but I don't think you can invent something without doing science. It might be really primitive science, but the essence will still be there: hypothesis, experimentation, analysis, and conclusion. How would one develop, say a canoe, without doing all that? — RogueAI

With trial and error, intuition, know-how, etc. We can call that "primitive science" if we want to, but that's so far from what is meant by "science" these days that it's very misleading. It makes nearly everything humans do "primitive science."

To say this equates to "philosophy, science, and logic" is pure confusion.

I don't see any reason to assume the homo sapiens of any given time period were any less intelligent than we are. I'm sure, at the very least, they had metaphysical discussions about the nature of reality, religious discussions, and ethical dilemmas to sort out. — RogueAI

I never said they were "less intelligent." But they were not doing philosophy, science, or logic any more than they were doing civil engineering or computer science. Sure, one way to look at it is that all of this comes out of the human mind and human creativity, it involves thought and language, etc. In that respect, we've been essentially the same species for 200,000 or so years. But again, to retroactively call tool-making and cave art "science" or animistic beliefs "religious discussion" is a just confusion. Let's not do that, for clarity's sake.

Yes, I understood that, I was wondering why you'd want to do that. We can already study human well-being and carry out any activities that such a study might reveal as benefitting human well-being. What's the advantage in equating such behaviours with 'morality'? — Isaac

I don't really understand what you mean. I'm not equating behavior with morality. Morality as judgment of "good" and "bad," or "right" and "wrong" applied to behavior (actions) is done all the time. We're constantly making those judgments. The question is "What is good?" If we say happiness (in terms of flourishing or well-being) is "good," then science can certainly help us discern "right" from "wrong."

If you can't think for yourself reading philosophy, any philosophy, is not going to make you a thinker. If a poster won't let me distinguish between a cited author, my own original take of the same ideas, and his or her way of understanding anything at all, then there is no discussion. And I suppose that is how all these threads end. — Gary M Washburn

"My own original take on the same ideas." First you have to know what those ideas are, and you haven't shown the slightest degree of understanding any of it -- and that's the point of this thread: Martin Heidegger. Like most people who want to hear themselves talk, any discussion that requires real work (i.e., having to back up your assertions with textual evidence, and thus the painful task of reading) you eschew. That's fine. Start your own thread and discuss whatever you want. Personally I think your writing is completely confused and nearly incoherent.

Or you can continue playing the victim by complaining about what a misunderstood free-thinking genius you are. Your call.

How the hell can we remembrance what we never knew and what is unprecedented in being? — Gary M Washburn

This is exactly what I mean by incoherent. First, is "remembrance" a typo or used in a special sense? Do you mean "remember"? If so, I've addressed this before. The whole sentence is meaningless. For example, "what is unprecedented in being"? What does that mean? What's unprecedented "in being"? What does "in being" even mean? Are you talking about being in general or about beings (entities)? What exactly in Heidegger are you responding to? Where does he say we need to "remember" being? Etc. etc.

Is "Being", before after all, what reason infers from antecedence? — Gary M Washburn

Are you even capable of formulating a coherent sentence? Or is this incoherence deliberate?

What remembrance the unprecedented? — Gary M Washburn

Literally gibberish.

Later Heidegger is pandering to his last and final refuge, the ineffable interest of practitioners of Zen. That is, his later terms of "Being" are meant as a "koan". Shock and awe, not understanding. — Gary M Washburn

You don't have a clue about what you're talking about, and it's both obvious and embarrassing. If you wish to learn about Heidegger, stop talking and listen -- or ask questions. You're in no position to make assertions of any kind.

Why would we need to link morality to human well-being in order to open up a field in which we can study it scientifically? Why don't we just study human well-being? — Isaac

By "it" I was there referring to morality. The argument is that there is no fact/value or is/ought distinction, and that morality can be based in science if we simply accept a concept of "well-being" as we accept "health" in medicine.

Sounds like Aristotle, in many ways. Eudaimonia gets translated as "happiness," but flourishing is better. In that sense, human beings should strive for this and actions can be judged on its basis. However, that's not saying a whole lot -- what gets considered "flourishing" becomes an issue in itself, not to mention all the lies told to people by priests and authorities who want to simply promote a morality to enhance or maintain their power.

But overall I think it's a good start. Someone was making noises like this a while back; it may have been Sam Harris. Trying to link morality to human well-being, in the same sense as "health" in medicine, thus being able to open up a field in which we can study it scientifically. All interesting stuff.

According to Heidegger, taking up the line of Parmenides and Heraclitus, which is what he was doing. According to Heidegger. Because the path that begins with Plato and continues with Aristotle, the Latin scholastic, Descartes or Kant was a wrong path. — David Mo

Parmenides also interpreted being as presence, as did Heraclitus. This was the inception. They thought and questioned being, but they did so from the perspective of one mode of time: the present. This is not "right" or "wrong."

Now about this point I'm not 100% sure. This is from my reading. But if it's true that Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus are not within the tradition, that would be very surprising to me. If you can find references to this that I've overlooked, I welcome it. I still doubt very much that you'll find anything about "right" and "wrong," however. Below is a relevant passage about Parmenides:

"Legein itself--or rather noein, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being--has the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. Those entities which show themselves in this and for it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence (ousia)." (Being and Time, p. 48 -- the BOLD is mine)

...no negative assessments of Aristotle or Descartes — Xtrix

How can we continue to argue if you say that accusing someone of being blind, of degenerating the sense of philosophy and hiding the real issue are not "negative assessments"? There's no way to argue with that. — David Mo

I've explained why, many times. I've cited Heidegger saying he "does not mean anything negative" -- many times. I have said before that there is certainly a "wrong" and "right" way to translate words (in terms of accuracy or correctness) -- many times. But you will only find the utmost respect for Aristotle and Descartes from Heidegger. If you want to continue to project your negativity, that's your business.

I can argue as long as you want, but not in terms you demand. You might as well offer the slave all the work he can manage, so long as he does it under your supervision and conditions. I can justify everything I say, but you don't want to know what I mean, because that would entail admitting ways of discussing the same issues in terms not under your control, or that there are ways of doing fundamental philosophy Heidegger language cannot help you with. — Gary M Washburn

This thread is about Heidegger. As I said from the very beginning, a pre-requisite should be at least a reading of Being and Time. If you want to give rambling, irrelevant lectures you're free to do so elsewhere. If you want to discuss Heidegger, then do so with sources. To equate this with slavery is embarrassing.

I cannot respect a thinker so attached to sources that nothing original speaks to them at all. — Gary M Washburn

Have you read Plato's Ion? — Gary M Washburn

Science has gone on since the first hominid began using tools. Looking under a rock is just as scientific as looking through a telescope. — Harry Hindu

No, it isn't. Looking under a rock is not science. If we define that as "science," then apes do science as well. It's an absurd definition.

Philosophy has been going on ever since humans created art and buried their dead. And logical and illogical thinking have occured since thinking began, just as tyrannosaurus rexes and triceratops existed before they were identified and given names as such. I never said logic equates to all thinking - just a certain type of thinking.

Ever since we started thinking we've known that there are errors in our thinking. Aristotle simply laid out the various ways we can avoid those errors. — Harry Hindu

No, this is completely wrong.

Logic is a branch of philosophy, which is what the above poster is talking about. Philosophy has not been going on since humans "created art" -- that's as meaningless as to say science was going on. All we know with high likelihood is that there was creativity present, that these early people (say 100,000 years ago) had language, and that thinking was going on.

To say this equates to "philosophy, science, and logic" is pure confusion.

Nietzsche saw nihilism in the West as the result of the "death" of God and a decadent culture. We've lost our instincts and haven't created a "single new god" in millennia. He is constantly going on about creating new values, in an attempt to overcome this nihilism.

Heidegger could have spared himself, and us, a bit of grief if he addressed one simple question. If there is such a thing as forgetfulness of Being, is there remembrance? If your take on his view of the Greeks is what he did believe of them, he's got them wrong. They, the Greeks, were far more down to earth than he gives them credit for. Their poetry might have been highfalutin, but they were not. I wonder what Aristophanes would make of Heidegger's seriosity? — Gary M Washburn

Remembrance of the question of being, yes. That's what he's trying to do: re-awaken that question, the question that's been forgotten.

To say Heidegger isn't "down to Earth" is kind of ridiculous. His entire analysis of the "worldhood of the world" emphasizes average everydayness and "ready-to-hand" activities like hammering and opening doors. As for the Greeks, he has quite a bit to say about their analysis of everyday practical activity, if you're interested in reading him.

Protected from the great powers around them by sea and geography, they were surrounded by cultures in which powerful rulers, or esoteric priests in the case of Judea and Egypt, who used the written word as an instrument of oppression. That is what writing was invented for. — Gary M Washburn

There's a lot of debate about why writing was invented. Many believe it was for accounting, etc., but it's not settled scholarship. To make declarative statements like "That is what writing was invented for" really makes me want to ignore you. No offense, just figured I'd give honest feedback. Let's not pretend to know things we don't know and give lectures on them.

That is, our incapacity for remembrancing Being is our way of needing each other free, and maybe even setting “Being” free, to grate upon the received terms of our minds and so refresh those terms and distinguish us from the tyranny of that receipt. And in that case, Heidegger is indeed wrong. Dead wrong! About us today, and about the Greeks. And about what “Being” is. — Gary M Washburn

You just don't know what you're talking about, I'm afraid. Please provide any textual evidence to back up these bizarre statements, because otherwise I have no idea what you're talking about.

Again, "Remembrance of being" refers to re-awakening the question of the meaning of being. The question has been forgotten -- we are no longer concerned with or it, we take it as self-evident, etc. Heidegger says over and over again that we all walk around with a "pre-ontological understanding of being," so it's not that there is something "out there" that we need to "remember." This is just a complete misreading if that's what jumps to mind. But, honestly, I think you're just uttering nonsense. I'm happy to be proven wrong -- but with sources.

Greece after the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity — W. J. Korab-Karpowicz, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This is excellent.

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.
— Heidegger: B&T, #3

Trivial, blind and perverted is not "wrong"... according you. What means "wrong" to you?

In my opinion you are blind to the true meaning of Heidegger's work. You trivialize and pervert it. But don't worry. I am not saying that you are wrong... according you. — David Mo

Because "wrong," in this case, is meaningless if you mean in terms of accuracy or correctness. What would be "right"? The Greeks? Well we know that's not the case because, according to Heidegger, although they questioned being they were still very much within the realm of the "metaphysics of presence," which is the basis for the rest of Western philosophy. So if it's not about the questioning of being, it's about the interpretation of being -- so what's the "correct" interpretation? Since Descartes and Kant are "wrong," what's "right"? Heidegger's interpretation? Well, as we've discussed before, Heidegger does not offer an interpretation or definition of being.

So where are we left? Exactly where we were: (1) the questioning of being has become forgotten and concealed, and (2) the interpretation (or "meaning") of being has been taken for granted as something present-at-hand, as a particular kind of being ("substance," mainly). So the question of the meaning of being should be re-awakened and we should begin questioning again, rather than taking it as trivial or "self-evident." That's all. Nothing about "right" or "wrong," no negative assessments of Aristotle or Descartes. Plenty of wrong translations of Greek philosophical words (in Heidegger's view) like "phusis" as nature, "ousia" as substance, and "aletheia" as truth -- but that's all. In relation to the "original" meanings, how they were translated was inaccurate, incorrect -- "wrong."

This is why you won't find "wrong" in Heidegger regarding Western interpretations of being. It's why he explicitly says he does not mean anything negative like that.

I'll call attention yet again to how boring this conversation is. You truly have nothing left to say. But carry on...

No. He never once says anything about "inaccurate metaphysics" or that concealment is "wrong."
— Xtrix

"Greek philosophy is then interpreted retroactively—that is, falsified from the bottom up—on the basis of the dominant concept of substance" (ItM: 148/207) — David Mo

I'll say it a thousand times: his is in reference to translations (which he says at one point always includes intepretation). Heidegger is talking there about how the Greeks are interpreted in terms of substance ontology -- and that interpretation is false. What does this have to do with Western metaphysics being "wrong"? Notice he doesn't say substance ontology is "wrong," he says that interpreting the Greeks this way (retroactively) is falsifying what they "really" (according to him) believed.

Referring to translations of the Greeks. He's claiming their original way of seeing the world -- as phusis -- gets mistranslated and thus the original meaning gets falsified. So what?
— Xtrix
.

So what? You mean Heidegger didn't think the forgery was wrong? — David Mo

What forgery? Regardless, yes he thinks this interpretation of the Greeks is wrong.

Do you have a special problem with the word "wrong"? Otherwise your position seems incomprehensible to me. — David Mo

I do, yes. This whole line of discussion started with what I admitted was a bit of a nit-pick, but I stand by it still. The claim that "all of Western philosophy after the Greeks is wrong" or any such claim like that is just a misunderstanding of Heidegger. If that's not what you're saying, fine. If you're talking about translations and interpretations of the "original" Greek meanings, then yes Heidegger thinks they're just wrong. That's not the same thing.

I think I would start fighting if it came to a civil war type scenario. Say Trump refuses to leave office -- I think at that point we'd have to band together against the military. That's not too far fetched anymore.
— Xtrix

Of course it is. There's no way US military will fight against US citizens. Trump isn't popular worthy the military. — Benkei

I'm not so sure about that. But there's also militias to worry about. In any case, I'm hoping you're right.

Pretty interesting to watch
— Xtrix
And what will it take for you to do more than watch? I'm not suggesting there is something you should or could do, because I don't know what that would be, other than by voting. But what would it take? — tim wood

Good question. I don't just watch and vote. I try organizing people. Right now we have a 180 members in a local group here in New Hampshire, "Seacoast Progressives." I'm getting more involved with people running for state assembly, etc. I try to sign petitions and join protests when I can. My strong suit isn't in protests, however -- I hate them, but recognize their importance.

I think I would start fighting if it came to a civil war type scenario. Say Trump refuses to leave office -- I think at that point we'd have to band together against the military. That's not too far fetched anymore.

Oregon, being a gun friendly state that allows for open carry of firearms, I'm surprised no civilian there has decided to defend him- or herself with a gun from being kidnapped. To their credit, I suppose. — tim wood

Yeah, I think it's strategic. I think that's exactly what Trump wants.

Trump's getting desperate. Pretty interesting to watch this tinpot dictator try to turn our country into a police state just so he doesn't lose an election.

How do you can dissimulate the absolutely obvious expression "falsified from the bottom up"? — David Mo

Referring to translations of the Greeks. He's claiming their original way of seeing the world -- as phusis -- gets mistranslated and thus the original meaning gets falsified. So what?

Page 2 of Being and Time:

"Yet the question [of the meaning of being] we are touching upon is not just any question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a theme for actual investigation. What these two men achieved was to persist through many alterations and 'retouchings' down to the 'logic' of Hegel. And what they wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena, fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long since become trivialized."

Also page 2:

"...a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect."

"In this way, that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method."

Does any of this sound like "all philosophers and metaphysics since the Greeks are wrong"? If so, you're wrong. Heidegger is uninterested in making claims about the truth or falsity of metaphysics since the Greeks. There have been many interpretations of Being, but today it's trivialized, concealed, and unquestioned. It's time to re-awaken that questioning, and in so doing perhaps find new interpretations.

If Heidegger ever once stated that Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hegel, etc., were all "wrong," he'd be an absolute joke figure. Which is apparently what you would like to turn him into. But you'll not find it in the texts.

The meaning of words in Greek philosophy is not an academic issue for him. Inaccurate translations are a reflection of inaccurate metaphysics: the concealment of Being. To reveal means truth in Heidegger, concealment is wrong. — David Mo

No. He never once says anything about "inaccurate metaphysics" or that concealment is "wrong." That's your projection, and it's not in Heidegger. Not once.

The question of the meaning of being has been concealed and forgotten. That doesn't make Descartes, Kant, or Hegel "wrong." This is a childish way of looking at things. But go on arguing it if you must.

According to Heidegger, God, substance or nature are not understood without a previous theory of Being.
— David Mo

What I was trying to explain is that Newton's theory is still valid in the terms that the theory is limited. That is, it is valid for concepts defined in the terms of Newtonian physics. Absolute space -independent of time and perspective- perfectly works in phenomenal objects. In this sense, it is still applied with constant success.

You pretended that it was the same case with the theories that are limited to talk about God, substance or other partial aspects of metaphysics, which according to you are valid "interpretations" of Being or partial aspects of it. I explained that for Heidegger this was not true. Theories about God, for example, are not different or partially valid interpretations, but wrong approaches without a correct comprehension of Being. Heidegger says textually that only a previous understanding of Being can lead to understanding of the sacred. Therefore, everything that is said about God outside a Heideggerian phenomenological perspective is invalid (inapplicable, if you want to say so). — David Mo

The analogy to Newton and Einstein was to demonstrate only that because A becomes the dominant theory does not always necessitate that B is "wrong." This is true for theories in science as it is for interpretations generally. Sometimes theories and interpretations certainly are simply wrong. But it's not always the case.

I brought that up in the context of your claiming that Heidegger is making some kind of negative judgment, which I don't see supported and in fact have quoted him directly saying he does NOT mean it this way. This was the only point, and a fairly trivial one.

There are many interpretations of being. Heidegger is not interested in proclaiming them "wrong" or "right." All he does is point out the interesting historical fact that there has been this series of interpretations, which are variations of the Greek interpretation of being as ousia, and that the "question of the meaning of being" has been forgotten and hidden, covered over as a question. He believes this question should be re-awakened.

That's all.

Of course, this is not compatible with your theory that all interpretation is valid. Heidegger never said such a thing. — David Mo

I never claimed that "all interpretation is valid." Not once. Nor has Heidegger.

The usual thoughtlessness translates ousia as "substance" and thereby misses its sense entirely (ItM: 46/64)

Greek philosophy is then interpreted retroactively—that is, falsified from the bottom up—on the basis of the dominant concept of substance (ItM: 148/207)
"Misses its sense entirely"; “Falsified from the bottom up”. Is it not clear for you? What context can change the meaning of phrases expressed so strongly? — David Mo

Here again, as I've said before, Heidegger is talking about translations. When talking about translations, of course he believes that many are simply inaccurate. This is a matter of scholarship.

You claimed, however, that Heidegger thought that Western philosophy (including the Greeks) was wrong. Those are two very different things. Here's what you have said:

He considered that Western philosophy had overlooked, deformed, degenerated, etc. this question since the time of the Greeks. — David Mo

Heidegger repeatedly accuses Western philosophy with negative concepts that imply falsity in many ways, — David Mo

According to Heidegger, Western metaphysics perverted the correct questioning of the Greeks. Therefore, the Greeks were right and western metaphysics was wrong. So much so that philosophy needs to start again, which does not happen until Heidegger arrives. Of course. — David Mo

Here is what Heidegger says:

"Firstly I have to correct the question with regard to the way in which you talked about the 'downfall of Being'. For that is not meant in a negative manner. I do not speak about a 'downfall' of Being, but rather about the fate of Being insofar as it hides itself more and more in comparison to the Openness of Being with the Greeks." — Xtrix

The question of being has been forgotten. The early Greeks (including Plato and Aristotle) still asked that question. It is not a negative judgment on Western metaphysics that it's become concealed.

So your above quotations are accurate, but they only mean that the original sense (or meaning) of various Greek words have been misinterpreted over the years.

It's the question of the meaning of Being that's been hidden and forgotten. The interpretation that's taken for granted, ousia (substance), isn't itself "hidden"
— Xtrix

I don't understand anything. The text above is by Heidegger? If so, it's misquoted. Quotes and reference are missing. — David Mo

No, I was just quoting my entire paragraph. It's not Heidegger, it's me. Hence why no references.

I don't understand either who talks about "the interpretation of ousia as substance is hidden". Is the interpretation hidden? That doesn't make much sense. Can you explain it better? — David Mo

You're the one that was making that claim, not me -- remember? Look:

The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being,
— Xtrix

This is rigorously disproved by the quotes I have placed above. — David Mo

Now you're agreeing that it doesn't make much sense?

I think a lot of this could be avoided if you just quoted (or perhaps read) more fairly. The context matters.

I think this whole mess you're making is because you didn't understand my opening remark. I can explain it better, if you like. — David Mo

That very well could be, and I welcome you to.

There is no mystical "hidden". But we do hide from ourselves, and with good reason. Any claim of understanding Heidegger should be suspect. — Gary M Washburn

True, which is why I give plenty of textual evidence. This is what the thread is about. If I'm mistaken, I'm not seeing it. Maybe it's just me being daft, I don't know. I'm sure I'm not 100% on everything, but in understanding the general thesis I feel I have a pretty decent understanding, after a year of study.

The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being,
— Xtrix

This is rigorously disproved by the quotes I have placed above. Your interpretation of Heidegger seems a little "autistic", if I may say so. I mean, you don't listen to the words of Heidegger himself. — David Mo

Your way of phrasing things is misleading.

Read the whole paragraph:

Also, "theory of Being" should be "interpretation of Being" in the above context. To talk about this interpretation not being understood without a "previous" interpretation (or theory) is nonsensical. The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being, it's interpreting Being -- on the background of the present moment (parousia) -- time -- which is indeed hidden as the horizon (or perspective) upon which Being is interpreted (in this case as "constantly present," later translated as "substance").

Emphasis mine. It's the question of the meaning of Being that's been hidden and forgotten. The interpretation that's taken for granted, ousia (substance), isn't itself "hidden" -- it is THE interpretation of the West, with different variations over 2500 years.

Not to be rude or egotistical or anything like that, but you don't understand Heidegger as well as I do.
— Xtrix

That's funny. — David Mo

Ok!

Sorry, but I really don't see the relevance of this. I have no idea what you're responding to.

You can praise yourself, but I don't think what you say is very "interesting" because it doesn't go to the heart of the matter.

The mistake that Heidegger blames on the metaphysical tradition is to err on the key question: Being. That's why he says it has to be "destroyed". Please read my previous comments. — David Mo

I have, and even if I were to agree with you that Heidegger is being negatively judgmental in some way in his analysis, it's hardly the "heart of the matter." In fact it has no real effect on his thesis. If he were as critical of Western metaphysics as Schopenhauer was of Hegel, it wouldn't prove anything. It's simply the only point left you feel competent enough to take a stand on, while ignoring the much more relevant issues -- namely, that it is from the standpoint of time (the present) that Being is interpreted from the beginning of philosophy to today. Whether this is "wrong" or "covered over" or "forgotten" really makes no difference. The question is: is this thesis accurate? Is it supported by historical and textual evidence?

Take it from the man himself (at 6:32):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcm05b8m6tQ&t=527s

"Firstly I have to correct the question with regard to the way in which you talked about the 'downfall of Being'. For that is not meant in a negative manner. I do not speak about a 'downfall' of Being, but rather about the fate of Being insofar as it hides itself more and more in comparison to the Openness of Being with the Greeks." -- Heidegger

This is what I've been saying all along. The rest is your interpretation, and you're welcome to it. But it's so far from the main issues raised in Being & Time and the Introduction to Metaphysics, that to carry on about it already proves me point.

According to Heidegger, God, substance or nature are not understood without a previous theory of Being. Western metaphysics was perverted because it hid Being under Substantialism.
On the other hand, the law of gravity can be understood without the general theory of relativity. Therefore, Newton could not degrade, nor err, nor hide a superior reality, as Thomas Aquinas or Descartes did. He worked correctly in the field of objects within his grasp. No one is going to destroy Newtonian physics. Scholasticism, on the other hand, must be destroyed as a system. — David Mo

Your reading of "destroyed" isn't accurate. I think someone on here already pointed that out to you.

Also, "theory of Being" should be "interpretation of Being" in the above context. To talk about this interpretation not being understood without a "previous" interpretation (or theory) is nonsensical. The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being, it's interpreting Being -- on the background of the present moment (parousia) -- time -- which is indeed hidden as the horizon (or perspective) upon which Being is interpreted (in this case as "constantly present," later translated as "substance").

Not to be rude or egotistical or anything like that, but you don't understand Heidegger as well as I do. Your ego isn't letting you see that, which is why you persist with irrelevancies at this point. This isn't a flaw in intelligence -- it's simply that I've dedicated more time in reading him. I can very easily admit that you probably understand many philosophers better than I do, and if I were interested I would want to learn about them collaboratively rather than defend some position on limited information. But that's me. You started with a real effort and some interesting questions, but now I'm afraid I'm rather bored with going in circles and repeating things I've already written.

More interesting lines of discussion (both ignored by you) that bears repeating:

Exactly. Philosophers of the last 2,500 are right within the scope of "presencing."
— Xtrix
I don't know what scope that is. What do you mean by "presence"?
— David Mo

That's a great question. There's plenty to talk about there. He has a lot to say in Being and Time about the "present-at-hand" relations to things in the world. This is the "mode" in which he believes nearly all philosophy has dwelled -- by seeing things as present before us, as substances or objects. This is the connection to the "time" part of the title -- that Being gets "interpreted" from the perspective of time. (Namely, the present.) — Xtrix

Being isn't a being, and it isn't in some mysterious "realm." It's any being whatsoever. It's the "is-ness" of any thing.
— Xtrix
You yourself are saying that the term being applies to all things. Therefore it is universal and we cannot find a "scope" that is restrictive.
— David Mo

Substance. Or God. Or nature. All interpretations of Being, and all restrictive in their interpretations.

Being itself isn't restricted to any class of entities.

Heidegger has an entire chapter on this, titled "The Restriction of Being." He goes through four of them: being and becoming, being and seeming, being and thinking, being and the ought. This is how being has been historically interpreted and "set apart" from something else. Being "and not", etc. — Xtrix

I have no way of knowing exactly what you're responding to here.