I don't understand "belongs to the order of the intelligible." — Xtrix
Remove intuition and there is nothing to say, yet to refer to some item, any item - be it of thought or knowledge - must necessarily mean there is an attachment to sensibility and intuition (space and time) — I like sushi
The number one is only given as a concept via sensibility — I like sushi
There is no ‘chair in and of itself’ and there is no ‘thing in and of itself’, there is phenomenon that is given through sensible experience due to limitation. — I like sushi
The relevance to the thread here is likely the miscasting of what can reasonably be called ‘outer’ that isn’t a merely anything but ‘inner’. — I like sushi
we don't represent black holes with an image of black holes.
— frank
Sure we do; in no other way can we cognize them, in order to talk about them. The images are indirect representations, therefore possibly false, but images nonetheless. — Mww
More specifically, noumena are intelligible objects that are not sensible — StreetlightX
and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real.
— Mww
"Real" in what sense exactly? — Xtrix
That aliens could see it differently from our perceptions? — Xtrix
That's such a misreading of Kant. But have it your way. — Xtrix
As is the thing-in-itself. — Xtrix
...though we cannot know (sensibility + cognition) these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think (thought) them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears. — CoPR
Further, the concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge — CoPR
Examples of such intelligible objects would be what exactly? — Xtrix
Kant is an indirect realist, if such be synonymous with being a representationalist. His entire academic catalog is dedicated to a representational human epistemological and moral system.
He calls himself a transcendental realist, in order to grant Hume his empiricism, but also to add the faculty of pure reason to it, as a supplementary, but no less necessary, human condition. — Mww
It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it. — Mww
The thing in itself isn't generated by our faculties limits, or anything to do with us, rather it's that which generates whatever appears to us — fdrake
The distinction between boundary (noumenon) and what lays outside the boundary (thing in itself), what lays within the boundary are phenomena and appearances. — fdrake
The importance of the distinction as I understand it lies in Kant's desire to remain a certain kind of realist (an 'empirical realist', as he famously calls himself). As is well known, Kant is keen to distinguish himself from idealism of Berkeley, and does so precisely by positing the thing-in-itself which gives rise to appearance. The importance of the fact that the TII is not relative to us (or to our transcendental constitution) means that in some way, the universe exists 'out there' regardless of whether we are there to cognize it or not. — StreetlightX
God, soul, Universe as Totality... It can be thought, but not known. It is thought as a mere boundary of what I cannot know. My intelect push me to it, but knowledge fails because only phenomena can be known. — David Mo
It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it.
— Mww
Then in this sense both thing-in-itself and noumenon exists, otherwise we wouldn't say anything about either. Although to use "perception" is misleading -- we don't strictly perceive either. — Xtrix
Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. — Mww
Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. — Mww
Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. — Mww
That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. — Mww
That which is conceived can be talked about. To be conceived does not require existence. — Mww
We perceive the thing-in itself. We don’t perceive noumena because there is nothing in the human faculty of representation that allows for it. — Mww
objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility... — Mww
What I'm failing to see is where noumena play a role if they're not representations and not the thing-in-itself. — Xtrix
The cantankerous one is very much correct. That doesn’t stop them being a needless impolite and obnoxious person. — I like sushi
(My italics)"it also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word "appearance" must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. Now from this arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not at all positive and does not signify a determinate cognition of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition". (A251–2) — David Mo
Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. What we perceive -- our representations, our sensations in time and space -- are phenomena. You grant this. — Xtrix
That which is merely perceived is unknown to us.
— Mww
You just said perception is an affect of our sensations, of our senses. Some sensations and perceptions are "unknown"? I still don't see your point I'm afraid. — Xtrix
We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it — Xtrix
If something is perceived, it's phenomena. — Xtrix
To say the thing in itself is perceived is therefore saying it's a phenomenon or representation of some kind. It's not. — Xtrix
but we have no idea what that something is, and as soon as we try to attribute to it any property whatsoever we're assigning to it something spatial-temporal -- that's the whole point of bringing in the "in itself." — Xtrix
The most spectacular reference is quantum mechanics, where the act of measuring creates the measured. — David Mo
But even in relativity, there is still an objective truth. Space and time may distort relative to an observer, but a spacetime interval is the same for all observers. Simultaneity may be relative to an observer, but cause and effect are still the same for all observers. And the impetus behind all of that, the speed of light is the same for all observers: all the things that are relative are reasoned to be so because they must be in order to account for the speed of light being an objective, non-relative value. — Pfhorrest
No, I do not grant that what we perceive are representations. — Mww
One needs to keep in mind perception actually is nothing but reception of incoming empirical data. If incoming data, not in but incoming, are representations, how were they created? We can say how representations are created on the backside of sense organs, but we cannot use the equipment from the inside of us to create representation on the outside of us. Inside, everything relates to something, on the outside, what would data relate to except other data, which tells us nothing. — Mww
An affect on our senses, not of. It isn’t that perceptions are unknown, as in we don’t know we have been affected. We don’t know what we’ve been affected by. — Mww
Try this: incoming data is information in certain forms of energy. The output of the sense organs is still energy, but a different form. — Mww
We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it
— Xtrix
Thing is...to say we have no knowledge is to say we have no experience. — Mww
But we often perceive things of which we have no experience, every time we learn something new. — Mww
Not yet. If something is perceived, it will be a phenomenon. It isn’t phenomenon merely by being an affect on the senses. That is sensation and tells us something has appeared to the faculty of representation. — Mww
Correct. It’s not. See above. The thing-in-itself perceived is just another something perceived. Same-o, same-o. See waaaayyyy above: object in itself equals thing-in-itself, and we certainly perceive objects, so....... — Mww
Don’t forget. We cognize representations, not things. There’s no contradiction in allowing things-in-themselves to be the objects of perception, because they have nothing to do with the system, other than to kick-start it. — Mww
We can’t have an empty object affect us. How would we know we’d been affected? We have no knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. That doesn’t mean we don’t know anything about the thing that affected us. We are given an object, that object must have characteristics of some kind which show up in its appearance. — Mww
No, the phenomenon has been imagined as having wings. In light of the manifold of intuitions imagined, that contradicts experience, this object is not possible. Scratch the wings) — Mww
Putting it very simply and in a way that Kant may not have specifically explained it: a noumenon is the idea of an idea; the concept of something beyond our (sensible) knowledge; an idea of the in itself. A thing in itself is the idea of an actuality beyond not merely our knowledge, but our very ideas. — Janus
This shit is all very hard to speak coherently about: hence the disagreements and misunderstandings. — Janus
This shit is all very hard to speak coherently about: hence the disagreements and misunderstandings. — Janus
Maybe I'm just hopeless, but I'm still not understanding exactly where noumena are supposed to fit in your (and others') readings. — Xtrix
One might say: noumena are things-in-themselves under the aspect of the transcendental subject. However, get rid of the transcendental subject, and one similarly 'gets rid' of noumena - but not things-in-themselves, which are subject-independant. — StreetlightX
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