I think Schopenhauer puts it best:

"Descartes was probably the first to attain the degree of reflection demanded by that fundamental truth [that the world is representation of a subject]; consequently, he made that truth the starting-point of his philosophy, although provisionally only in the form of skeptical doubt. By his taking cogito ergo sum as the only thing certain, and provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential and only correct starting-point, and at the same time the true point of support, of all philosophy was really found. This point, indeed, is essentially and of necessity the subjective, our own consciousness." World as Will and Representation Vol. II, p 4.

I think he's correct, and I think this idea -- as I said originally -- still dominates much of philosophy and science today, especially in epistemology.

This seems to be too thin for a philosophical basis. Can you elaborate? Not the specific meaning of "subject/object" (I think we have clarified that part), but how you think that forms the philosophical basis. — SophistiCat

Again, it seems to me that since Descartes epistemology has become predominant, the "problem of knowledge" -- how we know anything at all, what knowledge is, etc. This view of a conscious being (a subject) which takes in the "objective" world through means of sensibility (the "representations" of Kant) is an underlying assumption in modern science to this day. It barely gets questioned anymore, thus serving as a philosophical basis and a framework for understanding human knowledge, perception, and thus the universe.

The image of tying a shoe is much more the case than the thought, “I am tying my shoe”. — Mww

That's a very interesting point and, incredibly, often overlooked when discussing human action.

I think it’s a distinction without a difference. All subjects are objects. — NOS4A2

But not all objects are subjects it would seem, unless you attribute to rocks conscious awareness, which I doubt anyone would.

The idea as human beings being subjects and the world being the object is what I'm referencing here. That we're thinking things in the sense Descartes meant -- consciously aware beings, and since Kant subjects with object as "phenomenon" and representation. Schopenhauer discusses this at length as well, as one of the most basic principles of all knowledge.

It's hard to see things any other way, I realize...hence why I'm wondering about others' opinions.

In my analysis this marks the advent of the distinctively modern outlook, formed by the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which sought to sweep away all of the ambiguities and obscurities associated with metaphysics and view the world and its problems solely through the perspective of scientific rationalism. However as various critics of the Enlightenment have long since noted, this too embodies a kind of metaphysics, or rather, attempts to address many of the questions associated with metaphysics through the perspective of naturalism. — Wayfarer

Very true.

With reference to the OP, do you see the world in some other way? what other way would there be to see the world? — tim wood

What's "OP"? Original Post? Anyway, yes when I'm thinking about the world I think this distinction makes sense, and I see why it's been so powerful.

Or at least Ockham. — bongo fury

Hmm, really? That's interesting. Never read Ockham. Where does he touch on this?

The notion of subject/object is me thinking as subject in relation to the world as object, not the world as subject/object in itself, which is how I understood the question, re: “see the world that way”. — Mww

Very true. I meant it in the former way.

If I were to start over, I would start not with what's often called "philosophy" but with learning history, dwelling especially on the Greeks. Read Homer, learn the Greek language.

As far as texts -- start with Parmenides' poem and the fragments of the presocratics. Then Plato and Aristotle. Once you get to Plato and Aristotle, with a decent understanding of the Greek language and the general historical context, then everything else in Western history and philosophy has been basically determined, from the Christian thinkers to Descartes to Kant to Hegel.

Then I would start on the most relevant for modern times (in my view):

Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger.
Russell, Wittgenstein, and Chomsky.

If you want to study the subject, which is not necessarily the same as developing a personal philosophy, I strongly recommend studying it historically. Start with the pre-Socratics, then read forward - widely, synoptically and historically. Try and get a feel for the questions that were being grappled with and the historical circumstances in which they arose. Get a feeling for dialectic - that is one of the most elusive aspects of philosophy. Don’t neglect Plato. Find some question that nags at you, then try and find sources that seem to be dealing with the same questions. Learn to feel the questions, not simply verbalise them. — Wayfarer

This is excellent.

Ugh. Whatever.

You're boring me. Bye.

It would be well to recall that Einstein originally constructed his model of the universe out of nonverbal signs, 'of visual and some of muscular type.' As he wrote to a colleague in 1945: 'The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced and combined.' Later, 'only in a secondary stage,' after long and hard labour to transmute his nonverbal construct into 'conventional words and other signs,' was he able to communicate it to others. — Galuchat

Certainly worth bearing in mind, yes.

The best exploration of the nature of a 'market' is Ludwig Von Mises's Human Action. — Virgo Avalytikh

Oh, and what exactly makes this the "best exploration"? According to who? You?

(You see how easy it is to play these philosophy games.)

For anyone who knows, is there a book in which Chomsky lays out his own political philosophy (since he very clearly has one) from the ground up, as it were?
— Virgo Avalytikh

It sounds as if the answer is 'No'. — Virgo Avalytikh

How the World Works, Understanding Power, American Power and the New Mandarins, Powers and Prospects, Who Rules the World?, Government in the Future, Because we Say So, etc. I skipped the recommendations and went straight for an answer to your question about principles, since I've read Chomsky widely. But nevertheless, here you go.

In any case, 'power' and 'justification' still have not been defined. Expressions of 'power' are indeed everywhere, which is why they are multivalent and don't admit of an easy, monolithic definition that unites them. I might be justified in pulling a child back from a busy road, but that still doesn't give a 'justification condition'. What precisely is the condition of justified coercion? Multiplying examples does not give us such a condition. — Virgo Avalytikh

They have been defined. It's quite true that there are no easy definitions that accounts for all situations, and in fact one can define a word anyway one likes. What's interesting is finding out why the notion is defined in this way in a larger theory and ask about the theory itself, whether it's sensible, etc. Regardless, if you knew that "power" -- in the same way as "truth" or "beauty" or anything else -- is multivalent, then why ask for a definition at all?

Also, to say "power is indeed everywhere" is already admitting there's something you believe to be "power," something that allows you to pick out those examples as examples of power.

I don't know what you mean by "justification condition." The point isn't to create a rule that one can follow in every situation. If that's what you're asking, then neither you nor I can provide it. You have to look to specific situations, not abstract fantasies. Chomsky excels, more than any living writer, in precisely that: the real world and the effects of policies on real people, all around the world. Worrying about "principles" and abstract philosophizing doesn't concern him much, it's true. That's not to say he doesn't have them or hasn't discussed them, but something like "the workplace should be democratized" and "structures of hierarchy and control aren't self-justifying" are clear enough formulations for what should be done.

The best exploration of the nature of a 'market' is Ludwig Von Mises's Human Action. A market is 'free' to the extent that it is not subject to invasion, and the best exploration of the nature of this invasion is Rothbard's Power and Market. For an application of Locke's classical liberalism to the ethical categories of libertarianism (e.g. property, aggression), see Ibid., The Ethics of Liberty. — Virgo Avalytikh

Still undefined. Sounds rather vague, as well. What is a "market"? Why should Von Misse's definition of "free market" be any more important than anyone else's? "Free market" is multivalent, after all. I recommend reading less of these "libertarians," but feel free to synopsize-- perhaps there's something interesting there. Personally I think the ideas thrown around over the years about "free markets" is pure fantasy; they've seemingly never existed except in libertarians' imaginations. In the real world, there's almost always strong state intervention in the economy.

I really don't think it's necessary to get quite this prickly. I have not attacked Chomsky. My query was just that - a query — Virgo Avalytikh

I don't see what was "prickly." The problem is that you've asked a question, received an answer, and then changed the question.
(1) You asked for principles, claiming you couldn't find any in Chomsky. I gave several.
(2) You then ask for "definitions," which I gave.
(3) Then you say they're not definitions because they don't account for all the data, that the terms are "multivalent." You ask for "axioms" and dismiss Chomsky as "informal" writing and not presenting his views "systematically" enough (which, it seems, only means "Not in the fashion of my favorite libertarian writers").
It's a little circular.

More importantly, I have also said, repeatedly, that I'll answer any specific question you have about Chomsky's political philosophy. You've failed to ask one. Instead you ask for books where he lays this out, which I gave (above). I assume you'll next say that those aren't good enough because they're not written in the style of Rothbard? But then all this has boiled down to is: "I don't think Chomsky is as clear as Rothbard et al." Which is fine -- but that's not really a "query" is it?

Of course I'm putting words in your mouth there, so maybe I'm wrong about the last part.

Yes, I'd be embarrassed too. Run along.

That's funny.

Being and nothingness are two poles of an opposition. — frank

Riveting analysis.

Make it interesting or I'll be sure you're an idiot. — frank

Well I'm already sure you are, just from that comment alone, so NO. End of discussion, and reported. How about this: read some Heidegger.

Not gibberish, just vague. Take 'power' for instance: 'power', like other foundational concepts in political philosophy, like liberty, rights, obligation, equality, etc., admit of numerous conceptions. They do not come pre-interpreted for us. — Virgo Avalytikh

Which is why I explained earlier what is meant in this context by power: structures of hierarchy and control. In any situation, from families to businesses. In the workplace (the most relevant here) you have bosses giving orders to people below them in rank, etc. You see people organized like this everywhere - in the church, in the military, in corporations, and so on.

You can claim it's all "vague" and play philosophical games with semantics, but it's not vague at all. Spending a little less time in the classroom or library, you'll see it all around you. You'll see it in academia as well. To claim these principles are "vague" is to claim anything is vague. Fine, we all know that's a move for philosophy students -- and not always a useless one. But in this case, my sense is you're not confused at all. You're just playing games.

And what of 'justification'? What, in principle, would or could constitute a 'justification' of a coercive institution? — Virgo Avalytikh

Chomsky often uses the example of his granddaughter running into the road. If he grabs her arm and pulls her back -- that's control, use of force, etc., but he could give a justification for its use. Hence why he's not a pacifist -- war can be justified. Although it's rare, it can be done. As far as coercive institutions -- you can invent all kinds of scenarios where they could be justified, although admittedly it almost never happens in the real world. There's a lot of pretense, of course, but we easily see through that. Going to war is a good example -- always some "justification" for it, usually pretty flimsy.

As for the claim that workers should own the companies in which they work, there is nothing axiomatic about this. — Virgo Avalytikh

You didn't ask for an axiom. The world is a complex place, and this isn't mathematics. You asked for various principles on which Chomsky bases his critiques and political philosophy. I've given some.

Political philosophy in general benefits greatly from being presented in a cumulative, systematic form, beginning from first principles and making plain the assumptions at work. — Virgo Avalytikh

And I gave you some principles. Must every thinker lay out his thoughts like the libertarian thinkers you happen to admire? Who says philosophy benefits greatly by laying it out in this way? Remember your original post:

But, among his (more than 100) books, I have yet to find one in which he lays out his political philosophy with clarity, reasoning his way up from first principles. — Virgo Avalytikh

And again I ask: what exactly are you looking for? You asked for principles, claiming Chomsky doesn't lay them out -- I've given them. Then you claim those principles are too vague and aren't "axioms." It appears all you're really saying is "anyone who doesn't lay out their political philosophy like my favorite political thinkers is unclear." Fine. But Chomsky isn't unclear to me, and I've both talked with him and read him widely.

The point is, right-libertarianism's opposition to the State and advocacy for the free market are logical derivations from its more fundamental opposition to aggression. 'Aggression' is not left as a vague banner behind which to rally, but is defined in terms of a system of property which is explored and defended at length, and which itself has a tradition going back to Locke. And this is not unique to the 'right': Marxist philosopher Gerry Cohen also manages to present himself in this way (he is far and away the best Marxist, precisely on account of his clarity). — Virgo Avalytikh

Vague. What is the "free market"? How can a "system of property" (vague) be "aggressive"? What in Locke are you referring to?

It seems exactly like another "banner behind which to rally," only for some reason you think it more axiomatic than "systems of power/authority/domination/control should be justified," which is kind of ridiculous considering the latter is a principle you yourself live by every day.

The issue is that Chomsky is not particularly persuasive, except to the already-convinced, and this is owing to the relative informality of his approach. — Virgo Avalytikh

I did not show up to Chomsky "already convinced," by any means. It took some effort to understand his thought, an effort which apparently you're unwilling to make.

Fine, let me qualify: for anyone who's actually read it and understands it, that's certainly not what it's about. Just the phrase "concept of being emerging" is ridiculous to anyone who's read Heidegger, since being is not a concept or a being or a word in the sense he's meaning it. Sure we can try talking about it, but it's an extremely complex thing to discuss.

And it certainly doesn't "emerge" from "dread of nothingness."

I did this to show that it is perhaps misleading to suggest that the reason we breath is to speak, and that to equate ‘language’ with some innate capacity is kind of leaning in this direction too - as there is no hard physical evidence for some ‘language module’ anymore than there is for some ‘conscious module’. — I like sushi

What's misleading is the near universal belief that language is for communication and evolved as such.

Also, no one is talking about a language module in your sense. If one can't talk about language as a separate (though obviously interactive) system of an organism, then let's also throw out study of vision, digestion, circulation, the nervous system, etc. -- after all, they're not completely separate from the rest of the body either. It's a trivial semantic digression you're making, without any motivation other than to apparently hear yourself talk.

I’m new to this myself. Would you use ‘thought’ instead of ‘intelligence’? I’m still trying to determine whether it’s true that ‘thoughts are "sentences in the head", meaning they take place within a mental language’. (Wikipedia.) — Brett

Let's separate "thought" from "language." Thought can happen without language is my belief, and there's good evidence for that. Thinking is not merely restricted to "sentences in the head." I've had colleagues argue that thinking and language are the same thing; I'm just not convinced of it.

There has been talk in decent times of "mentalese," for example. Which is interesting, but we know very little about it.

My belief is, language doesn't have a strictly scientific explanation. It's associated with intelligence, and I don't know if intelligence is something that can be understood through the evolutionary perspective; that once we become language-using, meaning-seeking beings, then we've escaped the gravitational pull of biology. — Wayfarer

Doesn't have a "strictly" scientific explanation? How are you defining "science"? Language is certainly amenable to analysis, scientific or otherwise. True, language could be magic -- but I don't see any reason for taking that route.

Have you read Heidegger's What is Metaphysics? All about the concept of being emerging from the dread of nothingness. It's awesome. — frank

That's not what it's about.

What I bemoaned was the lack of a work of systematic political philosophy in which the reader is led to anarcho-syndicalism from a set of first principles. I observed that neither Chomsky nor his heroes (Rocker, Proudhon, Bakunin) seem to have produced such a work. — Virgo Avalytikh

So the principle that power should be justified and the principle that workers who run the companies should own the companies is what, exactly? Gibberish? Seems very clear to me. The fact that he doesn't write in precisely the same way as the Austrian school is a merit, in my view. But even if you don't agree, what exactly are you asking for, specifically? As someone who has read Chomsky widely, I'd be happy to answer to the best of my ability.

If you want philosophical principles on which his anarchism itself is based, Chomsky discusses this too -- at length.

I didn't accuse you of being an enemy of Chomsky, but I am a bit skeptical about how much you've read- since so far what you've claimed he's lacking he's expressed consistently and clearly throughout his writings.

If you want it formatted differently - like in a list or something, fine. But that's hardly a fair criticism. Chomsky's principles and political philosophy can be understood despite not writing like Rothbard.

That sounds wonderful - the problem is that this is a statement which would also be endorsed by figures who arrive at radically different conclusions from Chomsky, figures who have written with far more clarity and systematicity. So much is left unsaid; hence why a systematic political programme would be welcome. — Virgo Avalytikh

You're moving the goalposts. You specifically mentioned his "principles." That's been given. Anyone who accepts this principle may arrive at different ways to implement it politically, but different conclusions? I don't think so - unless they're simply professing to believe in it. What "figures" who endorse this principle are you talking about specifically?

Chomsky has been both "clear" and "systematic" for 60 years. If you deign to read anything he's written, you'd quickly find that out.

As far as a "systematic political programme" -- this is meaningless, until it's explained what you mean by it. Chomsky has addressed specifically the idea that workers (of a factory or a business) who run the company should own the company. This has very specific and real-world applications which we could get into. As opposed to sophomoric academic political system-building which may be fun, but which are both easy and useless.

So much is left unsaid — Virgo Avalytikh

No. So much is left unread. By you.

No confusion here. — I like sushi

No, there's plenty of confusion - you just don't want to admit it. Go talk nonsense somewhere else.

Well fine, but that's not saying much. Of course you agree language is something separate from, say, digestion. The visual system is separate from the circulatory system as an object of study. Are there overlaps and interactions? Yes, of course. I don't disagree with that. But we're trying to find out what language is and what the principles underlying it are.
— Xtrix

This is just speculation as much as what I have mentioned regarding language acquisition in adulthood. — I like sushi

No, it isn't. That other systems are involved in language is not speculation, it's fact. That the nervous system is involved in the visual system isn't speculation, it's fact.

This is a bit of a scatter gun approach. My intent here isn’t to ‘debate’ or ‘argue’. My intent is to explore the subject matter beyond the initial post made by you - I’m not really interested in talking about Merge in depth because I can, and have, read up on that elsewhere. — I like sushi

Exploring subject matter is fine. But - and I say this without hostility - you haven't given me the impression that you're very well versed in this field. This entire post is rife with confusions and mischaracterizations, to the point it's difficult to follow or even know what you're driving at.

Are there overlaps and interactions? Yes, of course. I don't disagree with that. But we're trying to find out what language is and what the principles underlying it are.

Maybe it isn’t really a ‘distinct’ item at all - other than in a communicative sense. I don’t look at a knife and fork and think ‘knife and fork’, the ‘and’ is not perceived in any manner at all. — I like sushi

Odd that you say this and yet earlier you said you're not interested in debating the "semantics" of language.

Linguistics is the study of language. According to the evidence, language is a system of thought. We can talk about what thought is, we can talk about neurolinguistics, we can talk anthropology, etc. This all informs the study of language, no doubt.

Mouth are for eating and lungs are for breathing. The underlying principles of language must then be ‘eating’ and ‘breathing’ - the brain on top of this mechanism combines this with locomotion (to find air to breath and food to eat) and a memory to map the world for more efficient sourcing of said ‘food’ and ‘air’. So why not just say language’s underlying principles originate in memory and environmental mapping, which then became a function of consciousness and through ‘theory of mind’ took on a communicative function for thought too that was established by way of vocalisation, motor ability and spacial awareness through an ability to direct attention via memories/mapping/models. — I like sushi

The underlying principles of language must be eating and breathing? Is this supposed to be a serious statement? This is what I was saying about utter confusion from your posts.

Language is structure-dependent with recursive properties that nearly always is for thought, not communication. Given these basic facts, we can learn something about language and the principles involved in language, like computational efficiency. Everything else is uninteresting armchair speculation until evidence is presented.

One of my general ideas is that ‘language’ is more of less about an emotional narrative function used to instill memories and develop a set of thoughts that led to free formed abstract concepts — I like sushi

Defining what language is apart from theory is a waste of time. We can define it any way you'd like. The question is whether it fits into an explanatory theory, what the evidence is for this theory, etc. This is how it's done in the sciences. So to say language is "more or less" about an "emotional narrative function" is incoherent unless it's explained and evidence is offered for this way of conceptualizing it.

Any kind of ‘recursion’ is a matter of memory so maybe ‘language’ is spandrel of ‘memory’. After all explicit memory (‘semantic’ and ‘episodic’) are far more important for thought than anything else (without them there is no ‘thought’). The ‘language’ thing looks to me to be something to do with ‘episodic’ memory — I like sushi

Memory in the case of word retrieval in some cases, sure. There have been people who lost long term memory and still are able to speak perfectly well, however. Regardless, memory is certainly involved in language. The sensorimotor system is involved in language. Intentions are involved. Emotions are involved. Communication is involved. So what? Where are you going with this? You've yet to say anything meaningful.

If you want to simply speculate with "maybe it's this, maybe it's that" then you're welcome to but forgive me if I'm underwhelmed, given there's an entire field out there, called lingusitics, that has studied this seriously.

Yes, language is innate.

Maybe this will help: skip to 1:01:40.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv66xFD7s7g&t=1167s

And language can't have evolved by being passed on vocally from one to another.

Or can't have begun from zero. — Brett

I don't really understand this.

So this suggests language existed before the spoken word. — Brett

Yes indeed.

Thought uses language to formulate idea, theories, etc. — Brett

It certainly appears so.

What would be an example of another aspect of language? — Brett

Thought. And not just a secondary aspect, like externalization. It seems to be the core "function" of language.

I’m suggesting there are two modes of thought expressed through two modes of language. — Brett

Sure, and the suggestion is wrong because "two modes of language" is meaningless. It's two modes of communication -- phatic and informational. Communication and language are not synonymous. Communication is one aspect of language -- how language is externalized in various ways. Language itself appears to be a system of thought, as indicated by it's characteristic use (viz., you're talking to yourself all the time but rarely communicate those thoughts).

Yes, but the thought expressed as phatic expression is essentially functional, in the sense of being socio-pragmatic, which is what I’m calling primitive because it’s purpose is ancient. — Brett

I'm not even sure phatic communication is an expression of thought, but let's say it is. It's certainly true that phatic means socio-pragmatic, and that social interactions/communication goes way back in time, from primates to whales to elephants. So what? All those pieces are correct. What's incorrect is the statement "language then is a social function." That's taking one aspect of communication (namely, phatic communication) and using this to define language generally. That's incorrect. The characteristic use of language is not communication, whether phatic or informational: its characteristic use is for thought.

So not inadequate but mostly phatic in function and to a lesser degree information. What does the information consist of? — Brett

Of what gets externalized in communication, most is phatic. The rest can be exchange of information. What "information" gets exchanged? There's an infinite amount of information that can be exchanged - I don't understand the relevance of that question. You can pick literally any example you'd like. Giving someone directions is exchanging information. Teaching physics is exchanging information. Etc etc etc.

Edit: language then is a social function, cohesive and bonding. — Brett

No, language then is for thought.

I don't know, it seems a little cheap to me. Critiquing the status quo - even voluminously or insightfully - is a relatively trivial undertaking. Justifying the principles by which one does so in the battle of ideas, where one has so many competitors, is more ambitious. Until he does so, he is leaving the substance of his philosophical system open to the reconstruction of an interpreter, and Chomsky's inner consistency, and even his first principles, are still very much in question. Simply, it is just not at all clear that Chomsky is right. — Virgo Avalytikh

Chomsky has repeatedly stated, for the last 60 years, what he sees as the essential principle of anarchism:that power should be justified. That is to say, that structures of power, hierarchy, domination, and control are not self-justifying -- that they have the responsibility to justify themselves and, if they can't, should be dismantled.

It's hard to imagine how one manages to overlook this, given Chomsky's presence over the years and his hundreds of books, articles, and YouTube videos.

But I’ll go along with the use of language being thought and that what does get externalised is a strange, inefficient or inaccurate, form of communication.

So language is inadequate for communication?

Edit: or there is only so much we wish to communicate through language. — Brett

My sentence was misleading. I forgot to put "most of what gets externalized." Obviously of the small part of what does get externalized, there's exchange of information. But most of the externalization seems to be phatic communication rather than exchange of information. That's what I meant.

So no, language is not "inadequate for communication."

It seems to have different uses: enquiring, confirming, emoting. — Brett

I'm not sure what "confirming" refers to here. "Emoting" is also vague -- one can emote without language. Animals can emote as well in this sense. Furthermore, one can communicate emotions without language -- through a hairstyle, by slamming doors, by mien, by gait, etc.

Regardless, to say these are characteristic uses of language is just a mistake. When looking at language's characteristic use, just statistically speaking, it's for thought, not communication. Very little gets externalized, and [most of] what does get externalized is only communication in a strange sense -- what's usually called "phatic" communication -- hardly exchanging information in any sense that's usually believed.

Ok, so I'll repeat: What's the characteristic use of language?

Turns out we've discussed this before: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/364151

I may have missed it (I’ve realised my reading of posts is a bit dodgy at times) but if it’s not communication then what is it? — Brett

Well when looking at the "function" of something, as vague as that notion is, what's usually done is to look at characteristic use to give you some insight in to the object's function. So let's do the same thing with language. What's the characteristic use?

The point was that ‘language’ may not be the primary function. Chomsky himself practically admits this when he talks about Music or some other capacity. The neural basis maybe due to another primary faculty with ‘language’ piggybacking. — I like sushi

As I said before, music and arithmetic may have evolved separately, or they could be piggybacking off of language. There's a much more plausible reason for believing language evolved first and the others are derivative in some way. This is what Chomsky is saying when he discusses music and arithmetic.

True, Merge may have been used in other ways, as was discussed in the Science article.

The case of the man with no language holds no interest for you? Not willing to speculate? — I like sushi

It's interesting, sure. We can speculate all day long, but why pick out one strange case study to base your interest in linguistics? (So far, these are the examples you've mentioned.) They're not very sceintific or even really linguistics.

It wasn’t a scientific study it was one woman ignoring (not knowing) that it was apparently ‘impossible’ to teach someone a language after adolescence - according to linguists. If the story isn’t fabricated then it backs up Chomsky’s position perhaps? — I like sushi

It doesn't really have much to say about Chomsky's position concerning UG, but his wife did a lot of study on language acquisition in children and he's held the position that there's a critical period for learning language, yes. So if it's possible to teach someone a language when they've been exposed to no language all their lives, then yes that's very interesting and would indicate that perhaps there is no critical period, depending on the level of sophistication a language gets acquired. But it's impossible to tell from this case study.

Much more serious work has been done that indicates the opposite, like the one I mentioned about the deafblind: it seems like the limit is roughly 18 months of age, after which it's impossible to acquire. I wonder: is THAT not fascinating? It should be, as there's much more evidence for it. The fact that you pick out these sensational cases indicates to me you're not very serious about learning much about the field of linguistics.

There have been plenty of studies into Piraha so to claim there is no science there is plain bloody-minded. Linguistics is a very young ‘science’. There is no conclusive evidence for a lack of ‘recursion’ within that language to date - that is the point of being scientific rather than dismissive. — I like sushi

I agree, there is no conclusive evidence, yet it is often claimed that there is. And even if there was, it wouldn't matter to what Chomsky is talking about. So it's an interesting study in anthropology.

I side with the view that language is at least mostly an innate faculty, but I’m not entirely convinced that language is really worth looking at as some ‘separate’ function of human cognition. — I like sushi

Well fine, but that's not saying much. Of course you agree language is something separate from, say, digestion. The visual system is separate from the circulatory system as an object of study. Are there overlaps and interactions? Yes, of course. I don't disagree with that. But we're trying to find out what language is and what the principles underlying it are.

The word "function" is used very loosely anyway, so we have to be careful. Is the function of our skeleton for motion or to keep our organs from falling down, for example? The function of language has always been thought to be for communication, as you know. I just think that's completely wrong, which is where this thread started. We could go into that a little more maybe, but otherwise I'm not seeing what the real issue is here, other than clearing away confusions.

This has little to do with my main worry which I did admit was irrational. — Nils Loc

Not just irrational -- incoherent.

There is only what it is like to be something. We do not experience what it is like to be nothing. — Nils Loc

Former is a groundless assertion; the latter completely wrong. We experience "nothing" all the time -- we know we do, but just have no memory of it. A dreamless sleep is a kind of nothing. Driving all the way home automatically without thinking about it is a kind of "nothing" -- the use of equipment, the experience of "flow," are all kinds of nothing. None of this involves a subject/object distinction, none of it involves thinking or reflecting or even "consciousness," and yet we do these things all the time.

Therefore being (what it is like to be something) is all there is. — Nils Loc

That's just silly subjectivizing. That has a long history in philosophy, and is completely wrong.

It's as incoherent as the hard problem of consciousness. How could there possibly be satisfying explanation for qualia (being like something rather than nothing)? — Nils Loc

The whole "problem" of consciousness is nonsense, because no one knows how to formulate what "consciousness" is. So, like the mind/body "problem," it's simply incoherent. A waste of time.